

DEMOCRACY, GOOD GOVERNANCE and DEVELOPMENT in AFRICA



EDITED BY
Munyaradzi Mawere
& Tendai R. Mwanaka

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Langa Research & Publishing CIG
Mankon, Bamenda

Publisher

Langaa RPCIG

Langaa Research & Publishing Common Initiative Group

P.O. Box 902 Mankon

Bamenda

North West Region

Cameroon

Langaagrp@gmail.com

www.langaa-rpcig.net

Distributed in and outside N. America by African Books Collective

orders@africanbookscollective.com

www.africanbookscollective.com

ISBN: 9956-763-00-4

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List of Contributors

Munyaradzi Mawere holds a PhD in Social Anthropology from the University of Cape Town in South Africa. Dr Mawere also holds a Master's Degree in Philosophy and B. A. (Hons) Degree in Philosophy from the University of Zimbabwe. He is currently Professor in the Department of Culture and Heritage Studies at Great Zimbabwe University. Before joining this university, Dr Mawere was a lecturer at the University of Zimbabwe and at Universidade Pedagógica, Mozambique, where he has also worked in different capacities as a Senior lecturer, Assistant Research Director, Postgraduate Coordinator and Associate Professor. He has an outstanding publishing record of more than one hundred pieces of work which include more than twenty books and over eighty book chapters and papers in scholarly journals. His research interests include, but not limited to, development and knowledge studies, political anthropology, science and technology studies, environmental issues, African studies, coloniality, decoloniality, post-coloniality, African political systems, culture and heritage studies.

Tendai R. Mwanaka is a multidisciplinary and collaborative artist and writer who live in Chitungwiza, Zimbabwe. His contracted books coming out in 2015 include, *Zimbabwe: The Urgency of Now* (creative nonfiction and essays), *Finding a Way Home* (stories novel), *Revolution* (poems), *A Dark Energy* (novel), *Development, Governance, and Democracy: A Search for Sustainable Democracy and Development in Africa* (scholarly essays, co-editor), *Best New African Poets 2015 Anthology* (poetry, co-editor). Other books published include, *Keys in the River* (stories novel), *Voices from Exile* (poetry), *Zimbabwe: The blame game* (creative nonfiction and essays). He is also a visual artist (photography, painting, drawing, collage, video...), sound/musical artist, mentor, translator, scholar/theorist/thinker, reviewer, editor, critic...; over 400 pieces of various works have been published in over 300 journals in over 27 countries, translated into French, Germany and Spanish.

Patrick Uchenna Nwosu is a lecturer in African and Comparative Religion, Department of Religions, University of Ilorin, Ilorin, Nigeria. A Roman Catholic priest, he holds a Ph.D. degree in Comparative Religious Studies from the University of Ilorin, Nigeria (2010) and a Master's in Christian Studies from the same University (2006) specializing in Inter-religious Dialogue. He also has the Postgraduate Diploma in Education (PGDE), University of Ado-Ekiti (2009) now Ekiti State University, Ekiti; Bachelors of Theology and Philosophy from Urban University Rome (2000 & 1994). His primary areas of research are interdisciplinary approaches to the religions of the World, African Cultures and Ancestral Societies in Africa with focus on Okonko and Ogboni Societies in Igbo and Yorubalands. He is the author of *"Introducing the Study of Comparative Religion"* and *"Theory and Practice of Secrecy: Focus on Okonko and Ogboni Societies in Africa"*, both published by Lambert Academic Publishing, Germany, 2012.

Artwell Nhemachena holds a PhD in Social Anthropology from the University of Cape Town, South Africa. He is currently a lecturer at the University of Namibia. His research interests include culture, indigenous knowledge and development, political anthropology, peace and conflict, democracy, civil society, postcolonial transformation, African jurisprudence, environmental issues and African studies, science and technology studies.

Alex Magaisa is a law lecturer at Kent Law School, the University of Kent in the United Kingdom. He has previously taught at the University of Nottingham, also in the UK. He holds an LLBs (Hons) degree from the University of Zimbabwe and an LLM and PhD degrees from the University of Warwick in the UK. His teaching and research interests are in the area of Public Law and has written widely on constitutional law in Zimbabwe. Between 2011 and 2013, he was retained as a technical adviser to Copac, the Parliamentary Committee that spear-headed the constitution-writing exercise in Zimbabwe, leading to the adoption of the new Constitution in March 2013. He was also retained by the Office of the Prime Minister of Zimbabwe, where he was an adviser to Mr Tsvangirai. Dr Magaisa is a regular writer and commentator on legal

and political issues in Zimbabwe, using his experience from the fields of both academia and politics. His work can be viewed at www.alexmagaisa.com.

Richard Asante is a Senior Research Fellow in the Institute of African Studies, University of Ghana, Legon. He holds a doctorate degree in Political Science from the University of Ghana under the Harvard University, USA/University of Ghana Split-PhD Programme. Dr. Asante is also the Head and Research Coordinator of the History and Politics Unit of the Institute of African Studies, responsible for initiating and coordinating teaching and research projects in the unit in particular and the Institute in general. His research interests span the political economy of African development, democratisation, and human security. In addition to teaching graduate and undergraduate courses in African politics and development, he has published on democracy and public sector governance, human security and decentralisation. Dr. Asante is currently the Regional Manager of Anglo West Africa of the Varieties of Democracy (V-DEM), a research Project designed to provide an alternative measurement of democracy, hosted at the Department of Political Science at the University of Gothenburg, Sweden.

Ngonidzashe Marongwe is a lecturer in the History and Development Studies Department at the Great Zimbabwe University located in Masvingo City, Zimbabwe. He holds a PhD in African History from the University of the Western Cape (UWC), South Africa. He is a past Andrew Mellon Foundation Doctoral Fellow at the Centre for Humanities Research, UWC (2009–2010 & 2012); and a SEPHIS fellow at the Centre for the Study of Culture and Society, Bangalore, India (2011).

Gertjan van Stam was born in the Netherlands. For 10 years, he and his family have lived in the rural village of Macha, in the Southern Province of Zambia. Before that he stayed for 2 years in rural Murambinda, Zimbabwe. He has been involved with strategic developments in ICT, in Africa, since 1987, culminating in an MTech (cum laude) at Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University,

South Africa. Currently he is Foreign Research Fellow at the Scientific and Industrial Research and Development Centre in Harare, Zimbabwe and PhD student at Tilburg University in the Netherlands. He lives with his family in Masvingo and Harare, Zimbabwe. His goal is to identify and inspire local talent and introduce appropriate technologies to build the necessary capacity for community-led activities to yield sustainable human development outcomes. His quest is for a logical framework for understanding dynamics of change in African communities and engendering leadership capable of inspiring, initiating, implementing, operating, and scaling up sustainable progress and the use of technology in the local community. Since 2011, Gertjan has volunteered in strategy-making at the IEEE, the largest professional institute in the world. He is part of IEEE's Ad Hoc Committee for Humanitarian Activities, working on Social Innovation, especially in 'thought leadership and advocacy.' His activities in Zambia were featured in IEEE. The Institute, and his career were documented in an award-winning IEEE video at Try Engineering. The activities in Zambia were documented worldwide though BBC Clicks. Gertjan authored the book *Placemark*, fervent blogger, and has published extensively on findings and lessons learned in rural Africa.

Anastacia M. Mawere is a graduate teacher at Nyamandi High School in Zimbabwe. She holds a B. A. (Hons) degree from Great Zimbabwe and a post-graduate diploma in education (PGDE). She is currently pursuing her Master's degree. Her research interests include but not limited to community development, governance, women studies, knowledge studies, ethics, culture, African traditional religions, and African traditional institutions.

Akiti Glory Alamu holds a PhD in the studies of religions. He is currently with the Department of Religions at the University of Ilorin in Ilorin in Nigeria. His research interests are, but not limited to, sacred places, indigenous communities' traditional practices, African traditional religions, and conservation.

Misheck P. Chingozha holds BMgt (HR), MBA, MSc. in Peace Leadership and Conflict Resolution from the Zimbabwe Open University, an MSc. in Development Studies from the Women's University in Africa (WUA). Mr Chingozha is also a holder of a Diploma in Adult Education from the University of Zimbabwe, Diploma in Business Studies (FBS), a National Diploma in Electrical Power Engineering, Certificate in Electrical Engineering (HEXCO), Certificate in Accountancy (ZAAT), and Skilled Worker Class One (manpower). Chingozha is also an incumbent part-time Lecturer in the Faculties of Commerce and Law, and Applied Social Sciences at the Zimbabwe Open University. Besides, Chingozha is an incumbent Senior Officer at the Rank of Chief Superintendent in the Police Force, and is currently based in Mutare urban. Chingozha has written and published a Shona novel and co-authored 4 modules for the Zimbabwe Open University. His research interests lie in the areas of development, policing, gender, leadership, indigenous knowledge systems, and environmentally related issues.

Lemuel E. Odeh is a graduate of the Lagos State University Ojo-Lagos in B.A. History and International Studies, an M.sc International Relations and Strategic Studies and a Ph.D. in History from the Benue State University Makurdi. His area of research is Diplomatic History & International Economic Relations. He is currently a lecturer in the Department of History & International Studies, University of Ilorin, Nigeria. Dr Odeh has published extensively in the areas of economic history and international relations.

Tinashe Mawere is a PhD Researcher in Gender Studies at the University of the Western Cape (UWC), South Africa. He is also a Mellon Foundation Doctoral Fellow at the Centre for Humanities Research at the UWC, South Africa.

Peter Ateh-Afac Fossungu is currently an independent researcher and *bush-falling* in the 'Forest University' in Quebec, Canada, Peter Ateh-Afac Fossungu is 'officially' bilingual (English & French); having (1) assisted in teaching Comparative Politics at the University of Windsor (2013-2014) and (2) taught Law in

Cameroonian universities for a number of years, between 1989 and 1995. He holds a host of university degrees, including the following from Canadian academic institutions: a Master of Arts in Political Science (University of Windsor, 2014), *Docteur en Droit* (Université de Montréal, 2000), Master of Laws (Air & Space) from McGill University (1997), and Master of Laws (University of Alberta, 1992). From Université de Yaoundé he obtained *Diplôme d'Études Approfondies* (1989), *Maîtrise en Droit* (1988), & *Licence en Droit* (1987). He has published extensively on various aspects of society in Africa and North America.

Tapuwa Raymond Mubaya is a Lecturer and a PhD candidate at Great Zimbabwe University, Faculty of Culture and Heritage Studies. Before joining Great Zimbabwe University, Mr. Mubaya worked for National Museums and Monuments of Zimbabwe (NMMZ) for eight years as the Curator of Archaeology and Head of the Great Zimbabwe Monument Conservation Centre. Currently he is heading the Department of Heritage Studies at Great Zimbabwe University. Mr Mubaya holds a Master of Arts Degree in Heritage Studies from the University of Zimbabwe. He is also a member of the Association of Southern African Professional Archaeologists (ASAPA) and the Zimbabwe Association of Professional Archaeologists and related Disciplines (ZAPAD). His current research interests are focussed on heritage management and conservation, cultural tourism and museums. Mubaya has written and published fourteen articles in internationally esteemed scholarly journals and is the co-editor of the book: *African Cultures, Memory and Space: Living the Past Presence in Zimbabwean Heritage*.

Pedro Celso Jovo studied International Relations and Diplomacy at Instituto Superior de Relacoes (ISRE). His research interests include domestic violence, local governance, coloniality, decoloniality, and Africa-EuroAmerican relations. Jovo is a multi-talented academic who doubles with filming and acting.

Joshua Chikozho is a holder of a Master's Degree in Heritage Studies from the University of Zimbabwe. He is the current Curator for the BaTonga Community Museum. His research interests

include but not limited to community museum, intangible heritage and heritage management.

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Good Governance, Democracy and Sustainable Development in Africa

An Introduction

Munyaradzi Mawere & Tendai R. Mwanaka

Introduction

Over the years, there have been acrimonious debates around the world on whether there can be a meaningful talk about ‘real’ democracy, good governance and development (especially political and economic) in Africa. For those who look at Africa from a negative perspective, Africa is more like a toddler still learning to crawl such that it is incapable of fostering and steering democracy, on its own, without the aid of the West and America. These proponents believe that as long as Africa tries to wean itself from the West and the Americas, its democratic structures will continue to stagger like a blind drunkard and ultimately crumble. Yet, for those who view Africa with positive lens, the continent being endowed with both natural resources and human capital of quality is capable of driving the continent towards either majoritarian or pluralist democracy, good governance and ultimately sustainable development. Whether either of the position is a mere tantalising dream or not is yet to be confirmed: it remains a story whose certainty cannot be ascertained, at least for now. There is, therefore, need to establish a path or rather a framework crafted by Africans themselves to guide both democracy and governance to ensure sustainability on the continent. Nevertheless, evidence on the ground is not too clear if indeed African governments appreciate this urgent call.

This being the case, the present volume explores, through interdisciplinary engagement diverse issues ranging from the problems, challenges and prospects of democracy and good

governance to possible framework for fostering sustainable development in Africa. In this regard, scholars from around Africa representing different fields of study as diverse as social anthropology, philosophy, history, political science, education, international relations, culture and heritage studies, religious studies, Law, media and communication studies, among others, have endeavoured, in this book, to produce an impeccable volume of essays which do not only break new ground in interdisciplinary scholarship but generate more insights for future debates. Through incisive research, engagements and conversations, the authors in this volume have demonstrated the efficacy and benefits of concerted and collaborative efforts on topical issues that haunts the contemporary African societies today especially around the question of democracy, governance and development.

A Guide to the Chapters

As already been highlighted, this book explores, through interdisciplinary engagement, the problems, challenges, and prospects of brought about by democracy and good governance in their attempt to foster sustainable development in Africa. Contributions to this important volume were solicited from scholars with different scholarly background and experiences around Africa, but with special reference to countries such as Zimbabwe, Cameroon, Ghana, Nigeria, Zambia, and Mozambique. Yet, while the chapters that make up this book are a result of diverse experiences and contextual milieus, they all advance the argument that good governance and African-based democracy are likely to stimulate and promote sustainable development in Africa. Artwell Nhemachena's luminary work in chapter 1, for example, grapples with 'how African modes of engagement have often given rise to conceptualisations of what are called 'alternative' knowledge systems, alternative health and alternative medicines.' Through these African modes of engagement, Nhemachena critically examines the different ways in which colonialism and colonality have upturned African indigenous conceptualisation of governance,

development, freedom, rights and democracy. On this note, Nhemachena makes an important argument that observance of the popular modes of governance has huge import in the rethinking and practising of peace and conflict management in Africa and beyond. Thus, for him, such popular modes of governance serve to prevent role conflicts by those at the helm of governments all in metaphorical and empirical senses, ‘some of whom may not be prone to take cognisance of the boundaries of their kingdoms even as they often insist on underprivileged colonised others to remember that they are prisoners of their localities.’

Chapter 2 by Tendai R. Mwanaka and Munyaradzi Mawere tackles head on the long-debated issue of unifying Africa towards a United States of Africa that respects no 1884 Berlin drawn boundaries in Africa as the most feasible and lasting solution to Africa’s perennial problems of underdevelopment, civil strife, and bad governance. The duo takes the courage to challenge African governments and leaders to swiftly capitulate on the idea of unity in order to rescue Africa from the whims and caprices of coloniality and neo-colonialism. Mwana and Mawere, thus, argue that “Now” is the time for Africa to start a United States of Africa which as a matter of fact does not necessarily require agreement of all African nation-states, but can start with a few willing countries and the rest of the continent join when they see fit to do so.

Peter Fossungu’s brilliant and elegantly written chapter 3 problematizes and tease out what African Democracy vis-a-vis Western Democracy has meant to the leaders, scholars, thinkers and the general populace. For Fossungu, there is need to rethink and critique both African democracy and Western democracy as both have their follies and weaknesses. He refuses to accept those labels for the major reason that they are not authentic but false and detached from their authentic systems from which they are rooted. Instead, Fossungu proposes another way to view the whole issue of the different brands of democracy, offering us alternatives to each of the two. In the case of ‘African democracy’ for example, Fossungu argues that ‘the larger portion of the African Democracy debate has tended to be mere Westernised distractions geared

towards precluding the realisation' of true democracy on the continent. And, in the case of 'Western democracy' he argues that it has tended to be subjugating and supportive of coloniality and other such imperialistic tendencies.

Drawing on their wealth experience of lectureship, research and observations on South Africa's politics, Ngonidzashe Marongwe and Tinashe Mawere's chapter 4 recasts the question of Mandela and coloniality in South Africa. Whilst they accept that, 'Mandela is idolised as a champion of peace and of the oppressed, a liberator, a saint, a statesman and a model of what African leaders ought to emulate,' they toss up the other side of Mandela and the coloniality associated with that side. While arguing for the need to maintain peace and order in South Africa in view of Mandela's vision, Marongwe and Mawere also remind us to be as level-headed as possible to also look at the mistakes and limitations of the liberation icon. Thus, Marongwe and Mawere are concerned with coloniality, whose consequences, sometimes, are worse off than colonialism itself.

In chapter 5, Richard Asante provides a judicious and meticulous analysis democracy in Africa. Using his scholarly epistemological lens of political science and democracy as applied to the state, Asante adopts West Africa region to lobby for the need to rethink and reframe democracy as a form of government in Africa. He notes that whilst there are regular general elections in most of the countries in this region but most of the democracies are not yet stable with 'the resurgence of military coup d'état, the rancour, violence and apparent manipulations associated with elections, and the trend towards political settlement after electoral conflicts through the formation of coalition governments.' Asante's central argument, thus, is that there is need for Africa to develop governance and democratic institutions that are not only strong sustainable and African-based.

Munyaradzi Mawere and Gertjan van Stam, utilising their vast knowledge in lectureship and research with rural communities, have their chapter 6 astutely examining 'the relationship between the meanings that researchers from the global north often make when

carrying out research in rural Africa, and the way the world presents itself to them from the perspective of ontologies that govern global research and decision-making in areas of policy making and socio-economic development.’ Making an argument for diversity and plurality of epistemological fronts, Mawere and Van Stam propose that we ‘challenge the continued self-assumed superiority of Western scientism with a view to promote epistemic pluralism.’ In fact, they argue that ‘through epistemic pluralism, world societies could possibly achieve symmetrical relationships in the areas of knowledge production and socio-economic development.’ These symmetrical relationships have the merit that they afford all the possible stories about a particular subject matter to be heard from the perspectives of those that experience them.

In chapter 7, Akiti Glory Alamu, using historical, analytical, political and religio-ethical approaches, conscientiously examines pre-colonial indigenous governance and the contemporary dimension it has taken in the colonial and post-colonial periods. He notes that the ‘democratic tendencies occasioned by the West have woefully failed the masses, because of their wrong application as well as their foreignness.’ On this basis, Alamu argues for ‘re-integrating, internalising and implementing traditional religious tenets that would guarantee democratization process and democratic sustainability in Nigeria.’

Alex Magaisa in chapter 8 uses his wealth experience and knowledge in law practise and lectureship to critically examine the Global Political Agreement (GPA) in Zimbabwe, and the inclusive government and Government of National Unity (GNU) formed in the 21st century. He uses his insider’s view (lego-political) as part of the constitution making team in the Government of National Unity, as well as a legal advisor to one of the players (prime minister of Zimbabwe) to figure out why the promised political and legal reforms didn’t materialise. Magaisa argues that these ‘problems arose because the political reforms during the GPA period were insufficient.’ He makes the important observation that the GPA failed chiefly because it had structural weaknesses, ‘which ensured that there was an imbalance of power between the key partners in

the GNU and consequently the GNU was characterised by continuous contestation for power between the partners at the expense of the political reform project.’ Magaisa’s arguments and observations, thus, are inclined towards helping future governments to be more careful and vigilant before and during the time they will be involved in GNUs to avoid political shattering.

In chapter 9, Munyaradzi Mawere, Annastacia M. Mawere, and Pedro Celso Jovo invoke the colonial ghosts and coloniality arguments in Mozambique. They observe that ‘the Machiavellian politics (politics of violence, greediness, nepotism, and corruption) – the kind of politics of the colonial day – continue wracking havoc in many African societies.’ They note with concern that sadly, these political Machiavellianism were now being ‘propagated and promulgated by African sons and daughters against their fellow brothers and sisters.’ Mawere, Mawere and Jovo, therefore argue and urge African political governments and all such political players to seriously consider political ethics and fundamental African philosophies such as Ubuntu/Unhu in all their dealings in society. For them, it is only through this consideration and acknowledgement of ethics as cushion in politics that we can have a society that is not only peaceful but counts on good governance and socio-economic development.

Patrick Uchenna Nwosu in his luminous chapter 10 takes up the issue of education for sustainable development in Africa. He notes that knowledge (inculcated in education) is the key to Africa’s development and goes on to argue that ‘the education that is key to the continent’s development is that which leads the individual to a holistic self-discovery and in turn empowers the individual to add value to the society. It is the education that prepares one to appreciate and cherish African values and potentials.’ He makes a critical observation that ‘the reality on the ground in many African countries is that unsuitable educational and economic approaches are the principal causes of the continent wasting chances of development.’ He gives an example of Nigeria which ‘patterns its educational institutions in line with colonial masters’ style instead of developing’ an indigenous-based system that fits squarely in

context. On this note, Nwosu proposes for pre-colonial education precepts that allowed one to develop themselves for the betterment and development of the society at large to be included in the education system of Nigeria and Africa at large.

How to make Africa Great as it always was before colonialism! In chapter 11, Tapuwa Raymond Mubaya, Munyaradzi Mawere, and Joshua Chikozho, dig deep into the history and development of The Great Zimbabwe Monumental structure and civilisation. They note that ‘insignificant attention has been given to try to understand and unpack the perceived intellect, skills and expertise, that is, the indigenous knowledge systems (IKSs) that masterminded and propelled such self-imposing and impressive dry stone structures of enormous magnitude.’ They argue that ‘the dry stone structures together with their associated earthen *dhaka* platforms alone without incorporating the unsung indigenous knowledge (IK) that were used to put up such magnificent structures have presented and will always present an incomplete story of Great Zimbabwe National Monument.’ Mubaya, Chikozho and Mawere, thus, urge researchers to complete the story of Great Zimbabwe National Monument, which for long has remained half-told.

In chapter 12, Lemuel E. Odeh deals with the effects of youths in Ethno-religious conflicts in Sino-Nigeria countries. He uses the historic-structural, analytical and comparative approach to indict that Ethno-religious problem across the world has retarded effective nation building process and viable socio-economic development. The further argues that the problem – ethnoreligious – has also been catapulted by high levels of poverty situations in the northern parts of Nigeria as elsewhere on the continent which in no doubt retards economic growth and development in this region in comparison to other parts of Nigeria. In this whole attempt, Odeh brings to light that ‘minority problems in terms of marginalisation, ethnicity, religion as well as unequal development are the major causes of this economic retardation.’ He concludes that ‘rule of law coupled with bilateral peace processes are the needed measures to manage this scourge while creating an enabling atmosphere that will

ensure sustainable economic growth and eradicate poverty from the populace.’

Misheck, P. Chingozha, Munyaradzi Mawere & Annastacia M. Mawere, in chapter 13, grapple with the question of good governance and development in Africa but with a focus on Zimbabwe. They argue that one surest ways of promoting good governance that stimulate sustainable development is to revive and integrate African Indigenous Institutions with those that exist in contemporary African societies. Through careful research, Chingozha, Mawere and Mawere observe that political will by African governments is often the greatest problem that retards development and downplays good governance. Based on this observation, the trio argues that ‘cultural imperialism is sometimes not only promoted by the West but sometimes by African governments themselves who feel inadequate to promote what is typically African.’

In chapter 14, Joshua Chikozho, Tapuwa R. Mubaya and Munyaradzi Mawere cross-examine indigeneity in Africa, particularly the issues of architecture, technology and indigenous knowledge of the BaTonga people of northwest Zimbabwe. The trio argues that, if properly recognised and indigeneity recognised and tapped accordingly, has the potential to promote sustainable development in Africa.

Envisioning African Democracy in the Twenty-First Century: *Mwana washe muranda kumwe* and the Coloniality of Contrived “Democracy”

Artwell Nhemachena

Introduction

Democracy, human rights and freedom in the conventional European sense have been critiqued for absence of sensitivity to African forms of freedoms, rights and democracy (Englund 2006) but little has been heard from African scholars about how to conceptualise governance within African popular epistemologies. While African modes of engagement have often given rise to conceptualisations of what are called “alternatives” knowledge system, alternative health and alternative medicines, this way of understanding Africans as providing only alternatives is flawed. Such alternativism in conceptualising Africa shortchanges the continent in instances where African modes of engagements should logically be the main or central frame in understanding Africa. In other words, viewing African modes of engagement and thoughts as alternatives subalternises Africa; it sustains erroneous logics that African people so deemed to be providing the alternatives are themselves merely alternative people in the world. The erroneous picture originally painted by colonial epistemologies and political practices where Africans were deprived of their essence (Vera 2001) including political essence and without political principles continues to prevail in postcolonial Africa. Much as the borders and the rest of the political fate of Africa was decided in 1884 at the Berlin Conference in the absence of affected Africans, principles of government and governance in Africa continue to be determined in the North, that is, from outside Africa and without due recognition

of African indigenous political principles. This has deleterious effects on African freedom of physical space. Relying uncritically on such theorisations, which do not cognise African epistemologies and ontologies, limits the African liberty to intellectual spaces. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other such conventions, however inclusive they may appear, were established in the 1940s prior to the independence of the majority African states and therefore without including Africans. Africans have simply been expected by the North to accept and live on the basis of antecedent colonial *fait accompli* that have come not only to determine but to constitute contemporary global coloniality in the political, legal, economic, cultural and social senses. To the extent that what has come to be understood as globalisation replicates the logics of apartheid at a broader level where some are excluded from the making of policies that affect them and where dominant others monopolise at a global broader level the crafting of international law, the establishment of international institutions including in the political and economic domains, the global has in effect come to mark apartheid par excellence. These anomalies are exemplified by the inequalities in the structures including those that are termed international. The inequalities are exemplified in the United Nations Security Council where only a few countries dominate in making and implementing of international policies including declarations of wars on others. The inequalities are also exemplified in the economic dictatorships of international institutions including the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. There is also the duplicity of international institutions including the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs and the World Trade Organisation which are not elected and are therefore undemocratic in the electoral sense that is paradoxically so much emphasised in the periphery by the North. The autocracy of these institutions is well captured by Mentan (2013: xii) who argued that African countries were forced by the newly formed transnational elite of the North, through a 'carrot and stick' policy to abandon any idea of planning development and, instead open their markets to foreign capital and commodities.

The setting up of institutions and the emphasis by the North on what they understand as democracy even as the institutions they set up hardly measure to democracy poses questions about the covert functions of such democracy. Being fundamentally an idealised democracy that was emphasised in the colonies particularly at a time when they were decolonising and at a time when they were laying claim to the reappropriation of material and nonmaterial resources looted by colonisers, it is a kind of democracy that is blind to the centrality of struggles for ownership particularly of material resources. It thus has the effect of effacing, occluding and dematerialising African claims to liberation particularly in the material sense. It is a liberal kind of democracy that emphasises elections and in the economic realm emphasised neoliberal economic reforms including Economic Structural Adjustment Programmes which saw Africans being retrenched, currencies of African countries devalued, social security provisions being removed, prices being deregulated and cost recovery measures being established, subsidies being removed (Gibbon 1995). It is therefore a democracy that privileges the global economic dictatorship of sponsored International Financial Institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank (Bond 2005) that hold the privilege and in a *defacto* sense the right to dictate at a global level on economic and political policies. It is thus a kind of democracy that retrenched Africans and their states from policy making and from their means of sustenance. The challenge for scholars and leaders is that when the disastrous neoliberal economic interventions were enforced on Africa by the IMF and the World Bank, little notice was taken that these neoliberal interventions were meant to be precursors to neoliberal projects of deconstructing the sovereignty of African states. They were meant to introduce sharp economic shocks in order to surreptitiously destabilise Africa and erode the popularity of African states that had just gained independence. There is thus no wonder why over time discourses have emerged questioning African states' right to sovereignty even as the sovereignty of Northern states is not questioned. Discourses have emerged questioning the right of African states to

environmental sovereignty (Smith 2011) and the right to have militaries. Discourses have emerged questioning the nationalism of Africans even as the nationalisms and even imperialisms of the North are not as seriously questioned. To the extent that these discourses question the right of Africans to organise and to be organised they replicate the colonial banning of African organisations even though this time they use liberal individualism to erode such rights to organise. But even if liberal democracy uses liberal individualism to destabilise African organisations, including states and economies, it is as evident in the fortresses against African immigrants to the North also averse to the African figure. In this sense it is averse to the African figure though it often mobilises and uses African individuals to assist in destabilising and destroying African institutions.

Liberal democracy is also a kind of democracy that is insensitive to African epistemologies and ontologies such that it effectively retrenches Africans from politics even as it claims to be inclusive. In this sense for instance the “cost” in the IMF’s “cost recovery measures”, that it forced down the throats of postindependence African states, was obviously conceived in Northern senses. Yet in Africa at the dawn of independence the logic was to recover the costs of colonialism including of slavery, colonial forced labour of Africans, colonial obliteration of African epistemologies and costs of colonial expropriation of assets. Conversely the Northerners through their International Financial Institutions privileged narrow Northern conceptualisations of costs in terms of balance of payments which were central to the International Monetary Fund’s interventions in Africa. Similarly, indebtedness in Africa has been narrowly conceptualised, inverted and perverted in the Northern sense of finances yet it is actually the North that is indebted to Africa for the historical wrongs including enslavement, colonial forced labour: , and expropriation of African resources. In this erroneous sense Africa and the rest of the world subjected to coloniality have been described after their independence as indebted; some highly indebted to Northern financial institutions and this served to cloak the indebtedness of the North to the rest of

the world that it exploited, disinherited and oppressed. The challenge in Africa is that the costs of colonialism and slavery are denied not only publicity but also the honour of arithmetics such that narrower conceptualisations of costs are privileged in economic discourses. This serves to efface historical costs of enslavement and colonialism to Africans even as they are paradoxically blamed for absence of development on the continent. Also, the fact that the costs of neoliberalism to Africans and to Africa are hardly considered in some scholarship replicates the historical effacement of antecedent costs of colonialism and coloniality to Africa. That neoliberalism was forced down the throats of African states in an era of liberal democracy poses paradoxes in that the neoliberalism destroyed the livelihoods and institutions of Africans even as they were expected to celebrate liberal democracy. What was not categorically specified in the neoliberal packages on Africa was the fact that liberal democracy itself would not be meaningful for capital in the absence of capital's freedom to roam, and slash and burn, the world while paradoxically dictating to everyone else to lie prostrate as enforced devotees of capital's not so new religion of preaching ideals while monopolising control and ownership of material resources in the world.

While the notion of time is central in liberal electoral democracy, such liberal electoral democracy is not liberal enough to recognise complex conceptualisations of time in various societies and temporalities (see also Delany 2004). It relies on the Northern dictation of progressive linearity of time even as the North paradoxically lives in and is unwilling to restitute the wealth of the tragedies of the colonial past. In this sense the North claims to have progressed beyond the past even as it clings on to the benefits of the past including the shameful colonial past that has presence in the unaddressed contemporary global economic inequalities. In the paradoxes of the Northern democracy, the former colonised peripheries are expected to distance themselves from their past even as the past of colonial expropriation and disinheritance is allowed to continue in the world. It is not addressed and *a fortiori*, it is not addressed using relevant African epistemologies and ontological

frames. In this sense Northern democracy in so far as it relates to other colonially subalternised epistemologies and ontologies is a flight from responsibility even as it paradoxically claims to champion accountability, openness and transparency all conceived in the Northern senses. Such a kind of democracy is hardly transparent, open and accountable to the African colonial past; it is not transparency, openness and accountability to Africans and their institutions that matter in such liberal democracy. Such liberal democracy is a continuation of the colonial effacement and miniaturisation of Africans and their institutions that for instance via colonial Anthropology were summarily dismissed by colonists who were interested more in subjugating Africans than properly understanding them. Africans were erroneously portrayed by colonists as barbaric, archaic, irrational, illogical, patriarchal and authoritarian even as paradoxically the colonists premised their colonialism on patrimonial notions of protectionism, of African “protectorates”. Further, paradoxically the colonists premised their colonial projects on irrational human exploitation and expropriations even as they accused Africans of irrationality and illogicality. Such protectionism and the attendant contemporary *defacto* constitution of protectionist global patriarchies surprisingly escape the attention of uncritical advocates of liberal democracy who pay none to short shrift attention to the hypocrisies of contemporary ideological facades of democracy.

The downside of liberal democracy and interventionism that attends it is well captured by Boyle (2013: 154, 155, 156, 176). Boyle is critical of wars staged under the pretext of the neoliberal “responsibility to protect” and “humanitarianism” by the North that he argues is paradoxically behind the world’s major humanitarian crises and catastrophes. Boyle (2013: 156) argues thus: “Indeed the world’s major military powers [...] have been behind most of the major humanitarian atrocities and catastrophes in the modern world. Yet today these white racist great military powers have euphemistically retooled the doctrine of “humanitarian intervention” into some evanescent “responsibility to protect” (R2P)-as if they had ever been anything but rapacious and voracious

when it comes to their gross exploitation and degradation of peoples of colour in the Third World in order to steal their natural resources”. So for Boyle, the North foments and exploits tragedies in order to further exploit the natural resources and people in the Third World. They do this under the pretexts of “responsibility to protect”, of fighting wars against international terrorism or Islamic fundamentalism; they use the pretext of eliminating weapons of mass destruction or the promotion of democracy and under the pretext of “humanitarian” intervention (p 175).

The point here is not to merely vindicate antiquarians but it is more to highlight continuities and logical relations as well as contradictions that for instance allow us to glean the logics of antecedent monarchies in contemporary global relations. When the North dictates to peripheries even as it claims to champion democracy, it arrogates the role of monarchies extended this time across the entire world. Attention to such continuities and contradictions allows us to glean liberal democracy more as a global ideological interpellation in the Althusserian sense of a way of hailing others and mobilising them (see also Mungazi 1996; University of California e-Book 2004). In this sense it is hailing others on the peripheries for the purposes of replacing their epistemologies and ontologies with Eurocentric ones even if such replacements do not actually result in progress in the peripheries so mobilised and replaced. It is an ideological interpellation that often constitutes a sideshow to African development and decoloniality even though the North sometimes spuriously links the liberal democracy to development (Sachs 2005) even as it is busy militarising in order to make possible its interventionism in the world. The spurious links between liberal democracy and development replicate the spurious links that colonists made between colonisation and civilisation. It reminds one of the destruction including the burning of corn belonging to Africans in early colonial Zimbabwe (see Liffé 1990: 24, 29) as the colonists pursued what they deceptively called the process of civilisation of Africans while paradoxically destroying the livelihood of the Shona and the Ndebele in efforts to induce them to accept colonial rule.

Liberal democracy ignores practices of coloniality and the ways in which the development of the North is not necessarily a result of its excellence in democracy but rather of colonial expropriations and coloniality.

This chapter interrogates concepts of coloniality in relation to the notion of democracy and indigenous knowledge systems conceptualisations of governance. The chapter borrows insights from Latin American scholarship on Euro-modernity and coloniality (see for instance Maldonado-Torres 2008; Mignolo 2007 and Escobar 2002). Building on contemporary conceptual frameworks particularly from decolonial Latin American scholarship that seeks to interrogate Euro-modernity from its underside, from subalternised epistemologies, this chapter remaps democracy and governance. Besides borrowing insights from Latin American scholarship it borrows insights from Shona vernacular conceptualisations on matters of governance in order to remap democracy, human rights and freedom as conceived within popular epistemologies in Africa. The chapter argues that notions such as Afro-pessimism lack grounding in African popular epistemologies and that such a notion of Afro-pessimism is based on the erroneous colonial assumptions, which unfortunately continue to be purveyed. The colonial erroneous assumptions are that Africa lacks essence of governance, government and statehood. Using insights from observations by scholars who have noticed the resilience of colonial epistemologies in Africa (Nyamnjoh 2012), the chapter calls for a turn that rethinks democracy, human rights and freedom from outside the Euro-modernist epistemological boxes. The chapter argues that there is need to move Africa away from theoretical and epistemological *cul de sacs* where theoretical lenses are standardly developed outside Africa for consumption by scholar-hunter-gatherers of data. In order to enable the move out of the theoretical and epistemological *cul de sacs* there is need to ground Africa in African thought and in African epistemological historical landscape. To glean aspects of the indigenous forms of democracy and governance the chapter uses the Shona vernacular adage “*mwana washe muranda kumwe*” (the king’s child is a subject when he/she is in

another king's kingdom). Much as Prah (2011) and Mawere (2014) argue that culture is the missing link in Africa's development, one can also argue that culture is the missing link in African politics. While other scholars argued for shifts from culture which they simply categorised as traditional, other scholars like Mentan (2009: 2) argue that the supposedly linear and irreversible nature of liberal democratic progress is false and theoretically wrong.

The chapter further examine ways in which colonialism and more broadly coloniality inverted this African conceptualisation of governance, freedom, rights and democracy. The chapter interrogates the resilience of colonial modes of engagement that subverted the African popular epistemologies and modes of governance. The chapter argues that observance of the popular modes of governance has huge import in rethinking peace and conflict management in the world. Such popular modes of governance serve to prevent role conflicts by kings, princes, princesses and queens all in metaphorical and empirical sense, some of whom may not be prone to take cognisance of the boundaries of their kingdoms even as they often insist on underprivileged colonised others to remember that they are prisoners of their localities. A closer look at liberal democracy and the indigenous conceptualisations shows the ways in which coloniality inverted indigenous democracy as a way of detouring African politics and kingdoms towards the exteriorities of colonial and imperial institutions.

Democracy and *mwana washe muranda kumwe*: The paradoxes and inversions in coloniality

Standard Northern notions of liberal democracy have privileged electoral democracy, particularly in developing countries where other facets of democracy such as in the realms of the economy, cultural and social are neglected or marginalised. While Northern countries also practice electoral democracy, they paradoxically reserve to themselves the right to practise economic dictatorship particularly via transnational corporations and international financial

institutions which they have set as mechanisms to retain global power. So while Northern countries and their organisations have championed liberal electoral democracy, they have retained autocracy, oligarchy and dictatorship in the most important area of the economies and global politics. This dictation is not only exemplified in the monopolisation of extraction of resources and the manufacturing of products but it is also evident in the determination of economic policies and principles, in how to measure economic progress and development. Similarly in the realm of economies, the Northern countries have retained what they expropriated from the colonised peoples with little or no regard to the consequences in the material economic conditions of Africans. Though some scholars have roundly demonised African countries and governments as undemocratic, they have been blind to absence of democracy in the Northern economies and politics that play the logics of monarchies on Africa. Stiglitz (2002) has noted that the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs, the World Trade Organisation are all controlled by Northerners whose views differ from the poor people in the developing world. These organisations, Stiglitz (2002) further argues, are not elected, they have no constituencies and the leaders of these organisations are elected by Northerners behind closed doors yet the same organisations dictate the economic policies at a worldwide level. Equally for Amutabi (2006: 56) the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank are understood in Kenya as global dictatorships imposing their wills on hapless African governments. These arguments by Stiglitz (2002) and Amutabi (2006) ensign the need to interrogate failure of African economies not merely in terms of failures of African states and governments but also in terms of the ramifications of global economic dictatorship by Northern international financial institutions and other such organisations. The upshot of this is that economic failure in Africa and other parts of the world that are subject to coloniality is not necessarily solely a result of dictatorships by African leaders and states but also significantly a result of dictatorship by Northern global institutions that have

arrogated the right to rule the entire world. These logics of Northern dictatorship contravene and invert the logics of the principle *mwana washe muranda kumwe* particularly in the light of presumptions by a few countries and institutions in the world that the entire world is theirs to run as they wish.

The inversions of the indigenous principle can also be seen in the realm of politics. Blair (2010: 430) for instance notes that there are five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council with rights of veto powers on world affairs. The non-permanent membership to the Security Council rotates among nations drawn from the bulk of South America, Africa and Asia. While each of the five permanent members has veto powers, the selected non-permanent member does not have the same veto powers. In spite of the lack of control over world economic and political affairs that affect them, developing countries are entirely condemned for challenges within their territories (Kaplan 1994). Yet, as Chabal (2005) suggested, the kind of context within which developing countries are situated is one where patrons often fuel violence in the territories in order to capitalise on the chaos and grab what they need or source for donor aid on the basis of the chaos. For Blair (2010: 385, 388-9, 392-4, 405, 423-4, 436) Northern democracy is one where the North has the liberty to dictate to the world and to effect changes of governments in the peripheries of the world. It is a kind of democracy where toughness and decisiveness of North is applauded while paradoxically toughness of leaders in the peripheries is often understood as dictatorship. It is a kind of democracy where countries in the peripheries are manipulated to suit the needs of Northern strategic interests. Thus for instance in the 1980s, Saddam Hussein and the Mujahedeen in Afghanistan were armed by the West so that they could be used as a buffer against the expansion of Soviet Union's satellites (Blair 2010). Thus in Northern democracy the boundaries of peripheral nation states are constantly being transgressed and effaced in the context of empire resulting in their declining sovereignty and their increasing inability to regulate their economic and cultural exchanges (Buchanan and Pahuja 2004: 75). This, for Buchanan and

Pahuja (2004), is a democracy that facilitates and is privy to imperialism as evidenced in it by the extension of the sovereignty of the European nation states beyond their national boundaries even as the same Northern countries paradoxically deny sovereignty to other countries. So for Buchanan and Pahuja, empire is effectively global and is sometimes analogically referred to as globalisation.

While “globalisation” and “global” democracy appear to be all encompassing, it has been shown to privilege Northerners who arrogate the right to craft and enforce international law (Dean 2004) without due consideration of indigenous jurisprudence in various parts of the world. Not only do the Northern states arrogate the right to craft and enforce international laws but they also retain the latitude to dishonour agreements with peripheries of the world on various pretexts (Gono 2008: 91). Yet on the other hand Northern governments profess not to tolerate failures by other governments and states at the peripheries to honour international law and agreements (Blair 2010). It is a kind of democracy where in spite of sovereignty having pre-existed Northern definitions and coinage (Ramose 2002: 468) other countries and states that are subject to coloniality are defined out and deemed to be unfit for sovereignty. It is a democracy in which the rule of particular laws is insisted on in spite of the fact that Northern law has a role in imperialism and colonialism. In this regard Mattei *et al* (2008: 1) have argued that the rule of law has a dark side because law has been used to justify domination and to sanction Northern conquest and plunder resulting in massive global disparities. Western liberal democracy is one where other African states and countries are often advised by Northern experts to disarm and demilitarise even as the North establishes military command bases in Africa. In this sense liberal democracies replicate the logics of colonialism where Africans in Africa were ordered to disarm even as the colonists brought in arms to use against the Africans and to facilitate their exploitation of resources including African labour power. It is a kind of democracy where Africa and other continents subject to coloniality are exhorted to demilitarise even as paradoxically there is the militarisation in the Northern countries that as Amin (2011) argues

are keen to reserve access to the planet's natural resources exclusively for their global corporations. What is implied in Amin's argument is that there are connections between Northern countries and global corporations that dominate and dictate to the rest of the world. It can indeed be noted here that during the early colonial era Northern countries relied on companies such as the British South African Company (BSACo) and the East India Company to facilitate colonisation of for instance South Africa, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Malawi and India. This served the Northern countries public relations-wise by ensuring that they did not appear to be directly involved in colonisation even if paradoxically the trips to Africa and the colonial processes of subjugation were made in the name of European kings and queens (see for instance Kane 1954; Murphy et al 1978).

The paradoxes in the democracies where exhortations to democracy and to openness are made alongside militarisation and the retention of global military privileges speak to hypocrisies in democracy. Such hypocrisies are well captured by Amin (2011) above who notes that there are projects of military control over the planet. For Amin, there is the waging of pre-emptive wars under the pretext of the war on terror by organisations and states portraying themselves as the representatives of the international community. Even if they have not been elected to represent the international community of states, the organisations and states arrogate the right to represent the entire world. Further for Amin, in the new imperialist globalisation the domination of other countries is exercised no longer entirely by the monopoly of industrial production but by other means of control via technologies, financial markets, and access to the planet resources, information and communication and by monopolising weapons of mass destruction. He interprets this as apartheid on a global scale and as implying a permanent war against the states and the peoples of the "recalcitrant" peripheries. While this global apartheid justifies itself on the basis of humanitarianism and development assistance, this kind of intervention, for Amin, breeds dependence and builds client

states thus forestalling the delinking that is necessary for African development and democracy.

Having looked at the downside and paradoxes of Northern democracy it is now imperative to dwell more closely on the indigenous principle and how it has assisted not only Africans but also Europeans who travelled to Africa. Although Northern travellers, missionaries and scholars sought to portray Africa and the rest of the colonised world as lacking in modes of governance and civility, there is a plethora of evidence as shown below to show that early Europeans travelling to Africa were well received and assisted by Africans whose hospitality and democratic dispositions could not be matched by the Europeans. Instead of repaying the hospitality borne of indigenous epistemologies well, the Europeans instead subsequently repaid the friendship and hospitality of Africans badly by enslaving and colonising them. There is evidence to show that even in moments of difficulties while on African soil, European travellers who were often lonely (Jahn 1961; Kane 1954; Hromnick 1980) were treated with hospitality. Even Jameson Rudd who deceitfully secured the Rudd concession, which was to serve as the basis of colonisation of Zimbabwe, from the Ndebele king Lobengula was assisted by San people with water when he was hopeless and dying of thirst on his way to deliver the Rudd concession to his colleagues in South Africa (see Kane 1954; Samkange 1973). The Europeans were even assisted in carrying their luggage as they were also assisted with food and drink. Instead of appreciating the hospitality with gratitude, Europeans including European scholars like John Locke and Stuart Mill (see Parekh 1995; Weaver 2006) hypocritically considered the hospitality to be weakness. They erroneously and arrogantly considered the hospitality to constitute evidence that Africans and the rest of the colonised world failed to distinguish between insiders and outsiders. In this vein, they arrogantly held that Europeans could therefore settle and expropriate the lands of the colonised people without regard to the fact that they were outsiders. John Locke arrogantly considered that the colonial subjects did not have sovereignty and

that their societies were porous to the extent that they could not be respected in international law.

The views by Locke and Mill were however as erroneous as they were meant to facilitate colonisation and exploitation of Africans and other people in the world. Ranger (1966: 173) has noted about Africans in Zimbabwe that “despite tensions before and after conquest the Matabele did possess a concept of themselves as a nation”. Equally, Wittman (2012) argued that before the Trans-Atlantic slavery many African nations were active participants in international relations and were also socially and politically organised as states that had a high respect for the law in both internal and external dealings. For Wittman, Europeans initially recognised African states through the conclusion of treaties as well as the establishment of diplomatic contacts yet they subsequently paradoxically claimed that there were no states in precolonial Africa.

While Locke claimed that Africans and the rest of colonised peoples freely moved about and that therefore they did not have a concept of state and society, he paradoxically did not consider the fact that the European colonists themselves had obviously paradoxically moved even longer distances from Europe to Africa and America. So it is questionable why Locke decided to claim that mobile Africans did not have an idea of territory. The fact that European travellers claimed on their part to have states and even empires in spite of their mobility to other parts of the world underscores the fact that to be mobile is not necessarily to undo territory, society and the state. The African political principle *mwana washe muranda kumwe* or a king’s child is a subject in another king’s kingdom underscores the view that mobility does not necessarily unhinge territory and the state. It enjoins those who travel or migrate as guests to observe the rights to rule by the host Kings or leaders in the destination territories. This principle was central to African peace as it prevented migrants and other visitors from behaving as though they were rulers while in the territories of their hosts. While European colonists portrayed Africans as violent and always raiding each other this view has been shown to be wrong

and as intended to justify colonialism (Palmer 1977). Palmer has shown that Cecil John Rhodes, the Briton who spearheaded the colonisation of Zimbabwe, bribed the precolonial European hunter traveller Frederic Selous with 2000 British pounds so that he would write the lies that the Shona were at the mercy of Ndebele raids. Had the European travellers observed this indigenous principle, colonial conflicts and confrontations would not have occurred. In terms of this indigenous democratic principle a *muranda* in African political philosophy is not a slave in the European sense (see Posselt 1935) but a subject with rights to life, property, freedom to move including to go back to own kingdom and freedom to settle as a subject in a new kingdom provided the principle is observed. This principle underscores the fact that Africans very well knew what kingdom was theirs and conversely what was not theirs; they knew the boundaries of their kingdoms. So Africans knew on the basis of recognition of boundaries when they were subjects: they knew where and when they were rulers or kings. Africans welcomed others including European travellers on the presumption that they would observe such principle as *mwana washe muranda kumwe*. Yet observance of the principle enjoined Africans not only to welcome others with ideals of hospitality but also to assist them, often for no gain, with food, with protection, knowledge of the geographies of Africa, with food and drink. In this vein, even in rural areas even passers-by are often invited to meals.

African democracy was not a kind of democracy of the anarchist liberal sense. It was a kind of democracy wherein institutions were respected rather than destroyed in the service of individualism. In this sense African societies were not in the Hobbesian “state of nature of war of all against everyone”. Contrary to Eurocentric theories that presume absence of democracy and of political institutions in precolonial Africa, the principle of *mwana washe muranda kumwe* indicates that Africans were democratic. It shows that Europeans who paradoxically subsequently vilified Africans were beneficiaries of African democracy when they were received with hospitality and accorded freedoms to move and even to establish mission stations and

economic activities in Africa. The difference in African democracy and European democracy is that whereas African democracy recognised territories belonging to others European democracy is anarchist in failing to observe other territories as belonging to others. Interpreted in Maldonado-Torres' (2008) sense, Northern liberal democracy is a summons to war against others in the service of individualism. Yet in the context where Northern institutions are glorified while African institutions are pilloried, it is a kind of democracy that is aimed to perpetuate the logics of missionary conversion albeit in a secular political sense of civil religion. Liberal democracy is a kind of democracy calculated to convert Africans from African institutions and from African modes of engagements to European ones. And it is a conversion of Africans from Africa to Europe even as Europe is busy erecting fortresses against African immigration to European nations. The tight immigration laws and rules for entries into European nations underline the fortresses Europeans are paradoxically erecting against their African converts who have come to conceive Europe as a paradise. But the fortresses in Europe also underscore the hypocrisies in Northern liberal democracy where Africa is exhorted to open-up borders while paradoxically the Northern preachers of the opening-up ideologies are busy shutting their gates.

While the political principle of African democracy, *mwana washe muranda kumwe* underscores the need to receive guests with assistance in portage, with bowls of food and cups of drink, liberal democracy on the other hand privileges people with ideals of freedom even if the intended beneficiaries are without means to exercise the freedom. The principle underscores the need for a guest to notice changes in status as he/she travels away from home and away from one's kingdom. Yet it is exactly this principle that European colonists subverted when they sought to turn themselves into kings in kingdoms outside their territories. They sought to subvert this principle when they subjugated other kings and exploited people belonging to other kingdoms as if they were their subjects. Instead of assisting Africans retain their material means in order to continue receiving guest in terms of the principle *mwana*

washe muranda kumwe, the European travellers and colonists subverted this principle by expropriating property belonging to Africans. This not only impoverished Africans but it effectively diminished African means of exercising civility to guests. When they demonised and destroyed precolonial African schools, economies, politics and cultures they contravened the fundamental African political principle of democracy. They also contravened the fundamental African principle of democracy when they invaded the territories, and when through colonial ideologies they invaded the minds of others. When, in order to justify the colonial projects, they demonised the Kings and leaders in other territories they infringed the fundamental African principle. When they introduced forced labour of Africans, seizing their cattle and burnt down their granaries so as to force Africans to work for the Europeans, the colonists paradoxically unhinged the basis of African hospitality and of African democracy via which they had been received by Africans.

As hinted above, the interrogation of relations and contradictions between Northern democracy and the African principle of democracy, *mwana washe muranda kumwe* is of relevance in the contemporary era where in spite of formal decolonisation African states and territories continue to suffer coloniality (see also Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013). Coloniality in this sense is exemplified in the continued dictation on African politics using the façade of a liberal democracy that claims to be inclusive even if paradoxically it is not inclusive right from its inception. Coloniality is exemplified in a kind of democracy that is more of a project of co-optation and mobilisation than real inclusion. While this distinction, between on the one hand co-optation and mobilisation and on the other hand inclusion, is often ignored in politics it is an important one to make particularly in a context where the purported inclusion of Africa in the global has not seen positive development. Such vacuous “inclusion” of Africa is best understood in terms of its co-optation, enrolment and mobilisation in the service of the goals and purposes of metropolitan regions of the world. In this regard, it is important to remember that poverty and impoverishment are often resources and not necessarily liabilities for coloniality. This is why the

inception of colonialism and imperialism was attended by the expropriation of the resources of colonial subjects who as argued above were reduced to clients and workers for the colonists. In a similar sense poverty and impoverishment is a resource for contemporary coloniality that often relies on mobilising the impoverished to fight the battles of dominant others who retain control over global resources. Such mobilisation and co-optation is exemplified in the contemporary era by arguments, of scholars like Mudhai 2013: 3; Atwood 2010; Akine 2012: 21), to the effect that information and communication technologies are often used to poke into African politics so as to generate revolutions against perceived dictatorships. While other scholars have seen positive aspects in such e-democracy, as it has come to be understood, some scholars like Dean (2004: 277) have argued that making the virtual world a key location of struggle risks conceding the more mundane terrains, practices and institutions of power to those forces of conservatism and capitalism old fashioned enough to continue their occupation. Thus in Zimbabwe's recent politics, the government of Zimbabwe has argued that Zimbabwean airwaves were being invaded by hostile forces (see Zimbabwe Parliamentary Debates 8 October 2003). Interference in politics via invisible means has historically been interpreted by colonists in terms of surreptitious activities by "witchdoctors" acting behind the scenes to stir revolts and rebellions (see Ranger 1969: 195), but in "postmodern politics" the virtual modes of communication have come to also facilitate interference at a distance in the logics of global invisible realms. The logics of virtualities have come to infringe the African principle of *mwana washe muranda kumwe* at least in the ways in which they facilitate interference at a distance often mobilising and using the mediumship of the impoverished and disinherited. The colonial creation of African middle class buffer zones in order to defuse African struggles against colonial oppression exemplifies the logics of colonial and imperial emplacing of disinherited others as mediums and buffers to absorb shocks on behalf of colonial and imperial hegemonies. The neoliberal economic shocks were obviously intended to be absorbed by Africans on behalf of western

international financial institutions. Equally the political shocks induced by interventionism, including indirectly via inducing economic atrocities and crises at an international level, are intended to be borne by Africans on behalf of empire's projects of transformation, in the logics of colonial civilisation. As argued above, inducing shocks is not only a way of poking into Africa but it is a form of surreptitious enforced enrolment and mobilisation of the subjects of coloniality into the projects of empire, wherein and on whose behalf Africans often unwittingly fight wars against one another. In this vein, peoples subject to coloniality of empire begin to unwittingly serve the projects of empire that are often disguised and ambiguated as if to the benefit of the entirety of humanity irrespective of location and other categorisations.

While the proliferation of civil society organisations and nongovernmental organisations in post-independence Africa may be laudable their roles can be properly understood by looking at the context within which they proliferated rather than by simply focusing on what they manifestly do in Africa. It is important to take into cognisance the fact that former colonists and imperialists needed to hedge in and tame African independence. This, they could only do by perpetuating the view, as during the colonial era, that they were the bastions of civility willing to export the "surplus civility" to post-independence Africa. Post-independence Africa continued to be viewed as lacking inherent modes of civility to the extent that the post-independence African states needed even greater infusions of "civility" from beyond Africa than during the colonial era. On the basis of threats by post-independence African governments, of delinking from empire, claiming restitution and reappropriation of African resources, empire deemed that post-independence Africa needed more "nongovernmental" organisations than were present in the colonial era. Thus liberal democracy including "civil" society organisations and "nongovernmental" organisations are logics of rehashed versions of the old colonial civilising mission. Much as liberal democracy was used to destabilise and topple the Soviet Union, it was used at the inception of independence to capture, reverse and enrol the

independence of African states into the fold of the North. Liberal democracy had to present to newly independent African states appealing even if vacuous ideals of freedom in order to forestall the redistribution of material resources in the decolonising states. Emphasis in scholarly theories on participatory development rather than on redistribution and emphasis on actor and action rather than on redistribution of material resources on independence indicate deceptive and redirective liberal developmental and environmental interventions since the 1970s when most African states were decolonising. Liberal democracy erroneously presumes that Africa is the negative other of Europe lacking as much in ideas of governance as in notions of property and possessions. In this sense some scholars have argued for what they call ‘communicative rationality’ as an aspect of “modernity” as if communication can ever be rational in the absence of its actual translation into ownership of materialities for the historically colonially disinherited and impoverished.

While peasants in Africa have been noted as sometimes coerced into liberation wars by parties fighting anticolonial wars (Kriger 1992), in the contemporary world, Boyle (2013: 154) has argued that indigenous proxy land forces of mercenaries are equipped, armed and supplied with weapons by the North to fight against their governments. If neoliberalism and the hardships it unleashed on Africa are interpreted in the context of Boyle’s argument, one begins to see how poverty is often created to be used as a resource to coerce and mobilise the impoverished to fight wars and destabilise other countries in an era of global coloniality. Just as frightening images of want in Africa are used as a political resource, poverty and impoverishment can be argued to also constitute political resources and ways of preparing those impoverished via the global and national systems for mobilisation and as mercenaries in clandestine and unwitting wars for empire. Of course in Shona indigenous knowledge such a clandestine creation of crises and the attendant mobilisation of those affected are understood via adages such as *kurova imbwa wakaviga mupinyi* (to beat a dog while hiding the log). But the important issue here is that the impoverished and

disinherited often constitute the expendable others, in the logics of raw materials for the sustenance of coloniality and empire, in battles that are not necessarily their own. What is not revealed in politics including by the global democracies is that as a reading of Levinas (2001, 2003) suggests, poverty and impoverishment are a political way of forcing the other to seek and to submit to the tutelage of the outside that then postures as the indispensable saviour of those who it has impoverished. In this sense, poverty and impoverishment are ways of breaking the “I” or the self of the colonised other such that impoverished other opens up to the outside: in the process the colonised other stands ready to service the outside as an inevitable way to assuage the poverty so induced. In the world, Africa and the so-called Third World are needed as sources of natural resources, and not necessarily as equal global partners, for the global democracies. One begins to see why impoverishment in relation to other sections of the globe plays the covert role of maintaining the impoverished in the orbits of those who find political, moral and economic capital in the conditions of the impoverished. Paradoxically the enrolment and mobilisation of the colonised others is often portrayed in terms of opening-up societies to global circulation.

Such interference by way of opening up territories has historically served to open up spaces for colonists to set their foothold, the Portuguese interference in politics of the Manyika for their own colonial ends (Bhila 1982). Equally missionary writings about African deplorable primitiveness and the writings of NGOs with imagery of African pitifulness has been argued to facilitate fund raising and interventionism from metropolitan home (Palmberg 2001). For Amutabi (2006), the logics of NGOs imagery of pitiful Africans are meant to prey on the vulnerability of their African patients that are diagnosed with bizarre developmental ailments so as to justify interference. Amutabi (2006) argues that NGOs often engage in peddling fear and danger so as to force Africans to seek outside aid even when their developmental ailments have not healed fifty years later. He further argues that NGOs have played covert and overt roles in the colonial and

postcolonial states in Africa where they practice a kind of autocracy premised on pretensions of philanthropy that he calls philanthropocracy. They are understood to moralise development pretending to be genuinely interested in genuine development and eradication of poverty and for Amutabi (2006) they sometimes operate as Northern secret security agents. Further for Amutabi, NGOs sometimes use Africans as guinea pigs in their experiments in social, cultural, political, development and medical engineering project. The shortcomings of global political economies of interventionism and interference have been observed in the recent African past by Gono (2008: 25, 33). Gono (2008) notes that the Northern sponsored Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act (ZIDERA) declared the Zimbabwean economic and land reform as threats to the Northern foreign policies. It directed Northern representatives in multilateral organisations such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the African Development Bank not to vote for any assistance whatsoever to Zimbabwe. For Gono, there is interference via the invisible political hands of powerful nations in the world “which stir dirty politics to secure African regime change”.

While the principle of *mwana washe muranda kumwe* enjoins those from other kingdoms to notice that they translate to subjects when they are in other people’s kingdoms, it is a principle that does not necessarily and invariably envisage delinking. It simply calls for reckoning other people’s kingdoms and abiding by the rules and laws of those other host people when one is a guest. As long as travellers and foreigners recognise the principle they would be welcome and treated with hospitality as noted by Hromnick (1980); Samkange (1973); Kane (1954) and Jahn (1961). In this sense, it was upon noticing that European travellers whom they had treated with hospitality were bent on toppling their kingdoms that Africans took to liberation wars. Otherwise Africans recognised the right of freedom of movement to the extent of even assisting early European travellers with food, shelter and to carry their baggage across swathes of the African continent. As argued above, Africans recognised the right to life by offering protection, shelter and food

even to the early European travellers and colonist who paradoxically subsequently exploited them and deposed their African kings and chiefs. In other words, Africans did not only recognise the right to freedom of movement but they also provided travellers with the wherewithal or means including food, shelter, protection, porter age and guides to facilitate their free movement in Africa. In this sense, African democratic principles enjoin hosts to welcome guests and passers-by with food unlike the liberal democratic principles that would privilege, in its emphasis on ideals, welcoming hungry guests to a table of ideas and ideals. While it is stated in indigenous Shona adages that *hapana musha usina muenzi*, the principle *mwana washe muranda kumwe* enjoins the *muenzi* to observe subjecthood and that he/she is outside her/his own kingdom. A *muenzi* who fails to do so ceases to be a *muenzi* and becomes a foe. In this regard, Samkange (1973: 34) notes that in “Revolt in Southern Rhodesia 1896-7” Terrence Ranger has shown that in fact the Shona welcomed the colonial invaders believing that their stay was temporary. He notes that it never occurred to the Shona that their land could be taken or that people could enter a strange country and take other people’s land.

In contextualising the African principle of democracy *mwana washe muranda kumwe* in the global politics, it is necessary to take into cognisance that democracy has historically been applied in Europe at home while paradoxically Europeans practised imperialism and autocracy abroad (Starr 1984; Ophir 1991: 39). In this way, European states have appeared to be democratic at home, in Europe, while paradoxically they have been despotic and autocratic in their relations with people outside of Europe. In Greece for instance, scholars like Plato argued that foreigners could be enslaved and violated, plundered and their property could be destroyed but Plato considered that Greeks should be free from these kinds of treatment (Ophir 1991).

This principle of *mwana washe muranda kumwe* has implications on notions of openness of society that is conceptualised by other scholars who hold that there is openness in the world with no inside and outside (see for instance Ingold 1993; Latour 2005).

Underscored in the principle is the point that there is no absolute openness but rather there is openness and closure depending on perceived threats and opportunities. The problem in notions presuming absolute openness is that countries on the periphery, that are exhorted to open up while paradoxically Northern countries close off, have been opened up since the colonial eras with no consequent benefit in development. In the light of such historiography of colonially induced openness, a democracy that is premised on absolute openness amounts to a democracy of vulnerabilities; it creates and perpetuates vulnerabilities for Africa such as the kinds of vulnerabilities of colonialism. Further presumptions of openness with no inside and outside have little relevance in Africa where the majority of the people struggle to access food and other basic needs. Stomachs are obviously not absolutely open as is presumed in the conceptualisations of absence of dichotomies between the outside and the inside: this is why openness and closure whether at societal level or at the level of the stomach, so to speak; are functions of perceived opportunities and dangers. So politics premised on presumptions of absolute openness with no inside and outside erroneously presume that stomachs are liberally open with no inside and outside. As noted above, in the Northern nations where fortresses are erected against immigrants, democracy is not necessarily about absolute openness. If it was about openness the North would have been the first to open borders to Africans, who they historically exploited, so that they could enjoy their sweat and assets looted to Europe. As Franz Fanon (1963) argues, the wealth and splendour of Europe was built on the sweat and suffering of Africans who were colonised and exploited. If democracy is really about absolute openness the building of armaments and the expansion of militaries that we see in the world would have been a thing of the past. Besides, if democracy was really about absolute openness the North would have been the first to let go of spaces that it has historically enclosed and defined as private.

The local, the global and *Mwana washe muranda kumwe*: a revisit of some epistemological and ontological aspects

While the principle of *mwana washe muranda kumwe* is an indigenous principle that has along with the wider popular African epistemologies been vilified as particularistic and as underpinning xenophobia in contemporary Africa (see for instance Neocosmos 2008), the vilifications are unfounded. They are unfounded because what the indigenous African democratic principle simply does is to allow for interdependence while at the same time preventing usurpations of the domains of others by those prone to bouts of hegemonism. It allows for politics that recognises difference and sameness so it cannot be blamed for xenophobia. In fact in African indigenous epistemologies and ontologies sharing resources is one of the key issues among Africans yet coloniality has disinherited Africans of the resources that historically formed the basis of their modes of civility. Further the principle *mwana washe muranda kumwe* is a principle that is useful in preventing conflicts over political kingdoms, territories, places and resources. In politics the principle enjoins guests to observe the inviolability of the domains of hosts, inviolability in this sense entails desisting from usurpation and colonisation of the domains of the hosts. Similarly at a global level it is a precept that is consonant with the principles of self-determination and sovereignty. In this vein the principle can be useful in rethinking contemporary unilateral interventionist politics at a global level. When used to interpret the notion of sovereignty, the principle underscores the fact as Ramose (2002) rightly argues that sovereignty in Africa pre-existed its coinage by Euro-American political thinkers. Sovereignty existed in Africa prior to the coinage of the term by European thinkers. If used to interpret global “humanitarianism” and the recently coined “responsibility to protect” (see Blair 2010), the principle *mwana washe muranda kumwe* requires those intervening in other nations to observe that they are working in other people’s territories and are therefore expected to observe the rules and laws of those territories rather than bring in and enforce their own rules and laws. It enjoins them to observe

that no territory lacks the essences of laws and rules and that even if other kingdoms and territories regard themselves as having surplus rules and laws they cannot, under the principle forcibly export their surplus laws and rules to the territories and kingdoms of others. This then cast aspersions at the notions of exporting Africans to be tried in courts based for instance in Europe and America that do not observe African principles. The tragedy for Africa is that everything African has come to be tried and tested abroad often resulting in piracy and destabilisation of African institutions and systems.

Apart from allegations of biases against African leaders, it is through such a principle that the exceptions taken by African states (see du Plessis et al 2013) to courts such as the International Criminal Court (ICC) can be understood. While Northern countries have not submitted themselves to the International Criminal Court, presuming that they are not international criminals, African states have been expected to submit their leaders to the court which is located outside Africa and has been noted as staffed by white judges and prosecutors who are biased against African leaders. The principle of *mwana washe muranda kumwe* would logically entail that trials in cases of infringements of laws and rules within a particular territory would require trials within such territories where the infringements occurred and before the people whose rights have been infringed. If used together with the African adage *itsitsi dzei tsvimborume kubvisa mwana wemvana madzihwa* (what empathy is there for an unmarried man to wipe the phlegm of a baby of a single mother) the principle enjoins those who are targeted for interventionism, whether in terms of the “responsibility to protect” or “humanitarianism”, to carefully consider the hidden or latent intentions of interveners. The underlying idea in the principle is that politics require ethics including the observance of the domains of others. However, it is the absence or lack of such observance of the ethics that is increasingly coming to characterise what is understood as globalisation, that is, the process that assumed its name in the unipolar world that dawned with the collapse of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s. The sovereignty of other states is increasingly being

trampled upon by Northern powers that are keen to monopolise world sovereignty by flattening all other nation states except in the North. And such trampling on the sovereignty of other nation states is often hidden in the mantra on “humanitarianism” and the “responsibility to protect” yet paradoxically the logic of these aspects also underpinned colonialism. Paradoxically the targeted nation states have had very little if any say in the constitution of “humanitarianism” and “responsibility to protect”.

In a context where Northern states have historically expropriated and exploited Africans the crucial question in relation to Northern interventionism is whether or not Africans in the postcolonies need restitution and compensation rather than “humanitarianism” and “protection” by the same powers that have historically exploited and expropriated their resources. Other scholars like Brennan et al (2012), Wittman (2012) and Gifford (2012) have argued for restitution, reparations and compensation by Northern powers for the enslavement and colonisation including expropriation of assets belonging to Africans (see also Mubaya and Mawere 2015). It is not clear whether the “humanitarianism” that the Northern powers have increasingly championed is intended by the Northern states to assume or take the place of restitution and compensation for enslavement and colonial expropriations. But when Africans claim for restitution and compensation they obviously are not soliciting for “humanitarian” aid or for the “protection” of their states and people by former colonial powers. The Northern “responsibility to protect” and the “humanitarianism” can be understood as efforts to circumvent restitution and compensation while simultaneously playing public relations exercises to cleanse the Northern powers of the damage to their reputations borne from antecedent colonial expropriations and enslavement of people from other continents like Africa. It is a kind of public relations exercise that also serves the North well by unhinging the populism and eventually sovereignty of African states that would otherwise serve as conduits for claiming restitution and compensation for the enslavement and colonial expropriations. Africans would with “humanitarianism” and “responsibility to

protect” remain disinherited even in the contemporary period. Divided, unorganised and stateless, they would lack the archives on historical disinheritance and expropriation. They would find it impossible to reclaim their heritages including restitution and compensation for historic dismemberment and exploitation. For this reason the empire would logically be opposed to African states that currently are often summarily described as failed, corrupt, weak states by scholars who care less to appraise the broader contexts of African states and the covert rationales for summarily describing them as such. In contexts where the colonised have been disinherited of their history and forced to rely on the history of others it is not surprising that the victims of coloniality fail to discern historical continuities of disparagement. The precolonial African states and leaders for instance were summarily disparaged by colonists as failed, ignorant, autocratic, backward and poor even as paradoxically the colonist relied on African knowledge of geographies and plants used in the production of medicines, and even if colonists established brutal autocratic colonial projects in Africa with the intention of expropriating and exploiting African resources. The encouragement of friction between African rulers and their subjects is noted to have continued into the colonial period: for instance, Feierman (1990: 124) observes that Germans forced chiefs in the colonies to confiscate land and to recruit forced labour among their subjects, earning the contempt of their subjects and destroying the loyalty which made them useful. A similar observation to Feierman (1990) was noted by Mandela (2013: 71, 105) when he stated that in South Africa chiefs had to submit to European colonists or they were deposed if they sought the interests of their people. The colonists hoped by this measure that the wrath of the people would, in the course of time, be directed not at the colonial authorities but at the Bantu authorities who were forced to do the direct collection of taxes and exerting other measures on their subjects. What matters more in relation to these arguments is the resilience of the logics of such coloniality in a contemporary world where governments in the so-called peripheries of the world are expected by Northern capital to govern

citizens without reappropriating and transferring to them ownership of material means of existence in the territories that were colonially expropriated. Besides such conundrums, the logic of such colonial practices noted by Feierman (1990) and Mandela (2013) can be gleaned in the projects of the IMF and the World Bank that involved retrenchment of African labour force, the privatisation of parastatals, deindustrialisation, cost recovery measures, the devaluation of currencies of Africa and so on, that posed challenges and eroded the popularity of post-independence African governments.

The upshot of the above is that at the global level Africans are disinherited not only of African natural resources that remain under the control of transnational corporations that are controlled by the North. The faulty logic of this disinheritance is that Africans lack the means to exploit the natural resources. But the Africans are also disinherited of processed or manufactured products on the pretext that the products are manufactured in the North. Tags of Northern corporations are pasted to the products in a world that paradoxically preaches circulation, flows and absence of hierarchies. The consequence is a global liberal democracy premised on disinheritance of other parts of the world even as it preaches equality. The result is thus a liberal democracy that legitimises impoverishment of others even as it preaches progress and advancement for all. It is a kind of democracy within which power sharing is for instance often stressed on the continent even as Africa is paradoxically being emasculated and disempowered by globalisation, including international financial institutions, that equally paradoxically vouches for individual empowerment while at the same time disempowering the broader African context within which African individuals live. Consequently, it is a democracy which in so far as it separates politics from economic control by Africans, legitimises what I call empty shell politics in Africa. Such democracy of empty shell politics is in essence democracy that justifies the material status quo of the impoverished while choosing to focus instead on ideals of freedom. It is a democracy that privileges ideals and downplays materialities of restitution and

compensation even as it preaches justice and equality. Empty shell politics is in this respect politics that is divorced from materialities of the economy such as in Africa where particularly during the neoliberal era African governments were retrenched from the economy in the interest of what was called privatisation. They were retrenched from the economy in spite of the fact that African governments needed money to perform their functions including for holding regular elections. While even in the Northern countries there is at least notionally the separation of powers in governance, the transnational corporations that make billion and trillions by exploiting African resources and peoples are Northern in origin. The corporations and Northern governments might appear to be separate but just as during the colonial era when companies such as the British South African Company and the East India Company were forerunners to colonialism and imperialism, the separations in the North are often a mere façade. While the corporations can engage in tax evasion, under-invoicing and other forms of evasions they obviously pay allegiance to their home countries whose economies they sustain.

The example of Zimbabwe makes clear the conundrums of democracy and African indigenous epistemologies. Zimbabwe was colonised by Britain in the late 19th century. Prior to colonisation British travellers, missionaries and fortune hunters courted the Ndebele king, Lobengula (see for instance Samkange 1973; Kane 1954 and Murphy et al 1978). Some of them threatened the king that his neighbours were about to attack and depose him and that therefore he had to swiftly secure treaties of friendship with the British for protection. The British promised Lobengula that they would give him ammunition, monthly payments and other items if he allowed them to exploit minerals in the country. Upon realising that Lobengula was unwilling, they bribed Lobengula's close aide named Lotshe so that he could together with British missionaries like Robert Moffat represent the British interest and help them secure the King's approval. The bribery of Lotshe, the king's aide was of course not applied only to the Ndebele as Bredekamp et al (1984) and Szalay (1995) observe that some San and Khoi

inhabitants of the Cape in South Africa were bribed to work, often to the chagrin of their kin, as informants and agents of the Dutch and English colonist in the 1600s. So Lobengula, the Ndebele king, eventually allowed the British who subsequently deposed the king and colonised Zimbabwe to dig for minerals. What the British actually wanted was not merely the right to dig for and exploit minerals but to eventually depose the king and to annex the territory which is what they eventually did using a pretext. And of course the entire colonial process was full of pretexts of “civilisation”, of “humanitarianism”, of the alleged “barbarism” of Africans, of the alleged “backwardness” and alleged “ignorance” of Africans. These pretexts constituted the faulty basis of colonial expropriation of African land, cattle, labour power, minerals and other resources. In fact the colonial expropriations of land and cattle were also meant to force Africans, who were thereby deprived of their means of livelihood, to labour for Europeans thus making them dependants and clients of the colonial system of which logics have been resilient even in the global “postcolonial” era. Instead of compensating for the African labour that was exploited by capital as cheap labour during the colonial period international institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) perceived postcolonial Zimbabweans as indebted to the North. Instead of perceiving the economic challenges in postcolonial Zimbabwe partly as a result of the costs of colonial exploitation and expropriation, the international financial institutions perceived the challenges in terms of lack of balance of payments and absence of cost recovery measures. It was not recovery of costs incurred by Zimbabwe as a result of colonial expropriations that mattered to the IMF but what IMF did was to coerce the Zimbabwean government to ensure recovery of costs from Zimbabwean taxpayers by capital to which the IMF paradoxically deemed Zimbabwe to be indebted. While information and communication technologies played a role in democratic discussions and extending freedom of information particularly during the conflicts post 2000, the fundamental question from the Zimbabwean instance is whether what Zimbabweans needed most was merely information or the land

redistribution that was opposed by those who championed liberal freedoms. Both the freedom of information and the land redistribution are aspects of democracy only that one is in the realm of ideal and the other in the realm of materialities. The question then is whether in Africa democratic ideals should always come before democratising ownership and control of materialities. The challenge of putting democratic ideals before democratic materialities is exemplified by land ownership and control struggles in various parts of the former colonies (Moyo 2008) and in Australia by Aborigines, in America and Canada by indigenous people, in New Zealand where governments are challenged by indigenous people reclaiming their land (Weaver 2006).

While liberal democracy in relation to the Zimbabwean case pretended to be averse to what some called “farm invasions”, it is as all ideologies a democracy that is paradoxically premised on invasions and inversions of Africans, including of African minds. It is as all ideologies premised on invasions of physical and mental spaces in its quest to enrol, mobilise, co-opt and hail peoples subject to coloniality. As indicated above it hails, mobilises and enrolls in the name of inclusion even as the terms of inclusion differ and even as the included are in effect merely co-opted, enrolled and mobilised sometimes against their social, cultural, material and ethical essence. Of course it was from the colonial era that the essence of Africans has been systematically attacked and denied with a view to engineering and creating African individuals lacking African social, political, material and cultural institutional clothing. Africans divested of their cultural, social, political and material clothing would then be easier to enrol and mobilise so that they cannot effectively compete with the hegemonic metropolitan institutions and cultures.

Underlying these snapshots about Zimbabwe is the fact that corruption that is standardly blamed on African leaders by the North has a long history and that history is marked by the initiation of aides of African kings into corrupt practices by the colonists. In the contemporary world, Amin (2011) has argued that the patron-client relations that mark present Northern “humanitarianism” are

the North's ways of creating and sustaining client-states on the peripheries. Such patron-client relations entailing patrimonial relations with the North may not be apparent in the context of hypocritical Northern critiques of patrimonialism, patron-client relation and patriarchy. These practices have been linked in Northern epistemologies and mantra to corruption and authoritarianism even as the North sustains patron-client and patrimonial relations with the wider world. However, the patron-client relations at a global level become apparent when Northern states imposed sanctions on other countries such as on Zimbabwe, Iraq and Iran. The logic of sanctions is obviously premised on patron-client relations, on patrimonialism and patriarchal relations at a global level yet this is often paradoxically ignored in Northern scholarship. It is African leadership that is labelled as patriarchal, patrimonial and as creating and sustaining patron-client relations while paradoxically Northern global patrimonialism and patriarchy is downplayed or ignored. Equally, the patron-client relations that were created by colonists in the colonial economies, via the expropriation and disinheritance of Africans whose cattle, land, minerals and other resources including labour power, is ignored in the mantras on African corruption and patrimonialism. Perhaps the best evidence on the centrality of hypocritical patrimonialism, patriarchy and patron-client relations to global relations, is the fact that even when African states demanded independence, Northern states were unwilling to let go. They chose instead to use the resources and wealth they got from colonially exploiting Africans to buy and force back Africans into the Northern created and dominated relations of global neopatrimonialism and patriarchy.

Africa needs to consider such indigenous principles of governance as *mwana washe muranda kumwe* if it is to properly contextualise nationalism, and regionalism in the ramifications of the global. In the creation of Pan Africanism and regionalism, the principle is vital in envisioning ways in which localities can be harmonised while promoting such broader regional projects. In the context of the principle, Pan Africanism and regionalism need not be frightening to localities and individual nations because they will

have control over their localities in view of rights granted by the principle. Equally, localities and individual nations need not be xenophobic towards other Africans as the principle recognises interdependence and the insiderness of outsiders provided they deport themselves as subjects not minded on deposing leaders of individual nations to which they migrate. In this sense xenophobia and Afrophobia are not products of African indigenous epistemologies and ontologies; rather they are functions of the struggle for resources in Africa, where from slavery to colonialism and through to postcolonialism, Africans have been subjected to expropriation without restitution and compensation. Expropriation and exploitation without restitution and compensation have reduced the numbers of paradises in the world thereby inducing competitive migration to the few terminals of expropriation. While through the principle of *mwana washe muranda kumwe* Africans assisted migrant subjects with food, shelter and means of portage, the contemporary liberal democracy merely guarantees ideals of freedom to migrants. Where in the contemporary global context migrants, however few, are assisted with food and shelter it is often out of the resources that were colonially expropriated, but that are never revealed as such, that they find themselves perpetual clients of “humanitarianism”.

The principle *mwana washe muranda kumwe* flags the point that democracy is not a zero sum game where, as is suggested in liberal democracy, if others have it in the North the rest do not have. Interpreted in relation to liberal democracy, the African principle, as indeed the broader indigenous epistemologies, is a democracy not merely of liberal ideals but also it is a democracy that takes cognisance of restitution and compensation without sweeping antecedent injustices under the carpet of pastness and pretensions of amnesia. For future researchers, the African principle of democracy poses the question whether what should be privileged is a democracy of ownership, restitution and compensation or on the other hand a liberal democracy that privileges ideals, including of global circulations and flows. It poses the question whether liberal democracy should be privileged even if for the majority in the world

it is a kind of democracy that pre-empts ownership, restitution and compensation for historic injustices. African indigenous democracy poses for future researchers the question whether liberal democracy is not privy to corruption which it is paradoxically understood by Northern scholars to be an effective tool. It asks whether liberal democracy does not legitimate and cloak expropriation of resources of colonised others, whether it does not justify failure to restitute and compensate others for historic wrongs. It poses the question whether by corrupting indigenous forms of knowledge and modes of existence liberal democracy is not complicity to corruption on a global scale. It poses the question whether liberal democracy does not legitimate the corruption of indigenous morals, ethics and laws by ignoring and destroying such forms. The challenge here is that corruption in liberal democracy has been narrowly conceived in financial economic terms whereas corruption can be broadened to cultural, social, moral, ethical, epistemic, political and spiritual domains. The question is whether liberal democracy has not corrupted broader conceptualisations of corruption in its own interests of perpetuating imperial hegemony on economies in the so-called peripheries of the world. Further the broader indigenous conceptualisations of corruption pose the question why liberal encouragement of individualism and the attendant dissidence to one's society and cultural mores should not be recognised as corrupting citizens. African democratic principle poses the question why liberal democracy and liberal project should not be conceived as instruments of violence when they are used to perpetrate symbolic violence by attacking and deconstructing other cultures, societies and mores around the world. The indigenous African principle *mwana washe muranda kumwe* poses the question why liberal individualism should not amount to production of citizens who, in their uncritical band wagonisms to Northern liberalism, are not accountable and transparent to their own societies, cultural mores and leadership. In the realm of development the African principle poses the question why development should be principally about participation and actors rather than about restitution and compensation for historical wrongs in the first instance.

Liberal democracy is therefore covertly premised on expropriation of resources on a world scale on the promise of benefits of circulation and flows even if the circulation and flows eventuate, at the level of African everyday life, as merely cosmetic and ideological. It is a democracy that, via its pretensions of absence of democracy in various other parts of the world, negates the histories of the disinherited others. It is a democracy that has the effect of inducing amnesia in the colonised about their temporalities and about their spaces such disinherited others even as the liberal democracy claims to be liberally inclusive. In this way it is a democracy that thrives on modelling the disinherited others to ensure they disconnect from their histories and live principally in the virtual spaces of contrived ideas and ideals, even if such virtualities lack the materialities that are necessary to address the historical material impoverishment of Africa. Liberal democracy is a kind of democracy where for territories that are subject to coloniality, the virtualities and surrealities from other worlds are supposed to matter more than material ownership of resources by the historically disinherited citizens of such territories. It is a democracy that concentrates on feeding the world with idealised surrealities and virtualities while paradoxically it legitimates and cloaks the expropriation of materialities of the world by the historic hegemonic others. To the extent that its logics deny political essence to subjects of coloniality, it disinherits them of realities while paradoxically force-feeding them with such surrealities and virtualities as are consistent with the sustenance of empire. It is a contrived democracy that preaches “inclusion” which in fact amounts to mobilisation and enrolment of the impoverished into the octopus of empire that boasts as a champion of freedom even as it also ignores or legitimises material and other forms of historical colonial disinheritance.

Whereas even the English would say a “bird in hand is worth two in the bush” liberal democracy and neoliberal ideologies encourage citizens of the disinherited and impoverished world to let go of what they have in terms of entitlements and ownership of their resources on the basis of neoliberal promises that they will

eventually benefit from global circulation. Similarly the citizens of such worlds are promised freedom and liberty if they refrain from claiming back what was historically colonially expropriated from them. Whereas in Shona indigenous knowledge it is said *chawawana batisisa midzimu haipekaviri* (hold fast onto what you have got because ancestors do not give back what you lose) the citizens of territories subject to coloniality are exhorted by Northern liberalism to let go of what they have on the basis of promises of eventually gaining from the benevolence of the global hegemonies. Liberal democracy is therefore a democracy of invasions and inversions on the peripheries even as those who in the metropolitan centres gained from enslaving and colonising other territories hold fast to such gains.

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Chapter Two

Towards a United States of Africa: Concepts, Issues, and Methodologies

Tendai Mwanaka & Munyaradzi Mawere

Introduction

This chapter uses the pragmatic approach in looking at the concepts towards a United States of Africa. We look at the issues involved in the discussions towards the dream, and light on the methodologies. We took the discursive approach so that we would highlight both the limitations and strengths towards uniting, and thus we regurgitate constructively and critically towards our favouring of a United States of Africa, which we feel is the only way (without outside intervention) towards competing in a globalised multinational-driven world economy, growth, development and achievement of a stable democratic Africa. We propose that rather than waiting for consensus on this union to happen, we start with countries that are willing, and the rest of Africa will join when it suits them.

A United States of Africa: An ever-longed idea?

In 1924, Marcus Garvey wrote the poem, *Hail, United States of Africa*, about the creation of The United States of Africa. In 1963 Kwame Nkrumah called for and wrote a book titled *Africa Must Unite* in which he declared:

No single part of Africa can be safe, or free to develop fully and independently, while any part remains un-liberated, or while Africa's vast economic resource continue to be exploited by imperialist and neo-colonialist interests. Unless Africa is

politically united under an All-Africa Union Government, there can be no solution to our political and economic problems (Nkrumah, 1963 as quoted in Kam Kar 2012, 29).

And many founding fathers of Africa like Salassie, SekouToure and Senghor also shouted here and there about this, including recently Muammar Gaddafi, who was very vocal about it and tried to push for it when his country had the presidency and chairmanship of the African Union, but they either faced non-interest or facile interest from their contemporaries. Scholars such as Ngugi wa Thiongo, Ali Mazrui, and Okot p'Bitek also have always been for the idea of not a united Africa but an Africa free from the whims and caprices of colonial forces. Wa Thiongo (1986), for example, argued in his *Decolonising the mind: The politics of language in African literature*, for the need for the decolonisation of the African mind. Mazrui also stresses the need for, not only uniting, but decolonising the African language to ensure that Africans are considered as equal others who can move their continent on their own without depending overly on others. In his keynote Address in 1996, Mazrui thus had this to say:

No country has ascended to a first rank technological and economic power by excessive dependence on foreign languages. Japan rose to dazzling industrial heights by the Japanese language and making it the medium of its own industrialisation. Korea has approximately scientified the Korean language and made it the medium of its own technological take-off. Can Africa ever take-off technologically if it retains so overwhelmingly European languages for discourse on advanced learning? (Key Note Address 22-27 April 1996).

Other scholars like Okot p'Bitek even went a step further to try to conscientise African scholars to ensure that they research and write positively about Africa so as to correct the nefarious and pejorative labels and misrepresentations that Africa suffered in the

hands of colonialism. P'Bitek (1979), thus, had this to say to the African scholars:

The African scholar has two clear tasks before him. First, to explore and destroy all false ideas about African peoples and culture that has been perpetuated by Western scholarship. Vague terms as *Tribe*, *Folk*, *Non-literate* or even innocent looking ones such as *Developing*, etc., must be subjected to critical analysis and thrown out or redefined to suit African interests. Second, the African scholar must endeavour to present the institutions of African peoples as they really are (p. 7).

Elaborating on the role and responsibility of an African scholar and in African statesmen and political representatives, Ochieng-Odhiambo and Iteyo (2012: 176) follow p'Bitek's understanding elaborated above as they aver:

The genuine African philosopher, besides being concerned with discussing the subject matter and finer points of philosophy as a discipline, has the special responsibility of deconstructing mainstream philosophy with a view to liberating the identity, consciousness and culture of the marginalised African "other". This is the role ethno-philosophy and professional philosophy never took up.

Besides revolutionary figures and scholars, artists like Salif Keita, Bob Marley, Lucky Dube, Isaac Chirwa and many others, have all sung about the need for a united Africa. Above all, general masses all over Africa have hypothesised and argued and talked about it, in the streets, farmlands, mines and elsewhere, that Africa be united. Henry Kam Kar (2012: 26) in his paper '*Africa Must Unite: Vindicating Kwame Nkrumah and Uniting Africa Against Global Destruction*', notes on the lack of impetus to this idea from the start:

Many self-seeking African leaders described Kwame Nkrumah as a dreamer of impossibility. A few decades after his

clarion call, some European countries created the European Union (EU) for their greater unity, collective benefit and for providing global leadership. Since then, American and Asian states have also come together, challenges notwithstanding. Africa is yet to make any meaningful progress towards a union government in spite of public acknowledgement of this need by some of its leaders.

Now, nearly a century after Marcus Garvey called for the creation of the union of African states we are still yet to see concrete steps towards this dream. In his essay, *United States of Africa achievable*, May 29, 2015, Liesl Louw-Vaudran, notes on this reluctance:

Outgoing African Development Bank president Donald Kaberuka, however, says that economic integration in Africa over the past 50 years has been slower than in other regions of the world. In an editorial published by the European Centre for Policy Development Management, Kaberuka said that this is largely due to “political indifference at a national level”. The “decades-long prevarication” to implement real economic integration, despite ambitious documents ranging from the Lagos Plan of Action in 1980 to those establishing the New Partnership for Africa’s Development in 2000, has had a devastating effect on the continent. Intra-African trade — the theme of two AU summits, in 2012 — remains lower than that of any other continent. The lack of continental strategies in the airline industry, for example, has caused a ‘structural logjam’, which means travelling within Africa is more expensive than elsewhere.... Infrastructure linking the continent and enabling the free movement of goods and people is a crucial first step towards continental integration. Strong leadership by committed pan-Africanists, not only African leaders, is however also needed to revive the idea of true African unity (n.d).

The Pan-Africanism that has true meaning to us is one when free trade is allowed across borders of one's country, individual freedoms are respected and political power truly belongs to the African people not that which we have been dosed with over the years whereby power absolutely resides with dictators who abuse it with impunity as they wish. Some of the dictators would go to the extent of telling us we belong to them; the country belongs to them, as if they bought these countries and people from God, the Creator of all humanity. It can only be a unity borne of democracy of people saying we don't trust big government, big leaders-turned rulers and the self-proclaimed elitists in government to masquerade as representatives of the poor masses when in fact they are the blood suckers of the latter. On the basis of our understanding elaborated above, Pan Africanism can make things happen. In the essay, *Towards A United States Of Africa And True Pan-Africanism*, Sep, 28, 2014, *Ajibola Adigun*, espouses the same issues:

They are wrong (those who consider themselves as the promoters of Pan Africanism), first because they have not taken enough time to understand the pan-Africanist agenda of old, and secondly because there is folly in thinking that Africa's redemption lies in an African agenda that misses the forest for trees. The primordial form of pan-Africanism, the one propounded by Nkrumah and his other notable contemporaries was all about 'consolidation for power in Africa' in other words it was Africa's try at changing the global power environment. It was about the desire by African statesmen to find locus in the global scheme of things and events. It was about Nkrumah's egocentric desire to become Africa's 'Asantehene' (n.d).

As we have demonstrated in this section, the idea of a united Africa is not new. It is an idea that has been tinkling and tumbling in the minds of many Africans across the continent for so long. In fact, for the contemporary generation, it is an idea that is long overdue.

Enlivening the idea of a united Africa

While the idea of a united Africa seems to have died with the demise of Kwame Nkrumah in 1972, it remerged with the election of Muammar Gaddafi as the chairperson of the African Union (AU). When Gaddafi was elected the chairperson of the AU, he proposed for a single African military force, a single currency and a single passport for Africans to move freely around the continent as a way to pave way for the movement towards the union of African states. Some African leaders and critics alike felt Gaddafi was doing the same thing that Nkrumah was doing as he went about trying to sell the idea to the other nations, that is, consolidating power to himself, making him poised to be the first president of such a grand union. Some even noted this by saying Gaddafi and Libya was buying votes through its oil, financing a lot of the poor countries on procurement of cheap oil, debt repayment and many other humanitarian aids he provided across Africa, thus buying these small countries' votes towards the union project. Other countries felt they needed time to study the proposal, some like South Africa thought they were not ready to open their borders to the rest of Africa. Some wanted the integration to start from regional blocs like SADC, ECOWAS, East African Federation (that has already being proposed), Central Africa, and North Africa, and then after these regional blocs have integrated they would move toward joining all those regional blocs into one state. Yet, the African Union, by contrast, has set itself the task of building a "united and integrated" Africa by 2025. This is the first insight into why we have said integration is not being done with one vision, collectively as it ideally should. For they seem to be two ways to it without agreement on which path we should follow, the AU position and that of regional blockings being favoured by regional powerhouse countries. Still arguing on this lack of leadership's push towards integration and union of African states, George Mukundi (2007) gave an historical overview of the pan-African debate, underscoring the motivation for shared historical and cultural values, collective

self-reliance, self-sufficiency and political freedom. He observes that Africa has continued to remain poor and divided, thus, he says:

The establishment of the African Union in 2002 was meant to accelerate the continent's integration process and to strengthen its shared values and common purpose. But the challenges to continental integration have remained, especially with AU member states still holding onto the issue of sovereignty. The contradiction is that it is these leaders who are leading the debate on the formation of a 'United States of Africa' (Mukundi 2007: Issue 307).

Mukundi noted the challenges to continental unity including; mistrust, economic inequalities, racism and questions of ethnicity. He also pointed out that political leaders are at the moment pursuing the question of integration without involving the general public. He went further to propose that there is need for AU to take tough and courageous decisions and determination to enforce them, to consult and involve all Africans, to strengthen and rationalise the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) as the building blocks to achieve a Union government, to address the recurrent financial constraint on the union and adopt measured steps that take into account the synchronisation of political and economic structures.

One would, however, wonder if the integration of Africa as a continent would not pose serious problems such as migration from and to particular member states and the continent in general. Mukundi (Ibid) is of the view that integration will not cause migration problems as countries like South Africa think, and also that the union can be started by a few countries, and the rest will join when it suits them, rather than waiting for consensus as we have been going about it. We plainly agree with Mukundi's view. As we will argue later, countries like the United States of America, the EU, Soviet Union etc.... didn't start with all the states that now constitute their states but started with a few, and the rest joined as it suited them. We strongly believe that deploying the same strategy would expedite the integration process than waiting for a time when all countries on the continent comes to a consensus.

We further argue that the spirit of African integration generally has always had a higher level of support among poorer, less developed, and smaller African countries versus less poor, more developed, and larger African countries. Smaller countries like Zimbabwe, Eritrea, Ghana, Mozambique, Zambia, Malawi, Senegal feel they will instantly benefit from this close integration than larger countries like South Africa, Kenya, Nigeria, Egypt, Libya and Tunisia who haven't warmed up to the idea, maybe thinking they would have more to lose from this integration, in the meantime. For example, South African people and its leadership have stated it, on several instances, that they are reluctant to open their borders to the rest of Africa, afraid of unchecked migration of poor migrants into its borders, thereby exacerbating its services, making resources inadequate to cater for its population that is basically still trying to deal with economic disparities of the apartheid policies and the new additions (see Herald 15 April 2015; Mbembe 2015). But we feel integration should be looked at on a long term basis, say 50 years from now. Both small and bigger countries would benefit from it as long as it is properly planned and done in earnest.

For some of us, it is difficult to envision this dream given that the proposed federation would have the largest territory of any state on earth, nearly 30 million square kilometres against the Russian federation which would be the second biggest at about 17 million square kilometres. In the meanwhile it would be the third most populous state behind China and India, and by 2050 it would be the most populous, with its population doubling by the close of the 21st century to over 2 billion people population that speak over 2000 languages! (UN World Population Prospectus 2015; The Guardian 2015). Those against this integration feel that it would be difficult to govern such a huge country. It would be the first country to be this big. Some even give the example of the USA, China and India; three very big countries that they feel have been difficult to govern, even though they have the few languages, religions, cultural differences, shared by their populations. The question is on the difficultness and not impossibility for those who want a united

Africa. Thus, the idea of African unification is not something that should be so easily discarded.

As already alluded to, unification is not something new to history. In reality that is the way most countries have come into being as we know them today. Think of the Roman Empire which existed for hundreds of years which comprised hundreds of languages, from at least 3 continents of the world. We can also talk of the British, French, and Spanish colonial empires. Adding to the list are the Ottoman Empire, the Byzantium Empires, the USSR; all these groupings included several countries, with distinct and different races, cultures, languages, ideologues, regions, besides many other such variations. Even every major power we can name today is made up of historically unique nations or the descendants of one.

Besides, one might argue that there is no such “thing” as a country. There is nothing on the ground that is a country; it’s not the fences or signs that make a country or borders of a country, even in a person’s mind, too. In one’s mind, or even physically, one can never be sure, for example, of what is the border of Zimbabwe with Mozambique, that is said to be somewhere in the Lowveld. Yes, one might know it’s there but haven’t seen it, most of the times not even caring to think of it, maybe unless Mozambique decides to invade Zimbabwe or vice versa. We pursue our argument here to theorise a country, state and even boarder. Who disagrees that a country, state, and boarder is not an object, but an idea, a social and cognitive process? Isn’t it a political and ideological division that people force into their minds to separate themselves from others? A state is a collection of force and divisions of people and resources but the formation of a state is purely arbitrary based on history and ideology. It is a state’s choice to decide its destiny; either to remain independent or integrate with another state for the benefit of both. *Mwayila Tshiyembe* (2000) theorising and reconceptualising what really constitutes, or make up a state, nation, citizenship, locality and how each is different from the other, brings forward very interesting ideas on this issue.

An unexpected consequence of the crisis in the nation-state is that the concept of nation is no longer shackled by the law or by revolutionary mystique. The break-up of the Soviet Union and former Yugoslavia, the separation between the Czech Republic and Slovakia, the Tutsi genocide and the chaos in Somalia are all proof of that (Tshiyembe 2000: n.p).

He goes on to delineate the difference between a legal nation (state) and the sociological nation (ethnic group).

From now on, it will be possible to distinguish between the legal nation – “state” – and the sociological nation – “ethnic group”. The sociological nation is founded on shared traits (language, blood ties, religion and a common history) and an evident desire to live together. It is the bedrock of nationality of origin. But the post-colonial state merely notes its existence, having no historical or administrative memory of the people and countries juxtaposed, simply because colonialism willed it so. Reinstating these nations will make it possible to bring to an end the crisis of national consciousness and identity that is ravaging Africa, and will prevent political manipulation of disputes over nationality. This kind of manipulation has led, for example, to the banishment of the Banyamulenge community to the east of Congo-Kinshasa (Ibid).

Just like revolutionary figures such as Marcus Garvey, Kwame Nkrumah, and Murmur Gaddafi, Tshiyembe feels union of African states through the federation model is the way to go to deal with this problem of nation, states, citizenship, territory and for Africa to stand its chance in the globalised economy, noting. Tshiyembe (Ibid), thus, further argues:

If the multinational state were established, the law would lay down that nationality is defined by consciousness and membership of a community of shared values (Akan, Mosi, Bamileke) and citizenship by consciousness and membership of a state (Ivory Coast, Burkina Faso, Cameroon). The state and the nations that make it up would have to respect the principles of equality and the right to be different, in order to achieve a common destiny. In return, these nations automatically enjoy

the same rights and duties based on “founder rights”, including the right to language, religion, culture and nationality. Consequently, the issue of minority rights is without political foundation in a multinational state.

We go further and argue that the idea of statehood in Africa is relatively new, which makes the idea of statehood in Africa work differently than the rest of the world. Only in the last century have the majority of Africa’s population been granted independence, which leaves the majority of the African population more open to a new national identity unlike their European counterparts who have been independent of each other for centuries. When people you know such as your grandparents were members of a different regime, your nationality is not so much based in the current regime as much as it is being independent from the previous colonial power. Mwayila Tshiyembe (Ibid) develops the conceptualisation and theorisation of multinational state further noting that:

A kind of integral federalism is thus emerging and, in it, power is allocated on the basis of a threefold federation of nations, citizens and localities. It operates on the premise that the state acts on behalf of several nations, scattered over a number of localities. In that sense, authority and political action can be exercised rationally and effectively only if power is accorded first by reference to nations and citizens, and only then by territory. In fact, the tribal districts, communes and autonomous provinces are politically significant only because they are the cradles of the nations and citizens concerned - the founders of the political system.

On the same basis as Tshiyembe (2000), Tukumbi Lumumba-Kasongo (2002) stresses the need to reconceptualise the state especially in Africa where for many years, the continent’s nation-states have, for many years been subjected to under colonial rule and suffered many loses, politically, socially and economically. Lumumba-Kasongo (2002), thus, has this to say:

Reconceptualising the African state is a must because, firstly, about four decades of preoccupation with development

have yielded only very meagre returns. It has proven a mistake to attempt to analyse something that has not yet been seriously on the agenda, dealing mainly with symptoms related to behaviours of the state instead of its substance. Secondly, all the available evidence points to the inescapable conclusion that political conditions in Africa are the greatest impediment to development. Thirdly, despite the explosion of the number of actors in the global system and the deliberate efforts of mega financial, multinational and multilateral institutions to African States, and also despite the fact that the African systems of delivering services or performance at the national level are highly problematic, the African State is still the most visible actor in world politics. Finally, the fate of Africa's peoples and cultures has been historically defined by the dynamics of the state, especially its role in international political economy and in making alliances for its own immortality (p. 79).

The need to reconceptualise Africa is indeed more urgent than ever given its colonial and political history. Tshiyembe, taking further the question of state; the need to reconceptualise the state in Africa, gives the example of the sociological paradoxes in the societies of Rwanda and Burundi, thus:

For example, in the paradoxical societies of Rwanda and Burundi, in which the sociological duality of Hutu majority and sociological Tutsi minority seems insurmountable, civil peace is attained through a variety of mechanisms. The Hutus, Tutsis and Twas must be recognised as separate peoples. A new republican pact under which all state powers are allocated proportionally among the three peoples must be drawn up (within the civil service, government, diplomatic service, administration etc.), so that an electoral victory by the political parties does not threaten the right of each people to exist. Traditional authority must be republicanised. And the inalienable right of each people to live in peace in a

multinational state of Rwanda and Burundi, within the existing frontiers, must be proclaimed (n.d).

To avoid ethnic complexities and problems as those manifested in the societies of Rwanda and Burundi, we argue that the union of the African states can be worked along those lines whereby they should be breakdown of power, space, and economic activity of the nation, citizens, and localities. Thus, we can redraw new borders in the union, in the countries making up the union, in the localities to avoid racial and civil wars that are now resultant of these problems of nation, state, citizens, localities that was caused by the arbitrary demarcation and balkanisation of African countries during the Berlin conference that didn't care about all these issues. But how should we go about cultural and even ethnic differences and come up with a truly united Africa should not be taken for granted. It remains a critical issue that requires constant reflections in time and space.

Rising above ethnicity and cultural difference for unity

We have highlighted above that one problem that might hinder the question of African unity could be ethnic differences and complexities among African societies. We pursue the issue in this section but following the line of cultural and linguistic differences. We point out, therefore, that another important aspect to consider on the question of unity in Africa is, on one hand, about cultures and language groups in which we find most of the major cultures and language groups being shared by say at least 3 countries, like Kiswahili which is spoken in the biggest chunk of East Africa, Nguni (Zulu and Ndebele) languages and cultures spoken and shared in a number of Southern African countries, Arabic languages and cultures shared by the rest of north Africa etc. On the other hand, we have situations where we have languages spoken by relatively few people such as Nambya, Ndaou, Venda, and Korekore, which need to be protected. These many languages shouldn't be a problem towards integration, as long we understand that integration

will mostly be on the federal level, whereby these countries are free and allowed to keep to their unique languages, cultures, and to the provision of making their own local laws that apply to themselves, govern their respective communities, but still all fall under the same federal government which will be the recognised country. This means the federal government is the one that will have debated and agreed to language(s), like maybe, English, French, Portuguese, Kiswahili, Shona, Yoruba, Arabic, and so on. We have deliberately included Kiswahili and Arabic in our example above to make it obvious that we don't have any preference to European languages. But pragmatically, we think we can be served well by using at least one of those European languages as our federal government language, say English, given that it is a language that is already spoken and used by over 40 percent of Africa. After all, that's what is obtaining now as a result of colonial history on the continent. The use of European languages in governance matters, all over Africa. Almost all African countries use a European language for governance purpose even though we have many other, even stronger, African languages such as Kiswahili and Shona, among others. Those are used in local communities. Thus we can still use these European languages as our federal government language alongside our own African indigenous languages.

To reinforce our point above, we further argue that the United States of America (USA) was the American Indian territory before white occupation and English language came to dominate those local Indian languages, and it is the language of use today. We could even be wrong in saying English is now the official language of the USA, for the Americans themselves believe that their language is American. Inside the country there are many languages spoken in the USA other than American English. In fact, most American-Indian languages survived colonialism, so are spoken besides other languages that came from the outside USA like English did. Many languages like Spanish which is spoken by over 40 million people in the USA homes, Chinese, Hindu, Korean, Japanese, and others, are used but all these languages and cultures connect through the American English, which we have noted above, the Americans even

say their English is different from the other English(s). We can even argue further to say, yes those languages originated in Europe but they are just part of us as our local languages. We use them as much as we use our own indigenous languages, so it would be petty nationalism to over argue about non-use of these foreign languages when we already use them – the majority of us – quite a long time now. And it is very normal for a country to have 2 or 3 languages it uses for government purposes. Good examples are Canada, Belgium, Switzerland, India, and many others across the globe.

The other reason that could be proffered against and for the integration of the African nation-states could be that of stamping out civil strife all over the continent. Those for integration generally believe that with integration all these wars and violent tendencies rampant in many African nation-states would disappear, saying that Africa is losing out on developing by ceaselessly, cyclically, dealing with conflicts in its member countries. However, those who are against integration reason that not the rest of Africa is under strife, in fact two thirds are not, so it shouldn't be a reason to just strap countries into a union. They go further and say, violence (or any other problem) in one country cannot be solved by creating a new country by uniting the countries of the continent. The problem with this argument of two thirds being well to do and growing is that the nature of Africa's violence and strife is cyclical if not spiral. A country can be peaceful, and growing in ten years, and then the governance problems will return back to push that country back into strife and economic demise. In fact, it's safe to say that there are very few countries on the continent who haven't gone through some strife and economic demise, or disaster since its independence. Some of these countries are even unlucky that they undergo these waves of strife and violence every few years or so. Cases in point are the DRC, Central African Republic, Uganda, Sudan, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe, and the list is long. Yes, at one given time it might be 10 or so countries going through political problems but over many years, say 20 years, it might be two thirds of the continent that have gone through strife.

We should caution, however, that an Africa united by the brute force of some dictator or superior military would be a disaster though. Instead, we argue that an Africa united by democracy would in my view be better able to handle some of the civil strife issues that bother us, or even issues like nondescript little men becoming big men and venting all their insecurities on an innocent public. If Africa were to be united democratically it would make it very difficult to have an Idi Amin or Bokassa etc. Any one of these could have been deposed by a well-trained well-armed African peace keeping force of no more than 5000 men. A united Africa would have millions of soldiers at its disposal. Currently we have in access of 3.5 million soldiers combined together and these will go a long way in providing instant military strength to the union, which would be used to deal with these situations. Some scholars go further and give another example that the East African community is the world's oldest free trade area. It's older than the European Union. If the East African union had not broken up (it was later revived), Rwanda and Burundi would have joined in the 80s. And if this had happened there would have been no genocide. The war in Congo (ceaselessly since WWII) would have been stopped or substantially mitigated had been that Africa is united as one country. Related to the same issue they are a lot of countries dealing with persistent poverty, the number of people affected by internal violence, that are affected by AIDS, disease, and famine... resultant of past strife and governance issues, thus it knocks on the head this idea that Africa is well to do.

It is not farfetched to note that even for those countries that have united in the past it was because of exactly this reason that they united. The EU united because they wanted to stamp those endless European wars and strife situation of the early 20th century that gobbled the entire world. The forefathers of the European dream, Adenauer, Kohl, Mitterrand noted that they wanted to deal with those; especially Helmut Kohl who believed a united Europe would stamp Germany's tendencies to invade other countries, which he really felt was deeply rooted in the Germany's psyche. He was the one who endlessly worked to unite Europe even though he

knew his country was the strongest in Europe and had fewer possibilities of descending into strife or being invaded. When the United States fought for independence from Britain there were a few countries who united together to fight for this, and when the United States became independent it was only 13 countries that became independent and started the USA, and it has grown to 50 states plus the District County of Washington. They learned this hard lesson during their own civil war that united together they had a good chance of growing into a better and stable democracy. China wasn't the country it was, they had to unite countries and regions to create the China that is there now, because as small countries they had the tendencies of fighting each other, destroying each other. Even African countries, what we are calling African countries were not countries before the scramble of Africa. Before the scramble and demarcation we counted up to 10 000 states, so what we are saying are countries now were united together from these many countries to form these.

Many of the issues of violence within Africa are based on racial and religious conflict, which are a legacy of colonial indifference in the drawing of borders. Neighbouring nations that can unite in order tear down the borders that separate groups of people and allow them to resettle as I noted before. A historical scenario of this was India and Pakistan after Britain granted them independence. The two nations were formerly under one India until they resolved to allow cross migrations of Hindus and Muslims and then resolve to form independent nations. Their relationship is not perfect, but both are thriving nuclear powers with robust economies and have both overcome dependence on their former colonial power within the same timeframe as most modern African nations.

Africa has been achieving a growth rate of about 6%, thus those against uniting Africa feel it is not important since there is a significant growth without the union. But what they fail to understand is that with a united country growth will be prodigious and might even hit levels never experienced by any other country before such that they would be rapid growth, integration, industrialisation of the whole continent, as a whole, not just those

few or so countries that are growing, adding to the 6% growth we are having. For it is not farfetched to state that this 6% growth we are having is coming from a few countries like Nigeria, Kenya that are growing well, and the rest of the countries in the continent are contributing little to that. Think of the minerals wealth and potential of the western DRC, if it is to find peace, which it would under a united Africa, a country which is bigger than Western Europe combined together. What we have are small countries trying to develop with little trade between them, due to punitive tariffs and tight border controls that discourages trade. Such that we have little intra trade between African countries, as compared to other continents we lag behind. In his article: '*A United States of Africa? Not Yet,*' Peter Wonacott (2014), raises these issues aptly and nuancedly:

Foreign manufacturers have scant incentive to invest in Africa's bite-sized economies when their suppliers can't easily move goods across borders. East Africa's biggest economy, Kenya, is smaller than that of Madison, Wis., according to the Brookings Institution, a Washington think tank... And because most African economies sell a lot of raw commodities and manufacture very little, they don't buy much from each other either. Intra-Africa trade amounts to just 12% of the continent's total trade, the AU says. In Europe, it is 60%; in North America, it is 40%. [...]. Unity is no longer about ideology but economics (n.p).

Ajibola Adigun, in his online essay, *Towards A United States Of Africa And True Pan-Africanism*, states:

It is harder to travel across Africa and costs more to transport things than it is in any region of the world due to countless border restrictions and regulations. Nothing fosters peace like trade nothing is more lethal to parochial sentiments like travel (2014: n.p).

The unification of Africa is the only viable way for Africa to proceed in dealing with the challenges of globalisation and Western Multinationalisation of the world economy whereby most of this

globalisation is being pushed at the corporate-level which has been costly to African nations, as a result of the acceleration of trade and financial liberalisation and privatisation of national assets to the benefit of multinational corporations. In the online essay, *The United States of Africa: The challenges*, Demba Moussa Dembélé, notes:

Trade liberalisation, combined with western countries' disguised or open protectionism and subsidies, resulted in the deterioration of sub-Saharan Africa's terms of trade. Trade liberalisation alone has cost the region more than \$270 billion over a 20-year period, according to Christian Aid (2005). An illustration of these costs is Ghana, which lost an estimated \$10 billion. According to Christian Aid, it is as if the entire country had stopped working for 18 months! Capital flight, fuelled by trade and financial liberalisation, has reached alarming proportions, estimated at more than half of the continent's illegitimate external debt, according to the Commission for Africa (see Dembélé 2007: Issue 298).

The transfer of national assets and the punitive and unbearable external debt has deepened external domination and increased transfer of wealth from Africa to the Western world as acknowledged by the report produced by the Commission of Africa, put together by Tony Blair (British prime minister, 2005), quoting a study published in 2006 by Christian Aid, Archbishop Ndungane (2006) that indicated:

Britain took away far more money from sub-Saharan Africa than it gave in aid and debt relief last year, despite pledges to help the region. In all, it took away £27 billion from Africa. In the 12 months since an annual Group of Eight (G8) summit in Scotland last July, the British economy gained a net profit of more than £11 billion (\$20.3 billion) from the region. The charity calculated that almost £17 billion flowed from Britain to sub-Saharan Africa in the past year, including donations, remittances from salaries earned by Africans in Britain and

foreign direct investments. At the same time, more than £27 billion went in the opposite direction, thanks to debt repayments, profits made by British companies in Africa and imports of British goods and capital flight (see Dembele, Ibid)

The report goes further and touches another resultant problem to this globalisation of the world economy through the multinational corporations, noting:

This is compounded by the ‘brain drain’, which has deprived Africa of thousands of highly trained workers in all fields. The World Health Organisation (2006) says that more than 25% of doctors trained in Africa work abroad in developed countries. About 30,000 highly skilled Africans leave the continent each year for the United States and Europe. Still according to Archbishop Ndungane (2006), in the US alone, African immigrants are the highest educated class in the range of all immigrants [...] there are over 640,000 African professionals in the US, over 360,000 of them hold PhDs, 120,000 of them (from Nigeria, Ghana, Sudan and Uganda) are medical doctors. The rest are professionals in various fields – from the head of research for US Space Agency, NASA, to the highest paid material science professors (Ibid).

Another positive side to unification is that most of us have lived in one or another African country such that we understand each other’s cultures, languages, systems and it won’t be difficult for us to move into each other’s territories. East Africans can now travel within the region using only their national identity cards. East and Southern African leaders aim to establish a customs-free trade zone this year. In West Africa, eight countries maintain a common currency plus a central bank; in Central Africa, six more do the same. There is something we have to appreciate with the integration that has already been happening in our regional blockings, through organisations like COMESA (Common Market for Eastern and Southern African states), EAC (East African Community, which

has already mooted the creation of the east African federation as noted already), ECCAS (Economic Community of Central African States) , ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) , SADC (Southern African Development Community), and north African states. Although these organisations were not specifically formed to help integration into one union but more of what they have achieved can now help us towards uniting the whole continent into one country. As-Tendai Mwanaka (2015) have argued before in his essay, *NEO-COLONIALISM, RACIALISM AND IMPERIALISM : New forms of slavery toward a United States of Africa*, in *Zimbabwe: The Urgency of Now*, this opening-up and close-working together we have fostered in our regional blockings has resulted in creations of united regions, especially in the SADC, Southern African region, where in any one of the southern African countries you can find a sizable number of all the other countries' populations in the region represented well, and a good example is South Africa. Mwanaka, thus, suggests:

Another way to make it happen is for us to move into each other's territories, and make it our homes. Let's marry (people and ideologies), let's fuse, and let's integrate on our own. Look at what is happening between Zimbabwe and South Africa, or just the entire Southern African region, even though most of it is not happening due to our free will, but the two people, Zimbabwe and South Africa, or the people of Southern Africa are becoming one nation. We need that for us to move forward with this dream. It's not the leaders in the Southern Africa who are creating this infusion, it's the people, and the leaders are forced to implement rules to accommodate this phenomenon, to the benefit of us all (Mwanaka 2015: 163).

Ajibola Adigun, arguing on the vacuous pan-Africanism of the old and on how we, the people of Africa, can wrestle this dream from our reluctant leaders and make it a living reality, also notes:

African leaders were too protective of the small post-colonial fiefdoms and where it failed in delivering political integration it failed even more in delivering economic

integration. To this day Africa remains the most fragmented continent in the world. Pan-Africanism needs a breather from the esoteric pages of bureaucrats in the African Union and a new meaning to the popular theme in summits where African leaders are gathered. It needs to be freed from human planning and be left to human action. This was how it was in pre-colonial times when the trans-Saharan trade was without border restrictions. And the borderless transmission of ideas and values of the peoples of Africa through the entertainment industry is how it should be (Adgun, 28/09/2014).

Thus we have the good groundwork to forge ahead with a concerted, focused integration of the continent into one country using what we have already achieved with regional integrations.

These regional communities were created to work together to foster trade and economic development across particular regions. And also as you can see, several countries are members of two or three blocs. These economic groupings offer groups of countries the opportunity to work together for shared prosperity and understanding each other, or even understanding regions. I will give an example of Zimbabwe which belongs in the SADC grouping, in which it also deals with a minor South African Customs Union, for other countries in SADC are in this union (South Africa, Lesotho, Swaziland, Namibia), then it is also in COMESA, a grouping that includes countries from the SADC, ECCAS, EAC, and north African states like Egypt, thus it also deals indirectly with issues to do with these groupings that it is not a member of. Other than trade and economic development these groupings have also expanded their mandates over the years with for example the SADC, ECOWAS, and EAC creating *almost governments* that have most structures of governance, like courts, election courts and laws, armies, ministerial councils which has helped in diffusing potentially explosive situations in these regions. I will give the examples of the Kenyan hotly disputed 2007 election, the Ivorian 2010 elections and Zimbabwe's disdained 2008 elections which were managed by structures in these regional groupings so that they didn't degenerate

into full conflicts, through negotiating for the creation of government of national unity. Although we can argue whether these deals have been good or bad for democracy but we can't ignore the peace dividends they brought and how we can use these structures to forge ahead and create a continent-wide union.

But for us to continue with these trade blockings until they eventually work themselves into countries is time wasting, odious, retrogressive, and a tedious journey, with some regions like the central Africa region and north African states (Morocco is not even in the African Union) having little progress to talk of now, thus might take too long to really start accruing progress towards integration in those regions, and towards federal Africa. Even in those regions that have had progress, like the east Africa, west Africa and southern Africa regions, there are a myriad other issues that have resulted from this regional integration that is hampering the uniting of the whole continent. *Liesl Louw-Vaudran* notes some of these issues in his online essay, *United States of Africa achievable*:

Some critics, however, say the multiplication of overlapping institutions within the AU framework is hampering some of the existing structures and adding unnecessary costs to the unification project. Members of COMESA are also members of the Southern African Development Community or the EAC... This includes xenophobia in South Africa, where African immigrants have been targeted. Also smacking of xenophobia and a lack of solidarity is the fact that some countries, like Zambia, initially reacted to the Ebola crisis by closing their borders. The situation in Libya and the cruelty inflicted upon desperate migrants trying to flee to Europe is another setback for integration (*Liesl Louw-Vaudran*, May 29, 2015).

We can learn from the European Union integration. The EU has made many mistakes in its history and is paying the price now, especially from the Greek economic problems. The African economic communities have the opportunity to learn from these mistakes and create institutions tailored to their specific context to foster long-term economic growth and political stability. Over all this time, as these groupings have earned the trust of the citizens of the member countries, we can now be able to work together and

promote stability across the continent for generations to come. There is a clear opportunity to build institutions that will promote unity across the continent.

Let us underline once again that the unification of Africa can bring up impoverished nations through sharing resources and the means to work these resources. The standard of living in Africa is across the board the lowest in the world. The outputs of this are highest rates of poverty, disease, and infant mortality. The causes of these conditions are often attributed to the legacies of colonialism and lacking the development and advances of the rest of the world due to their subjugation under colonialism. The current attempts of increasing productivity and the standard of living are stifled by dependency and indebtedness on foreign loans and paying interest instead of development. The problem of development is that you are stuck with the resources you are given and your ability to leverage those resources. But with unification, you share resources and grow the means to utilise those resources, specialise, and be a function member of a market. This has been the trend of the past half century with the creation of new economic spheres: NAFTA, EU, ASEAN, AU etc. But these loose trading groupings worked well in Europe and North America where industrialisation and economic growth has already happened. These, like the old OAU, and newer AU, can work in the short term for countries in Africa that have a large population but no resources, or countries that have resources but lack development or means to develop them such as being landlocked. What we need is for all these countries to unite to be able to share these resources toward industrialisation and growth.

Conclusion

In this chapter, we have proposed and argued for a United Africa for the good and betterment of the people of Africa. We have noted that absent of outside intervention, the way for Africa to improve itself is to throw away the attachments of the legacies of colonialism and make a united front to reduce and even do away

with conflict, improve stability, overcome poverty, increase the standard of living, reduce deaths to illness and really stop the world from feeling bad for Africa and the African people. We believe the only way Africa can really rise from its blows and legacies of colonialism is through a shared identity, a unique interface with the world. Let's not be fooled, this world will be multi-polar. China is poised, India, Brazil, Russia is playing catch-up. See the mighty Europe struggling to be free from the US, thus uniting to increase trade among themselves, and ultimately walking towards being one country so as to compete with other huge countries in the 21st century and beyond. European countries know for sure that they will soon be nonentities if they continue trading as separate countries in a few years' time. We conclude with an advice that makes no mistake, if we do not unite as Africans, we are condemned to be vassals forever. Our Unity will be about existing with any form of dignity in the world of tomorrow.

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African Democracy Vis-A-Vis Western Democracy: Afrikenicating, Follyfying, Expibasketizing, and Reversing the “African Democracy” Debate

Peter Ateb-Afac Fossungu

Let me salute you all with this idea of mine that no idea that is aired is useless. What I think is unfruitful is an idea that is not aired or made known. Sometimes (if not often) it takes a small or little idea from one head to provoke or nourish a grand or big idea from another head. So, fellow ... [Africans], never think that your idea regarding how our dear ... [Africa], could be made even grander (or on any issue whatever) is not big or important enough to be aired.

Of course, not all ideas that are aired would end up being acceptable to all and sundry. But that is quite a different matter from saying that only ideas that are to be acceptable should be put forward. By the way, how on earth are we to know whether or not an idea is to be welcomed favourably except by actually tendering it? (Fossungu, 2013c: 124-25).

Introduction

A lot of people are afraid of controversy. But some of us just love it; because, as Funnyman once put it to me, *genuine intellectuals* do learn a lot from it. For those who are unfamiliar with Funnyman,¹ just don't worry because he is surely going to be with us a lot in this chapter which *might* not have been written. In April 2015 I had completed and submitted manuscript for a book that is 'Dedicated To The Millions Of Children Undeservingly Suffering Solely

¹ For more on this authentically African wisdom-box, see generally this writer's *The HISOFE Dictionary of Midnight Politics* (Fossungu, 2015a) and *Africans and Negative Competition in Canadian Factories* (Fossungu, 2015b).

Because Of The Scheming Of So-Called Parents, Fortified By The Complicity Of Canadian Institutions’ (Fossungu, 2015d) and my principal idea was just to concentrate all energies to making sure that my five scattered-around children do regularly meet to know themselves as siblings.

But on May 19, 2015, I opened my email to find that I had been invited to contribute to this book. At the time, I was almost on my way to Dolbeau-Mistassini for the ‘Forest University Programme’ popularly known as *Saison 2015*. I had planned to think anything *bookish* only about three months after *Saison 2015*. That is, from February 2016 onward. But the book chapter invitation had clear deadlines: (1) for submission of abstract (20 June 2015) and (2) for complete draft submission (30 August 2015). Leafing through the suggested sub-themes,² two very obvious things dawned on me. The first was the firm belief that this book’s captivating themes could not go by without some perspectives from the Forest University – an institution that is also called the HISOFÉ (Higher School of Four-Eyesism) – to spice up those from city-based Universities. Who fails to see the great value of cross-pollination here? And the second was the stance that no one would be requesting my participation in such a significant venture unless they have strong beliefs that I would have something interesting to say on the topic(s).

Yes! I have said two but take as the *third* (which could still be swallowed up in the second) the passage opening this chapter, which came re-ringing loud and clear to me; making it pellucid that we badly need a ‘Power Shift’ (Matthews, 1997) and that no one

² Which are: The political, social, cultural, economic and educational growth in Africa; The state of democracy in Africa; Africa and the politics of development; Sustainability in Africa; Democracy and development in Africa; Democracy and good governance in Africa; Western democracy vis-a-vis African democracy; Relevance and efficacy of African indigenous systems and institutions for democracy; Contemporary “African law” and politics; Politics and knowledge production in Africa; Possibility of sustainable institutions of governance and development in Africa; Indigenous institutions and governance in Africa; and African governments and prospects for achieving sustainable development.

who has anything valid to put forward on the ‘Shifting’ subject or process would lack the time to do so. As I have indicated several times, there is absolutely no need to struggle with your ideas (a thrash-about usually coached in the *Lack of Time Theory*) when you are truthful or authentic. You see a lot of this embarrassment with so-called African heads of state and of government (who are only so at home with *journadictationalism* – Fossungu, 2014: 119) before Western journalists who pose impromptu questions to them. A genuine talker (to spare *intellectual* some trouble for now) must certainly be aware of the fact that “if you have anything to do or say, just do or say it and let others worry later about how you have done or said it” (Fossungu, 2014: 104).

That is largely what I am about doing in this contribution that is particularly tilted in the direction of ‘Understanding and Appreciating Ambiguity, Deceit and Recapture of Decolonized Spaces’ (Mentan, 2010) – granted that some of those “spaces” have never been *decolonized* in the first place. The chapter argues essentially that what is needed indeed in Africa in guise of sustainable democracy and development is *Afrikentication*, and not an ‘African Democracy’ wrangling. I take this stance because the ‘African Democracy’ mirage or sing-song seems to be precisely what is preventing a truly *Afrikenticated* system of communal management that the continent is in dire need of, to be able to unshackle itself from the externally fabricated and imposed forces of regression. These negating forces are most often also embedded especially in *lielisticalism*. If we were not talking African experiences here, I would have asked you to delete this new terminology (*lielisticalism*) and replace it with ‘distorting theories on/from Africa’. In the present context, of course, such a substitution is out of the question; it being in place with “Fossungu’s dazzling capacity to invent, define and use a multitude of new terminological constructs informed by African experiences” (Fossungu, 2015a: back cover). The topic at hand is replete with a lot of *lielisticalism*, a term which doesn’t accept any *s* at all for the plural. It is like beef or meat.

Afrikentication, on its part, defines a tendency for Africans talking a renewed and vigorous pride in their *Africanness* – free of all

or most of the artificialities and stereotypes that have been *attached* to being African. Short and specifically, it entails our “just being bold and staying true to who we are: African” (Fossungu, 2015a: 195). We cannot attain this objective until we learn not to see our African values only through other foreign values. Sub-name it with whatever you may, such as “Donating for National Pride” like President Paul Kagamé in Rwanda, or ‘Re-thinking Development in Africa’ (Tsey, 2011) based on ‘African Belief and Knowledge Systems’ (Mawere, 2011) or ‘*Sur la philosophie africaine*’ (Hountondji, 2013); but the essential attributes remain: African pride and self-help; not paying too much attention to Western and other labels. That is why “I argue in this book (as elsewhere) for a system of governance that synchronizes with the African peoples’ realities (rather than just a useless copycat)” (Fossungu, 2013b: 108). As Nelson Madiba Mandela more fascinatingly put it in his answer to a question (from a Black American business woman) seeking to know if his future government would be communist, capitalist, or both, “We don’t care whether the cat is black or white as long as it can catch mice” (Koppel, Part 1). If you now ask me to give you a one-sentence write-up of this chapter’s position, then here it is: I think Africa needs more Paul Kagamés now than ‘African Democracy’ debaters.³

³ I am just hoping that Kagamé is building a legacy that would outlive him. That is, that he is preparing the younger generation to continue with what he has pioneered. Short, that he would be a good pioneer, properly defined by some experts “as someone that begins what she starts principally with the interests of others in mind, not just her own self-aggrandisement. As such, this type of pioneer not only creates but knows as well how and when to pass on the torch; appropriately creating opportunities for successors to excel and surpass her record. Briefly put then, a good pioneer’s motto is ‘Shine and Let Shine’; knowing that her job is to create a suitable and solid base upon which others can continue building or erecting skyscrapers rather than the bungalows she has been able to build. Her job is not to do everything to the end: except she wants to be the *bad* by being there forever or remaining the only one, a tyrant. Can we even really correctly talk of a pioneer X or Y until she has one or more successor(s)?” (Fossungu, 2015a: 72; original emphasis).

The larger portion of the ‘African Democracy’ debate has tended to be mere Westernized distractions geared towards precluding the realization of *Afrikentication*. That is, the obliteration of the possibility of Africans *reverting* to their authentic communal management systems which are truly incompatible with Western *grabbingmania*,⁴ and were supposedly destroyed for purposes of colonialism and subjugation and more. Like Religion with which it is constantly tussling, Democracy too has its own comforting deceptions (see Fossungu, 2015b: chapters 3 & 4; 2015c generally). As we may all know, there are various ways that the concept has been defined. But this study employs the classical description of Democracy from Pierre Pactet as ‘Government of the People for the People by the People’ (cited in Fossungu, 2013b: 18 n.16) to demonstrate (1) The Folly in ‘African Democracy’ that leads us to (2) The Real Meaning of ‘Western Democracy’.

The folly in “African democracy”: Roles of expibasketism and intellectualism

I have already done much lecturing on intellectualism in *Democracy and Human Rights in Africa*, a book that “is a general but pin-pointed critique of both the academia and the political elites in

⁴ This terminology is inspired by an informative doctoral research that I have been privileged to peruse. “Labelled ‘land-grabbing’ in the media,” Semie Memuna Sama writes in her impending University of Ottawa doctoral dissertation, “foreign agricultural investments in Africa have sparked much public squabble, in which robust positions are taken on the advantages and disadvantages of such investments. Some contestants are more enthusiastic about this new wave of investment, embracing it as the panacea for global environmental, economic, and social problems. Nonetheless, others are less excited about foreign agricultural investments. Opponents argue that such investments can disenfranchise local Africans, especially those in agricultural setting, leading to landlessness, food insecurity, and death. The dichotomous debates about such investments eventually reveal opposing visions on how to effectively balance the multifarious relationship between promoting economic development and environmental protection on the one hand and upholding the environmental rights of subsistence African farmers on the other” (Sama, forthcoming).

Africa with respect to the myriad of dishonest and confusing postulations that they have been and continue propagating to date” (Fossungu, 2013b: xi). The intellectuals of Africa, in my view, have largely been asking the wrong question (‘what does the West want and would accept’) and not the essential query of ‘What, in effect, do Africans want and how do they achieve it?’ That is to say that, like those of them in Cameroon vis-à-vis the numerous One-Manish Concepts,⁵ we have similarly sat around and complacently let others define who we are rather than us taking the lead in letting these others know who we actually are.⁶ Like Dr. Alvin L. Killough, a Cultural Ecological Psychologist at the University of Minnesota in Crookston (cited in Fossungu, 2015a: 195), I do believe that only Africans can truly define what being African is. But why wouldn’t non-Africans take to their popular *lielisticalism* when we are giving them no sign that we even know exactly what we are made of? Isn’t it high time this escapist and *lielistical* trend be reversed?

Escapism and *lielisticalism* brought down to the topic of discussion, Dr. Piet Konings of the African Studies Centre in Leiden in The Netherlands has categorized my *Democracy and Human Rights in Africa* as “a provocative but masterful study of federalism in Africa” which “provides us with many constructive building stones for the creation of truly federal states in Africa” (Fossungu, 2013b: back cover). If Democracy is actually about securing and

⁵ I am here alluding to Cameroon’s 1961 Federal Constitution “(which I see as the firm base of the country’s one-culture multiculturalism, one-man democracy, and one-state federation, and several other One-Manish concepts) [and which] has been so unnecessarily praised by most of the intellectuals for its solid human rights guarantees that, today that Cameroonians are fervently seeking and yearning for democracy and the respect for human rights, there are persistent calls ‘for a return to the 1961 Federal arrangement and Constitution’” (Fossungu, 2013b: xi-xii).

⁶ That mainly elucidates why most of their postulations “on the issues would appear to be very apologetic in regard of the rights-toying authorities in place or those that preceded them; and (in)directly linked to the foregoing, very sheepish and only reminiscent of what has been castigated as rank nostalgia – including the uncontrollable urge, especially within the academia and media, to only always paint angels out of colleagues or mentors” (Fossungu, 2013b: 224).

protecting human rights in governance, as theorized on page 224 & *passim* of the said book, then there is nothing like European Democracy, American Democracy (except you are referring to that of the USA, and not the American continents), let alone Asian Democracy. So, why this inelegant (or *millingbo*-like⁷) talk of African Democracy when, moreover, there is no *African* Government? Similarly and reinforcing the point, there is nothing like African Human Rights since human rights should be universal to the human race – which justifies the existence of a Universal Declaration of Human Rights, not a First World or Second World declaration of human rights (Fossungu. 2013a: 240). What is it with African minds then? I would here try to see if the roots of the *follyfication* can be traced to and pinned on (a) the complexity of *expibasketism* or/and (b) “the disease known as *pioneerwantism*” (Fossungu, 2015a: 72) or the un-*Afrikenticated* claim to patriotism?⁸ In the bid to define and expose intellectualism and its (un)availability, I will briefly examine (1) *Expibasketism* and the *Afrikentication* of Patriotism, and (2) the HISOFÉ Independence Messages from Pretoria/Bamako-Kigali.

***Expibasketism* and the *Afrikentication* of patriotism**

Expibasketism is a complex concept, although not exactly being like “the Cameroon (Federal) Republic [which] is itself so confusing and has confused so many people that it is simply difficult to clearly make a distinction between the intellectuals that are behind this confusion from those who are mere victims of the disorder” (Fossungu, 2013b: 173). You clearly cannot live in a *Confusioncracy* without being confused: unless you are a firm practitioner of *expibasketism*. *Expibasketism* is surely composite but not confusing and its practitioners have advised us to just consider it as the

⁷ *Millingbo* “is Bangwa for ‘things that make you laugh to breaking point’” (Fossungu, 2015a: 39). Of course, democracy must not involve only governments; but that is the definition of it that is being employed in this chapter to bring out the folly in the *continentalization* of democracy, especially for Africa.

⁸ *Follyfication* is the noun from *follyfying* in the title of this chapter and has to do with the art of showing the folly or nonsense in something.

science of drawing from one's experience in the field to be able to connect some dots that would otherwise be hard to link up (Fossungu, 2015a: xiii). Multifaceted as it certainly is, whatever it is that you practise, just do not refer to it as *expibasketism* if you cannot call a spade a spade, nor enjoy "[o]ne of the greatest gifts in life [which] is the ability to be able to stand up and say what you have to say, without fearing that someone would accuse you of taking sides" (Fossungu, 2015a: 74). This is true since one of the fundamentals of the *expibasketical* science is that *A Lie Is A Lie And Is Not Good And Bad Depending On Who Is Its Author*. Call that *The Lie Theory*, if you will. Briefly, this science is not helpfully unavailable only to the visionless (see Fossungu, 2015a: xiii) but as well to *nonoselfists* (Fossungu, 2014) and those who cannot handle the truth generally and more especially their own truth (Fossungu, 2013c: chapter 1; 2014). Quite accurate this is since "the greatest ingredients of my success in life [with *expibasketism*] has to do with the fact that I squarely confront the truth about myself as well as about those I deal with" (Fossungu, 2015d: 39).

Political Correctness is nothing but organized hypocrisy. It does not have to be politically correct but *correct* to be correct. That is the unlearnt lesson that Mandela taught Ted Koppel, as well as all of us (as you will see in this chapter). Listen to Madiba right now as he baffles the American pro-Israel political elites (championed by Mr. Siegman who made the nit-picking comments) on Ted Koppel's interview:

As far as Yesser Arafat is concerned, I explained to Mr. Siegman that we identify with the PLO because, just like ourselves, they are fighting for the right of self-determination. I went further, however, to say that our support for the PLO does not mean in any way that we do not recognize the right of Israel to exist as an independent state, legally. We have stood quite openly and firmly for the right of that state to exist within secure borders. But, of course, as I said to Mr. Siegman in Geneva in August, that we carefully define what we mean by 'secure borders'. We do not mean that Israel has the right to retain the territories they conquered from the Arab world, like the Gaza Strip, the Golan Heights, and the

West Bank. We do not agree with that. Those territories should be returned to the Arab people.

I also explained to Mr. Siegman that in our organization we have Jews. In fact Mr Gaddafi didn't allow us to open our offices in Libya precisely because we had the courage to say to him: 'We work with Jews in our organization'. And he didn't allow us to open an office until February this year; whereas he had to accept us as we are. We are not prepared to be pushed around by anybody. We have an independent policy which we assert no matter with whom we discuss (Koppel, Part 1).

The logical conclusion or powerful theorization then is that, with an outlook like this on life, "you will hardly have problems facing the truth and with others because you will know as well that telling them that they are what they are not, will never make them what they are not" (Fossungu, 2013c: 2). Thus, the DLT has no place and value on the *expibasketical* table.

The Dirty-Linen Theory (DLT)

My use of 'theory' in this chapter (like in most of my writings⁹) is *caricaturized* most of the times since we are talking about lies that, obviously, are still 'open to question'. "Ordinarily," Professor Bernard Nsokika Fonlon tells us, "when a suggested explanation is held to have been satisfactorily proved and to be no longer open to question, it becomes a theory. A theory, therefore, is a hypothesis that has been confirmed or proved definitively" (Fonlon, 2009: 56). This cannot be true of the DLT and neither can the DLT fit into *Expibasketism*. Those who cannot handle the truth are wont to hide behind the saying that we should not be exposing our dirty linen in public. Nay, I say; because if it is dirty it is dirty and hiding it from public view would not transform it into clean. The fact that it is

⁹ For example, 'The *Grand Frère* Theory from Cameroon to Africa' (Fossungu, 2015a: 43-64); 'The *Tree-Top Habitaters* Theory: Non-Africans Africanizing while in Africa?' (Fossungu, 2015a: 179-195); and 'The *Halfotwof* Logic Justifying the American Either-Or Race Theory?' (Fossungu, 2015b: 96-98).

dirty is even the more reason for it to be exposed *mafenly* (morning, afternoon, evening & night) so that steps can be taken to clean it up.

Truth-Haters Going to Cameroon to 'Consommer Camerounais'?

I hear (and know) that the state of Israel and Jews just don't tolerate any criticism of Israeli policies and actions. Cataloguing the number of Western politicians and other prominent personalities that have lost their posts just daring to raise a finger in the matter would fill hundreds of volumes. But I wouldn't mind advising anyone who doesn't like what is oozing out of *The Truth Machine* to speedily go to Cameroon. Why? Simple: Because this Truth Machine, like *Madibalism*,¹⁰ does not succumb to censorship, its source notwithstanding. For those thinking that censorship and book banning do not exist in 'Western Democracy', I have got news for them because Foerstel (1994) would quickly announce to us that they are daydreamers. Or, were you really asking 'Why to Cameroon'? That one too is so easy, if you are one of those who is aware of Peter Vakunta's apt description of "this terrestrial limbo" as "Mimboland aka Cameroon."¹¹ Thus, that is where the haters of truth would very easily find bottles to get into and cork themselves away from the sweet-bitter Truth (to adapt from Aretha Franklin's very touchy *Sweet Bitter Love*).

I know you are legitimately wondering why President Paul Biya is not already inside one of these bottles. Is it because he can handle the Truth or *Fossungupalogy*? Stop kidding yourself and I will clarify things to you. It is very simple as well. Biya just does not see the numerous bottles since he does not *consommer Camerounais*. Period! Don't begin asking me what the president consumes but instead be

¹⁰ This concept derives from Nelson Madiba Mandela (as you have just lightly seen above but would be immersing yourself into in the second part under *Madibalizing Koppelism*).

¹¹ See <http://www.langaa.net/Stories-from-abakwa.html> (Book review). "If only I could find the inventor of this opium called beer, s/he would no doubt have a good taste of the pains of Jesus' cross!" (Fossungu, 2015a: 103).

finding out for yourself why/whether a ‘patriotic’ leader would boastfully mount the podium and disdainfully instruct the rest of us with “*Consommez Camerounais!*” while he himself would be using non-Cameroonian goods and services. I would not even want to waste time telling you that a patriotic leader would rather be saying *Consommons* (which includes him/her), because s/he would just do it and the others, being aware of it, would just do the same. Just look at the way President Amadou Ahidjo popularized the African mode of dressing called *agwada* or *boubou* both at home and abroad, to get the point right. You hardly found his ministers and other government officials ‘in suits under hot sun’, as some critics have put it.

That is, however, not to say that Ahidjo consumed *Camerounais*. If he did (as he should have), I am sure he would still be in power today and, therefore, not dead. Is the story not out there that President François Mitterrand actually fooled him out of power by simply passing through Ahidjo’s French medical doctor in Paris? That is, that the French doctor told President Ahidjo that the African had just a few weeks to live and should constitutionally hand over power before dying in order to avert the confusion that would ensue in Cameroon, since no procedure for succession was then available. Oh! How these ignorant Africans think the Whiteman’s lie is never a lie! As my late father (Chief Forbehndia aka Emmanuel Nguajong Fossungu) would put it, they simply believe that the Whiteman is God or has “already read *The Book of Life and Death* to know” who will die before who (Fossungu, 2013c: 28). I am sure you would better appreciate Chief Forbehndia’s “wisdom that sometimes bordered wit and prophetic sarcasm” (Fossungu, 2013c: 28) if you realize that the book narrating it “provides the reader with a uniquely African philosophical perspective of cultural fusion” with “[t]he author mak[ing] a great effort to draw respectful contrasts and comparisons with Western and African community models” (Coding, 2013). And, in Dr. Piet Konings’ words, the book “is a fascinating story” that “provides the reader with a number of useful insights in the complicated African family relations, which are otherwise difficult to acquire from

standard scientific and more specifically anthropological literature” (Fossungu, 2013c: back cover). Can you then see just how farsighted my dad was in regard of these ‘leaders’ that do nothing other than going around the world *idiotickerizing* Africans?

What is even more incomprehensible is the fact that these African presidents would have ‘referral hospitals’ at ‘home’ with very qualified doctors but would only trust foreign doctors to be able to take care of them. Why? *Consommer Camerounais* Indeed! Patriotic Leaders In Deed Indeed! You think ‘regular (dict)elections’ are so important in the sustainable development game? Our kings/queens were never elected (being hereditary) but who would want to gainsay “on the human rights protecting features of the political institutions in African before the arrival of Europeans” (Fossungu, 2013b: 113)? Who, for example, ever “elected” Kagamé to power in Rwanda? But, because of his love of the African people, and more precisely his country, he has, in less than ten years, transformed Rwanda not just in terms of infrastructure but also mentality-wise. Today, for example, Rwandans no longer see themselves in terms of Hutu and Tutsi but simply as Rwandans. Rest assured that one-fiftieth of what this *unelected* president has done in a very short period would never be performed by Advanced-Democratic Biya of Advanced-Democratic Cameroon during his one hundred years in power.¹² How else does one explain this except by Patriotism and Independence, as you can see in more details in the *Afrikentation* of patriotism?

¹² You can clearly see that “since 1982 Biya has been in power whereas during that same period the United States of America has had five presidents, with most of them having been re-elected for a second four-year term; France (itself that is propping them up and forcing all these dictators on Africans) has had four presidents; and Ghana in Africa has seen four presidents. So just tell me how Ghanaians are ever going to give even an iota of one ear to Cameroon’s talk of African unity when the ‘advanced’ President Biya talking to them is equal to four plus of their presidents? And when, moreover, they can see the very shabby way Biya treats the English-speaking in Miniature Africa?” (Fossungu, 2013a: 70).

Afrikenticating Patriotism

I will use two major narratives to perform the task here: (1) Listing of African Patriots Thesis, and (2) *Fofanaing* and *Loloing* Head/Face Covering

Funny-Paafinizing the Listing of African Patriots Thesis

I have already talked a lot about patriotism as a formidable force for nation-building in *Democracy and Human Rights in Africa* (see Fossungu, 2013b: chapter 2). But let me discuss it again with you here from another controversial angle known as the *Listing of African Patriots Thesis*. To get you ready for it, I must indicate right away that in Africa the authentic never goes around making a lot of noises about being authentic (South Africa's Madiba, do I hear you well?). That is the job of the unauthentic, which largely also justifies the prominence of advertisement in the Western world (see Winter, 1997), with the United States in the lead. Just hear some Presidents of the Republic (PORs) in Africa making the fuss they are known for making and you would have grasped the points being advanced here. When has Paul Biya ever visited a village (other than his own, Mvogmekka, that is now the practical capital of the country) or visited Cameroonians abroad to listen to their suggestions and concerns? In the same vein, Mwanaka (2015) has argued that President Robert Mugabe (who regularly 'wins' elections) claims to love Zimbabweans, to die for them but never visits them in their localities to see what they are really dealing with on a day to day basis. Paul Kagamé, on the other hand, is well known for doing all these things and more.

What other terminology than FUSS would describe the fact that a country's capital's economy is grounded for weeks simply because a POR like Paul Biya is about to make one of those his endless *private* visits to *his first home* in Europe?¹³ And the whole same

¹³ As some critics have indicated, Paul Biya went to Bamenda (capital of Savannazone) "and very haltingly made this simple phrase that many critics say he must have been rehearsing for about five months: 'Bamenda is my second home'..." (Fossungu, 1998a). Noting the strange reaction of "the hand-and-bottle-clapping beer-drinkers" (Fossungu, 2015a: 103), the four-eyes man could not help regretting that "Rather than pose the question as to where the

scenario would be repeated the week he is returning from his two or more months *private* stay abroad, with the people being forced to line the streets to clap him back into his ‘second home’ in Africa!¹⁴ Authentic things, as I have said, do not need any publicity for any sensible person to recognize them for what they are. Full Stop! This fact which also goes into defining our Horizontal Democracy can be concretized through a reading of both *Madibalization of Koppelism* and *Obamacaring Exceptionalism* below in the second part.

Coming squarely to our list thesis, I think no listing of African Patriots would be complete (or not be artificial) without names like De Klerk and other Apartheid architects. Some of you would obviously find this thesis outrageous until you reflect on this *paafinizing* question that is derived from Funnyman. Would the world have known about Nelson Madiba Mandela or “this rare human being with a South African tag [who] could pardon and embrace those on the frontline actively and brutally fighting to eliminate his crusade for a just society” (Fossungu, 2015a: 183) and

president’s first home was, Anglophones (in particular) and Cameroonians generally were only so happy and thankful to the Almighty above that a ‘whole president’ (the almighty below) went to Bamenda and spoke English. It is as if there was another single short paragraph thereafter in that whole long French speech in that other language – apart from the closing crooked voiced: “Thank you very much!” (Fossungu, 1998a).

¹⁴ According to the critics, “most importantly, if the president (or prime minister, as the case may be) of a country should declare the country to be his second home, should anyone not only be right in presuming that he,, is a national of two countries with the ‘first home’ country taking precedence over the other? Would that other Cameroon in Europe be the first and authentic home then? Where actually is home?” (Fossungu, 1998a). To the last query, it has been postulated that it is home to these African dictators only when they are absolute in it (Fossungu, 2015a: 3). For example, “I have discussed article 23 of the Federal Constitution that made the legislation-making role to belong *equally* to both the President of the Federal Republic (PFR) and the Federal National Assembly (FNA). The PFR seems not have been happy about this unequal equality which meant he was not as total as *pleins pouvoirs* permit or mean.” (Fossungu, 2013b: 174). So he speedily changed the legislation-making formula and became the sole legislator; a fact that also “clearly points to the fact that the ‘Glance Palacers’ [or parliamentarians] are not there representing anyone but their stomachs” (Fossungu, 2013b: 180)

other South African Patriots/Heroes: had he/they been dealing (like the *Upécistes* of Cameroon) with their fellow Blacks ‘in power’? That is truly some real *Paafinization* from Funnyman, don’t you think? Why and what do you now think is responsible for the apartheid regime’s comportment towards the members of the African National Congress (ANC)?

Simple enough to anyone who has been to the school of *Paafinization*, alias the HISOFE with a peculiar *programme d’études* that some would boldly think “all African schools need to institute and make a compulsory discipline: if the vandalized continent would have to be awakened to its realities” (Fossungu, 2015a: xv, xi, & back cover). The regime in Pretoria was an independent one. It could therefore decide on *what* to do with its own political opponents without any instructions from abroad.¹⁵ Just hear what happen(ed) in Cameroon, for instance, to comprehend what I mean. It is an open secret that President Ahidjo, when instructed by his *Champ d’Elysée* masters to wipe out (*à la Blaise-Compoaré*) fifty *Upécistes* (whose brand of independence Paris just couldn’t handle), would go ahead and add his own proper fifty (making it a hundred or more) in order to impress on the master, without whose active backing he would not be there ‘doing the wiping’ in the first place. “So where... [would be] the patriotism and sincerity on the part of these African leaders who are more than ready to unnecessarily spill the blood of their own citizens at the behest of a foreign power?” (Fossungu, 2013b: 165).

So, also tell me now if *Afrikentification* can ever take place without independence and whether that autonomy can come without

¹⁵ Mandela confirmed the thesis here when questions were posed to him as to what he considers the West could do to hasten up the *de-apartheid* process. He warned that the West should stay clear since Mr. De Klerk was sensible enough to know that the only aid he needed was from the ANC. If the West did anything or appeared like doing something, he concluded, they would only be killing (rather than helping) the De Klerk government that the Afrikaner Party was already accusing of doing what it was doing (negotiating with the ANC) because of instructions from Britain and the USA particularly (see Koppel, Part 1).

patriots/genuine intellectuals? Authentic independence is crucial because, without freedom/independence, *Afrikentation* is just as useless as is a genuine African being able to publish manuscripts with realistically African perspectives (like the present one) without African-sensitive and African-based publishing houses. I can and surely would write a whole book just *expibasketizing* this thesis; but for now you can still rely on Cabral *et al* (1998). Genuine intellectuals, mark you, are self-made, not appointed. That is, you easily recognize them even without the titles which, to them, shine only (if not mostly) from under (Fossungu, 2015a: 15-18; Fonlon, 2009: 101-102). I am not at all saying that officially recognizing intellectualism is a fruitless venture. It is not that entirely; but the enticement to move from an authentic intellectual to a bootlicking, *bellytical* ‘intellectual’ is a real danger in that exercise. That justifies in a sense the *Titi-Pierrization* and *Fonlonization* of genuine intellectualism.

Professor Bernard Nsokika Fonlon would certainly not be talking of the *Genuine Intellectual* in the title of his recent book (Fonlon, 2009) if he did not mean to dissociate this category from the fake or what others describe as “the IPM (intellectual in process manipulation)” (Fossungu, 2013a: 157) or as ‘*titillators* rather than educators’ (Le Cheminant and Parrish, 2010: 1). I have already used *bellyticians* in *Democracy and Human Rights in Africa* (Fossungu, 2013b) to describe fake politicians.¹⁶ That term would also have aptly captured fake *academia*ns. But I have avoided the term here not just because politicians already have it pinned on them. It is mostly because, having been to the enlightening *Funnywisdoming* Lectures,¹⁷

¹⁶ Having elaborately shown how the country’s politicians creating myriad of political parties are just after ‘politics of the inside’, the critic in me questioned, for instance: “When political parties exist for no other reason than bellytics, what is the guarantee that even the presidential system that people are acclaiming as the best system to prevent instability, would work and not become also nonsensical?” (Fossungu, 2013b: 172).

¹⁷ “This man is indeed very funny (justifying his name too) but not stupid at all. I have unsuccessfully tried to make him tell me what he studied in school and to what level, with him often asking back whether he has to necessarily have gone

I am convinced that intellectuals are not restricted to the academy, as most people are wont to think. We have them in several segments of society: for instance, as singers, comedians, publishers, actors and actresses, bush-fallers, you name them. Longue Longue of Cameroon who sang *Ayo Africa* would now help us in defining them. Longue Longue thus sings that a genuine intellectual would, like Titi Pierre, ‘not ask for a salary before doing what is good for society’. Some would prefer to call him/her “an Uncompromising Critic” (Tangwa, 2011).¹⁸ A Genuine Intellectual then, I am inclined to think and add, does not necessarily require a formal classroom setting to *intellectualize* or, to use Professor Dan Lantum’s celebrated definition of their role, ‘to illuminate his or her milieu with the improvement of the common good of humanity as his or her goal’ (cited in Fossungu, 2013a: viii-ix). Fonlon (2009: 101-122) would protractedly describe the Show as “Dedication To The Common Weal.” Permit me now to leave Africa’s notorious “Cameroon, a so-called ‘bilingual’ country where one-sentence judgments from one-man unijural and unilingual courts are the rule” (Fossungu, 2013b: 174) and take you instead to MYR or the Forest University for *expibasketical* concretization.

Fofanaing and Loloing the Hijab (Head/Face Covering)

This has to do with the very heated *Hijab* or *Face-Covering Argument* between Fofana of Guinea and Lolo of Haiti. The Guinean, obviously a university graduate, came to the kitchen one evening during supper and wondered aloud to me why the

to university and the like to acquire wisdom. That question observably always shuts me out of my ‘cunny-man’ discovery strategy” (Fossungu, 2015b: 8).

¹⁸ “If the intellectual, as I have defined him, is to be unflinchingly faithful to his role, that is, to be the untiring seeker of the true, the good, the right and the beautiful and their dauntless defender against falsehood, evil, injustice and Philistinism; if he is to be the principled non-conformist, or as I have baptized him, the gadfly and goad of society, risking ‘the frown of the great’ and ‘the tyrant’s stroke’, he must acquire a will of granite, must possess or cultivate a more than normal caliber of courage. Indeed, without fearlessness, without the readiness to die, to lose all if need be, no thinker-scholar, however high his talent, can ever make an impact on his community” (Fonlon, 2009: 96).

Canadian political elites would even be contemplating the voting of a law to ban Muslim women from wearing the *hijab* that covers their faces: when there is a multiculturalism law in place in the country? The Haitian jumped in immediately before I could start saying a thing. I did not interrupt him because the wise don't usually do so since they learn a thing or two even from the so-called 'stupid ones' or the Quick-Jumpers (Fossungu, 2014: 116-118). Lolo was so mad and postulated that the said law should be speedily passed because these Muslim people are hiding behind their so-called religious culture to commit crimes without being able to be identified. It was getting to fist-raising when I calmly inquired from Lolo why no one is talking of a law to ban Jews from wearing their small pope-like hats. His quick response was that it was different because it does not cover their faces.

Being of Haitian origin, I then indicated to him, you must, of course, be aware of the Ku Klux Klan (KKK), right? He agreed. These are clearly people who hide behind the KKK attire to behead and lynch black folks in America. Don't you think, Lolo, that your argument should be directed more to the KKK than to the Muslim women? Why has no one ever talked of enacting a law against the KKK attire? It was truly a tranquillizer for Lolo and many others like him – the good thing being that, all involved realized that I (unlike Fofana, in the eyes of some) was not here 'taking sides' as a Muslim person. Fonlon (2009: 99) advances the following as some of the foremost qualities of a genuine intellectual: "devotion and fidelity to the True, the Good and the Beautiful, an insatiate thirst for knowledge, life-long devotion to its quest, intellectual detachment and independence, indifference and immunity to the enticements of pleasure, wealth and power, humble openness of mind, a will of steel, a fearless heart, [and] deep concern for the fate of man." A person adorned with most of these traits must be quick to grasp the HISOFE independence messages radiating out from some unbelievable angles or quarters in Africa.

The HISOFE Independence Messages from Pretoria/Bamako-Kigali

After the *Poisonous-Snake* lecture (see below) was kind of over, Funnyman asked a question that led to another HISOFE lesson. What I like about Funnyman is not only that he contributes when I am lecturing about, but, above all, that (being a teacher and a student who was very fond of it) I can tell when he is asking a question because he wants to prompt more enlightenment from when he does so because he does not know the answer. He is very unlike the others who just listen and laugh without grasping anything. This only adds to my doubts about his *francophoneness* since “most of them are very good at laughing at their comedians and not what the artist is saying; nor do they even get the *fossungupalogistic* or trunk-cutting message. Hear them all over Francophone Africa laughing at Cameroonian Jean-Michel Kankan’s sketches without any grasp of the man’s messages. When are we going to listen and think and not just listen and laugh unnecessary?” (Fossungu, 2015b: 7).

For instance, one of them told me in the course of the Snake Lesson below that I was very funny and I responded with: “Just wish that your African presidents were a little *funny* like Mandela [19] – we wouldn’t be here so stressed up and cutting Western trees, but instead contributing our own quarter to national and continental development in various ways, including cutting but African trees to shed more light in the dark forest!” Everyone almost died from laughter. Another then perkily observed that “If Africa should one day have a strict president like this one here, I am sure no one would drink water in that continent!” I quickly took the time to correct him on two fronts. First, I indicated, you will not

¹⁹ Someone is talking to him about the efforts of the Apartheid regime in bringing about the end of apartheid and other such ranting and the response of Mandela (who clearly giggled at the suggestion) is: “I do not consider your remarks as a lecture to me.” This is because, as he went on to explain, “you would know that it is the ANC and not the government that has compelled the government to sit down and talk peace with us” (Koppel, Part 1).

only drink a lot of water then but healthier and cleaner water than what we now drink in the West. True; because, with strict and indiscriminate application of rules and regulations, no one will mess around with anything. Second, I am looking forward to an African King, not president, since we have already seen what the mess the Western introduced presidents are. There will be a King/Queen of the Democratic Kingdom of Africa (DKA) who, like Chieftainess Mantsebo of Lesotho (as Marc Epprecht tells us), was much liked by her people because her style of rule was based on the theory that ‘A chief is a chief by the people’, ‘a person who listens well and judges according to the will and advice of her people’ (cited in Fossungu, 2013b: 113-114).²⁰ Yes! Lesotho is *inside* South Africa! South Africa, does the rest of Africa even hear you well?

The ‘South African Experience’: Equivalence of ‘Canadian Experience’?

Much, and I mean much, has been written and said about the South African ‘African Crisis’. Most of those I have listened to (Africans) find only fault with the South Africans’ action of chasing and even killing other Africans in their homeland. I am here talking about African *bush-fallers* here in MYR with me, most of whom are university graduates, and especially lawyers who are supposed to be masters of “the study of that body of rules, whether customary or formally enacted, which a state or community recognises as binding on its members or subjects for the preservation of public harmony and welfare and the promotion of individual good” (Fonlon, 2009: 79). Don’t ask me why these university *diplômés* are instead in the forest cutting trees: unless you want to be frank enough (which is very good) to want to publicly admit that you haven’t read the portion of *Africans and Negative Competition in Canadian Factories* titled

²⁰ I have already more extensively surveyed some pre-colonial African kingdoms and also used the political set-up of the Bangwa in Cameroon in *Democracy and Human Rights in Africa* (particularly in chapter 3) to demonstrate how and why Africans need to fall back on their authentic highly de-concentrated governance system(s) in order to move forward

“Canadian Experience My Foot” (Fossungu, 2015b: 134-38). Could the South African ‘Crisis’ not be the *Canadian* equivalent of “South African Experience”?

Liberate Yourselves First Before Coming

I am not here going to join the chorus of RIGHT or WRONG. But this is what I make of the South African Show, though not entirely endorsing the manner of staging it. Their message seems to be as follows. ‘When we were struggling to end apartheid, you guys never were there for/with us. Now, we don’t need you to then come in free-riding. What we need from you, fellow Africans, is for you to go home and (also) liberate yourselves from (neo-) colonialism and then come so that we could thence unite to safeguard our independence and so on.’ There is no doubt that most of Africa got involved in the freeing of South Africa. But the fact remains that most of the *hommes de la rue* (common people) do not see it that way. And these common people are mostly the ones being used in the ‘African Crisis’. Whatever the case, only these South Africans can tell me if I am wrong in grasping their message. But isn’t it justly ironic that this important HISOFE message be largely emanating from the followers of someone (Chief Buthelezi) that was willing and ready to play *marionette* or puppet to the apartheid regime?

Just listen to Mandela’s response to the Chief’s fake appeal to him to talk to him from America. The genuine man first made it clear that he hates the “washing of our dirty linen in a foreign country” before lengthily addressing Buthelezi as follows:

One thing I would like to dispel with all the force at my command is that there is no difference whatsoever between myself and my organization on the attitude toward Inkatha and yourself in person. If I have not seen you, it is because of decisions which we have carefully discussed amongst ourselves, and of which I am part. I, however, would like to repeat what you know. I have said on numerous occasions I would like the ANC and the Inkatha to sit down and resolve our problems and end the violence that is going on today in our country. But you know as well as I do that the

question is no longer simple. The government has taken advantage of the differences between my organization and your organization. They are using these differences for the purpose of trying to eliminate the ANC and what they consider to be members of that organization who are a threat to white supremacy. That is now our problem. It is no longer just a question of me meeting you. I have asked Mr. De Klerk a simple question. I said to him: ‘You have a strong, efficient and well-equipped army and police force. Can you tell me why the government has failed to suppress violence in which almost 4000 Blacks have been killed?’ Mr. De Klerk has never been able to give a satisfactory answer to my question. I have told him; I have given him the answer. I have said to him: ‘You have not suppressed this violence deliberately because you believe that by using these differences between the two organizations you can crush your enemy number one – the ANC. That is your difficulty and I must repeat to you that that is the main problem facing the people of South Africa: It is the involvement of the government and its police in the violence that is taking place in Natal’ (Koppel, Part 1).

Isn’t life just so full of irony? Would it be sarcastic to visualize a ‘French-speaking’ African country liberating the continent from neo-colonialism – Rwanda or Senegal? But what is the paradox in it even when the legendary liberator of this continent (Cameroon) is still a Francophone country? Is Godfrey Tangwa not then justified in “believ[ing that] the time has come for Cameroon to graduate from a country over milked by mediocrity and callous indifference, to the paradise that it was meant to be to the poor and downtrodden”²¹? Or, is the *francophoneness* what is holding Africa back since the real patriots of that liberator (the *Upécistes*) have been *all* eliminated? Would similar patriots now emerge from some unexpected corner of Francophone Africa?²² Of course, that is the

²¹ <http://www.langaa.net/No-Trifling-Matter-Contributions.html>.

²² For more light on this query, see *Understanding Confusion in Africa* (Fossungu, 2013a); but, if that is such a long distance to go, see *Funnymania that is coming up* shortly.

natural thing to expect because, even if Anglophone Africa is independent (Longue Longue still doubts here), it is not it that has to liberate Francophone Africa or anyone else.

Enjoying Funnymania or the Beginning-End Puzzle

The foregoing theory is being built on Funnyman's thesis that has struck a huge chord in my head and I am still struggling to grapple with its whole significance. I read somewhere on the Internet (the Langaa RPCIG website, I think) that Senegal has recently followed Rwanda's steps by abandoning French for English. I don't know what happened but I made the error of discussing this with an Ivoirian called Adama Koné, substituting Ivory Coast with Senegal. Adama just could not accept what I was telling him, saying that "I could even have believed you a little if it wasn't Ouattara (but Gbagbo) who was at the presidency." At this point I got a 'revelation' from my Africa-wise man. I am talking about Funnyman whose thesis has left an enormous reflection gap in my clock-ticking head. He stated, in regard of the Ivory Coast issue under discussion, that "If France could one day abandon (for whatever reason) its colonies in Africa in the same way as some of them are now abandoning the French language and culture, there are two that it would be more than ready to create a Fourth (and up to even a Tenth) European World War to be able to cling unto: Cameroon and Ivory Coast." Incredible!

I found the thesis very puzzling and quickly reminded Funnyman of his also theorizing on many occasions that "Everything that has a beginning must also have an end." This Funnyman is funnily sagacious and the testimony is in his reply that was not hesitant in coming: "Don't we say that God has no end? Does that also mean that He (if it is actually not a She) had no beginning?" Well, I was not about arguing over something I don't exactly know. It should be noted that there is a Christian prayer that talks of a "world without end" whereas there was, according to them, a beginning of the world; with God even resting on the seventh day. Does God really get tired? Also, if 'God created man in his own image', as Christianity preaches, then woman was created

in whose image? I cannot pretend to know all that. But what I know for sure is that liberating Francophone Africa is the task of Francophone Africans, not that of South Africans. That, I suspect, is the gravamen of the South African HISOFE Message that most of us are not quite grasping; instead chasing the shadow as the real thing passes by unnoticed. That would seem to kind of reiteratively justify Fossungu's theory that the science of Four-Eyesism is a discipline that all African schools would need to institute and make a compulsory subject: if the vandalized continent would have to be awakened to its realities. With that discipline readily handy, the misapprehension in regard of Boko Haram would be lightened up.

Boko Haram in Halloween Costume?

Boko Haram is said to have taken its roots in Northern Nigeria and spread to other African countries. A lot of us have simply been brainwashed into equating Boko Haram with al-Qaeda or terrorism. I am not going to get into the semantics of the organization (if it could even be called that) here but simply to make a point very obvious. If the French are being applauded for imposing their way of life on Malians, a priori, we should be applauding even more some Malians (under the banner of Boko Haram) that want to impose a way of life on Malians that *they* think is the 'Malian way of life'. People have pointed blindly to the fact that Western media justifies the French violation and savagery on the basis that Malians were happy with the French action. But did the same Western media tell us just how many Malians were happy with the Boko Haram action? Does Kigali have a clear response to the quiz, perhaps?

President Kagamé appeared on Rwandan television to warn that any Rwandan seen in Halloween costume would be sent to jail. Why did the United States (that is best associated with Halloween) not get in there to chase the Kagamé regime out of Kigali? It is also uncomplicated indeed. Rwanda is not a colony of the United States of America, nor is it willing to play one with any other Western country – its having abandoned the French language for English attesting strongly. Talking of playing subservient or *nchinda* roles,

Kagamé would not even receive instructions also from the Ugandan ‘Strongman’ who (it is said) almost single-handedly aided him to grab power in Kigali. ‘No aid with strings attached’ seems to be the man’s watch word. As you already know, no African leader would seem to assert this policy more vehemently than Mandela.

That explains why the Western plot to *Mogabelize* Kagamé²³ failed to achieve goal when the Rwandan *Chief* turned to his countrymen with the innovative ‘*Donating for National Pride*’. As you will also see in *Obamacaring* Exceptionalism in America below, when you rely exclusively on the banker, there is no way you can play hard ball with him. You just cannot act independently of the banker unless you have alternative means of financing your proper projects. Professor Tatah Mentan in 2010 put it this way in his *The New World Order Ideology and Africa*: “The ideal from the Lending Agency viewpoint is to get an African country maxed out on loan to the point that it actually operates all of its government and the nation on LOANS. Once that goal is achieved, you basically have a never ending crop of FOREIGN EXCHANGE from helpless and hopeless African governments and people.”²⁴ All that would sort of explain why Africa is finding it really hard to stay clear of this mirage called Western Democracy.

The real meaning of “Western democracy”: The colonizers’ club?

Asif Hassan Qureshi (cited in both Fossungu, 1998b: 44 n.182 & 2013b: xviii) would appear to be correct in suspecting Democracy to be a Western mechanism for the imposition of its own value system. This critic is right, I think, because the idea is even not practised in the West as we are made to believe: unless you are naive enough to view only ‘the existence of regular elections’ as what James Patrick Winter calls “Democracy’s Oxygen” (Winter, 1997). That being the case (as it is) what then is Western

²³ That is, strangle him financially as they did to Robert Mugabe (and Zimbabwe) in order to bring him to his knees.

²⁴ See <http://www.langaa.net/The-New-World-Order-Ideology-and.html>.

Democracy all about? The shortest but clearest response could be that the concept “is just there to camouflage that the 99% being exploited has some sort of protection against the 1% that has them under chains” (Fossungu, 2015d: 56). Like it or not, that is the reality; otherwise, is there also “a Western Government” to also validate the employment of ‘Western Democracy’? It is a big fat NO that shows up.

Take the *United States and Canada Geography Quiz*: Is the ‘Western’ concept or phrase meant to distinguish from Eastern (non-) Democracy? If so, is Western then really Western when it encapsulates a lot of non-Westerners? If Western Europe is obviously the pivot then check out this geography quiz. Going west of West takes you to East (Remember that Alaska used to be Russian). It is then hard to see why North America (which to them, excludes Mexico – see Fossungu, 2015c: 43-46) is Western. Oh! I could now see the point! We did not go west of West enough to put us in the East, just as Africa is not in the East because it didn’t also go east of West enough? Granted that that is the principle (which still does not convincingly explicate the exclusion Mexico from ‘Western’), what about the *Queendoms* of Australia and of New Zealand? These two candidates of the Club are in the East but are in ‘Western Democracy’, just like the *Ethnocracy* called Israel which is not in the West but the Middle East! What kind of Democracy is even practised in Israel when Arab-Israelis are not considered as citizens? A Democracy Indeed! Just like Western Democracy Indeed! Does *Western* then not boil down to include just ‘anywhere that has been hijacked by people originally from Western Europe’? (Remember how Apartheid South Africa was considered to be Western Democracy?)

Upside-Downing Civilization: Multiply the queries, if you will but here is what I think. These ‘Westerners’ would tell you that our African way of life is barbaric and not civilized. I don’t want to tell you to reverse the argument by asking them when in history we have been responsible for starting a so-called ‘World War’, or for the crucifying of Jesus Christ, or been scrambling for other people’s continents? Who else but a barbarian does that/those? I need not

notify you to do that reversal because I know you are intelligent enough to be able to do that on your own. But I cannot afford not to let you know that I would rather we be *barbarically* free than be *civilizedly* in perpetual bondage.

Of course, I need not be the first or only to be telling you about the manipulations in Western Democracy. Others would better talk about the manoeuvrings being called Democracy in the West, manipulations that Ball (2010) finds to be ‘As Old as Democracy Itself (and Sometimes Dangerous).’ While Palan (2006) uses ‘The Offshore World’ to expose it, Wayne Le Cheminant and John M. Parrish declare that,

Manipulation is a source of pervasive anxiety in American politics, and more so today than at any time in recent memory. Accusations of manipulative practices in political advertising, media coverage, and public discourse have become increasingly widespread. Many observers claim that the American public finds itself more and more vulnerable to the manipulative practices of elites, and that the effects of manipulation are becoming more and more damaging to contemporary democracy. Among the host of societal evils which these observers attribute to the rising tide of political manipulation, some of the most egregious include: an increasingly polarized and antagonistic form of partisan politics; an uninformed and apathetic electorate; a consultant-driven mode of election campaigning that frequently exploits public fears and prejudices; a media motivated by commercial values and by the desire to titillate rather than educate; and a policy process that too often seems to produce results of symbolic rather than substantive value (Le Cheminant and Parrish, 2010: 1).²⁵

²⁵ On his part, a University of Tasmania (Australia) sociologist depicts “two inter-related leadership trends in advanced democracies: the increasing prominence of political leaders, and the waning influence of political parties, especially the ideological-programmatic ‘mass parties’ or *Volksparteien*. These trends intensified and reinforced each other over the last 30-40 years resulting in a rapidly changing physiognomy of contemporary democracy. Democratic politics becomes more elite driven, mass-mediated and populist in style than in the past. Moreover, the power and elite structures in advanced democracies, as

What I would rather be doing is accord you what they could not give you: *expibasketizing* those experts' theories. That dot-linking of the *confusioncratic* passing of *Dolarocracy* for Democracy would be exposed through two main heads. The first would show you just how the 1% in this *Democracy* enslaves the 99% while the second discusses some *lielisticalism* that have been fabricated on/from Africa so as to extend and concretize the 1% *dollarocratic* and enslaving grip worldwide.

One-Percent Enslavement of Ninety-Nine Percent

Here I would employ three simple interconnected concepts: (1) *Madibalizing Koppelism*, (2) the *Maximizing* and *Walt-Marting* of the Human Automation, and (3) *Obamacaring* Exceptionalism in America.

Madibalizing Koppelism.

When the world-renowned freed Robin Island Prisoner visited the United States and appeared on Ted Koppel's show, the idea was to make Nelson Madiba Mandela denounce friends (like Gaddafi, Castro, and Arafat) that the 1% would consider to be its enemies. Mandela is just not the type that would be pushed around; not even by Koppel's stern reminder that he ought to be a little bit more political not to offend "the few people in this country" who have the power at their disposal either to lift or impose sanctions on the racist regime in South Africa. Mandela said he did "not understand what you mean. Perhaps I would be able to answer if you clarify what you mean." Ted Koppel then specifically talked about the Jewish population or the One-Percent and Mandela stated that:

well as the electoral competition, increasingly resemble what Weber labeled 'leader-democracy'. This shift towards 'leader-democracy' has coincided with the processes of party-voter dealignment and decline of political parties, the rise of the electronic mass media, and the ascendancy of powerful leaders-reformers in the 'core' liberal democracies" (Pakulski, 2013: 366).

One of the problems we are facing in the world today are people who do not look at problems objectively, but from the point of view of their own interests. That makes things difficult because once a person is not objective it is extremely difficult to reach an agreement. One of the best examples of this is to think that because Arafat is conducting a struggle against the state of Israel that we must therefore condemn him. We cannot do that. It is just not possible for any organization or individual of integrity to do anything of the sort (Koppel, Part 2).

At this point Ted Koppel speedily tried to shut him off but Nelson Madiba Mandela would not be so easily cut off his umbilical cord. The racists in the Pretoria 'White House' weren't able to do so for several decades because *Okoroism* or *Surrenderism* (Fossungu, 2014: 17 & 14-15) is clearly incompatible with *Madibalism*. Thus, Mandela instead very technically and *Christickinologically* (Fossungu, 2014: 51-55) shut his 'shutter' off and *Beautifyingly* or *Civilizingly* (Fossungu, 2014: 118-120) went on to illustrate how;

When few lawyers were prepared to defend us it has been the Jewish lawyers who have come forward to defend us. I, myself, was articulated (I am a lawyer by profession) and I was trained to become a lawyer by a Jewish firm at a time when few firms in our country were prepared to do that. And as I have said, we have many Jews and members of the Jewish community in our struggle, and they have occupied very top positions. But that does not mean to say that the enemies of Israel are our enemies. We refuse to take that position. You can call it being political or a moral question. But for anybody who changes his principles depending on whom he is dealing with, that is not a man who can lead a nation" (Koppel, Part 2).

The standing ovation was just more than anything anyone has ever gotten before. When the ovation finally ended (if it even got there at all *before* Mandela began speaking *de novo*), Madiba very

Chantomaphetically (Fossungu, 2014: 113-114) and *Lion-killingly* (Fossungu, 2014: 34-35) carried on with: “Apparently, Mr. Koppel, you have not listened to my argument. If you had done so, then you have not been serious in examining it. I have replied to one of our friends here that I have refused to be drawn into the differences that exist between the various communities inside the U.S.A. You have not commented that I am going to offend anybody by refusing to involve myself in the internal affairs of the U.S.A. Why are you so keen that I should involve myself in the internal affairs of Cuba and Libya? I expect you to be consistent!” (Koppel, Part 2). As Ted Koppel was saying nothing for a long while, Mandela *Mbinchangalogistically* (Fossungu, 2014: 22-23) helped him out with: “I don’t know if I have paralyzed you or not.” It was only too clear that the *likebewasian* in the American journalist had been washed off by Madiba’s unbending refusal to *moutonly* ‘Americanize while in America’ (see Fossungu, 2015a: 193-195) and Ted had to *ngong-doghy* (Fossungu, 2014: 22) admit it with a handshake and thence *Charalicingly* and *Okoroistically* (Fossungu, 2014: 29-32) avoided further pushy pro-Israel questioning of the Old Sage. The entire interview is a classic in *Afrikentication* and the topics of this chapter but this little excerpt can be enough to make the essential point(s).

Who cannot now see why American politicians and academics are so scared of (objectively) criticizing Israeli policies and the Jews generally? And you would dare to call that country a Democracy? Rather correctly revert it to *One-Percentcracy*. Better still, *One-Percentcrazy*. It is indeed crazy and might necessarily lead one to *Madibalizingly* ask: ‘Why do you think Adolf Hitler and his friends were that incensed in regard of the Jews as to go for the so-called “Final Solution”’? The Bamileke in Cameroon are also referred to as *Juifs Noirs* (sorry *Falashas*, not you this time!), with Willard Johnson having shown how other Cameroonians are so hostile to their ‘money-like comportment’ and other features of Bamileke society (see Fossungu, 2013a: 74). And was the French ‘*Upéciste* Solution’ not similarly aimed principally at these hardworking and ‘real-independence-seeking’ Bamileke? Whatever the case, this is the essential point. The *Hitlerite* system was not democratic when it

scapegoated Jews, just as the uncivilized French who *scapegoated* the Bamileke on the Cameroon independence issue. The American or U.S. system (as the best representation of Western Democracy) cannot also be democratic when the Jews scapegoat anyone who criticizes Jewish ways or Israel. Period! Mandela was very clear on the point when he reiterated that most politicians of the world make the grave mistake of thinking that “their enemies should be our enemies” (Koppel, Part 1). And this dollar-amassing elimination of criticism/opposition is also seen in the calculated creation of human automatons.

The *Maximizing* and *Walt-Marting* of Human Automatons

In ‘Western Democracy’, to adopt from one expert, “man, the individual, is counting for less and less; he has virtually ceased to be a **human being** and has become a **number** – just one among a nameless, faceless, countless mammoth multitude” (Fonlon, 2009: 98; bold is original). James L. Riggs (Professor and Head of Department of Industrial and General Engineering at the Oregon State University) has detailed out how this *moutonization* (thank you Funnyman for the term) works to achieve the well-designed perpetual control of the 99% *moutons* (see Riggs, 1976). I would now *expibasketize* it with *Maximaxation* and *Wal-Martization*.

Western citizens have been so confused with control mechanisms (dubbed advanced technology²⁶) that they no longer use their natural God-given senses. *Moutons* or sheep, they have truly become. Having lived in the brutalizing system for as long as I have, some of us are still able to make good use of our unpolluted senses to tell you some of these things simply “because we were born to be and stay authentic even in the midst of all the artificiality and imitations” (Fossungu, 2015b: 37). Walk into the Maxi grocery store and take a fleeting but keen look and you can confirm what I am saying. You bring your items to the desk for payment. The

²⁶ According to Hampson *et al* (2002: 1), the mental “violence aided and abetted by modern technology is seen on a truly unprecedented scale.”

employee (make it a female that supposedly ‘was not created in God’s image’) has no idea what the prices are. She merely scans them and at the end the machine (the new or modern god) dictates what you have to pay. Big problem for those who don’t watch carefully because the price tag may be different from what the scanning machine “knows” it to be. This is particularly acute in the case of products sold by the weight (\$5/pound or kg, for instance). How are we sure the employee has entered the correct code for the item? Don’t forget the consequences of monotony.

Now the machine indicates that you are to pay \$75 and you tender a \$100 note. But she cannot use her head to know that she has to give you \$25 as your balance, and must wait for the machine. Should the control apparatus say your change is \$150, she would *moutonly* count that amount and hand it over to you! Rest assured though that the capitalist’s gadget is never fashioned in a way that it can make an error at the capitalist’s expense, but only the other way round. It can indicate your balance to be less than what it should be, not more. But the important point relates to the degree to which humans have been reduced to automatons.

I once walked out of a Wal-Mart store and approached an employee whose duty is the collection and arrangement of shopping carts left outside by customers. I asked him if there was a Royal Bank in the shopping mall. He responded with “I don’t know” (*Je ne sais pas*). You just wouldn’t believe that these banks always have their neon signs that you can see from very far. If you are someone that hates using the *Interac* option, the banks have still taken care of your spending propensity by following you around to all spending places live! In that particular mall there were almost all the banks, including conspicuous RBC (Royal Bank of Canada). Give that Wal-Mart guy the benefit of doubt that he was so engrossed in his minimum-wage job that nothing out of it mattered to him. But what would you say about these two young Burundian *bush-fallers* who would not line up in the evening to buy fuel for their machines because they are immersed in the net, texting and the like?

Truly, one expert has described the phenomenon very well as “the utopian community imagined for them by informational

capitalism. Yet this cyber-community of fantasy and play is also a harsh performative workplace where work for even the most privileged and rewarded requires routine ‘overwork’” (Toal, 1999: 150). The next day the two guys who work together in a team (and being my neighbours) were in my *terrain* asking me to lend them some fuel for the day. I gave them the following advice in the place of the fuel they wanted. ‘Your irresponsibility, I can see, is in at least two respects: your cyber-craziness and the fact that no one is leading in your team. I guess you are in a team simply because of the fear of bears, not that you both really want to do team work [see Fossungu, 2015a: 36-41]. To encourage you to be responsible, therefore, I have no fuel to lend to you. What type *débroussailleurs* are you two?’ They left my patch that day very disappointed and maybe stunned. Their other side neighbour, a Malian, “helped” them with the fuel but I am sure they will never forget to get themselves ready for the next day every evening before indulging in their “cyberspatialised world dominated by transnational informational capitalism or what Eisenstein terms the ‘cyber-media complex of transnational capital’ are themselves simplified and overstated, complicitious in some cases with the technologically deterministic hyperbole of that which they seek to criticize” (Toal, 1999: 150).²⁷ And criticize is properly what America’s 1% would further deserve in the *Obamacaring* exceptionalism.

The *Obamacaring* Exceptionalism in America

“For God so loved America that He sent His Beloved Son from Africa to keep America out of the catastrophe that was staring it in the eye!” That could be a neat way of summarizing the *Obamacaring* Exceptionalism in America. Get the gist of it from three simple

²⁷ And it must be noted that the “multinational corporations in the 1960s were virtually all American, and prided themselves on their insularity. Foreigners might run subsidiaries, but they were never partners. A foreign posting was a setback for a rising executive” (Mathews, 2002: 56).

headings: the Unpatriotic Not-Born-Here Cards; the Upside-Down System; and Wonders of the Blackman in the White House:

The Unpatriotic Not-Born-Here Cards

Yes! You can see that Barack Obama was God-sent from the exceptional way he got over all the hurdles of the *dollarocratic* system and other lately invented blocks to his ascension to the White House. Did the founders ever think of a non-White occupying it when they named it? Yes! Tell me what I already know, that Obama has a white parent too! That is more exceptionalism being added to the exceptional man, no doubt; but the ‘Halfotwof Logic’ (Fossungu, 2015b: 98-99) tells us that the Black side is dominant and this is clearly exposed in the man’s *Exceptionalism*. Exceptionalism is a trait that America proudly pins to the chest all the time but would rather not fully embrace now that it is emanating from ‘uncivilized’ Africa. The Black American’s solid *socialist* or people-oriented platform (dubbed ‘*Change We Can Trust In*’) just couldn’t be stopped or sidestepped. As Dr Rosetta Coding has explained my accentuated use of socialism here, “[t]his fact is stressed because in the sphere of the African community, one is never a single individual” (Coding, 2013). The African descendant was surely bringing something truly new to the American Political Football Field and did score a lot like Roger Mila in Italia 1990.

At party-nomination level one of America’s two Royal Families played the Unpatriotic Card and failed. President Clinton wanted his wife, Hilary Clinton, to succeed George W. Bush (from the other Royal Family²⁸) so much so that he declared that Obama was not a patriotic American. (Yes, Mr. Clinton, you are absolutely right *only* if we get the *real* definition of your *Patriotism* here: foolish devotion to the One-Percent.) Imagine all that ‘trashcan stuff’ coming from the Clintons and imagine the number of African children named after that U.S. president! As that *cocksbit* could still

²⁸ If you want to be schooled more on the openly and principled alternating reigning Royal Family(ies) of the same kingdom, then better go to the Buganda Kingdom in present day Uganda.

not bar the unstoppable Messiah, the Republican Party (whose Royal House was about to be replaced) conjured up this brainless idea that the ‘halfotwof’ man was not born in the United States of America. That couldn’t do the trick either. What an upside-down system!

The Upside-Down System (UDS)

If you think that the ‘Royal America’ thesis is not clear enough then take some other members of the ‘Western Democracy’ club. Very close to the United States is the *Queendom* of Canada and, to leave (Western) Europe itself out, the *Queendoms* of Australia and of New Zealand in South-East Asia. Yet, these people would come to Africa and instruct us to destroy our kingdoms, justifying that these aren’t democratic. What is the difference? Is what is good for the gander not also good for the goose? Africans, wake up! What do you call what they then put in its place? The UDS is the idea wherein the *nchinda* or *boy-boy* becomes the king (*chef d’état*) since, by nature, these *nchindas* served without questioning, unlike the authentic African Royals who do. You would thus hear Paul Biya, for instance, ‘chest-beatingly’ declaring to French journalists that “I am the best student of Mitterrand.” (*Vous savez bien que je suis le meilleur élève de Mitterrand.*) That obviously sends the message that Africans can only be Europeans’ students, never their teachers (masters). You see? That is what the UDS is in place to do.

The proof is in the Douala prince (Rudolf Manga Bell, I think) who told the Germans that were trying to order the prince around in his kingdom to quickly return to Germany where they *might* be qualified to order people around. The barbarians called Germans had the prince publicly hung in order to send the clear message of their savageness to the entire kingdom or country. Just imagine now a royal like that being a POR in any of the African states; not the *nchindas* we now have *nchidaing* the French, and, therefore, turning all of us into the Whiteman’s *jackass*. Lapiro de Mbanga, do I hear you well? Longue Longue has put it very well in *Ayo Africa*: “Cameroon di workoo, France di chopoo; Nigeria di workoo, Angletrrre di chopoo; Zaire di workoo, Belgique di chopoo; Guinée Équato di workoo, Espagne di chopoo;

etc.” The entire brain behind the UDS is summed up by ‘When I have the *Chef d’État* in my palm, I unquestioningly have the entire republic at my disposal to screw around with’ (Fossungu, 2013b: 122).

Wonders of the Blackman in the White House

The situation appears to have been the other way round in America, with the Royal White Families doing all to bar the Black Messiah who still entered the White House and began caring for the multitude (99%). Obama’s detractors, yes, you are absolutely right! Obama Cares for the general public and earnestly wants to find and administer a lasting cure for the ‘Madness [that has been technologically injected] in the Multitude’ (Hampson *et al*, 2002): You of the 1% don’t care about anyone else and that is what you camouflage as Democracy. Ten years of the Obama White House have exposed a lot of the One-Percent’s enslaving tools. If Americans are sensible people, they won’t let the Obama legacy die so easily. Imagine what the USA would be today if any war-mongering Republican president had succeeded Bush, and you might begin to grasp the theory I am here advancing.

Of course, some American intellectuals have not failed to embellish this fact. For instance, on ‘Ending the War in Afghanistan’ (Biddie, 2013) and elsewhere Obama has been hailed for “exiting the wars without leaving dangerous messes behind (Indyk *et al*, 2012: 32). Obama’s ‘Forward Engagement’ has contributed enormously to giving America a break with free-riders as well as changing its bully-like composure/perception. “Forward engagement, as this approach is called, does not mean policing the world or letting other countries free-ride on U.S. security guarantees.... Rather, forward engagement means leveraging the United States’ biggest strength, the ability to lead, while encouraging others to share the burden” (Flournoy & Davidson, 2012: 55). As I have already said, countenance America with a Bush-like president in Obama’s shoes. Some Brookings Institution experts have said it so well when they assert that “A president less open to soothing the international community might have become a lightning rod for

global frustrations, and Obama deserves more credit than he commonly receives for avoiding this outcome and helping keep a catastrophe at bay” (Indyk *et al*, 2012: 31).

Also look at the *Crisebacological* and wise way Obama handled the Mortgage and other Economic crises, leading observers to ponder ‘why those responsible for creating the problem never saw it coming’ (Hindmoor and McConnell, 2013). Who else with the never-ending money grabbing propensity would have done better? Look at the way Daniel W. Drezner in 2009 praised Obama’s pragmatism in not playing hard ball with one’s banker – China, that is (cited in Fossungu, 2015a: 15). Can I even sufficiently catalogue the cases? Let’s crown it up with *Foreign Policy*’s caption “Who Is More Obama than Obama?” in which it is indicated that “Politicians around the world would love a piece of Barack Obama’s popularity. So, a few are campaigning on their proximity to the U.S. president – both real and imagined.” Three cases given to illustrate the point are: Nicholas Rajula of Kenya, Claudio Henrique dos Anjos of Brazil, and David Lammy of Britain.

The Black Messiah was able to save America and very *Mandenguelovistically* and *Susaglamouringly* (Fossungu, 2014: 13-14 & 32-34) win the rest of the world largely because “Surrounding himself with experienced cabinet members who are not personally close to him, along with junior advisers who are close but not experienced, Obama has kept the conceptualization, articulation, and sometimes even implementation of his foreign policy in his own hands. Intelligent, self-confident, ambitious, and aloof, he is more directly responsible for his record than most of his predecessors have been” (Indyk *et al*, 2012: 30). Stephen M. Walt, for instance, has praised Obama’ “return to offshore balancing” (Walt, 2011: 15). He goes on to explain that the abandonment of that strategy “forced the United States to keep thousands of troops in Saudi Arabia, sparking Osama bin Laden’s ire and helping fuel the rise of al-Qaeda. The Bush administration compounded this error after 9/11 by adopting the even more foolish strategy of ‘regional transformation.’ Together with the ‘special relationship’ with Israel, these ill-conceived approaches deepened anti-

Americanism in the Middle East and gave states like Iran more reason to consider acquiring a nuclear deterrent” (Walt, 2011: 15-16).²⁹

Because of all what Obama was doing to alleviate the sufferings of the American masses, unfounded accusations and *lielisticalism* were directed at this son of an African by the mouthpieces of the one-percent. For example, “[h]is balancing act [or *Ritaian Crisebacology* – Fossungu, 2014: 24-29] has pleased few and provided fodder for Obama’s critics. His compromises have been interpreted as signs of weakness, and his inability to produce clean outcomes in short order taken as an indication of incompetence. His efforts to engage competing powers have seemed at times to come at the cost of ignoring traditional allies. Above all, his approach has caused some to question whether he has a strategy at all or merely responds to events” (Indyk *et al*, 2012: 30). The Forest University is certainly replete of fake theories on Africa or anything African.

On Lielisticalism (on/from Africa): The Forest Snake-Mosquito and Other *Shitting* Narratives

As the aforementioned University of Minnesota Cultural Ecological Psychologist (Dr. Killough, that is) has put it, in reviewing a book on the stigmatization of this continent, Dr. Emmanuel Fru Doh’s “work is honest, authentic and forthright in all its accounts on how stereotypes of Africa have been applied; moreover, misapplied through excessive and purposeful distortions by the West.”³⁰ To *fleshify* Doh’s painstaking work, I would have liked you to first eat before using the toilet. But sometimes the end becomes a better beginning, justifying why I want us to kick-start *Lielisticalism* with *shitting* business. Don’t we realize that *shitting* before a meal creates more room for easy ‘wiping’ of the food that

²⁹ For further readings on the Iran Bomb, see Waltz (2012); Hymans (2012); Kroenig (2012); and Eldelman *et al* (2011).

³⁰ See <http://www.africanbookscollective.com/books/steorotyping-africa#sthash.XrDgmSOR.dpuf>.

is put before you, like I did as a teenager in order “to have him [my brother, Bernard] come clean of his pretence” (Fossungu, 2013c: 100-101)? I would therefore discuss three principal *lielisticalism*, in this order: (1) the no-shitting theory, (2) the poisonous snake thesis, and (3) the mosquito narrative.

The No-*Shitting* Theory

On July 7, 2015 I had Fonlon’s *Genuine Intellectuals* (that I had ordered) delivered to me in the MYR Camp in the evening by the company owner who had received the package in the Head Office in Dolbeau-Mistassini. I spent the greater part of the night reading it and by early morning of July 8, I was unable to respect my alarm’s call to order. Everything thus proceeded later than usual. As I was about boarding the School Bus, I realized that I did not have a roll of toilet tissue for the day in my bag. I therefore ran to grab a pack of four and headed for the bus directly with it in my hand. A group of guys almost simultaneously asked: “What is that?” “What do you need that for?” And many more of such stupid queries from the pretenders! My reply was “What do you think it is? It is for doing what you are pretending not to know or do. Do any of you need one? Because I have here more than I need for the day.” Two guys (Mahamadou of Mali and Diallo of Guinea) admitted they had forgotten to put one in their bags and happily receive one each. Almost at the same time again two of the questioners stated that they don’t excrete or *shit* on their patch because when they do, they don’t easily *get out of it* (finish it, that is³¹). “You are my exact opposite!” Funnyman cut in abruptly. “I quickly finish my *terrain* only when I have *shit* on it!” How come? Asked the perplexed others. “Because I want to get off the smell of *kaka*: just as I would have liked to speedily get off this Bus that is jammed full with your

³¹ I now begin to see why these guys would rather stealthily cross over to a neighbour’s patch to *dot* it (in Funnyman’s words) with their “*purge-belly-shittings*” (Fossungu, 2015b: 19).

smelly lies and pretence!” Yes! Funnyman, you are my man, for sure!

Funnyman’s statement set my mind thinking about the possible *source* of the ‘*ka-ka* plus overdue stay in terrain’ theory. Could it be from the all-white *contremaîtres* who obviously “hate to repeatedly step on *ka-ka* when they *marcher un terrain* (or cross-check if it is finished and well done)” (Fossungu, 2015b: 20)? I suspect this because these white folks seem to have lots of *lielisticalism* to prevent the (unthinking) black folks from doing the natural things that do not fit into the former’s exploitation agenda. Who hasn’t heard of the *African Monogamy Story*, for example? That is, that it was introduced as a means of easily hijacking the continent in the Americano-Australian style? The number of Europeans arriving to populate the continent could just not outstrip the indigenous population (in spite of the wanton slaughtering that both Ian Robertson and Noam Chomsky would better describe to you³²) since, in a single year (for example), one African man would be having fourteen or more children from his fourteen or more wives. It was therefore imperative that these Africans be ‘civilized’ with monogamy.³³

It is ironic that when the colonizing state needed the church to do its ‘civilization’ mission, the church was at the forefront ‘civilizing’ (destroying) the African and Native American ways of life. Today that the same state no longer needs the church and has begun *civilizing* that institution itself with/on same-sex marriage and abortion we now hear vociferous preaching like Cardinal Wuerl’s condemning the silencing of the church’s voice (see Fossungu, 2015c: 43 & chapter 5). Where was this same church when *Hitlerism* (some call it Nazism) was silencing the voices and aspiration of Jews? Where was the same church when *Bushism* was wantonly destroying the Iraqi people and homeland? Would there have been

³² See, respectively, Fossungu (2013a: 159-160), & Fossungu (2015c: 33-34).

³³ The African trick with this ‘civilization’ tool seems to be found in ‘The Marriage MPPEP Equation: Monogamy Plus Polygamy Equals Polygamy’ (Fossungu, 2015b: 99-103). Smart polygamous Africans, you would say?

the Second World War if Nazism targeted just the Black race, as slavery *supposedly* did? A lie is a lie, not being good and bad depending on who is its author. We, intellectuals, too constantly condemn politicians for feeding the public with lies; but we don't do the same reprimanding when we ourselves tell those lies, whereas we should even be very outright in reproaching in this case. Truly, to reiterate, lies are not good and bad, depending on who tells them. A lie is a lie irrespective of its origin. Since we are here talking lies on/from Africa, I would want you to further enjoy the Snake Tale from the Forest University.

The Poisonous-Snake Thesis

The Lie Theory also greatly reminds me of this theory in the forest that seems to be saying that a Whiteman's lie is not a lie: expressed in the common saying among African *débroussaillieurs* that a Western snake is not as poisonous as an African snake! Yeah! When would this colonial mentality ever be eradicated in Africans? How can that frame of mind be eliminated *before* colonialism itself has been wiped out? Here is what I hear Funnyman funnily telling them (and those who say these poisonous reptiles shouldn't be harmed under any circumstances). "A snake is a snake, no matter where found! I guess you would soon be telling me that a Whiteman's automatic handgun is less deadly than an African's spear or cutlass?" At this point I had to step in to give the witty guy a push; wondering aloud if these brainwashed Africans ever correctly interpret daily news on Canadian television.

First, I found out from them if they followed (*suivre* in their French) a recent news story indicating that a python that was kept as a pet used the keepers' tender children as food? YES was the response. That is good, I said; observing that "I should then suppose that you suppose that the news anchor and his/her team of journalists on the scene *forgot completely* to specify that the python in question had been illegally smuggled into Canada from Africa (like *Afo-Akom* was to the U.S.A.)?" You could read (even with your closed eyes) the amazement on their faces as most of them woke up

unexpectedly to the question's call. I then added this in conclusion. Domesticate these wild animals as much as you can, but that never changes them to anything else than the wild animals that they are. Period! (How I wish someone could help me to just transform these African guys to the wild animals that they are assumed to be!)

That is precisely why, if I should learn that someone in the building or the next has a snake-pet, I would be packing the next instant. Just imagine turning on your spacious bed only to find a serpent charging at you: "Hey, MAN, watch out! Are you oblivious of the fact that I also live here?" I am not sure of what my response would be, but surely know that I would be long dead before it has even injected me with its deadly poison. Adama Koné, this Ivoirian in the Camp again, would completely agree with me here. If you want this West African *grand coupeur* to abandon his patch, just let him know that you saw a snake close to it. Adama would definitely not buy into the Western-Snake Theory, no matter what. This guy simply has an aversion for a *nnou* (that is snake in Bangwa) and must obviously be stiffly questioning the Snake-Theorists why these reptiles are still called *snakes* like those in Africa, rather than some other appellations like *poisonless*? Are we already in the Reverse Gear? If not yet, then consider this other thesis from Funnyman that could *fidatydoningly* (Fossungu, 2014: 117-118) help us out of the forward position.

The Mosquito Narrative

It has to do with those who, according to Funnyman, would hide their personal stupidity through aiding to *idiotickerize* the continent, just like a lot of the so-called PORs do, as amply seen above. They are so tight-fisted that they refuse purchasing products to protect themselves from mosquitoes, instead justifying that these mosquitoes here in Canada (the West) do not give sickness like those in Africa! "At least These Mosquitoes Don't Give You Malaria" is the caption of a *Focus Section* article in *The Globe and Mail* (Toronto) (5 July 2008), F5. This entire newspaper write-up (with lots of photos of some *grands coupeurs* of MYR) has been enlarged to

a half-office-wall dimension and laminated and has become that single thing which conspicuously first welcomes anyone entering the MYR Head Office on 385, rue Boulianne in Dolbeau-Mistassini, Quebec. It is surely the source of the Mosquito Theory being propagated by these African Francophones, most of whom can scarcely even say ‘Good Morning’ (let alone know what it means): notwithstanding their having been in bilingual Canada for ten-and-above years!

Just wait until these Africans fall sick and are asked at the hospital if they have been to Africa lately. The answer to which is often YES, as most of these *bush-fallers* travel there after season, and the unthinking *Adelajonistic-Spoiling* (Fossungu, 2014: 106) conclusion is that they got the sickness there in the Dark Continent. *Lie-lie!* What is even astonishing is that these mosquitoes-sick Africans would completely believe the medical specialist telling them so: completely forgetful of the endless mosquito bites in the Canadian forest – since the Whiteman’s lie (to them) is not a lie! The Mosquito Argument (with Funnyman) was heating up to the point of blow-exchanges, with each side clinging tenaciously to what it saw as the *vérité* and I necessarily had to intervene *expibasketically* to calm the storm and restore or usher in tranquillized use of the mind, using the advanced techniques tale and disease-origin theory.

The Advanced Mosquito’s Advanced Infection Techniques

Having ‘survived with forest work’ in both Africa and the West (see Fossungu, 2013c: 19-25), I told both sides, I think I am in a better position (than experts who are merely acting on the *lielisticalism* in Western books) to clear this uncalled for ‘controversy’. It could be very long but I would try to shorten it. The Western mosquito is more dangerous in infestation than the African one that uses only crude or traditional methods (like the bow and arrow in hunting or war). The Western counterpart uses advanced techniques comparable only to the modern ways of executing the death penalty – injection chamber. I am sure most of you are familiar with the *impermeable* (the dressing also used by

construction workers to quickly signal their presence to motorists). We here in the forest use it as well and it is assumed to be impervious. But not to the Western mosquito that still bites or injects you through it and the other layers of clothing inside it! You have all that amount of coverings on you and think you are covered. Yes, you are covered in a sense but the experienced and dangerously advanced mosquito has long taken care of your covering strategies with its injection-like apparatus that aids it to pour its stuff into you with or without body contact. It is analogous to the white invaders killing the Natives on the Land while still at Sea! As Petit-Pays has put it in one of his tunes, *fais-moi voyager sans décoller!* The African mosquito is clearly incapable of penetrating the human body without direct contact with it; making it less harmful than the other. So, tell me if the medical specialists assuming that the African *débroussailleurs* or *bush-fallers* have brought these illnesses from a temporary visit to the continent ever have “scientific” evidence other than the *lielisticalism*?

It is already in their brainwashed heads that Africa is such a pot of disease that they would rather believe that their laboratory testing went wrong than believe that the tested African is healthy. Having never travelled by air in my own corner called country in Africa jetlag almost killed me with buttocks-down pains when I had reached Edmonton in September 1991. Three days of almost continuous sitting for a teacher who is used to daily standing and pacing around while lecturing. The University of Alberta’s Medical Centre collected my blood sample for testing when I complained of the pains. On the rendezvous day I returned to hear what the problem was, but was instead made to understand that I needed to have my blood taken again because “there was an error” the first time. They pulled a lot of it again from my very healthy body. When I came back the second time, I was not in pains since rest and walking around were just what I needed. When the same bullshit of further testing of blood sample came up, I was categorical in telling them to go to hell because I was not as sick as they were thinking, and clearly did not need their upside-down help. Were they just

filling their ‘blood bank’ with my exceptionally good and royal blood or what?

The Disease-Origin Theory and the Miss Douala Light

Funnyman was truly exhilarated by this lecture but the other side was still puzzling over some connected issues. One of them asked to know (assuming that my mosquito theorization was right) how and why most dangerous and incurable sicknesses are said to originate from Africa? Well, I had this as response to his well phrased query. You can see for yourself that the irresponsible and miserly *bush-faller* was already contaminated in Canada before getting to Africa where he/she (unknowingly) spread the contagious disease before returning to Canada and being diagnosed, with the unsubstantiated claim that s/he got it “from ‘*The Dark Continent*’. Let There Therefore Be Light On The Darkness!” (Fossungu, 2015b: 110). I am so sure Miss Douala wouldn’t mind helping in bringing the required Light.

If you don’t quite get the Disease-Origin point then listen to my encounter with Miss Douala during one of my visits to Cameroon. Notwithstanding that I am a *bush-faller* I always use public transportation while in *mon pays natal* since, as you may already know, all the hefty *bush-falling* cash I make goes almost entirely to the experts of “The Child-Support Business School’ who are well known for using ‘Children as Money-Making Tools’ (Fossungu, 2015d). Returning to Douala from visiting family in Debundschazone, I boarded a taxi in Bonaberi that was heading for *Village* (Douala). One of the four passengers in the back seat of a Toyota Carina, I was flanked on the right by this pretty woman. She was so lost in phone conversation that I suspected it was just a self-alone made-up monologue solely meant to draw attention to her very expensive-looking gadget. As she finished one and was attempting to “dial” for another, I interrupted the routine and asked her if I could kindly have her phone number. The nonchalant answer was: “Sorry, I am married and don’t give my phone number to strangers!” Well, I said, in that case I wouldn’t mind giving you mine even as I know you wouldn’t bother calling me. To quickly

close up this useless intruder, she said off-handed “No problem; what’s the number?” I hastily created a Montreal number and gave to her – 514-XXX-XXXX. What kind of number is this, she asked. It is a Canadian number, precisely in Montréal, I said.

BINGO! The transformation was remarkable. Others go on the net to surf for *sawas* (whites – as the Douala people have it) or those in *mbengué* (the West in the Douala language), *meme s’il a le serpent*, as Eriko sings in his *Njombose*.³⁴ But here was her own *mbenguist* that has cheerfully come to her with no effort on her part! Isn’t she so blessed to be her? I suspect that was her thinking because her phone drama ended right there! Her being married went flying out of the locked window! The conversation assumed an unusual dimension and she even *Lovanglocardistically* (Fossungu, 2014: 60-62) suggested that we should stop at a certain spot *pour prendre un pot* (have a drink). I will leave to your imagination what these drinking spots with rooms “for quick service” stand for.

But just imagine that I had some STD (sexually transmitted disease) to spread around. Now, seeing the ease for me to do so, being just a local-man that has just been to the Western world (*un mbenguist*); what rampage do you foresee a very sick *sawa* Westerner would do in contaminating our population within a very short time? Do these people ever get to undergo medical examination by our own designated medical practitioners before obtaining visas to African countries? We go through all that before regularly getting to their societies but would still not be regarded as healthy (Edmonton, are you not still there?). You can take it from here and continue raising the hell of queries but, not to limit it to Westerners, take too the particular case of these Chinese “Magic Bodies” providing “Cursed Sex” to Cameroonians (Ndjio, 2014). And they are wont to then turn around and say that these diseases originated

³⁴ The expression derives from the stories going around concerning the occultists that Biya is surrounded with. While the *chef* is said to be a lion, some of them are pythons (locally known as *mboma*), etc. It is said that the pythons would lavish all the wealth in the world on a menstruating lady (not to have intercourse with her but) just to sniff protractedly at her *marigo*. That is what they have to do to stay on (forever?), goes the chitchat.

from Africa. Yes, Longue Longue, you are right: Everyone else sees Africa as the dumping ground for their toxins and other ills and a free-for-all looting site: precisely because the administrations in place are not there to carter for Africans but for foreign capitalist interests. For further illustration, I refer you to Semie Memuna Sama's forthcoming research which;

has looked at how G8 and some African nations, international finance institutions, and global corporations are collaborating in major new projects in Africa to restructure natural resource use and create industrial infrastructure over millions of hectares of valuable land. Although the New Alliance is described as development opportunities, especially for subsistence African farmers, this reordering of land and other natural resources is likely to be most advantageous to corporations and client governments. Land and investment reforms seem to be at the expense of regions in Africa whose population remains almost entirely reliant on subsistence agriculture. Most of the New Alliance companies specialize in seeds, machinery, and chemicals, which are most appropriate for big new investors in agriculture and less appropriate for the existing smallholder farmers that the New Alliance plans to assist" (Sama, forthcoming).

Conclusion

In view of this concise dot-linkage, it would be unwise for Africans to continue trying to rely on those who despise anything African to choose a system of governance for them. It would be "TOTAL REJECTION" of the African rights-respecting system,³⁵ as the students of Debundschazone and Savannazone of

³⁵ It has been protractedly shown that "the apparently much more democratic and power-splitting African traditional system even had no such things as 'executive, legislative and judicial' branches; yet, the African king or

Cameroon put it in 1985 (regarding Francophone officials who loathe anything Anglophone). “*Now the simple question we ask is what to expect from someone who condemns a system and is given the opportunity and liberty to select from it? No doubt, total rejection*” (cited in Fossungu, 2013a: 47). What the West would supposedly want Africa to have is even not what is known as Democracy in the West itself but a scheme that promotes and *infinitizes* the theory that ‘As I have the *chef d’état* in my palm, I have the entire country to fuck around with’ (Fossungu, 2013b: 122). And fucking it not just in the normal way of fucking that Africans are used to but through any available “hole” (big or small, round or oblong, different or same, you name it) on the human body! Africa clearly deserves more than that!

I have never been a beggar and never will be one. Especially not one that begs to be changed to be accepted, or to be given what I know I deserve having.³⁶ But, if there is one thing that I would not

chief could not just rule absolutely without effective reference to the effective input of the other recognized institutions and personalities” (Fossungu, 2013b: 169)

³⁶ See, e.g., Fossungu, 2013c: 92-93. If those cases of the 1980s would seem to be quite a long time ago, then you could also add this February 19, 2015 Letter of Application (in response to an advertised position of Policy Analyst) that I sent to Manitoba’s Civil Service Commission in Winnipeg, a missive that also gives you an insight into *lielistical* “Western Democracy”:

Dear Civil Service Commission Head:

I am interested in the above position and am hereby tendering my candidature. I believe I am an appropriate candidate for the post for a number of reasons that go beyond just having the required educational qualifications. I also satisfy some of the special skills you are searching for.

Of course, I am not unaware that I am handicapped in not having the “Experience in policy development, research or program development” and “Experience in leading, organizing or coordinating projects or teams” But the essential question remains: If no one ever hired those currently with these “experiences” insisted on (until they had them), who would you and other employers be hiring now?

I believe I still need to be accorded the chance to demonstrate what I am capable of doing in the domain not simply because of the implication of the foregoing query but other reasons as well. Briefly stated, some of the reasons include:

shy away from begging from the intellectuals and nation-builders of this continent, it is this. Please, let us stop giving these people (our detractors) reasons to think that they are justified in considering us immature. Africa, if you correctly and *four-eyesismatically* read into history, has more mature people than any other continent. Do I need to spoon-feed anyone here? If the need be, then take slavery. Do you think it all began and ended in Africa? The slave traders tried it elsewhere but were unsuccessful because all their

- I am well grounded in law and political science, with graduate degrees in these disciplines (including a doctorate in law) from four Canadian universities – Windsor, Montréal, McGill, and Alberta, my most recent Master's being in Political Science, which is the principal degree being tendered for this post.

- I am very much into scholarly research, as sanctioned by a couple of international academic journal publications and six books on African and Canadian politics and cultures most recently published within 2013-2015 that defy disciplinary boundaries. I also have teaching and research experience in the domains of political science (Comparative Politics) and law (public, administrative, constitutional, air & space). All these solidly provide strong indication of

- Experience in researching, analyzing and synthesizing complex information into reports which may include web related materials;

- Exceptional analytical and critical thinking skills [which] are essential;

- Exceptional ability to work independently, including remotely but also to work effectively and cooperatively with colleagues, clients and other stakeholders.

- Effective writing skills including the ability to adjust tone and reading levels and the proper use of grammar, punctuation, sentence structure, etc;

- Proficiency in computer applications (MS Word, Excel, PowerPoint, Outlook and Internet.).

- I am not only fluently bilingual in Canada's two official languages (English and French) but also very comfortable in its two legal traditions – Civil Law and Common Law.

- A position like the one you are offering (within the Family Services Policy and Planning Branch) is just the type of opportunity I have long been interested in, as can be attested to by three of my six books (as seen in C.V.).

If you are indeed looking for someone who, without all the fanfare, can competently deliver, then I am your candidate for a multitude of other reasons.

Accompanying this Letter of Application is the following document:

1. Curriculum Vitae

Sincerely yours,

Peter Ateh-Afac FOSSUNGU.

“merchandise” had perished in the container called ships before they reached destination ports. Only Africans (Blacks) proved resistant enough and that is why we today know only of this portion of the trade.

Moreover, not only did the Africans arrive alive; they also invented various “instruments” to help lighten up their tedious tasks; but the glory of such inventions went to their “masters” whose ‘property’ these African inventors supposedly were. If you can contact her, Michaele Jean (a Haitian-born former Canadian Governor-General) would better school you on this subject. By the way, which modern day Third World *assistant* scholar, particularly those stationed in the West, would not be frank enough to admit having seen his/her research published under some “big” names in the Domain or University Faculty/Department he/she works in/for? And with no (not even oblique) mention of him/her at all! Has slavery actually been over?

Some of us have refused to succumb to such practices and, consequently, are out of the city-university environment but do happily think for and by ourselves. I am not saying though that all universities are the same but I am at the same time not oblivious of the *One Wow-wow Coco* Theory (see Fossungu, 2014: 79); and simply emphasizing that any of these institutions that would want to have some of us around it must “ha[ve] enough habitable space in your heart that could conveniently accommodate me and my bitter truth” (Fossungu, 2013c: 62). Otherwise, there would be no difference in my eyes between that institution and ‘Western Democracy’ which, at the end of the day, is simply a Colonizers’ Club. At this point, I am sure only the most abjectly ignorant would fail to agree with Professor Dr. Munyaradzi Mawere at the Faculty of Culture and Heritage Studies of Great Zimbabwe University that it is high time we begin the very important task of revers[ing] the common trend, particularly in disciplines such as social anthropology, cultural studies, and ethnology that have a tendency of studying African societies without committing their resources and energies in understanding European and American societies. In the aforementioned disciplines, universities in the West and the

Americas normally send their students and researchers to carry out fieldwork in Africa while African universities hardly send their researchers to study European and American societies. Neither do European and American universities sponsor African students and researchers to come to their countries to study their respective societies. It is in this light that I consider the present work as one that contributes immensely to geopolitics, the politics of knowledge production, and the field of social sciences in general” (Fossungu, 2015d: back cover).

I think, therefore, that Africans had better stop trying to become a ‘Western Democracy’: because, no matter what, Africa going down that path would never ever be able to colonize anyone else (to qualify for entry³⁷) but forever be itself colonized and, therefore, never ever be capable of belonging to ‘Western Democracy’ – not even if this continent is carved a place on that other continent called *l’Europe d’Outre-Mer*. Therefore, it is time, I submit, for us to abandon this stifling distraction (of squabbling over ‘African Democracy’ and over other foreign labels) and focus attention and energies on *Afrikenticating* our communal administration and progress. The watch-word should rather be Independence! Independence! Independence!

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³⁷ This is not to say that it is Africa’s intention to colonize others though. Africa just wants to be left alone to choose its own proper path in governing its diverse peoples the way it sees fit, rather than being steadfastly pushed to pursue what “are only mirages meant to deceive the bed-ridden man that he can actually ride a bicycle when he is let up” (Fossungu, 2013b: 174); what Mentan (2013) ably denounces as ‘Mirage Democracy in Contemporary Africa’.

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Mandela and Coloniality in South Africa³⁸

Ngonidzashe Marongwe & Tinashe Mawere

Introduction

South Africa, and the world, literally came to a standstill on 4 December 2013 with the passing on of Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela, at the age of ninety-five (95). Upon his death, major international news agencies reserved large daily slots between 5 December and 15 December 2013 (and for some beyond) either showcasing his life and/or his death or its commemorations. In addition, more than ninety serving and retired heads of states and governments from Europe, Africa, Americas and Asia, plus leading entertainers such as U2's lead singer Bono and South African actress Charlize Theron and some Hollywood superstars (*BBC News* 10/12/13), attended either his memorial service held on the 10th of December 2013 at the FNB stadium in Johannesburg and/ or his burial in Qunu Village in the Eastern Cape on 15 December 2013. Furthermore, across the world "hundreds of streets, buildings and other community facilities [had or have] been named after [him]..." (*BBC News*, 11/12/13). In South Africa, President Jacob Zuma also announced that the Union Buildings' amphitheatre in Pretoria would be re-named Nelson Mandela and that Mandela's giant stature would be erected at the building. Some countries, such as Nigeria, Tanzania and Kenya declared three days of national mourning for Mandela while in the United States of America, and

³⁸ In a huge way, this chapter is inspired by the discussion on the African coloniality by Sabelo Gatsheni-Ndlovu (2013). It however deploys the coloniality perspective to rethink Mandela's legacy in South Africa. It was also provoked by the worldwide commemorations on the life of the late first black President of South Africa, Nelson Mandela.

several other European countries, flags were flown at half-mast in respect of Mandela (Zezeza, 2013). This was not a surprise because Mandela is idolised as a champion of peace and of the oppressed, a liberator, a saint, a statesman and a model of what African leaders ought to emulate. The latter feature was in relation to embracing the desire to relinquish power, preaching doctrines of peace and forgiveness while at the same time harbouring a progressiveness that is philosophically largely driven by Western liberalism. The adoration of Nelson Mandela was aptly summed up by the then United Nations Secretary General, Ban Ki Moon, who described him thus: “He was more than one of the greatest leaders of our time. He was one of our greatest teachers” and “his baobab tree has left deep roots that reach across the planet” (*Newsday*, 11 December 2013).

But, as Slavoj Žižek (*The Guardian*, 09/12/13) posed: “Is this [...] the whole story” that can be told of Mandela? This chapter raises Žižek’s question further and attempts to build on it and ask other related questions including: what sought of liberty did Mandela bring to South Africa? This question encapsulates what ideals of liberty Mandela brought to South Africa and, with what gains (and losses) and to whom? How else can he be remembered? How else could he have served South Africa? Is it possible to explain the situation of Black South Africans outside of coloniality? How else could decolonisation be realised in South Africa? Why is he depicted as a universal hero? And, in depicting him as a universal hero, is the world not falling into the same trap of deifying Mandela as a flawless leader, akin to the common occurrence on the continent ranging from Gaddafi to Nkrumah to Mugabe to Nyerere to Machel and beyond? These questions are pertinent especially in the light of the continued deep bifurcation of the South African society, between whites and blacks who can broadly be categorised as rich and poor, respectively, reminiscent of the Apartheid days.

In this chapter, we deploy the theory of coloniality to rethink Mandela’s legacy especially through an analysis of the impacts of the human rights language that strongly underpins the South African constitutionalism, the continued presence of structural violence, the

bifurcations in housing and education as well as the racially based unequal employment opportunities in South Africa. On the whole, we posit that this analysis enables an unpacking of those issues that have largely been ignored about Mandela. However, we are mindful of the other challenges that contribute to the perpetration of the racialised status quo in South Africa. These include, among others, corruption that has had an endemic presence in the country ranging from the abuse of social welfare grants, ‘tenderpreneurship’, the arms deal saga and the Inkandla security upgrades. There is also need to acknowledge the difficult transition that ushered majority rule in which the minority government was supported by a strong security services sector, which overall necessitated a shift from unbridled radicalism that Mandela and the ANC had been famed for.

Profiling Mandela

Nelson Mandela was born Rolihlahla Mandela on 18 July 1918 in Mvezo village of Eastern Cape South Africa among the Thembu ethnic group. He acquired the name Nelson on his first day at school (Mandela, 1995: 1-2). However, to many people he was known as Madiba, his family name or Dalibunga, the name that he acquired on his initiation. He joined the African National Congress (ANC) in the 1930s and helped to found the African National Congress (ANC) Youth League in the early 1940s that sought in Zeleza’s (2013) words to “radicalise and rescue the ANC from its reformist politics.” He also became the leader of the ANC’s adopted “Program of Action” in the early 1950s meant to oppose the institutionalisation of Apartheid (Ibid). Between 1955 and 1956 he, together with 155 other activists were tried in Rivonia. Mandela also spearheaded the militarisation of the ANC nationalism following the Sharpeville Massacre in March 1960 by leading the ANC’s newly created liberation wing *Umkhonto we Sizwe* (Spear of the Nation). He spent twenty-seven years in prison from 1963 to 1990 on terrorism charges. Mandela became the first democratically elected President of South Africa in 1994. He relinquished power in

1998 to his then deputy, Thabo Mbeki, after only serving one term as President of the Republic of South Africa. Thereafter he took to a low profile lifestyle until he passed on the 4th of December 2013.

‘Saint’Madiba

It is imperative to re-visit the laudatory terms that President Barack Obama used at Mandela’s memorial service at the FNB Stadium in Johannesburg to describe Mandela in an effort to highlight his positive legacy and cunningly compare and contrast him with ‘other’ African leaders. His words in essence encapsulate the genre of hero-worship that the world has grown accustomed to and which portrays Mandela as a universal hero. Obama also profiled Madiba as being beyond the ‘lower league’ of other African leaders. In a speech that was transcribed in full in *News 24* (10/12/13), President Obama described Mandela, among others:

a giant of history, who moved a nation toward justice and in the process moved billions around the world ... an icon, smiling and serene, detached from the tawdry affairs of lesser men ... He was not a bust made of marble; he was a man of flesh and blood - a son and husband, a father and a friend. [And] In the arc of his life, we see a man who earned his place in history through struggle and shrewdness; persistence and faith. He tells us what’s possible not just in the pages of dusty history books, but in our own lives as well.

Furthermore, he said:

Mandela demonstrated that action and ideas are not enough; no matter how right, they must be chiselled into laws and institutions. He was practical, testing his beliefs against the hard surface of circumstance and history. On core principles he was unyielding, which is why he could rebuff offers of conditional release, reminding the Apartheid regime that, ‘prisoners cannot enter into contracts.’ But as he showed in painstaking

negotiations to transfer power and draft new laws, he was not afraid to compromise for the sake of a larger goal. And because he was not only a leader of a movement, but a skilful politician, the Constitution that emerged was worthy of this multiracial democracy; true to his vision of laws that protect minority as well as majority rights, and the precious freedoms of every South African.

“Finally”, as Obama said, Mandela embodied the ethos of *Ubuntu* through:

his recognition that we are all bound together in ways that can be invisible to the eye; that there is a oneness to humanity; that we achieve ourselves by sharing ourselves with others, and caring for those around us ... we remember the gestures, large and small - introducing his jailors as honoured guests at his inauguration; taking the pitch in a Springbok uniform; turning his family’s heartbreak into a call to confront HIV/AIDS - that revealed the depth of his empathy and understanding. He not only embodied *Ubuntu*; he taught millions to find that truth within themselves. It took a man like Madiba to free not just the prisoner, but the jailor as well; to show that you must trust others so that they may trust you; to teach that reconciliation is not a matter of ignoring a cruel past, but a means of confronting it with inclusion, generosity and truth. He changed laws, but also hearts” (*News24*, 10/12/13).

Sanitised Transformation, Wretched Lives, Shattered Hopes, and the Mandela Legacy

A counterpoise to the celebratory tone to President Obama’s speech has been raised by some critics on the left. In an online treatise Zeleza (2013) argued that:

Mandela ... failed to dismantle the South African Apartheid economy that has left millions of black people especially the

unemployed youth in grinding poverty ... [and that] reconciliation rescued whites from seriously reckoning with Apartheid's past and its legacies and deprived blacks of restitution.

This discourse is further and clearly exemplified in Žizek's short piece in the Guardian newspaper, "If Mandela really won, he wouldn't be seen as a universal hero" (*The Guardian*, 09/12/13). The key to Žizek's discussion is that it draws our attention to another lens with which to perceive Mandela's legacy in South Africa. It also troubles pertinent issues on the nature of the post-Apartheid economic transformation, including the continued marginalisation of black South Africans, the failure of the ANC to deliver on the radical promises it made during the struggle against Apartheid, and the mellowing of Mandela, which touch on the coloniality situation in South Africa. To Žizek:

Mandela must have died a bitter man. To honour his legacy, we should focus on the unfulfilled promises his leadership gave rise to ... Two key facts remain obliterated by [the] celebratory vision [encapsulated in Obama above]. In South Africa, the miserable life of the poor majority broadly remains the same as under Apartheid, and the rise of political and civil rights is counterbalanced by the growing insecurity, violence and crime. The main change is that the old white ruling class is joined by the new black elite. Second, people remember the old African National Congress that promised not only the end of Apartheid, but also more social justice, even a kind of socialism. This much more radical ANC past is gradually obliterated from our memory. No wonder that anger is growing among poor, black South Africans (Žizek, 2013: np).

The above scenario of inadequate transformation, to Žizek, was because:

South Africa in this respect is just one version of the recurrent story of the contemporary left. A leader or party is elected with universal enthusiasm, promising a ‘new world’ – but, then, sooner or later, they stumble upon the key dilemma: does one dare to touch the capitalist mechanisms, or does one decide to ‘play the game’? If one disturbs these mechanisms, one is very swiftly ‘punished’ by market perturbations, economic chaos and the rest. This is why it is all too simple to criticise Mandela for abandoning the socialist perspective after the end of Apartheid: did he really have a choice? Was the move towards socialism a real option? (Ibid).

While trying to imagine an emancipatory politics that Mandela and the ANC could have pursued, Žizek, however, warns that it is easy to fall towards a kind of politics that is oppressive. He devised a metaphor for the predicament on “how to move further from Mandela without becoming Mugabe” (Ibid). He concludes the piece by noting that:

If we want to remain faithful to Mandela’s legacy, we should thus forget about celebratory crocodile tears and focus on the unfulfilled promises his leadership gave rise to. We can safely surmise that, on account of his doubtless moral and political greatness, he was at the end of his life also a bitter old man, well aware how his very political triumph and his elevation into a universal hero was the mask of a bitter defeat. His universal glory is also a sign that he really didn’t disturb the global order of power.

The above coagulates with Lewis and McFadden (n.d: 8)’s sentiments that “Despite the hype about South Africa’s unique democratisation among many of its citizens, the donor community and representatives of international capital, this country’s hasty embrace of structural adjustment from the early 1980s is a stark reminder of its neo-colonial typicality”. Heralded here is a theoretical change and not a practical one.

We are also reminded of Amadiume (1997: 100) who contends that “The African elites at so-called independence inherited the same structures of power, and have not yet dismantled the exploitative structures of the colonial state.” This follows earlier critiques such as Fanon who posits a Western European replicated African ruling class took over from where the colonial regime had left, with a scheme not meant for the alteration but the management and gate-keeping of the successor states in the context of a ‘global’ political economy (Fanon, 1967). This is a significant way disrupts the instructive ideology of ‘Black Consciousness’ that was espoused by Steve Bantu Biko. Under ‘Black Consciousness’, Biko called for an Africanness that was different from the colonially-inspired domination and othering, one that was philosophically grounded in Ubuntu that took pride in African traditions and heritage, African history, African unity against oppression and in the holistic liberation of Africans (Biko, 1990).

Theorising Coloniality

In an effort to define coloniality and to distinguish it from colonialism, Maldonado Torres points out that:

Colonialism denotes a political and economic relation in which the sovereignty of a nation or a people rests on the power of another nation, which makes such a nation an empire. [On the other hand] coloniality... refers to long-standing patterns of power that emerged as a result of colonialism, but that define culture, labour, intersubjective relations, and knowledge production well beyond the strict limits of colonial administrations. Thus, coloniality survives colonialism. It is maintained alive in books, in the criteria for academic performance, in cultural patterns, in common sense, in the self-image of peoples, in aspirations of self, and so many other aspects of our modern experience” (Maldonado-Torres, 2007, p. 243; cited also in Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013: 332).

As Grosfoguel also says, coloniality helps to explain “colonial situations” that are expressed as “the cultural, political, sexual, spiritual, epistemic and economic oppression/exploitation of subordinate racialised/ethnic groups by dominant racialised/ethnic groups with or without the existence of colonial administrations” (Ramón Grosfoguel cited in <http://decolonizingsolidarity.blogspot.com/2012/04/coloniality-vs-colonialism.html>). As Maldonado-Torres concludes, “in a way, as modern subjects we breathe coloniality all the time and every day” (Maldonado-Torres, 2007, p. 243; cited also in Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013: 332). Thus, coloniality is “a structure of control” which vests the “practical domains of political administration, production and exploitation, personal life and reproduction, and world-view and interpretive perspective” (Martinot, n.d).

The above set of relations in the African post-colony is clearly articulated in a number of literary works including in Ngugi wa Thiongo’s *Matigari*, Gonzo Musengezi’s *Honourable MP*, and Ayi Kweyi Armah’s *The Beautiful Ones Are Not Yet Born*, where structures and systems that sustained colonialism remain intact in the post-colony, the ruling class were also sharing the spoils with the disposed white regime and offering little respite for the expectant black electorate. In the end, as Mignolo (n.d: 44) says, coloniality presents a paradox where it is simultaneously “the hidden and darker side of modernity” “one of the most tragic ‘consequences of modernity’ and at the same time the most hopeful in that it has engendered the global march toward de-coloniality.”

Problematising the South African Human rights discourse

Troubling the significance of the centrality of the discourse of human rights in the South African society is crucial. It is also vital to connect the human rights discourse to the coloniality in the country. It also stands to reason that Mandela’s ‘ideals’ are universalised and naturalised owing to their consanguinity to grand narratives of ‘humanity’ and ‘human rights’ and ‘equality.’ Issa Shivji has forcefully posited that human rights are supportive of capitalism

and exploitation, individualist and are supportive of the *status quo*. To him, the language of human rights: “has succeeded in marginalising concrete analysis of society” because “human rights ideology is the ideology of status quo, not change” (Shivji, 1995: 115). Further for him, the

[d]ocumentation of the human rights abuses, although important, in its own right, by itself does not help us to understand the social and political relations in our society. It is not surprising that given the absence of political economy context and theoretical framework, much of our writings on human rights, rule of law, constitution, etc., uncritically reiterate or assume neo-liberal precepts. Human rights is not a theoretical tool of understanding social and political relations. At best it can only be a means of exposing a form of oppression and, therefore, perhaps an ideology of resistance (Shivji, 2003: 115).

Wendy Brown (1995: 89) further buttresses the above and alleges that the discourse of human rights is situated in a complex paradox of emancipation and domination, and protection and regulation. To her, the human rights discourse might not capture the full essence of inequalities in societies and may serve to normalise inequalities through propelling the rights of the powerful classes while simultaneously entrenching the suffering and exploitation of the weak classes (see also Marongwe, 2013: 258). When extrapolated to the South African case, issues such as the protection of private property rights and compliance with legal processes, which are central to the South African constitution, become very problematic in an environment that is economically imbalanced and fraught with politics. For example, what would be the meaning of property rights for someone living in a shack? This question speaks to a similar one that Shivji (1991 in Jirira, 1996: 16) once posited: “what use is free speech to a starving peasant?”

As such, the Western liberal conception of human rights is an incomplete way of analysing the post-independence dispensation in

South Africa as its focus is largely on socio-political concerns while almost ignoring the economic imperatives. This has shifted focus on addressing the yawning economic gap in the country wrought in by colonialism and sustained by racialism. As a result, many South Africans in the post-colonial set-up enjoy unbridled access to human rights, such as freedom of speech, freedom of association and assembly as well as the right to vote, among others, without a corresponding advance to accessing better employment and economic status. The above is cynically portrayed in Ian Douglas Smith's (2001) autobiography, in which he points out how the post-independence black ruling regime's preoccupation with accessing political power and economic aggrandisement did not alter the economic relations between races, thereby allowing a certain kind of coloniality through the maintenance of some of the structures and systems of colonialism. Smith (2001) further points out that if they had known that the liberation movement was just after office power, they would not have wasted so much time, effort and lives on war.

The overall impact of the lack of economic reform is that it has engendered the perpetuation of coloniality in South Africa where the racial bifurcation has endured notwithstanding the arrival of political independence in 1994. Save for a few black nationalists and a few other well-connected African National Congress (ANC) stalwarts who have become super rich on the back of the Broad-based Black Economic Empowerment (BBBEE), patronage and tenderpreneurship", many blacks continue to wallow in abject poverty and continue to exist on the fringes of society where they literally scavenge for life, and continue to knock on the door for their incorporation into mainstream economy, surviving, as it were, on selling their unskilled labour from street corners. It is thus little surprise that South Africa has remained, together with Brazil, as one of the most unequal global south societies in modern times.

One would also be puzzled as to why, South Africa as Africa's biggest economy, Africa's industrial hub and financial capital, we would find millions of blacks still living in shacks some twenty years into independence. The tempting question is: when will

independence come for these other millions of blacks? However, the more appropriate question would be: where is the genesis of the mistake that has led to the perpetuation of inequality in South Africa? Obviously, it is easy to point at colonialism for generating race-based structural inequalities. While correct, there is need also to blame the post-independence dispensation for perpetuating coloniality through leaving the economic and other hegemonic apparatus that operated under colonialism intact. More often than not, and as exemplified by the abuse of the BBBEE and other empowerment schemes, those holding leadership positions amass a lot of personal or individual advantages in an environment where coloniality exists.

Following from the above, Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013: 332-3) is probably correct to observe that:

Despite the fact that Africans have launched some of the most protracted and heroic anti-slavery and anti-colonial struggles, often these struggles have been informed by vocabularies and grammars fashioned by the immanent logic of modernity and coloniality that disciplined these struggles into emancipatory and reformist forces rather than revolutionary and anti-systemic movements. Consequently, the celebrated decolonisation struggles did not result in a new postcolonial world.

It thus seems as Nkrumah's famous adage, "seek ye independence and everything will be given" (cited in Mazrui, 1993: 105) was too simplistic and/ or misplaced. In South Africa as with many other African countries after independence, very little of what was contained in the rather instrumentalised doctrine of socialist-based liberation was 'given away' as the black nationalist elites proffered 'reconciliatory politics' in addition to living up to the dictates of the liberalist-inclined constitutions.

Also at the core of Ndlovu-Gatsheni's "vocabularies and grammars" is the religious observance of human rights. This provocative thought is insightful and it invites us to wanting to

assess the impact of the liberal notion of human rights on the coloniality situation of South Africa. This is precisely because the preservation of human rights was centralised at the moment of the independence of South Africa in 1994 and the subsequent Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). In addition, the South African constitution, which is widely regarded as one of the world's most advanced, centralises the observance of socio-political rights of the citizens. The above is depicted clearly in the "Bill of rights" section of the South African constitution, which while articulating the universality of socio-political and cultural rights, almost completely neglects to discuss other rights, such as economic. As Obama (2013) above says, "the Constitution that emerged was worthy of this multiracial democracy; true to his [Mandela's] vision of laws that protect minority as well as majority rights, and the precious freedoms of every South African."

However, should the quest for human rights be limited to socio-political rights? Alternatively, should the freedoms of every South African be exclusive of the economy or would the said freedoms mean much outside of the economic realm? One significant issue would be the meaning of such freedoms if economic rights were to be incorporated. On the whole, we posit that there could be a better enjoyment of socio-political rights if their observance is also accompanied by a reverence for economic and cultural rights.

Going forward, it is arguable, as Quijano, (in Vallega, 2011: 207) contends, that the Western liberal ideals of human rights that are emphasised in the South African constitution, that is, politico-judicial rights, are partial, Eurocentric, are inclined to force a lopsided understanding of human rights and they distort lived experiences especially in Third World countries. Arguing from a Latin American perspective, Quijano (in Vallega, 2011: 207) contends that:

The Eurocentric perspective of knowledge operates as a mirror that distorts what is reflected, as we can see in the Latin American historical experience. That is to say, what we Latin Americans find in that mirror is not completely chimerical, since we possess so

many and such important historically European traits in many material and intersubjective aspects. But at the same time we are profoundly different. Consequently, when we look in our Eurocentric mirror, the image that we see is not composite but also necessarily partial and distorted. The tragedy is that we have all been led, knowingly or not, wanting it or not, to see and accept that image as our own and as belonging to us alone. In this way, we continue being what we are not.

The foregoing discussion is further supported by Umar Johnson (2011) in *Hidden Colors* who bemoans that the problem with Africans is that their lives is prescribed by a Eurocentric template which unfortunately makes Africans move away from what they are, Africans and Africans with African structures and systems of being and doing, to what they can be, Europeans, and Europeans with European structures and systems of being and doing. If such is the template that underwrites the leadership and its governance in the independence period, then it might not be difficult to observe the negatives especially to the marginal spaces and classes.

Coloniality as structural violence

This section considers the relationship between coloniality and structural violence in South Africa. The primary contention is that coloniality has served to buttress structural violence in South Africa, as in many other African countries. Generally the discourse of structural violence sees violence as rooted in politico-historical terms of inequalities found in national and international political, social and economic structural relations. One can moreover say that this discourse deploys at its centre the Marxist economic model of power in the maintenance of class distinctions and oppression found in the “forces of production” (Foucault, 1980: 88-89). Slavoj Žižek (2008: 1), a key theoretician of violence, conceptualises violence as taking three basic forms. These are subjective violence and the two forms of objective violence, that is, symbolic and systematic violence. He describes subjective violence as that which is visible, for example crime and terror, while symbolic violence is

rooted in language and its forms like racism, hate speech and discrimination. Systematic violence is found in the economic and political systems of the world (Ibid). Most importantly, he posits that there is a link between subjective and objective violence. To him, what may be perceived as irrational (subjective) violence could be rooted in the objective forms of violence which are not easily decipherable. For him, systematic violence operates like “a notorious ‘dark matter’ of physics, the counterpart to an all too visible subjective violence” (Ibid, p 2). Thus, systematic violence underwrites subjective violence. As such, even when systematic violence cannot be easily deciphered, it should be assumed and taken into account in order for subjective violence to make sense.

Also, Zizek finds a direct correlation between capitalism, which was the major driver of colonialism in the Marxist sense, and objective violence. While capitalism may not have initiated systematic violence, it has worsened it and has given it a new meaning, impetus and direction. Zizek theorises that capitalism is exploitative and feeds like a “parasite” on humans and the environment, which has overhauled relations between workers and the owners of capital (Ibid, p12). For Zizek, global capitalism was responsible for the 16th century deaths in Mexico, and the 20th century massive deaths in the Belgian Congo. For him too this was due to “an ‘objective’ process, which nobody planned and executed and for which there was no ‘capitalist manifesto’” (Ibid, p14). In total, Zizek argues that capitalism through worsening the exploitation of workers and other resources has widened inequalities and injustices. However, “inequalities, exploitation and injustice” of capitalism are “naturalised” and “hidden” as reflective of cultural differences (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009: 193). Consequently, capitalism has given a new and extended meaning to objective violence.

Regarding South Africa, structural violence occurred because under colonialism:

Africans, Coloureds and Asians were dispossessed of most of their land, faced restricted opportunities for employment or

self-employment, were limited to low-quality public education and health care, and were physically confined to impoverished parts of the countryside or cities. At the same time, the white minority benefited from discriminatory public policies (Sharma, 2012).

The above trend is further explained by the fact that under the post-independence dispensation, and notwithstanding the rise in the gross domestic product (GDP), the inequality gap between races in South Africa continues to rise on the back of the platform laid by colonialism. To this end, South Africa has experienced an annual average GDP growth rate of around 3.26 percent between 1993 and 2011 (Ibid). However, the Gini coefficient, which measures inequality, has increased from 0.66 in 1993 to 0.70 in 2008 (Ibid). Furthermore, the consumption Gini coefficient stood at 0.63 in 2009 (Ibid). This therefore demonstrates that “economic growth has been highly uneven in its distribution, perpetuating inequality and exclusion” (Ibid). The above is clearly illustrated by the fact that the “top decile of the population (mostly whites) accounts for 58% of the country’s income, while the bottom decile (largely blacks) accounts for only 0.5% and the bottom half less than 8%” (Ibid).

The above speaks to the contention of Lewis and McFadden. Referring to former African colonies in general and South Africa in particular, Lewis and McFadden (n.d) argue that “in the wake of the Apartheid government’s economic monopolising in the interests of a white minority, the economic policy of the post-Apartheid government progressively, even though surreptitiously, compromised all commitment to transformative redistribution.” Thus, the nationalistic and socialist aspects of development aiming for democratic distribution of national resources expected by the majority of South Africans as they fought against the Apartheid regime and envisioned in the discourses of struggle pacts such as the Freedom Charter, have been grotesquely sacrificed for the blatantly neo-liberal, macroeconomic approach. Thus, “South Africa, far from being a trailblazing post-colony, is in fact a particularly abject neo-colony” (Ibid). The South African reality

mirrors a country whose policies are extensions of ‘universal’ liberal dictates as evidenced by notions of fair trade, open markets, stable climate and investor friendly without regard to the uniqueness of South Africa, and hence maintaining an imperialist and violent environment. At another level, the Mandela legacy can also be said to be the face of this imperial and violent cosmos. The sensual and affective, the vulgarised populism, the vastly blushed romanticism characterising the Julius Malema led Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) political organisation can be read as an opportunistic capitalisation of the existing void in South Africa.

Because of the prevalence of structural conditions that spur structural violence in South Africa, it is little surprise therefore that the nation is perennially plagued by various forms of violence by especially black South Africans. These are either to “enter” the society, survive within the society or to deal with adverse situations that confront them in their everyday lives. The magnitude of the violence is graphically illustrated by the South African Broadcasting Corporation 1 (SABC1) (10 April 2014), which stated that Gauteng Province experienced a massive five hundred service delivery protests, a hundred of which turned out violent and had injured some humans and properties, looted shops or had resulted in deaths, in the first quarter of 2014.

Crime statistics also revealed that South Africa lies in the top category in terms of the highest number of rape cases, cases of murder and vigilantism in the world (Johnson, 2012). While it stands to further debate, one could be forced to concur with the assessment by Whyte, (2011) that this can be traced to Apartheid and an imperfect transition to majority rule that prioritised the end of physical political violence to the almost total neglect of criminal, gender-based and structural violence in the economic and psychological realms. To further exemplify, and not discounting other factors as organised crime, the high prevalence of guns in private hands of around five million (*Mail and Guardian*, 22/02/13) resulting in the murders of some 300 000 people between April 1994 and 2007 in South Africa (Whyte, 2011), emanates from the period of the struggle against Apartheid. This also in a way

contributes to increased insecurity in the townships, that house mostly the poor people of colour in the country (Ibid). Examples for this include, among others, the high profile killings of honeymooner Ani Dewani and prominent reggae artist Lucky Dube in the townships of Johannesburg and Cape Town in recent years. In terms of gender-based violence, some 52 167 rape cases were reported to the police between 2006 and 2007, while some 43 330 cases of domestic violence were reported to the police between July and December of 2006 (Combrinck and Chenwi, 2007: 3).

While some efforts have been attempted to mitigate the situation, on the whole, however, these measures were either piecemeal or were hijacked by the powerful black elite, who in variegated forms looted the proceeds. To this extent, one can refer to the abuse of such programmes, as the BBBEE; Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) and the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) by the well-connected black elites/ANC nationalists. At best, these well-connected, have ended up joining the white elite, in what may fit a variation of the Fanonian “pitfalls of nationalism” (Fanon, 1963: 182). The pitfalls can also be seen from the climb down from the radicalism that ANC nationalism promised in the 1960s, and indeed that which Mandela showcased even during the trials of the 1960s. This radicalism led Mandela [and the ANC] to be labelled as terrorists. Mandela was only removed from that list in 2008 (Zezeza, 2013), while some leaders in the ANC, like Tokyo Sexwale, were as late as 2013 arrested in the USA for being on the terrorist watch list (*The Herald*, 29/1013).

Outside of the overt violence, the status quo in South Africa helps to reinforce the two nations in one phenomenon. Broadly, the two nations in South Africa refers to the apparent division in terms of access to wealth between blacks and whites. Mbeki’s comment, (cited in Sharma, 2012), below succinctly captures the essence of this viewpoint:

[o]ne of these nations is white, relatively prosperous, regardless of gender or geographic dispersal. It has ready access

to a developed economic, physical, educational, communication and other infrastructure. The second and larger nation of South Africa is black and poor, with the worst affected being women in the rural areas, the black rural population in general and the disabled. This nation lives under conditions of a grossly underdeveloped economic, physical, educational, communication and other infrastructure. It has virtually no possibility to exercise what in reality amounts to a theoretical right to equal opportunity.

Coloniality in education

Mahmood Mamdani (1998) is one scholar who has attempted to link the education system in South Africa to coloniality. In a specific reference to the African Studies Programme at the University of Cape Town (UCT), he noted that:

Historically, African Studies developed outside Africa, not within it. It was a study of Africa, but not by Africans. The context of this development was colonialism, the Cold War and Apartheid. This period shaped the organisation of social science studies in the Western academy. The key division was between the disciplines and area studies. The disciplines studied the White experience as a universal, human, experience; area studies studied the experience of people of colour as an ethnic experience (Mamdani, 1998: 2).

He noted that in the post-independence, the same trend continued in South Africa (at UCT) and called for a reform of the curriculum to do away with traits of the “South African exceptionalism”, which also spoke to a need to de-racialise the African Studies curriculum.

While Mamdani referred specifically to the UCT experience, the same lens of analysis can be extended to the South African post-independence education system as a whole. One finds that the education for the blacks in the townships and rural areas, although

it is run under the same curriculum rules as in the other (White) schools, it continues to suffer from severe challenges and disadvantages experienced under Apartheid, rendering the graduates as the practical products of the (colonial era) Bantu education. In this regard many township schools continue to face security concerns; shortages of adequately trained teachers; lack of access to extra-funding; shortages of textbooks, electricity, running water, and even physical infrastructure (Timaues, Simelane and Letsoalo, 2011: 3). At other times, especially in rural areas of South Africa, some classes continue to be conducted under trees or classrooms are shared by two or more classes. These problems render the schools as disadvantaged, a situation that is rooted in the racialised unequal spending on education during the colonial era.

Furthermore, as noted by Narayan and Mahajan (2013: 2), the rate of completion of primary school, which is a strong indicator of the quality of education, is rated “inadequate” and lags behind that of most Latin American countries [and even some African countries including the crisis-ridden Zimbabwe]. To Narayan and Mahajan, this is a function of the Apartheid legacy where black children are born to uneducated parents who do not value education and parents who cannot adequately supervise and/ or help the learners with homework; and the black children are also found in locations such as townships and rural areas where there are inadequate pre-school institutions (Ibid: 3). In addition, township locations suffer the added disadvantages of inadequate living/working spaces and are highly insecure (Ibid: 3). As the Council for Higher Education (CHE) South Africa, argues, this in part, was a product of the Apartheid system which put the non-whites at a disadvantage due to a disadvantaged income earnings (CHE, 2013 in *The Guardian*, 22/08/13).

Further to the above, “access to and success in higher education is strongly influenced by the socio-economic background of individuals ... This is especially so in the South African context where the large majority of black students come from low-income families that do not have the financial resources to support the pursuit of higher education” (Ibid). Differences in incomes also

impact the schools that black students attend, which also affects their competencies at universities and other institutions of higher learning. For example, it is argued that only five per cent of black South African students enrolled graduate from universities which is fifty per cent less than the rate of graduation by white students (Ibid). This then means that the figure for South African students might be lower than that especially if one considers that foreign black students are more likely to graduate than black South African students. Although affirmative action has led to a massive increase in the number of students from underprivileged societies admitted in universities, the inherent structures and systems of education inhibit their progress and they fail and/or drop out *en masse*, resulting in virtually no alterations to the socio-economic conditions following the years in higher educational institutions.

Overall, as noted by Timaeus, Simelane and Letsoalo, 2011: 3 “[o]ne can therefore conclude that so far policies in education have failed to address the underlying inequalities which remain between racial groups, inevitably reproducing the same trends found during the Apartheid era.” These trends affect the quality of education accessed by the different races. This is notwithstanding the significant efforts at improving access to education among the disadvantaged groups in South Africa by the post-Apartheid governments, including democratising access to education and the provision of improved funding towards the education sectors, among others. Ultimately, access to poor quality tuition in township and rural schools exacerbate coloniality. This, in Yamauchi’s (2004: 1) words, “potentially [contributes] to the long-term poverty trap for Blacks in the country” because educational attainment inequalities impact the “inequality in labour market earning opportunities” (Ibid: 2).

Interestingly, one also notes that the lack of adequate transformation in the education sector goes against the widely-quoted maxim by Mandela (cited in Rafamoyo, 2013) that “education is the most powerful weapon which you can use to change the world” because, as he further states, “education is the great engine of personal development. It is through education that

the daughter of a peasant can become a doctor, that a son of a mine worker can become the head of the mine that a child of farm workers can become the president of a country”. Thus, the question that begs answers is education in South Africa really serving as the powerful tool to transfigure the conditions in South Africa?

Unemployment and unequal employment opportunities

Statistically, South Africa has an unemployment rate of some twenty-five percent in the early years of the 21st century (Yamauchi, 2004: 3). However, on the balance of racial divisions, it is estimated that unemployment is more rampant among the non-white sections of the society where some seventy percent are unemployed (Ibid). Besides the quantitative statistics on employment figures, we should also consider the quality of the employment accessed by the different racial groups in South Africa. Statistics South Africa (2010: viii) showed clearly that the average monthly earnings of white South Africans was R9 500; for the Indian/Asian groups was R6 000; for the coloureds (Mixed blood) was R2 652 and it was R2 167 for the black Africans. The above figures demonstrated that “Black Africans earned [only] 22 per cent of what the white population earned; 36,1 per cent of what Indians/Asians earned; and 81,7% of what the coloured population earned” (Ibid: viii). As such, one observes that the income distribution in South Africa is closely tied to race, the hallmark of Apartheid and other colonial policies in the country. The above can be further explained by the fact that “while Africans accounted for 79% of the population in 2008, they captured only 44% of income and 41% of total expenditure. Whites, who accounted for only 9.2% of the population, captured 40.3% of income and 40.9% of total expenditure” (Sharma, 2012).

From the foregoing discussion, it stands to reason that the differences in unemployment rates and the employment opportunities also impact the incomes, helping to create profound inequalities in the country along racial lines. As Narayan and Mahajan (2013: 1) rightly observe, this is “an enduring legacy of the Apartheid system, which denied the non-whites the chance to

accumulate capital in any form-land, finance, skills, education, or social networks.” They continue to argue that “even though social assistance grants have had a moderating influence on inequality, an income Gini of about 0.70 in 2008 makes South Africa one of the most unequal countries in the world.” Unemployment and inequalities overall impact on the racial tensions and racial suspicions as well as the now entrenched political polarisation pitting the ANC and the DA as largely for non-whites and whites, respectively, in the country.

The above discussion feeds into and from the earlier discussion on coloniality as structural violence especially pertaining to the use of violence by the marginalised to access the state and access survival. Sadly, however, most discussions on South African crimes especially in townships, some of which are violent crimes, omit the effects of Apartheid and its remaining structures as well as the context under which these crimes are committed. For example, there is little mention of the general hatred of self and others created by Apartheid, the anger, lack of and miss-education, lack of jobs and economic disadvantages that breed and groom violence. However, we could take a cue from Umar Johnson’s (2011) discussion of the American context, where up to seventy-five per cent of black violence is economically based. Although the context under Johnson’s discussion differs from the South African one, it is not entirely off the mark to argue that black populations of the two states developed under related systems that marginalised and in a significant way continue to sideline blacks. Thus, the violence in South Africa can also be explained in terms of one person or group which is fighting for survival comes across another person or group also fighting for survival, making crime more about survival than supremacy.

Inadequate Housing and racial inequalities

Like the other sectors discussed above, the trend of differences to access of the basic housing infrastructure indicates racial undertones, pointing again to the overarching influences of the

Apartheid legacy continued under coloniality. Access is not the only issue to consider on housing. The size of the housing units also matters and, again the same trend can be deciphered with millions of black South Africans having very small, or no housing units at all with millions found living in shacks differently called *mikuku/emkukwini/ebokini/matsbonisa*, in the country. This is notwithstanding the fact that there have been some changes with people of different races found in any residential areas.

Even where the 3.3 million RDP houses have been erected (*News24*, 20/04/14), the trend of providing substandard housing is evident. An example comes from Cape Town township houses. Both these writers have lived in Cape Town for more than five years each and are familiar with the RDP houses in Bloekombos, Wallacedene, Khayelitsha and Joe Slovo in Milnerton, among other townships. The trend that is commonly observable is that the core houses consist of one (not so big) undivided room. The water point is attached to a separate toilet erected a few meters from the house. While this seems a significant improvement to the shacks, it evokes apartheid era perceptions on African accommodation. First, it rekindles the idea of bachelors' quarters in towns where the accommodation available in the form of one rooms is for the male workers with the larger family remaining in the rural villages, structuralising and systematising, in some sense, the highly patriarchal nature of European societies and colonialism. Second, the houses are closely packed together; chronicling the denial of space to South Africa's peripherised populations. Resultant is the occupation of large populations on a small piece of land leading to problems such as blocked sewerage systems, garden space, privacy concerns, how to share electricity, inadequate social services and noise, among others. Thirdly, one also finds that this in a serious sense also promotes insecurity at night when occupants have to use facilities such as the toilet. Furthermore, attaching water taps to the toilets potentially poses health risks pertaining to water-borne diseases for the residents as well in addition to security concerns arising from visiting the separate toilet structures at night. With the little regard placed for the welfare of blacks, their informality, if not

illegality, in urban areas continues as in the Apartheid era. This is in a way supported by the continued negative perceptions of the presence of blacks as ‘refugees’ in Cape Town (and other towns and cities, which represented white spaces during Apartheid) (Zille cited in *City Press*, 21 March 2012). The latter speaks strongly to the 1923 Urban Areas Act which created “native locations” that were largely constituted of slums as places of residence for blacks (Mandela, 1995).

Because of these informalities regarding the blacks’ residential areas, it is little surprise that townships and other informal areas have persisted as the crime hotspots of South Africa. This is in part fuelled by the high levels of unemployment and the presence of gangs in these areas. As well, most such settlements remain plagued by vigilantism in an effort to stamp out criminal activities. In many cases, the preferred method of “necklacing” suspects, that is putting a burning tyre around suspects’ necks and pouring of petrol on their bodies (Moosage, 2010), is an anti-colonial method of dealing with societal (and political) misfits in black communities. In a significant way, vigilantism is a direct result of a lack of inadequate policing and access to legal justice system by the township dwellers (van Zyl Smit 2004 check Dixon’s book). This contrasts significantly with the more affluent members of the South African society who can afford to employ private security firms to offer extra security in their areas (Dixon, 2004). In addition to the above, going round the middle and high end market residential places, one also finds that most, if not all, are well-secured by being fenced and gated, and are constantly being monitored by vehicle-based armed response patrols and electronic surveillance.

Conclusion

On the whole, the chapter has called for a more troubled reading of Mandela’s legacy, in ways that question those behind its construction, its epistemic rootedness and practices within which it has been created and those who benefit what and lose what from its shape. The magnificent narrative of the Mandela legacy has the

temptation and dreadful capacity to land systems and practices of privilege and power and responses to these, into the ‘unspeakable’ hence entrenching structural violence. By and large, the chapter questions if the Madiba legacy is not one of the most glorified rituals of domination. This rethinking of the legacy is especially necessary in the context of the continued bifurcation of the South African state along black and white racial categories more than twenty years into the country’s independence, which strongly also informs the racialisation of the statuses of poverty and opulence.

On the whole, these differences have larger ramifications on the political landscape of South Africa, in which, broadly and arguably, the ANC and the Democratic Alliance (DA), the largest political movements in South Africa, are largely moulded as black and white movements, respectively. The racialisation of politics in South Africa is also ably demonstrated in the 2013 formed Economic Freedom Fighters fronted by Julius Malema, whose philosophy, among others, advocates an African nativity (black-centred) politics, including radical altering of the economic structures of South Africa and the forced reallocation of land and other resources. Be that as it may, the chapter also acknowledges the negative effects of government corruption and the challenges that the difficult transition to majority rule that was undergirded by a militarised Apartheid government and the need for compromises and guarantees presented to the post-independence government had on the post-independence dispensation.

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The State and Knowledge of Democracy in West Africa: A Critical Analysis

Richard Asante

Introduction

It is generally believed that the consolidation of democracy and sound governance institutions is central to reducing poverty, promoting sustainable economic growth and achieving social and political progress and economic development in Africa (Lipset, 1960; World Bank, 1989; Leftwich, 1996; Adejumo, 2000a; Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, and Limongi, 2000). The West Africa region consists of a variety of ethnicity, culture and traditions. With a population of 339 million (Population Reference Bureau, 2014), the region comprises of 16 countries, namely: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo (see Fig. 1).

The democratic struggles in West Africa triggered constitutional and political changes and reforms in many countries in the region resulting in the holding of elections and granting of civil and political freedom. Part of the changes included the re-introduction of multi-party politics in the early 1990s in West Africa leading to a renewed hope and interest in institutions of democracy. However, over two decades on, this promising wave of pluralism has not produced effective institutions of governance to underpin democratisation. Instead, most of these democracies in West Africa are still fragile and characterised by dominant executives, weak judiciaries and parliaments, fragmented political parties and civil society organisations. While elections have become more regular, the quality of democracy and governance remains suspect in many

countries. Worse yet, the resurgence of military coup d'état, the rancour, violence and apparent manipulations associated with elections, and the trend towards political settlement after electoral conflicts through the formation of coalition governments all indicate huge deficits of democracy in West Africa.

These worrying developments have led some scholars such as Kwame Boafo-Arthur (2008) and Abdoulaye Bathily (2005) to argue that the quality of democracy and governance in West Africa is receding, and that the democratic project in the region is not only questionable, but has also become endangered. The September 16, 2015 military coup d'état in Burkina Faso (BBC News, 2015; Aljazeera News 2015), has sparked renewed debates and interest among scholars about the future of democracy in West Africa. Some of the dominant questions that have engaged the attention of many political observers of the region are: After two decades in which the process of democratisation begun in Africa, how far has West Africa gone in terms of promoting democracy and democratic governance? What are the differing interpretations and discourses on democracy and governance in the West Africa region? These are some of the issues to be addressed in this chapter.

The uncertainties and challenges that have characterised democratic experiment in West Africa require a rigorous scholarly analysis and interrogation of the progress, problems and the future of democracy and governance in the region. Towards this end, this chapter seeks to reflect on the progress, challenges, and prospects of the democracy and governance project in West Africa. Drawing on a number of more recent democracy and governance indexes, the chapter seeks to examine the state and knowledge of democracy and governance in West Africa, highlighting as to where democracy and democratic governance is being consolidated, and where there have been reversals or stalemates. It argues that without the full development of the institutions of democracy, prospects for democratic consolidation in the region will remain a tantalising dream.

This chapter is organised as follows: The introduction is followed by a brief survey of the African postcolony as a theoretical

construct with a focus on how and where West Africa and her contemporary governance institutions and mechanisms fall within that theoretical framework. Furthermore, the section examines the ongoing debates among scholars about the prospects of building viable and durable democratic systems in the region. The next section analyses the progress, challenges and future of democracy and governance in West Africa looking at key governance and democratic institutions including the media. This section is followed by the conclusion.

West Africa Democracy and Governance: Theoretical Implications

Much of Africa's post-colonial history has been characterised by dysfunctional governance and politics. Previous efforts towards democratisation in the first three decades into independence were abandoned leading to various forms of governance ranging from one party rule, military rule and authoritarianism. However, the end of the Cold War in 1989 marked the triumph of Western liberal democracy (Fukuyama, 1989), in Africa. Consequently, many countries in Africa have embraced democracy, more precisely liberal democracy, with the passage of new constitutions and holding of multiparty elections (Bratton and van de Walle, 1997; Gyimah-Boadi, 2004; Lindberg, 2006 & 2009; Obi, 2008, Edgell et al, 2015), leading to an outburst of optimistic scholarship voicing hopes for a 'second liberation' (Joseph, 1997; Hyden and Bratton 1992; Adejumobi, 2015). More broadly, there is a consensus among scholars about liberal democracy. According to Stephenson, democracy from a Western perspective is based on four objectives: a. Majority rule expressed in free, periodic elections; b. Full protection of the minority right against an irrational tyrannical majority; c. Protection of individual rights to freedom of speech, press, religion, petition, and assembly; d. Equality before the law for all citizens, regardless of race, creed, colour, gender, or national origin (Stephenson, 1992: 15).

Since the 1990s there has been acrimonious debate among scholars about the feasibility of liberal democracy in Africa (Ake, 2000 & 2001; Obi, 2008 & 2007; Olukoshi 1998; Ayittey, 1998). On the one hand, advocates of liberal democracy argue that it promotes checks and balances among the three arms of government: executive, judiciary and legislature; allows for equal protection particularly for minorities and other disadvantaged groups; ensures effective guarantees against arbitrary arrest; and contributes to press/media freedom (Diamond, 1996; Huntington, 1991 & 1997; Mukandala, 2001). It is further argued that liberal democracy opens up the democratic space for the people to participate in politics (Chole and Ibrahim 1995; Joseph, 1997), and contributes to a flowering of civil society organisations (Gyimah-Boadi, 2004). The alleged benefits of liberal democracy trumpeted by advocates of liberal democracy particularly in the early 1990s, contributed to raising the expectations of many Africans of a new dawn of social justice, equality, dignity and a better quality of life.

However, critics have repeatedly questioned the feasibility of liberal democracy in Africa, arguing that it is not suitable for Africa's realities (Ake, 2000 & 2001; Obi, 2008; Nyamnjoh, 2005). They contend that liberal democracy and multiparty politics is elitist and has failed to address the interests of the grassroots, while others criticise it for being 'nontransitions' (Ihonvbere, 1996a & 1996b). Thomas Carothers (1997 & 2002) and Richard Joseph, (1998) lament on the lack of 'real' change while others hold that liberal democracy and multiparty democracy has not led to qualitative transformation of the dominant power relations, yet others have also noted that elections do not offer the people any choice, a phenomenon, Mkandawire (1996, 1999), describes as 'choice-less democracies'.

Claude Ake (2000), a critic of liberal democracy is of the view that liberal democracy is not really democratic in nature because it gives power to the few, while ensuring that the masses remained alienated from politics and power. He further states that "the absence of enabling conditions for democratic participation at the grassroots is the greatest obstacle to democracy in Africa, just as the

transformation of society for the empowerment of ordinary people is the greatest challenge of democratisation” (Ake 1993b: A7). Ake is also sceptical of multiparty elections, stressing that electoralism disempowers African people, a phenomenon he portrays as the democratisation of disempowerment (Ake, 1994 & 2000). He posits that the African notion of participation is not based on the “assumption of individualism or conflicting interests, but on the social nature of human beings” (Ake 1993a: 243).

According to Ake (2000), liberal democracy is a product of history, as a result, the liberal democracy being promoted by the West in Africa was unsuitable to the historical and socio-economic circumstances as well as the collective aspirations of the African people, in light of Africa’s common history of slavery, exploitation, colonialism and dictatorships, largely fomented by the agents of Western liberal democracy. He opines that what Africa needs is its own model of democracy, anchored around an African Cradle and cultural relevant realities such as collective social aspirations, solidarity and humanism. Consequently, he cautioned against the wholesale adoption of the Western liberal democracy as the solution to Africa’s crises of underdevelopment and dysfunctional governance.

Claude Ake argues that:

...the political arrangement of liberal democracy makes little sense in Africa. Liberal democracy assures individualism but there is little individualism in Africa...it assumes abstract universalism, but in Africa that would apply only to the urban environment, and finally political parties of liberal democracy do not make sense in societies where associational life is rudimentary and interest groups are essentially primary groups ...

Nyamnjoh (2005) shares Ake’s concerns about the weaknesses of liberal democracy in Africa. Like Ake, Nyamnjoh points to the exaggerated emphasis on the autonomous individual, contrary to

the dominant communal spirit, as well as the strong attachment to the community rather than the state. According to Nyamnjoh (Ibid):

... implementing liberal democracy in Africa has been like trying to force onto a body of a fully figured person, rich in cultural indicators of health with which Africans are familiar, a dress made to fit a slim, de-fleshed Hollywood consumer model of a Barbie-doll entertainment icon...then when the dress fails to fit the African body, instead of blaming the tiny dress or its designer, the tradition has been to fault the popular body for emphasising too much bulk, for parading the wrong sizes, for just not being the right thing. Not often is the experience of the designer or dress maker questioned. Such high levels of insensitivity is akin to the behaviour of a Lilliputian undertaker who would rather trim a corpse than expand a coffin to accommodate a man-mountain or a carpenter whose only tool is a hammer and to whom every problem is a nail...(p. 25).

Ake further argues that in Africa, the elite supported democracy only as a means to power, while international agencies supported it as an asset to structural adjustment and as a result, states in Africa got trapped between the demands of external donors for economic liberalisation on the one hand, and the needs of political majorities on the other, leading to the creation of 'exclusionary democracies', which allow for political competition, but can't respond to majority demands in a meaningful way.

Ake believes that a major shortcoming of multi-partyism in Africa was that it was blind to the character of the state (Ake 1993b), which he describes as exploitative and authoritarian in character. He holds that a high premium was placed on the monopoly of power by a small group, as a result power is often personalised and abused, reducing politics to the single-minded pursuit of the capture of state power, leading to 'political monolithism' and privatisation of power (Ake 2000: 38 & 2001). Although Ake's perspective on democracy and concerns by other

scholars are useful in explaining contemporary African politics, there are still some peculiarities in the West African Region which is not fully accounted for due to the complex nature of politics and other structural factors such as the geography and demography, socio-economic factors and the role the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in promoting economic integration, political stability and democratic governance among member states (See Fig.1). Understanding the impacts of these structural factors will help us to appreciate the efforts and challenges of building viable and durable democratic institutions in the region.

Fig 1: Map of West Africa



Source:

<http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/profile/westafrica.pdf>

(Accessed 31/08/2015).

West Africa has had its fair share of the problems of democracy and governance dysfunctionalities and instability that has bedevilled many African postcolonial politics. Before the early 1990s, the region, just like the rest of Africa, was seen as a hotbed of authoritarianism. Coups and counter-coups became distinctive features of the politics of the region (Boafo-Arthur, 2008; Adejumobi 2000b & 2000b; Ibrahim, 2006). For example, from 1960 to 1989, West Africa was highly unstable and accounted for a very high percentage of military coups on the continent. Beyond abortive coups, Nigeria, the regional giant, had recorded six (January 1966; July 1966; 1975; 1983; 1985; 1993), successful interventions, followed by Ghana with five (1966; 1972; 1978 (Palace Coup), 1979; 1981), Burkina Faso had five (1966; 1974; 1980; 1987 and 2015).

1966; 1974; 1980; 1987) and Benin also had recorded four successful coups (1963; 1965; 1969; 1972) (Boafo-Arthur, 2008: 12). Throughout the period of instability, the military, dictatorial or autocratic regimes presided over failed economies, poverty and underdevelopment, amidst experimentations with disastrous structural adjustment programmes imposed by the Bretton-Woods Institutions (Gbeho, 2011, Bathily, 2005).

However, the late 1980s and early 1990s coincided with concerted struggles by citizens and increased resistance to dictatorship and bad governance. Concerns about bad governance, underdevelopment and increasing marginalisation in international affairs, violent conflicts, and the realisation of the leaders of the sub-region of the need to secure political stability compelled ECOWAS to promote democracy among its members as a necessary precondition for successful integration and economic development. Towards this end, ECOWAS adopted a more political orientation through the Declaration on Political Principles in 1991, and later in 1993, the regional leaders revised the ECOWAS Treaty to confer supranational status on the Organisation. In the Declaration on Political Principles (1991) document, the ECOWAS leaders affirmed their commitment “to settle all disputes among ourselves [ECOWAS member states] by

peaceful means in such a manner as not to endanger the peace, security and stability of our sub-region” (ECOWAS, 1991, Article 3) . They further stated their respect for “human rights and fundamental freedoms...including in particular freedom of thought, conscience, association, religion or belief for all our peoples without distinction as to race, sex, language or creed” , (ECOWAS, 1991, Article 4). Also, the leaders pledged to “promote and encourage the full enjoyment of all members of their “fundamental human rights, especially their political, economic, social, cultural and other rights inherent in the dignity of the human person” (ECOWAS, 1991, Article 5). They also affirmed their “belief in the liberty of the individual and in his inalienable right to participate by means of free and democratic processes” (ECOWAS, 1991, Article 6). Finally, the Heads of States pledged their commitment to “promote [...] political pluralism” (ECOWAS, Article 6, 1991) in their member countries.

Furthermore, in December 1999, the Authority enacted another instrument regarding its peace and security architecture, known as the Protocol relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security. This protocol inspired the African Union’s (AU) to adopt a similar one, the protocol relating to the establishment of the Peace and Security Council on July, 2002. In the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security document, the West African leaders pledged their commitment to “prevent, manage and resolve internal and inter-State conflicts” (ECOWAS, 1999, Article 3a). Also they pledged to strengthen cooperation in the areas of conflict prevention, early-warning, peace-keeping operations, the control of cross-border crime, international terrorism and proliferation of small arms and anti-personnel mines” (ECOWAS, 1999, Article 3d). Finally, the ECOWAS leaders also expressed their commitment to “maintain and consolidate peace, security and stability within the Community” (ECOWAS, 1999, Article 3e).

In particular, Article 25 of the Mechanism stipulates the conditions under which it could be applied: a) in the case of internal conflict that threatens to trigger a humanitarian disaster, or b) that poses a serious threat to peace and security in the region; c) in the event of serious and massive violation of human rights and the rule of law; d) In the event of an overthrow or attempted overthrow of a democratically elected government; and e) Any other situation as may be decided by the Mediation and Security Council (ECOWAS, 1999).

Two years later, in December 2001, ECOWAS adopted the Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance Article 1(a) of the Supplementary Protocol stipulates the constitutional convergence principles including: separation of powers, popular participation, strengthening of parliaments and guarantee of parliamentary immunity; Independence of the Judiciary; that accession to power must be made through free, fair and transparent elections; underscored Zero tolerance for power obtained or maintained by unconstitutional means among others (ECOWAS, 2001). To some extent these principles have contributed to peaceful, transparent and credible outcomes in the conduct of presidential elections in Ghana in 2004 and 2008, Benin, and Nigeria in 2015. In short, ECOWAS has played an important role in the democracy and governance project in West Africa, nevertheless, there has been a growing debate among scholars about the prospects of democratic sustenance in the region. Much of the populace of West Africa is anxious to get the democracy dividends in terms of an improved quality of life and material benefits and inclusive governance. While some scholars have painted a grim picture about the future of democracy in West Africa, others believe that the prospects are still bright. According to Bathily (2005: 26):

West Africa may be compared to a volcanic area with blowouts here and there and other hotspots waiting to erupt. Each national territory contains the ingredients of a cocktail that only needs a spark to explode. Given the changes currently underway, far more than other sub-regions, West Africa is going

through a tumultuous democratic process, whose continuity is itself under constant threat. The uniqueness of this process is the result of the conjunction of a number of historical phenomena.

However, Cyril Obi (2007: 10) disagrees suggesting that transition elections in West Africa shows that there is much potential for democratic consolidation and peace, though considerable work still has to be done. Despite the remarkable progress achieved in democratic governance, the security situation in the region continues to be characterised by fragility and unpredictability, and susceptible to reversals. For example, recent experiences of military interventions in Mali, Niger, Guinea, and failed coup d'état in Gambia, as well as political tensions in Guinea-Bissau attest to the uncertainties of democracy in the region. The situation is further complicated by the fact that governance institutions are weak while there is also corrupting influences of money in politics. Since the 1990s, the nature of conflicts in the West African region has changed from interstate conflicts to intra-state conflicts with great concern for the security of West African states. The predominance of intra-state conflicts have given rise to a variety of new Non-state actors who operate freely without respect and recognition of borders and legal and international frameworks that define the rules of conflict. The rise of terrorists groups such as Boko Haram, Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM); the Movement for the Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), all operate across borders with impunity without respect for the rights of people or the sovereignty of the states in the region. The location of the region, the Gulf of Guinea, which is a vast area where drug and human trafficking, piracy, proliferation of small arms and light weapon, activities and Jihad and other extreme groups operates freely is a major challenge to peace and security in the region. The consequences are the surge in transnational crimes such as human and drug trafficking.

The slow growth of the economies in the region and the high level of unemployment including graduates, have created a large

pool of the disgruntled youth. Worse still, the extreme volatility of the West African Region, particularly in 2014 following the emergence of Ebola outbreak in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, poses grave challenges to democratic consolidation.

West Africa: Progress, Challenges and Prospects of Democracy

As stated earlier, three decades on, the expectations for a democracy dividend in the form of peace and stable political atmosphere, strong and effective institutions and economic prosperity are yet to materialise in the West African region. In recent times, various democracy and governance research findings such as the Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG) and Freedom House Ratings have revealed that despite the progress made towards democratisation, there has been disquieting trends in West Africa. The 2014 Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG) revealed that out of the total of 52 countries ranked for the period, three countries from the West African sub-region: Cape Verde, Ghana and Senegal featured in the top 10 rankings. The rankings were based on three variables: safety and rule of law, participation and human rights and sustainable economic opportunities. These countries score well on participation and human rights, while Cape Verde and Ghana ranked fairly regarding safety and security, yet Ghana obtained a weak score on sustainable economic opportunities (See Table 1). Remarkably, the three countries have exhibited improvements since 2009 (Table 1). However, Guinea Bissau was ranked 48 out of 52, obtaining poor scores on all the three variables: safety and rule of law, participation and human rights and sustainable economic opportunities (See Table 2).

**Table 1: Compiled By The Author From The Ibrahim Index Of African Governance (Iiag) 2014
TOP TEN WEST AFRICAN COUNTRIES AND THEIR RESPECTIVE RANKINGS OUT OF 52 COUNTRIES**

Rank/52	Country	Score/100	Change since 2009	Safety and rule of law	Rank	Participation and human right	Rank	Sustainable economic opportunity	Rank	Human development	Rank
2 ND	CAPE VERDE	7 6.6	+ 1.3	78.2	3 RD	83.5	1 ST	63.1	8 TH	81.6	3 RD
7 TH	GHANA	6 8.2	+ 1.6	69.9	6 TH	73.6	7 TH	53.6	14 ^T H	75.5	8 TH
9 TH	SENEGAL	6 4.3	+ 4.6	63.5	1 2 TH	73.7	6 TH	56.7	10 ^T H	63.4	1 ^{7TH}

Table 2: Compiled By The Author From The Ibrahim Index Of African Governance (ILAG) 2014
Last Ten West African Countries And Their Respective Rankings Out Of 52 Countries

Rank/52	Country	Score/100	Change since 2009	Safety and rule of law	Rank	Participati on and human rights	Rank	Sustainabl e economic opportunity	Rank	Human development	Rank
48 TH	GUINE A BISSAU	33.2	- 6.8	30.5	49 TH	30.1	47 TH	25.7	48 TH	46.7	46 TH

The 2015 Freedom House’s report, *Freedom in the World 2015*, evaluates the state of freedom globally. In the report, each country and territory is assigned two ratings—from 1 to 7—for political rights (PR) and civil liberties (CL), where 1 represents the most free and 7 the least free (Freedom House, 2015: 2). The two ratings are based on scores assigned to 25 indicators. The Sub-Categories of Political Rights were: **A:** Electoral Process, **B:** Political Pluralism and Participation, **C:** Functioning of Government, The Sub-Categories: Civil Liberties were: **D:** Freedom of Expression and Belief, **E:** Associational and Organizational Rights, **F:** Rule of Law, **G:** Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights. The average of a country or territory’s political rights and civil liberties ratings determines whether it is Free (F), Partly Free (PF), or Not Free (NF). (Freedom House, 2015: 2). The 2015 Freedom House report provides useful information particularly on the state of democracy in the West African Region. The report clearly demonstrates that while some countries in the West African region improved upon their rankings other slipped badly as discussed below as discussed below..

Table 3: Compiled By The Author From The Freedom House Report 2015

West African Countries Rating From Freedom House Ratings 2015

Country	Status	PRRating	CL Rating	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Benin	F	2	2	8	6	8	5	1	2	0
Burkina Faso	P F	5	3	5		4	3	8		
Cape Verde	F	1	1	1	2	1	5	1	4	3
Cote D'Ivoire	P F	5	4	6		4	0	7		

The Gambia	N F	6	6	2	0	3		
Ghana	F	1	2	1	1	1	1	0
Guinea	P F	5	5	0	3	6		
Guinea- Bissau	N F	6	5	3	1	5		
Liberia	P F	3	4	9	6	8		
Mali	P F	5	4	0	4	6		
Mauritania	N F	6	5	3	5	4		
Niger	P F	3	4	9	7	8		
Nigeria	P F	4	4	0	5	7		
Senegal	F	2	2	1	9	1	0	0
Sierra Leone	P F	3	3	1	7	7		0
Togo	P F	4	4	8	9	7		

Source: <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2015> (accessed 31/08/2015).

While elections have become more regular, and other components of liberal democracy relatively improved compared to the situation that obtained two decades ago, the quality of democracy and governance remains suspect in many countries. For example, the pace of democratisation has been fairly slow in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau and Côte d'Ivoire following conflicts and civil in these countries. The political and security situation in West Africa remained highly precarious, the resurgence

of military coup d'état, ethnic and interreligious conflicts, increasing threats from international crime, violence and apparent manipulations associated with elections, and the trend towards political settlement after electoral conflicts through the formation of coalition governments all indicate the deficits of democracies in the region.

According to Abdoulaye Bathily (2005: 25) “apart from the Great Lakes Region with the genocide in Rwanda, the democratisation process has been more turbulent in West Africa than anywhere else on the African continent.” Almost all the countries in the region show several signs of lasting political instability. Some of them are victims of still unresolved conflicts (Côte d'Ivoire); others are, with difficulty, treading the path of civil peace with the international community's support, (Liberia – Sierra Leone – Guinea Bissau). These developments have led to strong anxieties among scholars, donors and democracy activists because of West Africa's past experience with failed democracy, coups and civil wars. This disturbing state of affairs indicates that more needs to be done by ECOWAS, the African Union and the international community in order to establish democracy in the West African Region. In the next section, I draw from specific countries to show the state of democracy in the West African Region. The analyses will further help us to understand the progress, challenges and the future prospects of democratic governance in the region.

Case Studies: Democratic Consolidation, Stalemates and Reversals in West Africa

Ghana's democracy has steadily improved since the inauguration of the Fourth Republic on 7 January 1993. Six successive multi-party elections have been held so far with two peaceful alternation of power in 2001 and 2009 (Asante, 2013). Despite the progress made so far, there are significant challenges especially in moving from electoral democracy to consolidation. There are major deficiencies in the practical workings of the Constitution and democracy, institutional capacity, the delivery of

public services, the electoral process, and the performance of governance institutions at the various levels of the governance system. Governmental accountability and transparency are severely inadequate, institutional checks-and-balances remain weak, as power is legally and constitutionally over-concentrated in the executive branch, especially the presidency. The rule of law also remains poorly entrenched, administrative, fiscal and political decentralisation remains weak (Gyimah Boadi and Yankah, 2012; Gyimah Boadi and Prempeh, 2012). In 2010, the government inaugurated a constitutional review commission to review Ghana's 1992 constitution but the implementation of the reforms have been stalled due to a legal suit and lack of political will.

In Nigeria, the 1999 elections marked the return to electoral democracy after nearly four decades of military rule. Historically, elections in Nigeria have been marred by violence ranging from verbal attacks to outright killings. The four previous national elections witnessed their share of violent conflicts. However, the historic election of Muhammadu Buhari, All Progressives Congress (APC) in the 2015 General Elections presents opportunities and challenges to democracy and governance in Nigeria including the Boko Haram insurgency and corruption. Since 2009, the government of Nigeria has been battling with the Boko Haram, a militant Islamic sect, that recently (in 2015), pledged its allegiance to the Islamic State and rebranding to the Islamic State's West African Province. Boko Haram is reported to have committed serious human rights abuses against civilians including kidnapping of girls and deadly bomb attacks on civilians, forcing the Nigeria government to declare war against the sect (CDD, Nigeria, 2015). The Boko Haram insurgency poses grave challenge to democratic sustenance in the West African region, since their attacks have spillover effect in neighbouring countries and the continent as a whole. The war against the sect is yielding some positive gains such as recapturing of territories previously occupied by the insurgents and rescue of more than 1, 500 women and girls (CDD, Nigeria, 2015). President Buhari, has adopted a multilateral approach by galvanising local, regional and international efforts to end the Boko

Haram insurgency since his inauguration on 29 May 2015 (CDD, Nigeria, 2015). The 2015 Freedom House ranking indicate that Nigeria's civil liberties rating declined from 4 to 5 due to a sharp deterioration in conditions for residents of areas affected by the Boko Haram insurgency, including mass displacement and a dramatic increase in violence perpetrated by both the militants and security forces (Table 3).

Senegal has won praise from the donor community as an example of stable democracy, however, the Senegalese exception has witnessed some setbacks in recent years. Senegal has been a constitutional democracy since it gained independence from France in 1960, and has suffered no coup or serious political upheaval. However, attempt by President Abdoulaye Wade, who came to power in 2000 to change the constitution heightened political tensions in the country. The Constitutional Court issued a curious legal judgment permitting Mr. Wade to run for a third term, maintaining that since the constitution was new, his first term could not be counted. There were mass protests, leading to burned public buildings and several deaths. During the elections in 2012 Mr. Wade secured only 34.8 per cent in the first round. In the run-off the following month, he lost to Macky Sall. Senegal's democratic institutions are weak and corruption is a major issue, while the Casamance Region that has faced a rebellion since 1982 has not been fully resolved (Bathily, 2005).

Liberia has achieved a modicum of stability since the re-introduction of multi-party politics. Since the 2005 election of Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, Liberia has demonstrated strong respect for civil and political rights. The government has shown an open attitude to democratic reform. However, Liberia is faced with formidable democracy and governance challenges, and fared poorly in the areas of government effectiveness, control of corruption, regulatory quality, and the rule of law (Cooper, n.d). Institutions of the state are generally weak and governance efforts on rebuilding both the basic physical infrastructure of government and the capacity of civil servants has been weak (Cooper, n.d). The governance challenges in Liberia could be attributed to the country's fourteen year civil war

which only ended in late 2003. In April 2012, the International Criminal Court (ICC) convicted former president Charles Taylor of 50 years' imprisonment for crimes committed during Sierra Leone's civil war. Fears expressed by some observers of Liberian politics of violent backlash due to the conviction were unfounded; however, Taylor's imprisonment revived nationwide discussions around accountability for human rights abuses and the implementation of recommendations by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, including a tribunal to try those accused of committing war crimes (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2014).

Like Liberia, Sierra Leone also faces similar democracy and governance challenges. Sierra Leone emerged out of a longstanding civil war which ended in 2000. The country has made relative gains in democracy and governance, however, institutions of democracy are weak. Liberia received a downward trend arrow in the 2014 Freedom House ranking due to the government's imposition of quarantines that restricted freedom of movement and employment in some of the country's most destitute areas, as well as several new or revived restrictions on freedoms of the press and assembly (See Table 3).

Benin has been a good example of relatively successful democracies in Africa and part of the eleven liberal democracies on the continent according to the 2014 Freedom House Report. Benin transitioned to democracy in 1991 and has been holding periodic elections. There are however major democracy and governance deficits. Key institutions of democracy such as parliament, judiciary and political parties and the media are weak. Since 2004 a number of indicators connected to quality democracy have declined, especially in the field of the rule of law and corruption prevention. As noted from Freedom House, Benin is one of the most corrupt nations in the continent defined as free, it is the home of drug trafficking from Latin America as a conduit to Europe and Asia, and power brokers are suspected as complicit in the drug trade. Political parties are continually fragmenting, several parties established do not hold political activities nor contest elections. The media is relatively independent of political actors largely as a result

of donor support. However, Benin lacks professional journalism, while President Yayi Boni has been highly intolerant to media critiques of corruption and authoritarian governance. (UNU-WIDER, 2012).

Mali, one of the eleven liberal democracies on the continent according to Freedom House was a celebrated case of democratic awakening in West Africa. The country has been a multiparty state since 1992. Elections are regularly held since then and are considered open and competitive; their constitutions enshrine checks and balances on the government. Mali, however, suffered a major setback in its democratic journey when on 22 March 2012, soldiers led by a young officer Amadou Sanogo abandoned a faltering campaign against Tuareg Rebels in the north of the country and seized power from President Amadou Toumani Touré.

Though ECOWAS promptly condemned the coup and imposed financial and other sanctions on Mali, democracy and governance challenges have been compounded by recent developments in the Sahel Regions. The return to Mali of tens of thousands of migrants, including a few thousand heavily armed and battle-hardened Tuareg fighters who had fled Libya following the overthrow of the dictator Muammar al-Qaddafi gave new potency to the largely contained Tuareg separatists in northern Mali, leading to the rebels' capture of the three northern regions of Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu and a proclamation of secession from southern Mali. Presidential elections were held in Mali on 28 July 2013, with a second round run-off held on 11 August when President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta defeated Soumaila Cissé in the run-off. The proliferation of small arms and light weapon in the Sahel has wider implications for the region, particularly Niger, Mauritania and Chad. Armed "Islamist" groups that may or may not be linked to the Al Qaeda in the Sahara, with their ideologies and expertise in warfare, poses a permanent threat to the stability of all Sahel countries.

Burkina Faso, Niger, Gambia, Guinea and Guinea Bissau have witnessed a transition to multi-party systems but are showing signs of instability. In Burkina Faso, President Blaise Compaoré was forced to resign amid popular protests over his attempt to change

the constitution and extend his 27-year rule in 2015. He has been in power for 27 years from 1987 until his resignation on 31 October 2014 after massive public protests where at least 24 people were killed and more than 600 were injured. Various state properties including Parliament, the State house, Compaore's brother's house among others were destroyed and looted. He was elected President in 1991, in an election that was boycotted by the opposition, and re-elected in 1998, 2005 and 2010. His attempt to amend the constitution to extend his 27-year term in order to seek re-election in 2015 caused the 2014 Burkinabé uprising. This led to the dissolution of the government and parliament by the military, which took charge of the country (Freedom House, 2015). Burkina Faso's political rights rating declined from 5 to 6 as a result of the dissolution of the government and parliament by the military, which took charge of the country after President Blaise Compaoré was forced to resign amid popular protests over his attempt to run for reelection in 2015 (See Table 3).

On September 16, 2015, just weeks ahead of presidential and legislative elections scheduled for October 11, 2015, the country's first since President Blaise Compaore was forced out in 2014, soldiers from the elite presidential guard (RSP) burst into a cabinet meeting in the Presidential Palace and seized interim President Michel Kafando and Prime Minister Isaac Zida, amid protests in the capital, Ouagadougou, resulting in three deaths and over 60 injured (BBC, News 2015; Aljazeera News, 2015; Ollo Hien/Yahoo News, 2015), plunging the country into fresh uncertainty. General Gilbert Diendere, chief-of-staff and a close ally of former President Blaise Compaore has been named as the country's new leader (BBC News, 2015). The new leader has dissolved the country's transitional government that had been charged with running the country until the October 11 elections and announced the establishment of a National Democratic Council to oversee the transition and end "the deviant regime of transition" (Ollo Hien/Yahoo News, 2015) and create a government which would organise "inclusive" elections (Yahoo News, 2015). In the run up to the elections, supporters of Compaore complained of discrimination following the passage of a

controversial law in April 2015 that made anyone backing “unconstitutional change” ineligible (Ollo Hien/Yahoo News, 2015). A communique read by Lieutenant Colonel Mamadou Bamba criticised the electoral code, which they claimed blocked members of Compaore’s party from taking part in the October 11 elections (Aljazeera News, 2015). The new leader has indicated that he still wanted elections to take place but refused to give a date for a vote, insisting that electoral rules would be “revised... in order to allow all those who wish to participate in the vote to do so” (Ollo Hien/Yahoo News, 2015). Since the ouster of Blaise Compaore, members of the presidential guard that had a strong allegiance to him have expressed uncertainty about their future in a new democratic regime.

In Togo and Guinea (Conakry), the democratisation process still remains strongly characterised by the powerful after-effects of the old single-party system, with militarism having a stronger influence in governance. In these two countries, despite having a multi-party system for several decades, the armed forces still play a decisive role in the devolvement of power and people management mechanisms at all levels.

In Ivory Coast, Mr. Ouattara won the 2010 election but the incumbent, Laurent Gbagbo, refused to step down. Institutions of democracy such as the judiciary, parliament and the armed forces are weak. Mr. Ouattara’s control over the forces that helped oust Mr. Gbagbo is unclear. He is trying to shape them into a new national army but their origin as rebels for nearly ten years has not been erased. A recent report by Amnesty International indicate that security forces and militia fighters allied with President Alassane Ouattara are intimidating and killing members of ethnic groups perceived to be against him.

Guinea and Niger have experienced coup plots, by disgruntled soldiers. According to Pierre Englebert, in Niger, “the military has been the self-anointed referee of politics for 20 years”. In all three countries — Guinea, Niger and Ivory Coast — the establishment of democracy has been difficult. Armies operate as laws unto themselves. The soldiers have rarely been put in check by civilian

institutions that remain chronically weak. Consequently, politicians often depend on the good graces, or otherwise, of the men who carry the guns. Guinea's 2010 election was beset with allegations of corruption, vote rigging, and fraud. In 2011, President Alpha Condé of Guinea narrowly survived an assassination attempt by soldiers (IMANI, 2015). Likewise, in 2010, President Mahamadou Issoufou's government in Niger arrested coup-plotting soldiers.

Guinea-Bissau has been an exception to the overall trend of democratisation in West Africa: the country has experienced five military coups in the past decade. Guinea-Bissau's political rights rating improved from 6 to 5, and its status improved from Not Free to Partly Free, because the 2014 elections—the first since a 2012 coup—were deemed free and fair by international and national observers, and the opposition was able to compete and increase its participation in government (See Table 3). Improvements were seen in Madagascar and Guinea-Bissau, which held their first elections during late 2013 and 2014 respectively following coups in previous years. It remained uncertain whether these gains would be consolidated (See Table 3).


In Gambia, Yahya Jammeh came into office through a military junta (APRC) on 22 July 1994; elected in 1996, re-elected in 2001, 2006, and 2011. The President has ruled for over seventeen (17) years. Yahya Jammeh's tenure of office or term limit has been renewed in a revised constitutional provision by majority in Parliament. The Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS), boycotted the 2011 presidential election because the country's political environment was not conducive for free, fair and transparent presidential elections. The sub-regional bloc fact-finding mission deployed to the country before the election found an intimidated electorate, cowed opposition and an unacceptable level of electronic media controlled by the ruling party (Lamin Jahateh, 2012). The United Democratic Party vehemently rejected the election results, called it "bogus, fraudulent and a capricious usurpation of the will of the people" (Lamin Jahateh, 2012). On the 30th December 2014, a coup d'état erupted in Gambia with gunfire, and roadblocks to ouster Yahya Jammeh, under the command of Lt

Colonel Lamin Sanneh. In the 2014 Freedom House ranking, Gambia received a downward trend arrow due to an amendment to the criminal code that increased the penalty for “aggravated homosexuality” to life in prison, leading to new arrests of suspected LGBT people and an intensified climate of fear (Table 3).

Media in West Africa

Since the 1990s, the media sector in West Africa has seen significant improvements (Fig. 2). A study by Asante et al 2013 revealed that overall index for media freedom has improved significantly in the last 10-20 years. The levels of democratic freedoms in the media have been trending upwards, particularly when looking at aggregated indices, and also all specific indicators (Fig. 2).

Fig 2: Cross Country Variation in Media of Selected West African Countries



However, there are critical challenges ahead. This is because some areas in the media sector are lagging behind others. Four specific indicators need urgent attention: a). Harassment of journalists; b). Lack of media being critical towards the governments; c). Access to general media across the populations, and d). Gender imbalance among journalists. In some of the countries, the media sector is faring less well than in other nations: Guinea, Nigeria, and Togo. The study found that a major challenge confronting the media landscape of West Africa is Government censorship, informal as well as formal. It remains an issue even in relatively democratic countries like Benin and Senegal, and a major issue in the less democratic states like Togo and Guinea. Harassment of journalists is also a major issue in Burkina Faso, Togo and Nigeria where violence is a general issue; as well as in more democratic countries like Benin and Senegal. For example, in Burkina Faso, Article 8 of the constitution and the 1993 Information Code guarantee freedoms of expression, information, and the press (Freedom House, 2014). Despite this, libel is still a criminal offense while the media are prohibited from publishing or broadcasting graphic images. In 2012, Issa Lohé Konaté, the editor of a weekly newspaper, was sentenced to 12 months in prison for publishing two articles accusing a public prosecutor of abusing his power. His paper was shut down for six months, and he was ordered to pay excessive fines, damages, and costs. However, in a landmark ruling on December 5, the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights ruled that Burkina Faso violated the right to freedom of expression of Konaté (*Human Rights Watch*, 8 December 2014; Freedom House, 2014). In September 2015, a Nigerian newspaper columnist, Donu Kogbara was abducted from her home (CPJ, 2015). The Committee to Protect Journalists appealed to the Nigerian authorities to establish the motive for the abduction, and apprehend and prosecute the perpetrators. In August, 2015, armed police officers barred several journalists from entering a courthouse in Lagos state to cover court proceedings (CPJ, 2015).

Corruption in the media sector is a very significant issue in most countries and poses a threat to democratic rights in the media

sector in West Africa. The media is an important institution for promoting transparency and accountability as well as the fight against corruption. However, some Journalists are often given informal incentives, such as money (bribes) in a brown envelope, to publish or refrain from publishing particular stories. In Ghana, the practice is referred to as *solli*, tend to undermine good governance. However, it is less clear the extent to which corruption is distorting the media towards or against incumbent governments, or other actors (Asante *et al.*, 2013).

Conclusion

This chapter examined the state of democracy in the West African Region. It analysed the various scholarly debates about the transition from authoritarianism to democracy as well as the relevance of liberal democracy in Africa. The chapter also discussed the various regional initiatives and frameworks adopted by ECOWAS to promote democracy and good governance including, the Declaration on Political Principles in 1991, Constitutional Convergence Principles and Protocols on Democracy and Governance, the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security.

The chapter highlighted the progress, challenges, and prospects of democracy and governance in the West African Region. It shows that the democratic outcomes have been mixed with different levels of progress, stalemates and reversals. While some countries are moving ahead and becoming more free (Ghana, Benin), others are lagging (Guinea, Togo, Gambia), and, in some cases, regressing (Mali). The chapter also noted massive improvements in the media sector but also pointed out the challenges ahead.

It demonstrated that despite the remarkable progress achieved in democratic governance and the role of ECOWAS, the security situation in the region continues to be volatile and is characterised by fragility and uncertainties and susceptible to reversals. Most of the democracies in West Africa are characterised by dominant executives, weak judiciaries and parliaments, political parties and

civil society organisations. The resurgence of military coup d'état, manipulations of elections and post electoral disputes that often result in the formation of coalition governments show that a lot more has to be done by regional leaders and the international community in order to establish democracy in the region.

Other challenges include harassment of journalism, media corruption, and spill over of conflicts. The rise in non-state actors including Islamist militants from Boko Haram in Nigeria and others in the Sahel Region with or without links to al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) poses major challenges to democracy and governance.

There is the need to deepen democracy through the enforcement of the various ECOWAS instruments on democracy and governance, strengthening democratic institutions, reform the security system to make it more responsive to democratic control and human rights; and ensure greater separation of powers, adherence to the rule of law and anti-corruption principles. West African leaders should galvanise national, regional and international actors to bring an end to the activities of terrorists groups find a more holistic approach to dealing with the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. In this regard, future research could explore the feasibility of regional initiatives and frameworks in reinforcing the drive towards democracy and good governance in West Africa.

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Paradigm Clash, Imperial Methodological Epistemologies and Development in Africa: Observations from rural Zimbabwe and Zambia

Munyaradzi Mawere & Gertjan van Stam

Introduction

The methodology of our research in the world influences the way we experience and interpret the world (Gadamer 2014). It dictates the whole discourse on knowledge and development in any human society, including the direction in which society should take in the formulation and implementation of political and socio-economic policies. As we underline here, methodology is not only influential in the global north where most of the theories and models that the world embraces today were (and continue to be) formulated. It is also influential in many other contexts such as Africa to which this chapter focuses. Yet, the choice of methodology, in the case of Africa, is often determined and set by researchers from the global north exercising their privileged agency, based upon their political power to have their choice imposed and embraced ‘as is’. The agency that these privileged researchers rely on is mediated by identity and how we make meaning of ourselves through the very way the world reflects us through the mirror and lens provided by the environment around us (Verhaeghe 2014). This means that there is a loop in the way we approach the world and the way the world approaches us. Our methodologies and epistemological lens frame this loop, popularise it and make it appear as it is a universal truth – a truth that no one under the sun should question.

On this note, this chapter critically examines the relationship between the meanings that researchers from the global north often make when carrying out research in rural Africa, and the way the

world presents itself to them from the perspective of ontologies that govern global research and decision-making in areas of policy making and socio-economic development. We argue in this chapter that, since the European enlightenment, the dominant ontology for knowledge generation in Africa and many parts of the world has been Western scientism, yielding the paradigms of positivism and post-positivism (also known as post-empiricism). Both paradigms – positivism and post-positivism – assume that the world is ordered and regular and reality exists independently of the way we experience/observe, measure, and learn about it. Post-positivism additionally asserts that context, considered to be a set of external factors, affects the patterns of our observations. In fact, while positivists believe that the researcher and the researched person(s) are independent of each other, post-positivists accept that background, theories, models and values of the researcher can influence what is observed (Robson 2002). Nevertheless, just like positivists, post-positivists pursue objectivity – objective truth – through experimentation and by recognising the possible effects of biases likely to influence the researcher. Over the years, scholars such as Karl Popper (1959), through his falsification theory, which advances that it is impossible to verify that a belief is true, and others like Thomas Kuhn (1970), through his exposition of paradigm shift, have rubbished positivism. For example, Kuhn's idea of paradigm shift offers a broader critique of positivism, arguing that it is not simply individual theories but whole worldviews that must occasionally shift in response to evidence.

What worries, however, is that, even with the overwhelming evidence that all theory is revisable as now widely recognised by post-positivism, and that all humanity across the world is naturally endowed with reason and the ability to generate knowledge, some societies have been denied (directly or otherwise) their right to contribute to knowledge production by other societies that deem themselves more equal than others. What Kuhn suggests in his paradigm shift, thus, is nothing less than words falling on deaf ears when it comes to knowledge production and administration at global level. The ontology that dominates knowledge generation

and meaning-making has, over the years, been promoted and empowered by certain political and economic systems championed by the global north. In particular, rationalist theory, which considers that decisions and actions are best based on particular ‘facts’ has reinforced an ideology of scientism. Scientism considers the scientific method (positivism) to produce the most authoritative knowledge and tends to promote research, even in social sciences that is founded on empirically measurable data. This movement means Aristotle’s logos are limited to an empirical rationalist set where knowledge is understood to be ‘value-free’ and asocial. However, Aristotle understood the value of forms of knowledge that are context specific, a notion current science seems to have discarded to the dustbins of stupor in its strive for universally applicable propositions, models and methodologies.

Despite efforts by scholars and critics alike to de-colonise not only the world politics but Western science – Scientism – in order to be more tolerant to other sciences the world over, Scientism seems to be on an imperial conquest tour espousing its particular view of scientific reason, hegemony and self-assumed superiority. Scientism remains the determinant factor that continues to influence both methodologies and policies of socio-economic development even in Africa where conditions and contexts are different. It is this realisation that prompted us to challenge the continued self-assumed superiority of Western scientism with a view to promote epistemic pluralism. We argue that it is only through epistemic pluralism – methodological pluralism/diversity – that world societies could possibly achieve symmetrical relationships in the areas of knowledge production and socio-economic development.

Paradigm clashes: Research escapades in rural Zambia and Zimbabwe

During research on community development in rural Zambia and Zimbabwe by one of us, major constraints were experienced in methodological guidance on how to perform acceptable research

(van Stam 2014a). When trying to frame research in ways deemed ‘acceptable’ for academic certification, the loop back into the community – to assure community deposit of the research – yielded very little (van Stam 2013). ‘Scientific’ processes and outcomes were not recognised by the people in the rural areas as having much relevance or meaning. The people had their own ways of doing the same things one from the global north would do, following particular procedures of their own and expecting specific outcomes. In short, there was a paradigm clash between the researcher informed in the Western epistemologies and the rural people informed in local epistemologies.

These experiences confirmed the researcher’s observations that when studying academic texts written by Western authors while working in African settings and contexts, there often remains a lingering feeling of discomfort (van Stam 2012). Worse still is trying to use those works – theories and models – in Africa in a manner that assumes that one size fits all! It became apparent to the researcher, grown up and educated in the European setting, that Western epistemology is not as universally applicable as he was led to believe. There was need for the researcher to make a U-turn, to realise that education in some parts of the world instils a kind of knowledge that assumes universality when in reality it is not applicable to many other settings where the knowledge could be transferred and practised. However, academic practice (especially in the field of publishing) implicitly demands one should cite, or at least acknowledge, such previous works (Peekhouse, 2012). We argue in this chapter that although the content of such works might seem good and make a lot of sense to an academically trained person, it has to be read and understood in terms of its meaning, relevance, and suitability to the communities to which the content is to be applied. Otherwise, reading the material without juxtaposing it with the context in which it is to be used would carry one from ‘the local reality’ into a different framing of reality so that the proposed models and theories will be rendered useless. This necessitates the need for the production and consumption of research work grounded in context to avoid research work in communities

appearing as work meant to show the inapplicability of the building blocks instead of taking building blocks and building onwards. There is no doubt that doing the former de-rails the pace of community development, yet what would a researcher do when confronted by a situation where the models s/he is asked to use do not squarely fit the context? This kind of situation normally poses dilemma to critical community development practitioners, especially when assigned to work in a different setting from the one where they received their formal training. As one of the authors who was directly involved in these paradigm clashes confesses:

It took me many years, and many discussions, to understand that the conflict of the academic approach and the mismatch with its ability to communicate meaning to the rural African community all started from the perspective from which the methodologies we used in our community development projects evolved. In the contrasts presented in rural Africa, it became clear that the academic perspective implicitly involved a positionality outlook that carried a tone of imposition and coercion as from a Western, white, male person (van Stam, 2015).

The same feeling that the aforementioned author and researcher had was clearly shared by a participant in one of the many meetings that the research team had with different stakeholders. In a meeting of Deans of Engineering of Universities in Southern Africa, in October 2014, a participant, in response to a presentation on experience in research and development in rural Africa (van Stam 2014b) and discussing engineering education in Sub Sahara Africa exclaimed in frustration:

Can we stop citing work by academics in the West? We are losing time in constantly rebuking their supposedly helpful work. How can we innovate if we are forced to keep thinking like them?

Contemporary orientalism, imperialism and colonialism

Theories and literature on African realities have been severely modulated by Western influence. From around the year 1500, colonial encounters influenced Africa, and besieged African world-views, value systems, cultures, identity, systems of politics and conservation, academics and business (Ackroyd 2004; Adams & Mulligan 2003; Asante 1994, 2000; Bourdillon 1987; Mawere 2014a,b,c). This is what Mawere (2014c) describes as ‘Western hegemony and imperial conquest of Africa’ marred with imperial hypocrisy and invasion of African cultures across the continent. We add that in such situations where invasions and foreign dominations occur at a large scale, various perspectives, primarily those of the invaders, and the victims compete with the former, imposing exogenous perspectives and those being invaded having to strike a balance between indigenous and exogenous perspectives. The choice of perspective is important, as it represents a particular attitude towards, or way of regarding something – a point of view with the capacity to influence a people’s way of life.

Access to indigenous African views is challenging, as literature is difficult to access due to a limited number of book shops, logistical difficulties, or pay walls in Africa. Much of the knowledge is captured in orality, a format that necessitates other forms of access and permissions different from those involved in textuality and Western traditions. Further difficulties are that many of the texts on Africa are written by foreigners who, from their experiences as researchers, visitors or travellers, write ‘about Africa’. And texts from ‘the Global South’ often show an apologetic format, at least from a Western perspective, describing a theory in ‘how it is not Western’ although Western writings do not describe a theory in ‘how it is not aligned with the ‘Global South’. This is in fact a scenario that one could describe as academic imperialism, whereby one school of thought assumes universality to such degree that it overshadows other voices or schools. When allowed to take place, such a situation perpetuates ‘the danger of a single story’ (Adichie 2009). Perpetuating a single story results in other stories relating to

the same event not being heard at all – the stories are rejected before they are even heard. In a situation as the one described above, the single story that is dangerously perpetuated at the expense of all others is the Western perspective.

But what causes contemporary asymmetrical relationships going on and on even decades well after the demise of Western colonial administration on the African soil? Ndlovu-Gatsheni's (2013) observation seems to provide an answer to the above raised question. He recognises the political correctness that influences texts and people's minds, hence he observes that:

Africa continues to be inhabited by a people suffering from mental colonisation to the extent that the majority of them are comfortable with being judged by Europeans and are always striving to get validation of whatever they do from Europeans and Americans (p.46).

Ndlovu-Gatsheni's observation is similar to the one picked up by Mamdani (2011) who regards participation of most African intellectuals and academics in research to merely focus on 'hunters and gatherers' of raw data as 'native informants' who collect and provide empirical data. We add that this is a colonial hang-over that should be cured if Africa is to genuinely progress politically and socio-economically.

The Feminist scholar, Oyěwùmí (1997) also alludes to how Africans, through colonial imperialism, have had their sense of reality and their life-worlds self shaped by the Western narrative. With regards to African identities, Oyěwùmí calls for the need to actively address this fundamental problem as "without this necessary loosening we continue to mistake the West for the Self and therefore see ourselves as the 'Other'" (ibid, location 802). Oyěwùmí's argument here is critical as far as African consciousness is concerned. It is in fact a call for the indigenous African people to be conscious of themselves: their identities and roots, such that they learn to appreciate their own cultures before appreciating those of others.

Yet we should underline that the debate on aspects of African identity is complex, especially considering Africa's historical trajectories in both pre-colonial and colonial periods. As Wright (2002) notes "Africa has a long history of being both romanticised in various pan-Africanist discourses and vilified in racist and colonialist discourses" (p.1) and African "voices have been appropriated in the West" (p.2). In the course of history, master narratives in the West continued to interact with African performance of roles. This dilutes the supposed African-ness in the indigenous African people.

A critical analysis of the works by Oyěwùmí, Wright and others cited above show that their positions align with a view of knowledge imperialism, where in established Western-biased academies, one is expected to make reference to Western texts and their framing even if they hardly fit in context. This is most evident in the way literary works, especially produced by African scholars and critical unbiased Western scholars, continue to be segregated and rejected for publication as long as they are critical of the Global North. It then brings into question whether most of these publishing houses and journals in the Global North are not stooges of the Western and American imperialists meant to promote their interests! We argue that the colonial set-up of the scientific systems like journals and academic institutes such as the one we describe above, has abused methodologies, making them serve as tools of appropriation of information for foreign benefit, leaving the local communities of Africa objectified and exploited even many years after the end of 'formal' colonialism on the continent. In line with this, we further argue that the implicit de-contextualisation and de-humanisation of indigenous knowledge and/or local methodologies and epistemologies is a moral offence to most African environments. Sadly, non-alignment with the imperial hegemony and utilisation of prescribed methodologies do not only shortchange the people of Africa but severely impair one's access to resources for research in Africa.

In line with the above, the resulting hostile attitude towards the presentation of local, rural African views – in an endeavour to bring

them out of their subaltern state – seem to invoke discussions containing diverging aspects of dualism and orientalism. Or, as Keller (2010) wrote down about a confrontation with his African-American friend:

“You’re a racist, you know,” he once said at our kitchen table. “Oh, you don’t mean to be, and you don’t want to be, but you are. You can’t really help it.” He said, for example, “When black people do things in a certain way, you say, ‘Well, that’s your culture.’ But when white people do things in a certain way, you say, ‘That’s just the right way to do things’. You don’t realise you really have culture. You are blind to how many of your beliefs and practices are cultural” (p.1650).

In rural Africa, local knowledge involves bi-directional/interactive orality and embodied knowledge (van Stam 2013) in a relationship that is symmetrical and not asymmetrical such as that given by Keller above. Often, one is at a loss how to translate such reality in academic English text that de-constructs and de-contextualises reality. Textualisation does implicitly demand an approach from a Western epistemological location and should anticipate scrutiny by access control as set by gatekeepers of Western scientism. We argue that this demand for value-independence quantification dictates alignment with Western values and de facto omits local knowledge enshrined in local morality and believe systems.

Culture and paradigm

In his study on integration of persons in Belgium, Verhaeghe views cultural differences to be the cause of problems of integration (Verhaeghe, n.d). These problems surface in the process of assessment of cultures, where some cultures are regarded as less valuable and desirable than others. Of course, ‘foreign cultures’ happen to be regarded as less valuable and undesirable at the same time. This assessment of cultures, Verhaeghe recognises as

culturism. Culturism de-individualises the individual, as the individual is regarded as subject to his/her cultural features.

Verhaeghe (ibid) recognises a cultural turn, where cultural explanations are replacing socio-economic explanations. Within this cultural turn, Verhaeghe argues, topics shift to social constructions like identities, religions, values and attitudes. He regards the replacements of Keynes theories by neo-liberalism to be an example of this cultural turn. In this theorisation of cultural difference, Verhaeghe goes on to problematise the underlying notion of cultural essentialism, as he regards culture as a social construction. Verhaeghe notes that culturism is not neutral, it is a political-ideological activity. This means that the Global North's urge for the universalisation of its methodologies and epistemologies could be interpreted as both political-ideological and a cultural war against societies of the Global South. Such 'wars', we argue, do not only deny other societies an opportunity to participate in global discourses, but de-rail political and socio-economic development on a global scale. In the case of our case studies in rural Zambia and Zimbabwe, the implication of a push for the universalisation of methodologies and epistemologies of the Global North is that they are more often than not inapplicable in such context as they can hardly stimulate or sustain progress of the communities concerned. Besides, it perpetuates a situation whereby the epistemologies and methodologies of the rural communities of Zimbabwe and Zambia remain trapped in orature with the possibility of them dying a natural death.

On this note, we argue that methodology must be sensitive to relationships and interactions between people who live within and are of different cultures. The notion of – and flight into – culturism is of prime concern. However, when one observes the difficulty of different peoples to understand each other, explanations from the perspective of cultural differences is not satisfactory. If cultural differences would explain mutuality in comprehensions more than time invested in education about other cultures, then one could be expected to yield tangible results, and more specifically a high level of understanding of each other's cultural position. However, we

infer from the research experiences in rural communities in Zambia and Zimbabwe between 2000 and 2015 that although much effort has been put into explaining cultural differences through education and explanations and ‘living-the-life’ the miscomprehension of people’s behaviour remains an issue. It is therefore suggested in this chapter that a view from cultural perspectives does not explain such differences in comprehension, but that a view from the perspective of paradigms provides more satisfactory explanation.

The term paradigm refers to a set of ideas, a theoretical framework, a theoretical model of how society or nature works (Slattery 2003, page 151). Kuhn (1970) worked on the idea of paradigms, where in talking of paradigm shift he defines paradigm as “universally recognised scientific achievements that for a time provide model problem and solutions to a community of practitioners” (ibid: viii).

Kuhn explains that it is impossible to hold, simultaneously, two paradigms because people holding different paradigms see different things and they see them in different relations to one another, an incompatibility which he calls incommensurability. It is for this reason that we end up having hegemonic paradigm, a paradigm we will explain in our sub-heading below. It suffices to note that a paradigm provides an interpretative framework, which is guided by a set of beliefs and feelings about the world and how it should be understood and that affects ontology, epistemology and methodologies studied (Guba 1994). The classic (Western) paradigm emerges from the realist school of thought that searches for the answers in the natural. In the South, the paradigm is more based upon a naturalist school of thought that includes the natural, the spiritual and the interaction between the two (Chimakonam, 2012).

Hegemonic paradigm

In his study of paradigms, Ramón Grosfoguel (2011, no pagination) shows that the hegemonic political-economy paradigm and world-system is a

European/capitalist/military/Christian/patriarchal/heterosexual/male paradigm imposed on the subaltern. He lists components of the hegemonic paradigm, emerging from a perspective change experiment, as follows:

➤ A particular global class formation where a diversity of forms of labour (slavery, semi-serfdom, wage labour, petty-commodity production, etc.) co-exists and is organized by capital as a source of production of surplus value through the selling of commodities for a profit in the world market;

➤ an international division of labour of core and periphery where capital organises labour in the periphery around coerced and authoritarian forms (citing Wallerstein 1974);

➤ an inter-state system of politico-military organisations controlled by European males and institutionalised in colonial administrations;

➤ a global racial/ethnic hierarchy that privileges European people over non-European people (cf. Quijano 2000);

➤ a global gender hierarchy that privileges males over females and European Judeo-Christian patriarchy over other forms of gender relations (cf. Spivak, 2012);

➤ a sexual hierarchy that privileges heterosexuals over homosexuals and lesbians;

➤ a spiritual hierarchy that privileges Christians over non-Christian/non-Western spiritualities institutionalised in the globalisation of the Christian (Catholic and later, Protestant) church;

➤ an epistemic hierarchy that privileges Western knowledge and cosmology over non-Western knowledge and cosmologies, and institutionalised in the global university system (cf. Mignolo 2003);

➤ a linguistic hierarchy between European languages and non-European languages that privileges communication and knowledge/theoretical production in the former and sub-alternise the latter as sole producers of folklore or culture but not of knowledge/theory (Mignolo 2000);

➤ an aesthetic hierarchy of high art vs. naive or primitive art where the West is considered superior high art and the non-West is considered as producers of inferior expressions of art institutionalised in Museums, Art Galleries and global art markets;

➤ a pedagogical hierarchy where the Cartesian Western forms of pedagogy are considered superior over non-Western concepts and practices of pedagogy;

➤ a media/informational hierarchy where the West has the control over the means of global media production and information technology while the non-West do not have the means to make their points of view enter the global media networks;

➤ an age hierarchy where the Western conception of productive life (that of ages between 15 and 65 years old). This has the implication that disposable people above 65 years old are considered superior over non-Western forms of age classification, where the older the person the more authority and respect he/she receives from the community;

➤ an ecological hierarchy where the Western conceptions of 'nature' (as an object that is a means towards an end) with its destruction of life (human and non-human) is privileged and considered superior over non-Western conceptions of the 'ecology' such as Ubuntu or (ecology or cosmos as subject that is an end in itself), which considers in its rationality the reproduction of life;

➤ a spatial hierarchy that privileges the urban over the rural with the consequent destruction of rural communities, peasants and agrarian production at the world-scale.

The exposure to disparate paradigms during life appears to have caused a double or triple consciousness in some of the African academics who are involved with research; one must discern from which consciousness one is referring to, which one is being addressed, how and when. We should underscore here that the paradigm view provides a solution for the geographical focus of many labels. Generalisations like 'the African culture is like this' or 'Westerners are like that' are shown to be stigmatising. Those kinds of statements label people, and often link with geographical areas

(e.g. ‘on the African continent’). In that manner, no explanation is offered for the variation of behaviour and differences and similarities within groups that are labelled and/or linked to a geographical area (e.g. African, Dutch, South African, or the South, Zimbabwean, the West). Culture is not static but dynamic and in a way spasmodic: it represents the past, current and sometimes future status of the dynamism of social interactions and their power relations. We add that the perspective of paradigm de-links (cultural constrained) behaviour, possibly seen to be linked to people of groups or geographical locations from the thought patterns of those people. It links thinking with belief systems and systems of thought. This means that within a group of people, or within a given geographical area, it can be understood that various paradigms can exist.

Galtung’s (1971) theory on imperialism can then be linked to a specific paradigm in which the acquisition of goods or knowledge from outside the local community for the benefit of one’s self-interest can be regarded as a possible proposition. People active in the perpetuation of such an imperial system would, in general, be aligned with its paradigm. However, observations in rural Africa, particularly rural Zambia and Zimbabwe, show that there are other views on the reality where the whole system of imperialism is not understood to exist in that manner. Imperialistic behaviour exercised is not understood, as, in this specific case; imperial behaviour is regarded as behaviour outside the purview of the people’s central philosophy of Ubuntu, that is, outside of the paradigm in which the community is seen as valuable. In rural Zimbabwe and Zambia, where we draw on our field data, there is no framework for linking imperial behaviour with what it means to be human (van Stam, 2014c). Here an explanation of cultural differences does not solve the underlying incompatibility of understanding due to a clash of paradigms. This realisation as exposed in this section begs for a look at the methodological consequences on both the imposing and victim parties, hence our next sub-heading.

Conclusion

Having examined hegemonic paradigm, we need to underscore in our conclusion that a working model of the different paradigms recognises three distinct paradigms:

- *I-paradigm*, where the focus is on the individual self in an atomistic universe, aiming at a redemption of rights and individual control, culminating in individualism and constructs like ‘social contract’. Neo-liberal thought can be seen to be aligned with the I-paradigm.

- *We-paradigm*, with a focus on social personhood in a universe of coherence, aiming for social cohesion and collective unity and culminating in communalism, social bond, and strive for reciprocity.

- *It-paradigm*, where a religious-constituted belonging recognises interaction with spiritual realms, transcendence, and focus on revealed personhood.

As we revealed in this chapter, long term research in the rural environment of Zambia and Zimbabwe is constrained by the local realities. The rural community mainly operated in a ‘we-paradigm’. Exceptions are leaders aligned with institutes set up along Western models, which would be based outside of the local culture (van Stam 2014c). Even in the transdisciplinary research in the community, it was felt that many methodologies were implicitly assessing realities from an ‘I-paradigm’ and therefore were not well fitted for purpose. Only approaches connected with transdisciplinary epistemologies that allow for highly variable approaches, those in the participatory realm like critical ethnography seemed ethically and environmentally sound, with possible alignment in the ‘we-paradigm’.

However, many mind boggling questions of methodology do arise. When one researches in the ‘we-paradigm’ is it possible to ask questions to the environment as if acting in an ‘I-paradigm’? If a researcher trained in individual environments does entertain preconceived questions, how would the existence of those questions be regarded in the ‘we-paradigm’? Is it possible to position questions from a ‘scientific approach’ that implies a

‘distance’ from the subject of research, and presuming a position of impartiality effectively in a *we*-paradigm? In practice, entertaining these questions appears to be leading the researcher into ethically constrained positions. How do questions and the process towards answers interact with the context, and can ‘context-independent research’ really be regarded as such?

We conclude that in every act of research, whether on politics, social sciences or economic development, the issue of colonialism must be considered, given that colonialism purposefully diminished African cultures and indigenous knowledges which it judged as superstitious, primitive, irrational and unscientific (Mawere 2014c). Even if one would believe the myth that with the departure of colonial powers in Africa colonialism would have left, the issue of coloniality is an important issue to reckon with. Therefore, utilising methodologies that emerged from localities of power have to be scrutinised as to their relation with imperial and colonial attitudes, and their enshrined colonial agency. Yet we acknowledge that this is a tedious process, given that such conditioning is not explicit and in many instances it remains a tantalising difficulty to recognise the dominant epistemological positions from which the methodologies are borrowed or adopted. However, illumination occurs when reviewing the matter at hand from the perspective of scholars not linked to the Western hegemonic paradigms.

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Exploring Indigenous Religious Tenets for Democratic Sustainability in Contemporary Nigerian Society

Akiti Glory Alamu

Introduction

The thrust of this chapter is the exploration of indigenous religious tenets or traditional moral values as catalysts for democratic sustainability in contemporary Nigerian society. The chapter appraisingly evaluates indigenous governance in the pre-colonial era and the contemporary dimension it has taken in the colonial and post-colonial periods. As a result, this chapter adopted historical, analytical, political and religio-ethical approach leading to the fact that the democratic tendencies occasioned by the West have woefully failed the masses, because of their wrong application as well as their foreignness. The chapter, therefore, postulates that re-integrating, internalizing and implementing traditional religious tenets would guarantee democratization process and democratic sustainability in Nigeria. To this end, the chapter concludes that democratic sustainability in Nigeria can only be possible as the only game in town when these indigenous religious tenets are faithfully applied with an African eye bird's view.

The 21st century Nigeria has failed in her democratization process. As a matter of fact, Nigeria who joined the League of Nations to practise democracy has vehemently refused to internalize or domesticate the supposed democratic ethos. To an extent, some political feelers believe that Nigeria is benefitting from democratic dividends one way or the other since 29th May, 1999 till to date because there is no military intervention. While some social feelers strongly believe that the democratic values are far from

being implemented since the unholy bedfellow of democracy which is corruption is a landlord in Nigeria. In another development, some indigenous believers hold on to the fact that integrating traditional religious tenets or traditional moral values as means of governance would bring about a vibrant and sustainable democracy that has become an issue in Nigeria.

This democracy notwithstanding, Nigeria is far from consolidating a vibrant and sustainable nation because the much needed domestication of democratic values is abysmally and wrongly applied if at all they are even applied. Thus, these Western democratic values become strange to Nigeria as a result of improper implementation, which have greatly retarded development, democratization and sustainability. Therefore, the thrust of this chapter is to explore indigenous religious tenets or moral values as catalysts for democratic sustainability in contemporary Nigerian society.

Indigenous Religious Tenets: An Overview

It would be worthwhile to start this section by giving account of indigenous religion before showcasing its tenets. First and foremost, it is proper to state that indigenous religion is as old as the people. Indigenous religion is a religion that had been handed down by our forefathers to this present generation. It is orally transmitted from one generation to another. It does not possess sacred scripture yet it is written in memory of the very world we live and transmit orally as the occasion demands (Awolalu and Dopamu, 2005). Indigenous religion is not proselytizing religion, nor does it guzzle for membership. Yet, it is tolerant, it accommodates, it socializes, it embraces and remains autochthonous. Awolalu and Dopamu again assert that we are born into this indigenous religion, live it and die in it. Rolling out the tonality of indigenous religion, Dopamu (2005: 3) has this to say:

This is clearly seen in African (indigenous) religion which encompasses all aspect of life. Africans (Nigerians) do not know how to live without religion. They celebrate life religiously and they

never embark on anything without bringing in religion. Thus, at birth, marriage, death, warfare, healing, the foundation of any project, planting, harvesting, enthronement of chiefs and kings and other areas of human endeavour *Afrel* plays important roles.

As a matter of fact, *Afrel* is an acronym of African religion, and the concept is coined by Dopamu (2006).

It is germane to state based on the aforementioned tolerance that indigenous religion embraced and tolerated; still embraces and tolerates the proselytizing religious of Islam and Christianity since their incursions. Again, Dopamu (2006: 30) consistently maintains that:

Afrel (indigenous religion) has maintained a long history of co-operative interaction with Christianity and Islam in Africa. In the face of ever-troublesome and discouraging history of contact between Afrel and the imported religions, Afrel was able to exercise itself in the style of activity for which it has existed from time immemorial.

Nevertheless, this indigenous religion has suffered a setback in the 19th and 20th centuries in the hand of Christianity and Islam in the wake of their incursions. Christianity and Islam condemned indigenous religion as devil worship, pagan worship, animism, fetishism and among others. In addition, a handful of people also boycotted the Indigenous religion especially those who have access to western style of life and subsequently embraced either Islam or Christianity (Alamu, 2014). Also, some indigenously educated people also attacked this indigenous religion, while some of the custodians who possessed or possess the indigenous traditions did or do not help issues as they conceal vital information from younger generation, and also the potency of the traditions from those who are ready to continue with them. However, the eclipse of the religion does not mean a total demise. Dopamu (2006) asserts that indigenous religion has staged a powerful comeback in this global age. The resurgence is becoming monumental and all-embracing now because the religion is speaking the language of the

people as well as their worldview. The religion will continue to survive the test of time.

Tenets of Indigenous Religion

Despite the current trends, many values of indigenous religion will continue to survive and be instrumental to the emerging democratic ethos of the west. To this end, tenets have to do with moral values of the indigenous people which have so far helped to better the lot of the community at large especially in the pre-colonial period. These indigenous tenets or moral values find expression in Oath-taking, selflessness, honesty, integrity, utilitarianism, tolerance, impartiality, accountability, transparency, chastity, communal humanity and brotherhood, proverbial philosophy and among others indigenous tenets would be fully explained later when we are reconciling both the tenets and democratic sustainability together. As a point of fact, these indigenous tenets are rich African cultural heritages that have distinguished the indigenous people and made the people unique in their environment. It is as a result of the abandonment or subjugation of these indigenous tenets that make indigenous people to face a plethora of problems that they could not solve till to date. Thus, the western democratic values are embodiments of setback because of their foreignness and improper implementation.

Nevertheless, these indigenous tenets are full of indigenous expressions, which are embedded in the uniqueness and ingenuity of the people. Through their assimilations and internalizations of a wealth of experience, local wisdom and moral techniques, good governance and democratic sustainability can be attained. The truth is that indigenous tenets are acquired informally, of which proverb, local wisdom; indigenous philosophy and local maxim are moral sciences that convey truths, based on common sense or practical experience of humanity. Often times, these indigenous religious tenets are expressed through traditional and cultural embodiments vis-à-vis metaphor and sentiment. As earlier stated, that indigenous religion is passed from generation to generation, usually by word of

mouth, so also these indigenous religious tenets which are indigenous credentials, are transmitted orally from generation to generation by conserving the truths and sentiments of the community. Even, the international labour organisation recognizes indigenous people with their religion and values thus:

People in independent countries who are regarded as indigenous on account of their descent from the populations which inhabited the country, or geographical region to which the country belongs at the time of conquest or colonization or the establishment of their present state boundaries and who irrespective of their legal status, retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural and political institution (ILO convention 169).

Although, indigenous people are strikingly diverse in their culture, religion, social and economic organization, yet they are subjected to a stereotypical way of life by the world around them. Unwaveringly, this stereotypical way of the native is depicted by some people as the embodiment of spiritual values and political progress.

It suffices to state that the majority of people may probably ask the source(s) of indigenous religious tenets? Gyekye (2002) has helped a great deal to depict that the ‘messages’ purported to be received occasionally by priests from the deities they serve have moral import and relevance for the people of a community. He further adds that the people are in possession of some moral values before those ‘messages’ descended on them. The interesting thing here is to first and foremost attempt a conceptual clarification of democracy before exploring these indigenous religious tenets for sustainability and consolidation.

Democracy: A Conceptual Clarification

Democracy as a concept originated from Greek-city state or the *polis* around 5th century B.C as “demo-cratia” meaning “rule of the people” (Eyinla, 2007: 66). Democracy emerged as the government

of the masses or the government of the majority with collective participation. Thus, this concept represented the interest of the people either directly or indirectly in the *polis*. As a result of civilization in the city-state, representatives at a public forum were recognised to articulate the interest of the vast majority. By and large, various dimensions came to expound the meaning of democracy and its set objectives. Despite the fact that a handful of scholars such as Eyinla (2007), Madison *et al*, (1987), Rustow (1985) and among others, have written about democracy, it is difficult to satisfy its definitive quest. Be that as it may, the concept remains the best option to ensure understanding of its very meaning between the leaders and the led with a view to regulating and appreciating the instrument of power control among the leaders (Alamu, 2011: 4).

Schmitter (1992: 35) sees democracy as the “institutional arrangement for arriving at political decision in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote”. Howell (1999) posits that democracy is a political process where rulers are held accountable to the ruled by a variety of political arrangements, which include regular security of tenure. However, Eyinla (2007: 65) argues that two fundamental elements in this definition are crucial and prevalent. “They are contestation and participation”. Eyinla (2007: 66) buttresses further that “a polity is democratic to the extent to which the collective decision makers are selected or displaced through free, fair and periodic elections based on universal adult suffrage and where candidates freely compete for votes”. Madison *et. al* (1987: 71) describe democracy as a set of institutions, including the three tiers of government, each of which is supposed to check and be checked by the other two, in order to maintain liberties and avoid tyranny, even of a majority against a majority. Applying cultural approach to the meaning of democracy, Rustow (1985: 82) defines democracy “as a problem-solving formula for power-sharing in which significant groups in society, either directly or through representative elites, negotiate from time to time over issues that are important to them all.”

Of paramount importance in this definition are the bargained interests that are entered into or reached that suffice for the time being. Often times, new issues arise, as old ones are replaced or even atrophy as groups' need change. Where negotiations are properly and honestly conducted, groups make concessions in one area in order that they may win concessions in other areas. In which case, any agreement worked out is the best possible for the whole society at the time; it is at most the second best for any of the negotiating groups (Omoruyi 1994: 54). Having considered the various definitions of democracy, the most widely acceptable and enduring is the one given by the 16th American President Abraham Lincoln (1809-65), "as government of the people, by the people and for the people". This means total representation, full participation and flawless accountability to the people by the electors because the people are the government entrusted to the few who represent their interest at the top. Thus, the implication of the three conditions of representation, full participation and complete accountability traced back to city-state, is indicative of its level of democratization (Alamu, 2011).

Indigenous Religious Tenets and Democratic Sustainability in Nigeria: A Symbiosis

It is instructive to note that some of the indigenous religious tenets are also indigenous values that are identified as African cultural heritages and indigenous credentials. Thus, some of these tenets are oath taking, selflessness, honesty, integrity, utilitarianism, tolerance, impartiality, proverbial philosophy, accountability, transparency, anti-wickedness, chastity and among others. These indigenous credentials are not new nomenclatures, inventions and engagements rather they are viewed and discussed with an African eye's bird view.

Ogunade (2010: 63) argues that despite the fact that indigenous religion is not given official recognition like outlandish religions of Christianity and Islam; its not being recognized does not in any way diminish its role, its function and relevance in the nation's democracy. In other words, indigenous religion has prominent and

relevant role to play in the modern socio-political dispensation in Nigeria since Christian and Islamic values have abysmally failed. Having established the relevance of indigenous religion, it is certain that indigenous religious tenets would have tremendous impact for integral development of the citizenry and more specifically, the method of harnessing and fostering the enduring values of the indigenous religious systems of the various Nigeria's groups in our present-day democratic process in order to ensure that political power remains humane both in its understanding ideology, moral values, social justice and equity (Ibid). To this end, some of these indigenous religious tenets will be exhaustively discussed.

Oath taking

Oath taking is a process whereby solemn allegiance is being taken or entered into by individual or group of individuals. This oath taking or oath of office is sacred and it requires steadfastness, truthfulness and loyalty without which the individual or group of individuals lives are at a risk. In which case, the paraphernalia of office must be respected by the chosen or appointed leader. In the traditional setting, this oath taking is very sacred and religiously upheld with corresponding effect if not religiously and truthfully upheld.

Therefore, in the political arena, indigenous oath taking should be encouraged at all the three tiers of government for political office holders and political leaders. This process would reduce abuse of power and office. Ogunade (2010) supports the fact that traditional ritual oaths by politicians vying for nomination and election into party office at the ward, local, state and national levels should be encouraged and promoted so as to have responsible and responsive, less-corrupt, and god-fearing leadership whose major preoccupation is selfless service to the people. From all indication, it is crystal clear that indigenous oath taking should be encouraged henceforth for leaders who are selected, elected or appointed.

Selflessness

Selflessness as the act of governance is also described as altruism. Altruism talks about concern for others than one's. In the traditional Nigerian setting, egoism is rejected because the egoist is considered to be a person who is insensitive to the needs, interests and plights of others. Gyekye (2002) presents an Akan Maxim which speaks directly against the unethical behaviour of the egoist. The Maxim goes: 'When it sticks into your neighbour's flesh, it is as if it sticks into a piece of wood.' This Akan maxim relates to the behaviour of a person who shows no moral concern whatsoever for the miserable or pitiable state in which another person finds himself or herself. The egoist does not care about the feelings of other persons. Insensitivity or lack of sympathy for others has its roots in egoism or selfishness. African social morality, thus, has no place for selfishness (Gyekye Ibid). Contrary it is what holds in present-day Nigeria and its political leadership. Therefore, the leaders and the led should internalize transformational selflessness in this modern age.

Utilitarianism

Indigenous utilitarianism implies seeking good for the majority of the people. In fact, their comfort becomes your watchword and happiness. This is the true sense of utilitarianism in the traditional communal Nigeria. Again, Gyekye (Ibid) opines that the social morality of the indigenous society enjoins its members to seek the good for the society as a whole, for in so doing they not only seek their own good but also build a firm basis for their own lasting happiness. Hence, the highest good according to African moral thought, is the welfare of the whole community. To this end, this should be integrated into our political system.

Justice

Justice is all about being just, fair and equitable. The indigenous religious tenets should be incorporated into our political culture so that fair play, justice, equity, will endure in our democratic process. The present adherents of indigenous religion should be adequately

acquainted with the essentials of the religion, which is justice to God, divinities, spirits, ancestors and humankind. Justice demands respect and toleration of political opponents and their view. Justice is summed up in these words “live and let live” (Ogunade 2010: 68). Thus, the spirit of “live and let live” is fostered by unity when the society is just and subsequently built on fair play.

Good Character

Traditional cultures place a high premium on good character. Good character is the essence of the African moral system or religious tenets, the linchpin of the moral wheel. In the context of moral life, in the struggle to do the right things and to lead a moral life, the quality of a person’s personal character is of paramount importance (Gyekye 2002). For it is from a person’s character that all his or her actions spring. Yoruba maxim has it: ‘Gentle character is that which enables the rope of life to stay unbroken in one’s hand’. The intention to carry out one’s moral duty, the decision to obey moral rules, the way to achieve happiness; all this depends upon the quality of one’s character. Similarly, the intention and ability to refrain from pursuing the morally wrong also depends on the quality of one’s character (Ibid).

Tolerance

Indigenous people are widely known for their high level of tolerance. Despite the incursions of Islam and Christianity into Nigeria with their attendant attacks on indigenous religion, it remained and still remains tolerant. Tolerance is an embodiment of the Nigerian people until the seed of intolerance was sown by the proselytizing religions of Islam and Christianity as a result of membership drive. This spirit of intolerance has been directly or indirectly watered and cultured by subsequent Nigerian governments who are either Muslims or Christians. In the fourth Republic, former military Head of State Major Gen. Muhammadu Buhari was quoted as saying during electioneering campaign that the Muslims should not vote in the incumbent President Olusegun Obasanjo because he is a Christian. Christians in churches urged

their members to register and voted en mass for the incumbent President and started casting aspersion on Major Gen. Buhari. While Islam and Christianity remain intolerant of each other especially when it comes to politics, which is not healthy, because indigenous religion seems to be the most tolerant, there are cases of the followers engaging in religious conflicts for political reasons rather than ensuring stability and peace through rituals and sacrifices to gods and goddesses for polity (Ogunade 2010: 67). To this end, the most surviving virtue today in Africa and perhaps Nigeria in general is tolerance that has a long history of the people.

Accountability

Accountability is regarded as commitment required from public officials; individuals and collectively to accept public responsibility for their own action or inaction (Kwassonko 2010). This also means responsibility of government and its agent towards the public to achieve previously set objectives and to account for them in public. In the traditional African setting, checks and balances were being infused through appointed leaders. Awolalu and Dopamu (2005) talk of Ogboni cult as a medium of checking the excess of the kings in those days and this was a mechanism for accountability. This accountability with the help of checks and balances in social organization and governance is discernible from the fact that these were set out for community. It was democratic to the extent that these rules or laws were well structured and strictly followed. This process of checks and balances became social order which was not only clearly stated and enforced, but also worked harmoniously for the progress of the society. This accountability coupled with checks and balance should be revisited urgently by our political leaders as a desideratum for emerging democratic nation.

Transparency

Transparency comprises the legal, political and institutional structure that makes information about internal characters of a government and society available to actors both inside and outside political system (Bernard and Lord, 2000). Again, transparency is

the increased flow of timely and reliable economic, social and political information which is accessible to all relevant stakeholders but is also reliable and accessible to a range of potential agents (Baudr and Grimics, 2009: 150). To this end, Nigeria as a democratic nation needs transparency for good governance.

Honesty

In the traditional African setting, honesty is manifested in trustworthiness, truthfulness, sincerity and fairness. It also means lack of deceitfulness and falsehood. Honest people are dependable and can be counted upon to honour their duties, obligations, promises and contracts. Thus, this indigenous religious tenet does not create room for deception, cheating, misappropriation and embezzlement. However, in contemporary Nigerian society corrupt practices misappropriation and embezzlement have become endemic, endless and a way of life for the nation. Dzurgba (2000) observes that an honest person is found to be faithful in taking care of what belongs to other people or nation. The sermon of the indigenous religion is that honest people are honest in both little and big acts and this is because “he who is dishonest in a very little thing is also dishonest in much” (Ibid: 73-74). Therefore, honest people are urgently needed to govern the nation for democratic sustainability.

Impartiality

Impartiality means not being partial in the treatment of people. It also goes to mean not showing too much favour to one person or side. An impartial person is not biased and does not show favouritism in the treatment of others. Dzurgba (Ibid) argues that in social relations, honour both the rich and the poor. In work situations, an impartial person values merit, efficiency and productivity as against nepotism, favouritism and ethnic considerations. While he recognizes his duties to the family, local community, the state and the nation, likewise he recognizes that specific merits of one or the other of his services are not transferred to another. Thus, the indigenous message of impartiality is

equivalent to federal character in Nigeria. Therefore, federal character should be strictly adhered to.

Divination

In the traditional and indigenous setting like Nigeria, divination is very handy in order to save human lives from being wasted because of politics. In indigenous religion, divination helps to choose a leader or a community leader without much ado. This method forestalls assassination of prominent people, destruction of life and struggle for political power. Ogunade (2010: 67) has argued that through consultation of *Ifa* oracle, continuity in the interrelationship of indigenous religion and politics has been much more enduring at the local community level. Leadership in many lineage segments remains in the hands of people who are obliged to discharge both traditional religious duties as well as administrative one. The use of divination to choose leaders especially political leaders will remove or lessen the act of do or die affairs which our people now take for granted. If this is encouraged, our democracy will endure, strive and live long enough to bear virile and solid fruits and dividends which this present generation and generations yet unborn will continue to savour (Ibid).

Integrity

Integrity was the watchword of African community leaders in the pre-colonial era. In the traditional African setting, Kings could die for their integrity without mincing words. At times, the traditional rulers could commit suicide in order not to betray or compromise their integrity. Therefore, it is not out place to re-address and incorporate integrity into the socio-political systems in Nigeria. Thus, this integrity would make leaders outstanding in performance, and such should also be rewarded appropriately. Instead of people of integrity to be celebrated today in Nigeria they rather become the vermin while the corrupt and questionable leaders are the beloved. These beloved ones who have dubious and questionable characters are celebrated today everywhere with traditional and religious titles.

Communal Humanity and Brotherhood

In the indigenous African setting, this is the unrelenting pre-occupation with human welfare. This implies that African society appreciates and thrives on harmonious social relationships. What is morally good is what promotes social welfare, solidarity and peace in human relationships. Interestingly, this communal humanity is thus identical to the welfare of the individual member of the society (Gyekye, 2002). In addition, this communal brotherhood includes kindness, compassion, generosity, hospitality, faithfulness, truthfulness, concern for others and the action that brings peace, justice, dignity, respect, and happiness. These are all considered humanistic because of their consequences for human well-being or social welfare. Gyekye (Ibid) opines that they are conducive to cooperative and harmonious living, having been fashioned out of the experiences of the indigenous people in living together in society.

On the contrary today, the indigenous people are swinging and promoting the opposite. This finds expression in selfishness, backbiting, lying, stealing, adultery, rape, incest, murder, suicide, assassination, kidnapping, reckless killings and among others. Nevertheless, Gyekye (Ibid) again asserts that the reason why two deer walk together is that one has to take the mote from the other's eye, which underlines the fact of reciprocity, togetherness, and we-feelings. Therefore, Africa is the centre of communal humanism. In addition, Francis (2007: 26-28) explores the concept of *Ubuntu* as indicating not only peace but also holistic conception of peace. The essence of *Ubuntu* is to promote a culture of peace, tolerance, peaceful co-existence and mutual development. Equally speaking, it is the principles of symbiosis, inclusivity and a sense of shared destiny between peoples and communities. In exploring *Ubuntu* conceptualization as relating to African Religion, peace in Africa is not only the absence of war, conflict, violence, fear, destruction and human suffering, but also the absence of unequal and unjust structures and cultural practices, about security, democratic participation, respect for human rights, development, social progress and justice (Francis 2007; Alamu 2012).

Chastity

Chastity is one of the moral principles or values that portray fidelity in all its totality. Among the deities in the indigenous religion, some gods are saddled with the responsibility of chastity, uprightness, steadfastness, forthrightness and among others. As moral guardians of the society, they ensure total compliance of all human beings. As moral custodians, they checkmate the conduct of the individuals in the society. However, they descend heavily on the recalcitrant in the community. At times, they may be struck with thunderbolt or be allowed to receive calamitous consequences. With chastity, everybody is mindful of what he or she does in the community. They serve as sense of reminder. In the larger community like Nigeria, leadership and responsibility should be channelled towards fidelity.

The above has showcased the indigenous religious credentials upon which the life of the people hinges. These moral and religious tenets of the indigenous people have distinguished the people and still distinguish them because they are barriers that cannot be easily destroyed or condemned. No doubt, these religious tenets of the Nigerian people were hallmarks of governance in the pre-colonial era, until after independence in 1960, when governance was based on militocracy and democracy.

Proverbial Philosophy

No doubt, Awolalu and Dopamu (2005: 31-32) describe proverbial philosophy as formulation of human experience and reflections from time immemorial. Much of the people's religion, beliefs and practices can be learnt from these. They probe further that proverbs are used to settle quarrels, to teach people, to warn implicitly or explicitly against evil conduct or an impending doom, to encourage people, to praise, to criticize people, to indict people and among others (Awolalu and Dopamu, 2005: 32). Idowu (1996: 5) equally opines that the religion of the people permeates their lives so much that it is expressed in multifarious ways. It finds vehicles in myths, sayings and is the basis of philosophy.

An Appraisal of Western Democratic Values in Nigeria

The chapter has explored the indigenous religious tenets as catalysts for democratic sustainability in Nigeria. Thus, these religious tenets are so much cherished on the platform that they are intergroup values that have identified Nigerian people to be unique and special. In addition, these religious tenets are indispensable. They are indispensable because they lifted up Nigeria in the pre-colonial period of which there was understanding, harmonious co-existence and tolerance.

Nevertheless, the recognition of the colonial masters in the 1900s vehemently and radically changed the socio-political systems. Thus, the failure of our social and political systems have often been blamed on moral decadence, indiscipline, corruption, intolerance and among others occasioned by the colonial masters who introduced western style of leadership under the disguise of democracy. With the incursions of Christianity and Islam, intolerance becomes the honey of madness that has been orchestrated and perpetuated by them till to date, under the guise of membership drive. Furthermore, the introduction of western democracy has plagued us in the ever-with-us problem of leadership. In fact, we find it excruciatingly and extremely difficult to digest Western values, which are foreign to the Nigerian enclave. The case of corruption which has become endemic and endless in the society was a foreign phenomenon which was never in the Nigerian dictionary or vocabulary. But today, we have become champions than those who introduced this social virus. In the pre-colonial period, we only understood lobby not financial inducement that has become a commonplace rehearsal in the Nigerian society. Virtually all the republics we have had in Nigeria so far, corrupt practices have wrecked both Military and Civilian leaders alike. This social virus has become 'institutionalized' to such an extent that it has become a way of life in the polity. Since independence in October 1st 1960 till to date, this monster called corruption has been soaring in proportion. The political leaders in the second republic till of recent have been described thus: "They breakfasted

in London, lunched in Madrid and dined in Lisbon. While Nigerian Naira nose-dived in worth, they coursed their path to the vaults of the Swiss and became notorious for stashing stolen money abroad... Therefore, the political corruption centre seems not able to hold. Subsequently, government gave fillip to the bug” (Sunday Tribune, 2002: 3). The concept of democratic breakdown is familiar with Nigeria, because corruption has been elevated to the status of gold and adorned purple as a carnival without rules and limitations. Everywhere, one wonders if “corruption is not a Nigerian person” (Oyeshile, 2000: 5). Corruption in Nigeria soars like fern in the open field. To this end, avarice which is the root of all evil according to Swahili maxim should be avoided by all means so that our democratic sustainability will not become façade or sham.

Before the introduction of the British law, the indigenous people were at home with their customs and conventions, not conservative law which cannot be abrogated. Today, it is difficult to review this extant and conservative law that came from conservative environment to a communal environment. In an attempt to understand this conservative law, we are faced with many problems and interpretation lapses. As a matter of fact, customary law and Shariah Law have their peculiar problems in Nigeria. All in all, these invented laws are incompatible with communal environment like Nigeria.

Democracy as a concept was not given birth to in Nigeria that is while some politicians prefer to kill in the name of politics. Politics today has become do-or-die affairs in Nigeria because the people as well as the government have made it lucrative, whereas, in the traditional Nigerian society, life was sacred and mystic and money was de-emphasized. The people believed in divine theory of leadership. Moreover, the modern oath taking or oath of office by Bible and Qu’ran is worthless because these holy writs are no longer feared, sacred and mystical hence everybody freely uses them and refuses to abide by them. In the traditional Nigerian society, ritual oath taking was sacred and everybody must abide by it because any deviation can bring about calamitous consequence.

Nonetheless, all these aspects of western ethos are alien to us, hence we find them difficult to implement. They have so far retarded our democratization process and political sustainability in Nigeria. To this end, the major and paramount concern is how to explore and harness the inherent religious values and other good teachings of indigenous religion in a bid to lay new Nigerian democratic foundations of solid and sustainable political order. When we successfully incorporate indigenous religious credentials into our democratic and political epicycle, then we shall begin to entertain sincere hope of having many people endowed with true religious conscience running public affairs of Nigeria.

Conclusion

This chapter has explored indigenous religious tenets as catalysts for democratic sustainability in Nigeria. These rich religious tenets and cultural heritage of the indigenous Nigerian people sufficiently emphasize the significance of the basic instinct in human beings to lead or rule very well in the society. It is of interest to note that when these indigenous religious values were implemented and infused into our structure power in the society, governance was at its best as everybody was tolerant, accommodating and fostered with the spirit of 'live and let live'. In fact, the Nigerian society began to experience spiritual and physical progress until the arrival of the British colonial Masters vis-à-vis the importations of Islam and Christianity. Since then, things have dramatically and radically changed for the worst. Governance has been at the lowest ebb, thereby retarding progress and development. Even, today the democratization process is sick because corruption which is its unholy bedfellow has been threatening its sustainability.

Therefore, this chapter advocated the re-entrenchment and internalization of indigenous religious tenets into our democratic system so that we can have and enjoy solid and virile democratic base indispensable for sustainability in Nigeria. This can only

sustain our democratization process and make it the only ‘game in town’.

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Global Political Agreement and the Government of National Unity in Zimbabwe: Legal and Political Reflections

Alex Magaisa

Introduction

On 15th September 2008, Zimbabwe's three major political parties, namely Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU PF), Movement for Democratic Change-Tsvangirai (MDC-T) and Movement for Democratic Change-Mutambara (MDC-M) signed the Global Political Agreement (GPA), under which a new Inclusive Government or Government of National Unity (hereafter the GNU) was formed. The GNU governed the country for the next five years until July 2013, when the next elections were held. It was designed to give respite to a nation going through a period of intense political and economic turmoil and to facilitate calm and stability, during which major reforms could be carried out in order to provide a lasting solution to the challenges the country was facing.

The GPA was negotiated between the above-mentioned parties under the mediation of the South African Government, following a mandate of the Extraordinary Summit of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) held in Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania on 29th March 2007 (Dar-es-Salaam Summit), and endorsed at the Extraordinary Summit of SADC in Lusaka on 12th April 2008 (Lusaka Summit). It was also held under the mandate of the Africa Union Summit held in Sharm Al-Sheikh, Egypt between June 30 and July 1 2008 (AU Summit). President Thabo Mbeki, then President of South Africa, was the chief mediator, operating through a Facilitation Team, made up of his representatives from

the South African government. These mandates by both the SADC and the AU followed important and acrimonious political developments in Zimbabwe, culminating in bitterly disputed and discredited elections in 2008.

The purpose of this chapter is to undertake a critical analysis of the GPA, which provided the terms under which the country was governed between 2008 and 2013, assessing how it performed in respect of one of its primary objectives, which was to promote political reforms which would eventually lead to a lasting solution to the Zimbabwean crisis. When the GNU ended in 2013, the subsequent elections were held in controversial circumstances and the outcome was yet again disputed by the opposition. While the country had achieved a level of stability and a new constitution during the GNU, these achievements did not resolve the main political questions over the credibility and legitimacy of the electoral process. This chapter argues that these problems arose because the political reforms during the GPA period were insufficient. It is the purpose of this chapter to assess why the political reforms failed.

The primary argument advanced in this chapter is that, apart from other factors, political reforms failed because the GPA had structural weaknesses, which ensured that there was an imbalance of power between the key partners in the GNU and consequently the GNU was characterised by continuous contestation for power between the partners at the expense of the political reform project. Raftopoulous et al. (2013) have previously carried out an important and useful assessment of the performance of the GNU. Matyszak (2009, 2011) has also contributed important legal critiques of the content of the GPA considerable body of literature critiquing the content of the GPA from a legal perspective. These assessments have generally given a damning account on the performance of the GNU, pointing to the fact that it helped to rehabilitate ZANU PF, while damaging the political prospects of the MDC parties. They give an account of the weaknesses and failures of the opposition parties to exploit their opportunity within the GNU while demonstrating how ZANU PF was able to use the facility to regroup and consolidate its position after suffering a dip in political

fortunes prior to the 2008 elections. What is evident is that given the problems around and after the seminal elections in 2013, the GNU failed to meet the objective of political reform which was envisaged when the GPA was signed in 2008.

The study of the GPA and the performance of the GPA is important in understanding how this Model of Government works and this chapter adds to the body of literature on this area. I had the opportunity, between 2012 and 2013, to play a role in the GNU as an advisor in the Office of the Prime Minister and observed first-hand the dynamics around the implementation of the GPA. Central questions that the current chapter grapples with include: What lessons can be drawn from the GPA Model in Zimbabwe? What is it about the GPA that accounts for its achievements and/or failures? The coalition model of government is one that has a precedent in Zimbabwe and may become relevant again in future. Indeed, it has been proposed and/or adopted in other countries, including Kenya, Madagascar and Afghanistan. It may become relevant again. Understanding how to strengthen a coalition model built under similar circumstances is important.

The chapter uses legal techniques to critique the text of the GPA and demonstrates its merits and demerits which had a bearing on the performance of the GNU. It will assess how the provisions of the GPA had a bearing on the political power dynamics within the GNU. Overall, the chapter provides a critical assessment of an important and defining period in the recent history of Zimbabwe.

Background to the GPA and the GNU

On 29th March 2008, Zimbabwe held a fairly peaceful general election (ZESN 2008). However, while the parliamentary election results were announced timeously, it took more than 6 weeks before the presidential election results were announced. When they were announced, the leader of the opposition MDC-T party, Morgan Tsvangirai had won the election, beating the incumbent, President Robert Mugabe of ZANU PF into second place.

However, the victory was not enough to give Tsvangirai the presidency, as the electoral law required the winner to have won an absolute majority, that is, fifty per cent plus one of the total votes cast. His simple majority victory was therefore inadequate to give him the Presidency and the outcome demanded an election re-run between him and Mugabe, who was the first-runner up in the first election. Tsvangirai and the MDC-T had reservations over the outcome, arguing that the controversial six-weeks delay before the results were announced were used to manipulate the results and give Mugabe another opportunity.

Nevertheless, preparations for the re-run presidential election went ahead, with the election scheduled for 27th June 2008. This period witnessed unprecedented levels of election-related violence and intimidation, with mostly the MDC-T supporters being targeted (The Guardian 2008). The opposition argued that the violence was state-sponsored, with the military being heavily implicated in the campaign to support President Mugabe's re-election, as he bid to overturn the first round defeat to Tsvangirai. It resulted in hundreds of deaths, torture and injuries to political supporters as well as the burning and destruction of property. There were also mass displacements of people from their homes. According to Human Rights Watch, the international human rights organisation, "the ZANU-PF-led government [in 2008] was responsible, at the highest levels, for widespread and systematic abuses that led to the killing of up to 200 people, the beating and torture of 5,000 more, and the displacement of about 36,000 people" (Human Rights Watch 2008 and 2011).

In any event, confirmation of political violence is evident in the text of the GPA, which, in the preamble and various substantive provisions, acknowledges the existence of violence and the need to take measures to prevent it. The violence resulted in Tsvangirai's withdrawal from the presidential election re-run, only a few days before it was due to be held. In withdrawing, Tsvangirai cited the violence and intimidation meted upon his supporters, and argued that the political environment was inimical to a free and fair election.

The re-run election went ahead, with the electoral authorities and ZANU PF insisting that Tsvangirai could not withdraw from the election at that stage. In the end, the election was effectively a one-man race as most of Tsvangirai's supporters stayed away from the polling stations. Mugabe's victory was no more than a pyrrhic victory, whose legitimacy was put in doubt by the events surrounding its conduct. Neither SADC nor the AU, the regional and continental bodies, endorsed the election as free and fair, but instead, mandated South Africa, which had been mediating a solution to the political conflict in Zimbabwe, to step up efforts and find an immediate solution to the problem.

Meanwhile, in the years preceding the GPA negotiations, Zimbabwe had been going through a serious and unprecedented economic crisis. Statistics showed hyperinflation at a monthly rate of 79,6 billion percent by mid-November 2008, making it the 30th hyperinflation in the world's record books and the first in the 21st century (Hanke and Kwok 2009). By this time, ordinary people had unofficially switched to foreign currencies on the black market and eventually, Government abandoned the local currency and introduced a multi-currency regime (Brulliard 2008). The economy was in bad shape and the desperate situation was one of the factors that pushed the parties into a coalition arrangement as they sought to arrest the collapse. This background explains the existence of articles 3 and 4 of the GPA, which deal with economic reform aspects of the GPA, which, however, are not within the scope of this chapter. However, for contextual purposes, these aspects represent some of the key forces that added to the pressure to negotiate the GPA and to form the GNU.

It was against this background of heightened political and economic instability that the parties signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in July 2008, under which they entered into negotiations leading to the GPA signed on September 15th 2008 under the mediation of South Africa's President, Thabo Mbeki. Although the GPA was signed in September 2008, the GNU did not commence operations until 5 months later, in February 2009.

The reasons for this delay which almost derailed the formation of the GNU are discussed in the analysis of the GPA.

GPA as a landmark moment

It is important, for purposes of perspective, to locate the GPA in the context of Zimbabwe's recent history. In this regard, the GPA represents a landmark moment in the legal and political history of Zimbabwe. Similar landmark moments in Zimbabwean legal and political history include the Lancaster House Constitutional Agreement 1979 (Lancaster House Agreement), which ushered in independence and the new Constitution of Zimbabwe adopted in 1980, and the Unity Accord that united the two major political parties at the time in 1987, which almost led to a one-party state system of government.

The Lancaster House Agreement was the agreement between the former colonial government and the nationalist forces which were waging the struggle for independence. It led to independence and the first constitution of the new Republic of Zimbabwe, in effect, giving birth to a new nation. A study of that agreement demonstrates the interests of the different political actors of the time and it is therefore an important reflection of the legal and political history in that period. Importantly, the Lancaster House Agreement was a compromise agreement between the parties, a fact that is also acknowledged in the GPA, which states in the preamble that it was a "power-transfer document" (Article 6 of the GPA).

The 1987 Unity Accord between ZANU PF and Patriotic Front Zimbabwe African National Union (PF ZAPU), which brought unity between the two major political parties another landmark moment. This followed a period of political conflict, which was also a dark era of mass atrocities, commonly referred to as *Gukurahundi*, in the Matabeleland and the Midlands Regions. The Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, which carried out a detailed study of the atrocities estimated that up to 20,000 civilians lost their lives in the conflict (CCJP Report) . The 1987 Unity Accord was a compromise agreement between the two parties and brought an

end to the conflict. A study of the Unity Accord reflects the legal and political history of the time.

Likewise, one can understand the legal and political issues of the period leading up to 2008, by studying the GPA. As with the 1979 Lancaster House Agreement and the 1987 Unity Accord, the 2008 GPA is a product of political compromise and a landmark moment which ushered in a new, if temporary order, in the affairs of the nation-state. There is a consistent line in all three agreements, defined by the politics of conflict and compromise, which is important in gaining a better appreciation of Zimbabwean politics. Apart from this, these agreements are important sources of the legal and political history of the nation.

The GPA as a political compromise

That the GPA is a product of political compromise is evident in its terms. Although there were three parties, each representing their members' interests, essentially there were two broad sides, ZANU PF on one side and the two MDC parties on the other side. The provisions of the GPA critically analysed in this chapter demonstrate the nature of the political compromises that were made between the parties. The preamble to the GPA is a good example of the mixture of narratives championed by the different sides. It captures the narrative of the liberation struggle, championed largely by ZANU PF which claimed the title of the party of liberation, but it also recognises the challenges which the country was facing at the time and the aspirational values and principles. In addition, while the MDC parties called for freedoms of expression and the media, the ZANU PF demanded a stop to organisations that were broadcasting from other countries, which they called pirate broadcasters.

Similar compromises were to be made during the course of the GNU when the new constitution was being written under the agency of the same GPA parties. That process, culminating in a new constitution adopted at a referendum in March 2013, was also

another landmark moment in the legal and political history of Zimbabwe an issue that will be discussed later in this chapter.

However, as is invariably the case with compromise agreements, the GPA was afflicted with serious flaws. These flaws are demonstrated in this analysis which explains the failure of the political reform agenda of the GPA. It is important to set out the core elements of the political reform agenda in the GPA and to explain the failure to achieve its objectives by the time the GNU expired in July 2013.

The Political Reform Objective

One of the key objectives of the GPA was to allow Zimbabwe an opportunity to stabilise both politically and economically, and to pave way for political reforms that would provide a lasting solution to the problems afflicting the country. This narrative of political reform is evident both in the preamble and the substantive terms of the GPA. In the Declaration of Commitment, Article 3 of the GPA, the parties state that they:

hereby declare and agree to work together to create a genuine, viable, permanent, sustainable and nationally acceptable solution to the Zimbabwe situation and in particular to implement the following agreement with the aims of resolving once and for all the current political and economic situations and charting a new political direction for the country.

In addition, Article 17 sets out that the legislative agenda of the GNU must be prioritised in order to reflect the letter and spirit of the GPA. This broad provision required the implementation of the GPA through legislative measures. It reflects a statement of intent to promote reforms since the terms of the GPA demanded the implementation of important political reforms. For example, Article 11 of the GPA, on the rule of law and respect for the constitution and all laws of the land, reflects a demand to promote legal reforms focussing on inculcating constitutionalism and the rule of law.

Further, Article 12 on freedoms of assembly and association, reaffirms the demand to promote freedom to conduct political activity articulated in Article 10. Restrictions on freedom of assembly and association were often cited as limiting political freedom in the country. Laws such as the Public Order and Security Act (POSA) were often invoked by government to stop political meetings and gatherings of the opposition, while the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) restricted media space. There were also expectations in the GPA of security sector reforms requiring changes in the conduct of senior members of the security organs, which was seen to be biased towards Zanu PF.

It is important to note that the political reform objective was not new, as it had already been part of the political agenda since before the GPA negotiations. South Africa's President, Thabo Mbeki had already been engaged as a mediator in the Zimbabwean crisis for some years and had been mandated by the at Dar-es-Salaam Summit in 2007 to carry on with the mediation role. In this regard, the three parties had already been involved in negotiations, which culminated in the enactment of Constitutional Amendment No. 18 and a draft constitution, often referred to as the Kariba Draft, in 2007. The existence of the political reform agenda is acknowledged in the preamble to the GPA:

ACKNOWLEDGING that pursuant to the Dar-es-Salaam SADC resolution, the Parties negotiated and agreed on a draft Constitution, initiated by the Parties on 30 September 2007, and further agreed and cosponsored the enactment of the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment Number 18 Act, amendments to the Electoral Act, the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission Act, Public Order and Security Act, Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act and Broadcasting Services Act.

It is important, for purposes of completeness, to set out the core aspects of the agenda for political reforms in the GPA to illustrate that it was a core element of this agreement.

Aspects of Political Reforms in the GPA

Alongside constitutional reforms, there were also provisions in the GPA which required more specific reforms in areas such as freedom to conduct political activities, freedoms of assembly and expression, free media, protection from violence and security of the person. All these aspects reflected the reform demands of the opposition parties and civil society, which argued that the then ruling party used state-sponsored violence and intimidation of opposition supporters. Human rights organisations, including Human Rights Watch, Sokwanele, Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, Zimbabwe Peace Project, have documented multiple cases of political violence carried out by state agents. By way of example, the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe held that Jestina Mukoko, a human rights defender had been illegally abducted and tortured by agents of the state in December 2008. Political activists like Tonderai Ndira, who was a youth leader of the MDC-T, were also abducted and murdered.

There are a number of articles in the GPA which deal with the issues of politically-motivated violence and the protection of fundamental freedoms. Article 18, for example, deals specifically with security of the person and protection from political violence. While issues of violence are covered in other articles, this article is specifically dedicated to the prevention of politically-motivated violence. It acknowledges in specific detail that there had been serious violence after the March 29 general elections and that many people had been displaced as a result of politically-motivated violence. It also details the undertakings that the parties were making in order to prevent politically-motivated violence. This clause is, therefore, a clear reflection of the time during which the GPA was negotiated, which was a period of serious and unmitigated violence upon ordinary people.

A major aspect of political reforms was encapsulated in the principle of political neutrality of state organs, institutions, and personnel. Article 13 of the GPA deals with state organs and institutions, making the bold statement that they *“do not belong to any political party and should be impartial in the discharge of their duties”*. Once again, this reflects a demand from the opposition parties, which often complained that such institutions worked in favour of ZANU PF and against their rights and interests. Relevant in this context would be the military, the police, electoral institutions, broadcasting institutions, all of whom were regularly accused of showing bias towards ZANU PF.

Likewise, Article 14 deals with traditional leaders, who, like state organs and institutions also faced accusations by opposition parties of bias towards ZANU PF in political matters, particularly mobilising voters for elections. This article requires parties to commit themselves to ensuring the principle of political neutrality of traditional leaders and in this regard, also ensuring that traditional leaders do not engage in partisan political activities. Once again, this reflects a demand from the opposition MDC formations.

In addition, Article 15 on the National Youth Service Programme requires that all youths regardless of political affiliation, race or gender shall be eligible for national service but that this shall not be a politically-partisan programme advancing the course of one political party at the expense of others. This provision reflects a compromise between ZANU PF on the one hand and the two MDC formations on the other hand. ZANU PF had for a long time advocated for and, at some time, run a National Youth Service Programme under which thousands of young people were trained. However, the opposition and civil society groups charged that these were ZANU PF youths and that it was in effect a political party programme disguised as a national programme. They alleged that these youths had been trained in violent activities and had in fact been used by ZANU PF in causing violence and intimidating ordinary people particularly during election times. Thus, while the clause provides for a National Youth Programme, it also calls for the principles of political neutrality and non-partisanship.

Furthermore, Article 16 is on humanitarian and food assistance, requiring the state to provide such assistance to every Zimbabwe regardless of race, ethnicity, gender, political affiliation and religion. This also reflects a demand from the opposition parties, who often complained that ZANU PF abused state assistance provided to communities in times of humanitarian crisis, particularly in the rural areas. The argument was that ZANU PF politicised food aid and assistance to rural communities, with support being given on the basis of political affiliation, selecting its supporters at the expense of opposition supporters, the aim being to punish opposition supporters and ultimately to force them into supporting the ruling party. Thus food aid and assistance was both a bait to attract and a rod to punish opposition supporters. This clause is therefore a political statement against such practices. It also contains a clause on support for displaced persons, reflecting the fact that in the period preceding the negotiations, there had been displacement of people from their original homes due to political violence and intimidation.

Finally, Article 19 is about freedom of expression and the media, in particular facilitating the enjoyment of these freedoms in print media and broadcasting. It recognises the restrictions in the media and limitations due to legislation and the policy inertia by state institutions regulating the media which prevented the issuing of broadcasting licences. It requires the GNU to ensure there is more flexibility in the media and that the regulatory authorities issue licences. It also requires the enforcement of the principle of political neutrality by public media to prevent political bias and favouritism between political parties. In this regard the clause reflects the demands of the opposition parties which charged that public media, owned by government and/or funded by taxpayers, was nevertheless openly biased towards ZANU PF.

Further, the provision calls upon parties to act against private radio services that were being broadcast from abroad. Due to restrictions in Zimbabwe, there were radio stations that had been broadcasting from different countries, such as the UK and the US. They gave a platform to the opposition to air their views. ZANU

PF charged that these were part of the regime change agents sponsored by Western countries and referred to them as 'pirate radio stations', notwithstanding the fact they also used them to disseminate their views. This was therefore a provision championed by ZANU PF, reflecting its discomfort with the alternative radio stations which they felt violated national laws apart from supporting the opposition.

Therefore, in the broad picture, the GPA negotiations were part of the political reform agenda that had begun some years before the crisis of the 2008 general elections. The expectation was that the GNU would give the parties a better opportunity to work on the reforms that would provide a lasting solution to the Zimbabwean crisis. The GPA included the constitutional reform process, alluding to the Kariba Draft that had been agreed before, as part of these political reforms that needed to be undertaken.

The conclusion of the constitution-making process and the adoption of a new constitution at a referendum in March 2013 was an important achievement in pursuit of the political reform objective. However, it did not provide a lasting solution that had been envisaged, partly because the elections in July 2013 were held soon after its adoption, well before the implementation of measures required under its terms. There were other impediments to reforms, which included resistance to reforms, which were seen as part of the regime-change agenda by ZANU PF and the failure by the MDC parties to use their opportunity and leverage in the spaces they had gained within the structures of the state to push for reforms. In this regard, the critique of the GNU by Raftopoulos et al. (2013) is a critical body of literature that dissects the weaknesses of the former opposition and the ability of ZANU PF to resist reforms and re-build during the four years of the GNU.

There are a number of reasons why the political reform agenda failed and it is argued that apart from the important critiques that have been provided by the likes of Raftopoulos et al, a source of these failures were the structural weaknesses of the GPA. Its broad and vague character meant that it was highly dependent on the goodwill of the parties as opposed to a set of measures that would

have brought serious consequences on the parties for wilful non-compliance. The GPA was based on the notion that parties would act in good faith and would strive to work to fulfil the GPA. This, however, was too ambitious and a flawed expectation, particularly given the fact that the GPA parties were also parties in competition for political power and were therefore, during the GNU, preparing themselves for elections. This meant their agendas were almost always in conflict and ultimately, the party that had the most power under the GPA and in practice had a comparative advantage. Unsurprisingly, ZANU PF had the edge, because it maintained the greater portion of power under the power-sharing arrangement and de facto remained the ruling party, while the others remained in opposition mode.

As this chapter demonstrates, the GPA maintained the balance of power in favour of ZANU PF and consequently, this had an impact on the failure of the political reform agenda. Since SADC and the AU were the guarantors of the GPA and therefore the political curators, they needed to have a clear and specific role and sanctions in place against parties that failed to comply with the GPA. When a country is governed under a system such as the GPA, and the parties are in competition with each other, there is need for a stronger third party that acts as the moderator and enforcer of the rules. Neither SADC nor the AU played this role of enforcer but instead chose “Quiet Diplomacy”, a softer approach to handling the crisis, which involved more persuasion than hard enforcement. This was President Mbeki’s flagship foreign policy towards Zimbabwe.

Balance of Power under the GPA

The GPA was essentially a power-sharing agreement between former political protagonists in Zimbabwe. For that reason, it was a sensitive and uneasy coalition of strange bedfellows, forced by circumstances to share power. Nevertheless, the balance of power favoured the status quo, with ZANU PF, which had held exclusive power since 1980, retaining the bulk of state power, both on paper

and in practice. The GPA did not do much to change the existing *status quo* in the arrangement and composition of the state machinery, which remained largely pro-ZANU PF. This is evident in the provisions of the GPA, as analysed in this chapter.

Structure of Government

In terms of Article 20 of the GPA, the GNU was headed by the President and two Vice Presidents, all from ZANU PF. There was a Prime Minister from the MDC-T and two Deputy Prime Ministers, one from each of the two MDC parties. The GPA specifically named the President and the Prime Minister, a unique constitutional arrangement since the GPA was incorporated into the constitution of the country. It meant that for the period of the GPA, only Robert Mugabe and Morgan Tsvangirai could be President and Prime Minister respectively. Mugabe had been controversially installed as President on 29th June 2008, soon after an election that was disputed and largely discredited but not overturned. The new Prime Minister's position was specifically created to accommodate Tsvangirai, who had withdrawn from the re-run election, in protest at the conditions then prevailing prior to the election.

From the outset, it was evident that Mugabe would hold the lion's share of power, even though the GPA was presented as a mechanism for sharing power between the two protagonists. The MDC-T believed that the GPA had in fact created a dual presidency in all but name, but both the law and reality demonstrated that Mugabe held the greater share of power and was the senior partner in the arrangement. This created an imbalance of power at the outset, with the former opposition always acting as the junior partners in the arrangement.

Cabinet and Ministerial Appointments

The weaknesses of the GPA were evident from the outset, when the GNU failed to take-off for nearly 5 months since its signing on 15th September 2008. The new Government only started

operations on 9th February 2009. The reason for the delay was that the parties were arguing over the allocation of Ministerial appointments in Cabinet. Each party had specific Ministries that it preferred and there were clashes, which almost derailed the GNU. SADC had to be involved, particularly through its Facilitator, the President of South Africa, in order to resolve the impasse.

There were also other issues, such as the appointments of the central bank Governor and the Attorney General, which remained “outstanding issues” according to the former opposition parties who strongly opposed the incumbents and preferred new appointments to these offices.

However, the problem was that the GPA was not specific enough on these issues. The formula on allocation of Cabinet seats was limited to the number of nominees from each party but there was no agreement on the Ministries that the party nominees would occupy. This caused problems as parties clashed over their preferences for Cabinet positions. There are Ministries that each party thought were more powerful than others. For example, the MDC-T wanted its nominee to occupy the Ministry of Home Affairs, which controls the police and the Registrar-General’s office which at the time was responsible for voter registration. However, ZANU PF also wanted to retain this Ministry. Both parties believed the Ministry was important for their strategic interests. In the end, the impasse was resolved by sharing the Ministry, so that there were two co-Ministers of Home Affairs, one from ZANU PF and the other from the MDC-T.

The fact that the GNU almost failed to take-off on account of the disputes over allocation of Cabinet seats is an indication of the weaknesses of the GPA, which could have dealt with the issue at the outset. A lesson learnt from this experience is that in such negotiations, the allocation of key positions has to be part of the formula in the power-sharing document.

Imbalance in Cabinet composition

The imbalance was also evident in the composition of Cabinet, which favoured ZANU PF, even though it had lost the parliamentary elections and the presidential election had been discredited, leading to the GNU. The Cabinet consisted of members nominated by the coalition parties, shared according to an agreed formula which also favoured ZANU PF. There were supposed to be 31 Ministers, 15 from ZANU PF, 13 from the MDC-T and 3 from the MDC-M. There were also 8 Deputy Ministers, 8 from ZANU PF, 6 from the MDC-T and 1 from the MDC-M.

There were in-built mechanisms to maintain this delicate balance of power within the GNU. First, the President could not dismiss a Minister or Deputy Minister without consulting all the GPA parties. The second safeguard was that, should a vacancy arise in the GNU, it would be filled by a nominee of the party that was represented by the departing Minister or Deputy Minister. Further Article 21.1 provided that there would be no by-elections for the first 12 months of the GPA, and that vacancies arising would be filled by nominees of the parties previously represented by the outgoing MPs. This was designed to minimise conflicts that normally arose during election periods but also to preserve the balance of power between the parties.

While the Ministries were supposed to be shared according to the agreed formula, this was entirely disregarded, with all parties conniving in the violation of the GPA and the constitution. In the end, 41 Ministers were appointed, 10 more than were allowed under the GPA. In addition, 19 Deputy Ministers were appointed, 4 more than the stated number in terms of the GPA. As Matysak (2009) pointed out in his critique, the appointments of the extra 10 Ministers and 7 Deputy Ministers were unconstitutional and void.

The GPA required the parties to uphold the rule of law and to protect and abide by the constitution and the laws of the land, but in this case, at the very outset, all GPA partners acted in concert to disregard and contravene it. The irony is that while the opposition

were accusing the President and ZANU PF of violating the constitution in other areas, they were complicit in the violation of the constitution in areas such as this, which was convenient to them. This weakened their pleas when they raised complaints over violations of the GPA by their counterparts. This did not augur well for the political reform objective, which the GPA was supposed to help pursue.

The effect of this violation is to be seen in the fact that the new constitution which was negotiated by the GPA partners excluded the provision that would place a maximum cap on the size of Cabinet. This otherwise progressive provision, which had been included in the GPA and would have helped towards ensuring smaller government, was left out of the new constitution. This is hardly surprising, given that all the GPA partners had paid scant regard to the provision when it was part of the GPA. In the end, a useful and progressive piece of political reform was completely ignored, ensuring the problem of big government is likely to persist.

Executive Authority

The GPA provided that executive authority was shared between the President, Prime Minister and Cabinet. Nevertheless, in the outline of powers of each of these organs under Article 20 of the GPA, the balance was clearly in favour of the President. After all, it was the President who was responsible for the appointment of the Prime Minister, Cabinet Ministers and all other heads of state organs and institutions and they all reported to him. A closer look at the wording of Article 20.1.6 of the GPA shows that while the Prime Minister was a creature of the GPA, the President was recognised as already existing, which gave the impression that the election of President Mugabe on 27th June 2008 was legitimate, notwithstanding the fact the election had largely been discredited.

Further, while Article 20.1.2(g) provided that the President and the Prime Minister were supposed to agree on allocation of supervisory roles in respect of the Ministries – which implied sharing supervision of Ministries - in practice, it was the Prime

Minister who was assigned the supervisory roles for all Ministries and had to report to the President. This immediately created a hierarchy which confirmed the subordinate role of the Prime Minister notwithstanding the fact that the GPA had been designed with the notion of sharing at the centre. The President was the commander while the Prime Minister was the foot-soldier in the chain of command. The political balance that the GPA sought to create was upset by these realities of power-sharing in practice.

In addition, while the Prime Minister was designated as the Deputy Chair of Cabinet, in practice, Cabinet was only ever chaired by the President, following a long-standing tradition since independence where the Vice Presidents were never allowed to chair the Cabinet in the President's absence. Instead, whenever the President was absent, no cabinet meeting was held. It also created a conflict because in terms of the constitution, there would be an Acting President during the absence of the President. Therefore, while the GPA gave the impression that the Prime Minister was the Deputy Chair of Cabinet and therefore had residual power in the absence of the President, in reality he was no different from an ordinary member of the Cabinet.

Instead, the Prime Minister chaired a lower organ, called the Council of Ministers in terms of Article 20.1.4(a) of the GPA. The problem is that in practice, the Council of Ministers was ineffective and almost a replication of Cabinet but without its power and status. It was poorly attended and treated with contempt, with most ZANU PF and MDC-M Ministers being regularly absent but even by some MDC-T Ministers. This effectively limited the relevance and effect of the Council of Ministers in the balance of power. Overall, in practice, the Prime Minister was effectively the junior partner in the GNU with President Mugabe taking the role of the senior partner in an arrangement that disproportionately favoured one side of the coalition.

While the GPA was worded in such a way as to ensure a consultative process and sharing of power, in practice, the President's office enjoyed more powers and flexibility. Alluding to this consultative process, Article 20.1.1 stated that:

In the exercise of executive authority, the President, Vice Presidents, the Prime Minister, the Deputy Prime Ministers, Ministers and Deputy Ministers must have regard to the principles and spirit underlying the formation of the Inclusive Government and accordingly act in a manner that seeks to promote cohesion both inside and outside government.

This meant in effect, the enforcement of the GPA was dependent upon the good faith of the parties. The wording shows its effectiveness was based on the expectation that the parties would be faithful to the letter and spirit of the agreement. However, relying on good faith alone and expecting parties to be guided by the spirit of the GPA without setting out specific terms was too ambitious and ultimately the source of conflicts in a coalition arrangement that put together parties that were in conflict with each other. This problem is well-illustrated in the area of public appointments and has been thoroughly analysed by Matysak (2009).

Public Appointments

Article 20.1.3(p) provided that: “The President in consultation with the Prime Minister makes key appointments the President is required to make under and in terms of the Constitution or any Act of Parliament.” This meant that the President was required to consult with the Prime Minister when making “*key appointments*” in terms of both the constitution and the other legislation. The first problem was that there was no definition of “key appointments” in the GPA, an issue that caused problems of interpretation whenever President Mugabe made appointments during the GNU. The definition article of the GPA only defined 3 terms and was very thin and weak. This left broad room for interpretation of terminology used in the GPA, leading to conflicts between the parties.

An important lesson from all this is that as in any standard agreement, the definition provision must be comprehensive and thorough, in order to minimise conflicts in interpretation between the parties. This lesson was certainly taken into account during the

constitution-making process, in which I was involved as a technical adviser, as key terms that had caused problems of interpretation during the GNU were defined in the new constitution. For example, during the GNU, there were conflicts over the meaning of what it meant when a provision required the President to act “*in consultation with*” another person, for example, the Prime Minister. Was it different if the phrase “*after consultation with*” is used? Or when it said the President must act “*upon the advice*” of the Prime Minister? These phrases were not defined in the GPA and this led to different interpretations between the parties as to what the President was obliged to do. It resulted in conflicts. Drawing upon this experience, the new constitution has clear and specific definitions on the meaning of these clauses, for the avoidance of any doubt. This was a lesson that had been learnt from the GPA: make sure all the key terms are defined in specific terms. The weakness of the GPA had been to leave key terms undefined.

Nevertheless, there were certain specific appointments that caused serious conflicts during the GNU, where the President went ahead and made unilateral appointments, without consulting the Prime Minister, and therefore in violation of the GPA and the reform agenda. This included such appointments as the Governor of the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (central bank), the Attorney-General, commanding officers of the armed forces, police and prisons and members of the judiciary. Yet in all cases when the President exercised these powers of appointment, he ignored the Prime Minister and did not consult him. There was no consequence for these blatant breaches of the GPA and the constitution since the GPA was incorporated into the constitution. As already pointed out earlier, the dispute between the parties over the appointment of the RBZ Governor and the AG remained one of the major “outstanding issues” of the GPA negotiations until the GNU expired in 2013.

Overall, the issue of appointments to senior positions in government and the public sector remained one of the most contentious during the period of the GNU. This was partly because the GPA did not have specific provisions to curtail the abuse of

power. It was too flexible and therefore gave room for evasion. Where there were clear breaches, there was no recourse, apart from disengaging from the GNU, which, with time became an unattractive option because in fact, ZANU PF wanted to end the GNU anyway. Tsvangirai and the opposition were frustrated but could not do much and no longer had the leverage once they were in the GNU. Far better would have been to have provisions that clearly specified the appointment procedures for specific positions.

The area of public appointments was very important in the reform agenda, which is why the GPA alluded to a consultative process. The problem is that the provisions of the GPA were not strong and specific enough and allowed the President to evade their requirements. For example, on the eve of signing the new constitution into law, after it had been approved at the referendum, President Mugabe appointed judges to the higher courts, without even consulting or informing the Prime Minister. The purpose of these appointments was plainly to avoid the more rigorous procedures that would have been required under the new constitution. These new procedures were part of the reform agenda, to promote independence of the judiciary through a fairer, transparent and more rigorous process. Yet, the President in violation of the GPA which demanded consultation with the Prime Minister when making key constitutional appointments, and preempting the new constitution, went ahead and appointed the judges. This was not the beginning of this practice. A few years before, at the start of the GNU, the President had appointed Provincial Governors, also without consulting the Prime Minister and in violation of the requirement which required sharing of these posts.

Independent Commissions

The reform agenda required fair and transparent appointment of members of the independent commissions. This was a process that required consultation and agreement between the GPA parties. Therefore, one of the key developments during the GNU was the

appointment of independent commissions such as the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC), which supervises all elections and the Zimbabwe Media Commission (ZMC), which regulates the media. The opposition parties were keen to have changes in these commissions in order to facilitate free and fair elections. They argued that the ruling party had used its vantage position in the past to appoint its own supporters. A new procedure was put in place so that each of the parties had nominees who were appointed to the different commissions, including ZEC, the ZMC, the Anti-Corruption Commission, etc. Party nominees would be selected by Parliament's Committee on Standing Rules and Orders before submitting the names to the President for formal appointment. The President's role became more or less nominal. This procedure ensured that the parties were well-represented in the various commissions. However, as things turned out, these reforms were insufficient to remove the mischief they were targeting. This was a weakness not of the procedure but of the GPA whose requirements were limited.

While Commissioners are important in giving strategic direction to the commissions, the most critical part of a commission is its Secretariat. The staff who run the Secretariat are the persons who carry out the day-to-day work of the commission. The problem is that most of the staff at commissions were alleged to be members of the security establishment or ZANU PF supporters. Therefore, as the opposition parties discovered, the reforms at the top were inadequate. When the parties tried during the tenure of the GNU to call for reforms, they were resisted on the basis that this would be a breach of employment contracts. It was argued that staff could not be removed on grounds of politics.

The result was that the elections in July 2013 were conducted by exactly the same machinery that had conducted previously disputed elections. The same personnel in charge of elections whose conduct and outcome had been seriously contested in 2008 presided over the elections in July 2013. In the end, two of the commissioners, Professor Geoff Feltoe and Mkhululi Nyathi who had been appointed to ZEC in 2009 during the reforms, resigned just before

the elections in 2013, frustrated and unable to make an impact on the way the Commission carried out its functions. These were commissioners that had been nominated by the opposition parties when ZEC was reconstituted at the start of the GNU period in 2009. The reform agenda in this regard had failed partly because of the narrowness of the reforms that had been mandated under the GPA.

A lesson from this is that when negotiating for reforms in state institutions, it is important to take a broader approach, which includes reforms at the top but also within the body of the organisation. In the case of Commissions, it has to be reforms at the level of the Commissioners and also the Secretariat of the Commission.

Façade of reforms

In some cases, the GNU carried out superfluous reforms, which nevertheless gave the misleading impression that political reforms were taking place, yet it was merely a façade. In this regard, the appearance of carrying out the reform agenda was highly deceptive. A good illustration of this is in regard to freedom of the media. The GPA specifically called for reforms in the press and broadcasting services, demanding the re-registration of newspapers that had been banned or restricted and freeing the airwaves by opening up space for private broadcasters as well as requiring public broadcasters to be politically neutral.

With regard to the press, reforms were carried out and a number of newspapers were registered, including The Daily News, a newspaper that had been de-registered and banned in 2003 under the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

With regard to commercial broadcasting, while the government invited applications for licences and conducted the process, the result was that only two new broadcasters, both connected to the ruling party and government were registered. Star FM is part of the Zimbabwe Newspapers Group, which is owned by government and is effectively the mouthpiece of the ruling party. ZiFM is owned by

a Member of Parliament for ZANU PF who is also a Government Minister. These two radio stations were “private” but were essentially closely linked to the ruling party, which raised questions as to their independence in political matters.

In respect of the public media, it continued to take a patently biased and partisan line against ZANU PF’s coalition partners and in favour of ZANU PF. Reports of media motoring organisations such as MMPZ, showed that the attacks against the MDC parties escalated during the period of the GNU. During the elections, which in which I was closely involved, the bias towards ZANU PF and against the opposition parties was patently evident in the coverage by both print and electronic public media. For example, when ZANU PF launched its election manifesto, the state broadcaster, Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC) provided live coverage of the event. However, when the MDC-T launched its own manifesto a few days later, the ZBC quoted an unusually high price for live coverage (\$US165,000), which was effectively a refusal given the size of the so-called fee which we were sure ZANU PF had not been asked to pay.

Overall, while there appeared to have been some effort to reform the media and to open up the airwaves, the result was no more than a façade, which gave a highly misleading impression that there had been reform when none had taken place.

Constitutional reforms

While the adoption of the new constitution, after a long and arduous negotiating process between the GPA parties was doubtless an important achievement in the reform agenda, it proved inadequate in the end to provide a lasting solution as the elections of July 2013 followed the same path as the ones before them. They were controversial and heavily disputed, leading to a legitimacy deficit that still haunts the country. One of the reasons is that there was not enough time to implement the reforms mandated by the new constitution as the elections were held soon after the adoption of the constitution and the process leading up to the elections was

marred by serious controversy which required the intervention of SADC. While the constitution was adopted at the referendum on March 16th 2013, the election came less than 4 months later on 31st July 2013, hardly enough time for the new constitution to change anything substantial. In fact, the constitution did not become law until 22nd May 2013.

This lack of time was partly because the constitution-making process itself took much longer than had been envisaged under the GPA. The strict time-lines that had been set out under Article 6 of the GPA were not adhered to. Instead of the 18 months that had been set, it took about 4 years to complete the process. By the time the process was concluded, the life of Parliament was due to expire and in the absence of an agreed extension of the GNU, elections were held almost immediately after the adoption of the constitution and before the reforms had set in. Indeed, the irony was that while the constitution demanded electoral reforms through Parliament, the President went ahead and unilaterally enacted amendments to the Electoral Act using the highly controversial and potentially unconstitutional Presidential Powers (Temporary Measures) Act, without consulting fellow principals of the GPA. This was despite protests from the opposition that the Presidential Powers Act was unconstitutional and contrary to the letter and spirit of the GPA and the new constitution.

Further, at the time of writing this chapter, more than 2 years after the adoption of the new constitution, the Zimbabwean Government is yet to re-align legislation to meet the terms of the new constitution. Some of the key constitutional reforms, such as devolution of power have been completely ignored. Instead of having provincial chairpersons under the new electoral system, the President appointed Ministers of State for provinces, retaining to all intents and purposes the system of appointed provincial governors which was discarded by the new constitution. In the result, despite having achieved a milestone with the new constitution, the political reform agenda has stalled principally due to the failure and/or neglect to implement the constitution.

It is important to consider a key structural weakness of the GPA, namely the implementation mechanisms, which contributed to the failure of the political reform agenda of the GNU.

Lack of Accountability

While the GPA set out elaborate provisions acknowledging the problem of political violence and committing the parties to stop such violence, nothing substantial was done to bring perpetrators of the violence in 2008 to justice. Although the 2013 elections were not affected by similar levels of violence, the fact that victims of past political violence still lived side by side with perpetrators meant that the fear factor was very high. This was particularly the case in the rural areas, where victims are more vulnerable and controlled by the machinery run by traditional leaders, who were also accused of partisanship in previous elections. Only a few cases went to the courts of law but the majority went unpunished.

These failures of the justice system were a continuation of what had transpired in the past and had led to a culture of impunity. The MDC parties were not successful in efforts to push for the prosecution of offenders. Justice in such cases would have formed a key area of reform, showing victims and perpetrators alike that justice can be done. The fact that it did not happen notwithstanding the grand statements and undertakings in the GPA meant that when the elections came in 2013, the fear factor was still dominant, meaning there had been no discernible reform in this area.

Enforcement, Implementation and periodic review

The effectiveness of any agreement rests on the enforcement and implementation mechanisms – both on paper and in practice. In the case of the GPA, there were two aspects to the implementation process – internal and external and both were soft and weak, leading to poor enforcement of the GPA. The internal mechanisms involved a monitoring and implementation facility by the parties to the GPA while the external mechanism was provided

by the role of the guarantors and facilitators of the GPA. The inefficiency of both mechanisms affected the realisation of political reforms.

There were two articles of the GPA that dealt with the internal implementation mechanisms. Article 22 provided for the establishment of a Joint Monitoring and Implementation Committee (JOMIC) comprising four senior members from each of the political parties in the GNU. Its main remit was to ensure the implementation in letter and spirit of this GPA. As Article 22.4 stated that:

JOMIC shall be the principal body dealing with the issues of compliance and monitoring of this Agreement and to that end, the Parties hereby undertake to channel all complaints, grievances, concerns and issues relating to compliance with this Agreement through JOMIC and to refrain from any conduct which might undermine the spirit of co-operation necessary for the fulfilment of this Agreement.

It would carry out regular assessments of the GPA implementation and promote a platform for continuing dialogue between the political parties. It would also receive complaints relating to the implementation and enforcement of the GPA. This was supposed to be an important institution, helping to promote the implementation of the GPA but actually, its remit became narrower in practice than was intended in the GPA and its power and effect was limited although it remained a useful forum for dialogue outside Government structures between the GPA partners.

Article 23 provided for the establishment of an annual Periodic Review Mechanism (PRM) designed to review the performance of the GNU in the various areas covered by the GPA and to make recommendations on compliance. Like the JOMIC, the provision for the PRM was well-intentioned and would have helped in the enforcement of the GPA. This was essentially an auditing vehicle built into the GPA to ensure that the GNU performance was monitored in so far as fulfilling the requirements of the GPA was concerned. However, unlike JOMIC, this institution was never

actually established. Thus, there was never any specific periodic review of the GNU. The internal audit system failed because the institution designed to carry out the audit was never created.

It is not clear why there were two internal mechanisms in JOMIC and the PRM in the GPA, since both appear to have been given a similar mandate. It would have been better to simply provide for one mechanism and in this case JOMIC would have been specifically mandated with the periodic review powers. This duplication probably explains why the PRM was never set up. The problem, however, is that while JOMIC had a wide remit on paper, in practice its mandate was limited to monitoring violence in the provinces and handling complaints from the various parties. In the end it did not actually deal with broader issues of violations of the GPA from the political parties.

Instead, the envisaged role of JOMIC in this regard was taken over by an informal political group that was not actually provided for in the GPA. This was the group of senior politicians from each of the GPA parties who had negotiated the GPA – the Negotiators Forum or the Management Committee. It consisted of senior politicians from the GPA partners and they were the chief representatives of the principals (party leaders) in negotiations leading up to the GPA. It was this group that interacted closely with SADC's Facilitation Team in dealing with issues around the GPA. All complaints or concerns to SADC were communicated by this group, not JOMIC. The result was that implementation GPA issues was through this group, outsourced to SADC.

While this outsourcing of solutions had its useful aspects, it was also problematic in that it shifted responsibility for implementation of the GPA from the parties and its formal mechanisms into the hands of a reluctant and limited third party whose capacity to effectively solve the implementation problems proved to be inadequate and unsatisfactory in the long run. The GPA had created internal mechanisms, such as the periodic review, which it never actually implemented, and relied instead on the political curatorship of South Africa and SADC.

The second mechanism was the use of third parties as political curators to implement the GPA. As guarantors of the GPA, SADC and the AU, were regarded as having responsibility to enforce the GPA between the parties. Article 22.4 of the GPA confirmed this arrangement, stating that the GPA would be guaranteed by SADC and the AU. This meant that politically, Zimbabwe would remain under the curatorship of SADC and the AU through the appointed agency of the South African Government, as the Facilitator.

When President Mbeki left office in South Africa, his successor, President Jacob Zuma took over the role of Facilitator in Zimbabwe. He also brought in a new Facilitation Team. The South African President and his Facilitation Team continued to be actively involved in the Zimbabwean political affairs until the end of the GNU in July 2013. However, their role was to persuade rather than to strictly enforce the GPA. They continued to apply the same “Quiet Diplomacy” which had been pursued by their predecessor in the Mbeki Government. Quiet Diplomacy was used as a contrast and preferred way of handling the Zimbabwean crisis compared to the “Megaphone Diplomacy” of the Western countries which involved public criticism and condemnation of the Zimbabwean Government.

This arrangement helped in sustaining the GPA and the GNU. It had what can be called the “Shock-Absorber effect” in that, whenever there were problems in the GNU, they were referred to the SADC Facilitator for resolution and the Facilitator usually got the parties to compromise before the dispute could derail the GNU. It was usually the MDC parties that raised complaints against ZANU PF, often over the violation of the GNU and failure or refusal to implement its provisions. At one point in October 2009, Tsvangirai and the MDC-T temporarily pulled out of the GNU but it was South Africa and SADC that helped get the GNU back on the rails. South Africa had been selected as Facilitator partly due to its proximity to Zimbabwe, both physically and economically, but also because it was generally respected by the GPA parties. South Africa was exposed to the effects of the Zimbabwean crisis as it was hosting most of the Zimbabwean political and economic migrants.

It therefore had an interest in the resolution of the crisis. For the period of the GNU, it was almost permanently engaged on the Zimbabwean issue.

A lesson to be drawn from this is that an agreement such as the GPA requires a guarantor and mediator who commands the respect of all parties. As guarantor, SADC was respected by the parties and usually responded to calls for mediation whenever there was a problem which the Facilitator could not resolve alone.

Nevertheless, the existence of this facility was also problematic. It gave the false impression that problems were being resolved when, in fact, oft-times, the problems were only being postponed or buried under the ground leading to either the slow pace of reforms or no reforms at all. The parties also became over-reliant on South Africa and SADC to solve the problems in Zimbabwe whereas the subtle message from SADC and South Africa was that it was the mandate of Zimbabweans to solve their own problems. They did this by making recommendations on what needed to be done without dictating, arguably mindful of the risk of overstepping their own mandate and dictating to a sovereign state and the risks of losing the respect and obedience of one of the parties. Both SADC and South Africa had to balance the interests of the two competing parties, which was a delicate task. The result was that the “outstanding issues” which the MDC parties raised remained unresolved until the expiry of the GNU.

The problem was that SADC did not have any legal powers for the enforcement of the GPA. They could only encourage and persuade the parties to comply. They could not force them. SADC did not have a sanctions policy which could be enforced against a party failing or refusing to comply. In the absence of hard enforcement mechanisms and sanctions against contravention, a party could afford to be arrogant or to delay implementation. This is what happened with the GPA, which meant large parts of it remained unimplemented by the time it expired in July 2013. Even if it was a good document, with good intentions, ultimately, it lacked robust enforcement mechanisms to ensure implementation.

This limitation of SADC became apparent in the period leading up to the July 2013 elections. When the MDC parties complained to SADC that President Mugabe and ZANU PF had violated the GPA by unilaterally setting election dates, SADC, could only issue a weakly-worded Communique after an Extra-Ordinary Summit in Maputo in June 2013, which effectively gave leeway for the Zimbabwe government to go ahead with its intended plans to hold early elections. When the SADC Facilitation Team tried to put pressure on the Zimbabwe Government, President Mugabe had a caustic response in which he virtually threatened to leave SADC. His response was:

“SADC has no power. Let it be known that we are in SADC voluntarily. If SADC decides to do stupid things, we can pull out. For now we have a SADC that has good sense. Although from some quotas there was a stupid, idiotic woman saying elections cannot be held by July 31. Did such person ever think as an independent country we would take such utterances which were stupid and idiotic?” (Newsday 2013)

The “stupid idiotic woman” whom he also called a “street woman” was Lindiwe Zulu, a key member of the South African Facilitation Team. South Africa’s response to this brutal assault was to censure, Lindiwe Zulu. After that President Mugabe and ZANU PF were left to do as they pleased and the complaints of the MDC parties came to nothing. The result was that the elections went ahead before the implementation of the political reforms required under the constitution, signalling at once the failure of the political reform agenda envisaged at the start of the GPA in 2008. This episode reflected the limitations of relying on the Facilitator to promote political reforms.

Conclusion

In conclusion, it is evident the GPA represents an important historical moment in Zimbabwe’s relatively young history. It

follows a similar pattern – conflict, compromise and coalition – which the country has seen since the time of independence. The Lancaster House Agreement followed a period of armed conflict, was a compromise and led to the first coalition government after Robert Mugabe won the elections. Although he had won the elections resoundingly, in the interests of stability, he invited opposition parties into his first government, forming an uneasy coalition. In 1987, the coalition was revived under the Unity Accord following yet another period of conflict followed by compromise during negotiations. The 2008 GPA also followed a period of conflict and it was a similar compromise.

However, unlike the other two coalition arrangements, the GPA had a mandate to promote political reforms, which would pave the way for a more lasting solution to the Zimbabwean crisis. In this regard, although some modest achievements were made through the enactment of a new constitution, it was largely a failure because of poor implementation and enforcement of the GPA.

This chapter has argued that part of the reason for the failure of political reforms lies in the structural weaknesses of the GPA. Its terms were loosely drafted, broad and vague, leaving room for evasion. This is shown in how public appointments were handled during the GNU. Some of the reform provisions were too limited in scope, as has been shown regarding the reforms to the independent commissions. It was not enough to change the commissioners but what was needed was a root and branch reform approach targeting also the secretariat of those organisations. However, the GPA did not have specific provisions to that effect, hence demands for such reforms were easily resisted.

The political reform agenda also failed because of poor implementation and enforcement mechanisms. The internal mechanisms were not fully implemented and there was no periodic review as envisaged in the GPA. The external mechanisms were helpful in sustaining the tenure of the GNU but over-reliance on the Facilitators meant that Zimbabwe outsourced solutions to a structure that had its own limitations. In some cases, there was a show of reform efforts, but in fact, the result was a façade. In the

end, the agenda for political reform envisaged in the GPA did not live up to expectations. It is unsurprising that the elections held in July 2013 were marred by the same problems that had been witnessed in the past. There was a reduction in violence but overall the political environment had hardly changed and impediments to free and fair elections were similar to those that had been encountered before.

There are important lessons to be drawn from Zimbabwe's experience with the GPA and its GNU. Other countries such as Kenya have gone through similar experience and future studies carrying out a comparative analysis of the performance of such coalitions will be helpful. Countries trying to experiment with coalition arrangements such as the one used in Zimbabwe will benefit from a study of the lessons learnt. The success of a coalition agreement in those circumstances depends on not only on the political will of the partners, but on a firm and precise agreement with clear and robust enforcement mechanisms. This paper sought to contribute to the body of knowledge in this area, using the Zimbabwean experience.

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Culture, Ethics and Politics for a Better and Sustainable Africa: The Mozambican Experience

Munyaradzi Mawere, Annastacia M. Mawere, & Pedro Celso Jovo

Introduction

In Africa, colonialism – an imperialist vice driven by greediness and sadism – has come and go, but it has left behind what appears to be permanent marks in many societies across the continent. Cruel as was, the colonial system left behind a trail of destruction, social vices, draconian laws, and questionable institutions on the African soil. All these vices have never done anything good to Africa besides plunging the continent under a thick blanket of miasma and hopelessness. The vices and other such mishaps continue to be felt and even experienced across the continent some decades after the colonial ghost and creed have been driven out of Africa, at least from an administrative perspective: in the present day Africa, with Mozambique as a case study, one observes politics of violence, greediness, nepotism, and corruption. The Machiavellian politics – the kind of politics of the colonial day – continue wracking havoc in many African societies but now propagated and promulgated by African sons and daughters against their fellow brothers and sisters.

In many African countries, it is now common that political leaders at both national and local levels no longer care about the very people who voted them (directly or otherwise) into power. Even the African philosophies of life such as MA'AT and *Ubuntu/Unhu* which are generally understood as philosophies of justice and truth and humanness respectively and with roots in African cosmology and communalism, are no longer valued by most African leaders. All these important philosophies that supported African forms of governance were rooted and embedded

in the African traditional culture and morality. Yet many contemporary African leaders no longer uphold the emblems of their cultures, worse still their 'traditional' principles of governance. In order to gain entrance into politics as well as to stay in power, most African political leaders no longer value or even seek the general masses' endorsement for what Aristotle calls 'a good life' which is the basic end of any human political society.

The feeling of repugnance that the current political trend in many African countries engenders and invokes, throws up the question of the relationship between culture, morality and politics. One would wonder if these three variables which in pre-colonial African states were understood to be bed fellows continue to be understood as such in post-colonial African states. In African societies such as Rwanda, Zimbabwe, South Africa, Nigeria, Egypt, Democratic Republic of Congo, Nigeria, and Mozambique, only to mention but a few, political unrest of one form or another has been experienced in the recent times. In South Africa, for example, the 2008 and 2015 sprouts of xenophobic attacks where fellow indigenous South Africans reined terror on other fellow indigenous people from across Africa, left many tongues wagging with a lot more questioning if Africa (and South Africa in particular) ever continues to uphold *Ubuntu/Unhu* – African philosophy of humanness that emphasises the spirit of unity, peace and sharing among humans across societies. Such experiences, among many others that occur on daily basis in Africa's political realms, have resulted in many concerned scholars and humanitarian organisations to think that politics in Africa has now divorced itself from African culture and morality: it is now a dog-eat-dog game. This has fuelled different woes, stalled dashed hopes, and instilled a sense of insecurity in the general public across the African continent. Celestina Omoso Isiramen (2006: 283) aptly underscores the woes and dashed hopes prompted by the divorce of morality from political landscapes in African countries such as Nigeria:

The Nigerian nation is presently weighed down by huge external debts, unemployment, mass retrenchment, armed

robbery, assassinations, dis-investments, collapse of infrastructures, food crisis, insecurity, pervasive poverty, strikes as well as alienating and repressive economic policies.

In Mozambique, the very high hopes and expectations that followed the political independence from the Portuguese in 1975 were first shuttered with the eruption of a civil war between the ruling government, Front for Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) and opposition, Mozambique Resistance Movement (RENAMO) in May 1977, barely two years after political independence. This tense situation seemed to have been brought to a halt with the signing of the Rome General Peace Accord and end of the civil war in October 1992, some 15 years-four months of civil unrest in the country. The civil war left about one million people dead, five million civilians displaced and many others made amputees by landmines (Cabrita 2000; Cahen 1998; Gersony 1988; Igreja 2007). As already noted, about one million people lost their lives during the conflict, an estimated 200,000 children were orphaned and another 250,000 separated from their families (Abreu 1998). Some 1.7 million people, more than 10 per cent of the total population, fled to neighbouring countries and another 4.3 million people became so-called *deslocados* (displaced persons) and sought refuge in the cities and other government-controlled areas (Maslen 1997).

With the end of civil war in 1992, hopes and expectations among the masses were high that majoritarian democracy envisaged in the 1992 Accord was going to bring them back sanity, total peace and their once stolen philosophy of humanness. Yet, the foundation of these expectations and hopes could be laid firm and the people's dream become a reality only and only if the people's political leaders were to be visionary, selfless, morally upright and altruistic political leaders.

Unfortunately, political leadership as a virtue was yet to be realised and cultivated by Mozambican politicians and statesmen such that the hopes and aspirations of many people were not only shattered but erased. Over the years, we have witnessed the

misallocation of public resources, embezzlement, stealing of the common wealth of the government coffers in the name of national service, and other forms of abuses by those who hold positions of trust (USAID 2005; Guardian Development Network 2013). Guardian Development Network (2013: 7) quotes Weimer who had this to say not only of Mozambique but Africa in general:

One factor for the large wealth divide is the high level of poverty on the one hand, as well as a rapidly emerging business class on the other [...] The speed of developments is important as it means that many opportunities bypass ordinary citizens. Another factor is that the business environment is particularly difficult for entrepreneurs and small and medium enterprises (SMEs).

In view of the unprecedented political and socio-economic cataclysmic situation obtaining in Mozambique, it could be argued that political leaders in Africa, particularly in Mozambique emerged from the 'colonial corridors' and later the civil unrest with renewed energy and crave for vice. The glaring fact that remains on the ground is that most of the political activities that the masses find themselves embroiled in is that Mozambican politics is slowly drifting away from the African culture and ethics or morality in general. Majority of the political leaders tend to be animated by self-seeking ambitions.

Applying philosophical-analytical, historical and anthropological (i.e. ethnographic) methods, this chapter makes an appraisal of the inter-connectedness between culture, ethics and politics, using Mozambique as a reference point. Conceptual analysis of the key terms is made before and while the chapter argues that the tendency, by many political leaders in Africa, of dissociating politics from culture and ethics always breeds many socio-political vices. The chapter concludes with recommendations based on our field and library research with the aim to re-engineer the country, and by extension Africa, ethically and politically.

Culture, ethics and politics: A brief conceptual analysis

Culture

Culture has been understood differently across societies and through time. While etymologically culture is derived from the Ancient Roman orator, Tullius Marcus Cicero in his *Tusculanae Disputationes*, where he wrote of cultivation of the soul (or *cultura animi*), it has been defined differently through time.

Useem and Useem (1963: 169) define culture as ‘the learned and shared behaviour of a community of interacting human beings.’ Damen (1987: 367) offers a similar definition: ‘culture is the learned and shared human patterns or models for living, day-to-day living patterns which pervade all aspects of human social interaction.’ For Parson (1949: 8), culture ‘consists in those patterns relative to behaviour and the products of human action which may be inherited, that is, passed on from generation to generation independently of the biological genes’. Similarly, Linton (1945: 32) conceptualises culture as ‘a configuration of learned behaviours and results of behaviour whose component elements are shared and transmitted by the members of a particular society.’ Linton’s conceptualisation shares a lot in common with Lederach (1995: 9) who understands culture as ‘shared knowledge and schemes created by a set of people for perceiving, interpreting, expressing, and responding to the social realities around them.’

For Banks *et. al* (1989), culture as consisting of the symbolic, ideational and intangible aspects of human societies. This means that for Banks *et al*, the essence of culture is not its artefacts, tools, or other tangible cultural elements but how the members of a society (or group) interpret, use and perceive them: culture thus is the value, symbols, interpretations, and perspectives that distinguish one group of people from another. A similar conceptualisation of culture to that of Banks *et al* is offered by Kroeber and Kluckhohn (1952) who conceptualise culture as patterns, explicit and implicit of and for behaviour acquired and transmitted by symbols, constituting the distinctive achievements in artefacts, ideas and especially their attached value.

For Kluckhohn and Kelly (1945: 79), culture refers to all those historically created designs for living, explicit and implicit, rational, irrational, and non-rational, which exist at any given time as potential guides for human behaviour. Hofstede (1984: 51) offers a somewhat similar definition when he says culture is ‘the collective programming of the mind which distinguishes the members of one category of people from another.’

As could be seen from the definitions offered above, culture has been understood differently. However, from all the definitions provided in this section it is clear that at least any definition of culture acknowledges that culture is learned, passed from one generation to another, and symbolic in a way. E. B. Tylor’s (1871: 1) classical definition of culture as that ‘complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society’ sums it all. It tries to capture all the important aspects of culture.

Ethics

Ethics as a science of morality has a long history. It goes back to the ancient times and peoples who produced moral codes by which people sanctioned their behaviours and thoughts to enrich societies and human lives therein. Etymologically, the concept of morality is derived from the Latin word ‘mores’ which literally mean custom, manner or action (Scanlon and Scanlon 1982).

We should underline that the Greeks preferred the term ‘ethics’ to morality. The word ‘ethics’ is where *ethos* is derived to designate ‘the force that maintains and nourishes the inner identity of a people’ (Moses and Leers 1990). It is all about distinguishing the good from the bad and the right from the wrong.

As already been noted above that ethics is a science of morality, the two are fundamentally complementary in the sense that they are both used to judge the rightness or wrongness, the goodness or badness of human activities and action. For this reason, the terms morality and ethics shall be used interchangeably in this chapter.

Emphasising the complementarity of ethics and morality, Kant (1970) argued that human beings possess moral nature, which

distinguishes them from lower-order animals and imposes upon them [human beings] a sense of responsibility and accountability. By virtue of their own nature, human beings are thus obliged to seek highest good and the highest virtue possible. Thus Kant (1970) makes it clear that morality is a collection of absolutely binding laws (what he calls categorical rules) by which our actions ought to be governed. As Williams Calloley Tremmel (1984) reminds us, the categorical rule governs human actions as individuals and as social beings. The concept of morality (or ethics), thus, is at the service of human beings on the basis that they [human beings] are rational and free (to do good or bad, right or wrong) agents in a society with others. In this regard, human beings, unlike lower-order animals, cannot imagine themselves in a society without moral principles that guide them as a people.

Politics

The Greek philosophers particularly Socrates (469-399BC), Plato (427-347BC) and Aristotle (384-322BC) are credited for having laid the foundation for the classical political thought ever known in the history of political science. These philosophers-cum-political theorists of Greek origin had calm and lucid rationality about the ideals of politics in the city-state, the Greek polis.

Etymologically, the term 'politics' is derived from the Greek word 'polis' which meant 'city' or 'state'. While politics has sometimes been understood negatively as the art and science of governing people in a state of confusion, the Greeks understood it as 'the art and science of taking part in a civilised society' (Angeles 1981: 275). Understood as such, politics was, for the Greeks, the consideration of life in common with men and women according to the essential structures of human society. Umejesi (2010: 323) captures this aptly when he notes:

For the Greeks, politics is a noble and indispensable profession involving every member of the city state. Thus, politics is the most developed part of man's morals: man's full participation is [...] achieved by living in intercourse with fellow

citizens [...] and, preferably involved in the business of government.

In essence, we can say politics is the art and science of human affairs that seeks to establish order and promote the highest good and happiness possible in human society. For the Greeks, a human person cannot realise the perfection of his/her nature individually but that realisation can only be attained within a community, a polis, where the individual lives with other human persons. In agreement with the Greek worldview, Nwoko (1988: 2) submits that:

Politics then involves the art of organising men in a society to live and interact with each other to the full realisation of their social nature. It requires the institutionalisation of the social structures, such as the establishment of the legal and governmental systems to facilitate this interaction. Politics therefore, deals with the state, that is, the state in its rational and legal nature as an association of men as moral beings.

The object of politics in society is spelt out in some detail by Aristotle. In his *Politics* and *Ethics*, Aristotle explains the mode of life that human happiness consists of. In so doing, Aristotle wanted to discover the form of government and social institutions that would guarantee that mode of life in society. His studies reveal that 'it is evident that the state is a creature of nature and that man is by nature a *zoon politikon* (or a political animal)' (Russell 1971: 197). For Aristotle, 'the connection between the human person and the state is so close that anyone who is unable to live in society or who has no need of it must be either a beast or a god' (see Umejesi 2010: 323).

Aristotle's studies further reveal that it is only politics devoid of selfish ambitions and free from self-seeking that promises happiness to all people, satisfaction and security of lives and property in a perfectly organised manner. Thus, as soon as politics diverts from this objective, human happiness and security of lives

and property are threatened. Umejesi (2010: 323) is apt in his emphasis of this point:

Man is destined by nature to live in a state, but the state as every other community or institution is established with a view of some good. Thus, the end or function of the state is to ensure supreme good of man, namely moral and intellectual life.

This means that the classical understanding of politics, at least from Aristotle's point of view, is the field of study which deals with all human problems in society and develops appropriate approaches to their solution with a view to guarantee the wellbeing and security of all people and property. This makes the goal of politics similar to that of ethics or morality in general: the goal of politics is the same as that of ethics or morality which is 'the vital well-being of the individual' (Angeles 1981: 216).

In fact, analytically, the nature and scope of politics includes the postulation of moral ideals and putting in place a moral laden system that guarantees a law-directed association and the greatest happiness and good. The good life then, is the ultimate aim of society, both collectively for all its members and individually (see Conford 1979: 13). As Barker (1918: 170-171) puts it, 'the *polis* was as ethical society; and political science as science of such society, became predominantly ethical'. Politics, then, would remain the social science of the morally permissible despite human frailty such that no essential difference would be drawn between political science and ethics. 'The good of the human person is ideally the same as the good of the society; one's virtue is by implication the virtue of the state. In other words, politics is the supreme ethics' (Ndugbu 1987: 106).

We should, however, be quick to note that the understanding of the goal of politics as being similar to that of ethics has never been homogeneous. Some scholars such as St Augustine of Hippo, St Aquinas and McNabb, only to mention but a few, are of the view that morality and politics are two different and independent categories that should be mixed or at least confused with each other

(see also Ukah and Okoro 2011). But why these scholars perceive politics and morality as distinct and totally different from each other? For St Aquinas and St Augustine, politics and morality place their ends at different levels. St Augustine, for example, located morality in the City of God, which he saw as the domain of morality and not politics. For St Augustine, the earthly city (like the Greek polis) is the place for politics where all political activities to do with human affairs could be found and these political activities have no place in the peaceful City of God. The City of God that St Augustine talks about could be likened to the human heart where moral sentiments and the spirit are believed to reside while politics could be likened to the outside body where emotions find their place. This is because in the book, *The City of God*, which Augustine wrote in response to the punishment executed on the Romans for abandoning traditional Roman religion for Christianity, he argues that even if the earthly rule of the Empire/the Earthly City/City of Man (which is political) was imperilled, it was the heavenly city/City of God (which is spiritual) that would ultimately triumph. As Ndugbu (1987: 102) puts it, the proponents of this school of thought claim that morality responds to an interior exigency and is concerned with the rectitude of personal acts according to norms of duty each assuming fully the responsibility of his/her own conducts. As Ndugbu further interprets, politics, on the other hand, responds to the need of social life propelling an actor in it to participate in the assumption of the global destiny of a collective people.

Understood in the light of the latter view of politics, some scholars like Max Weber reason that moral uprightness can endanger the realisation of political ends if one considers that good only attracts good and evil fundamentally so (Tremmel 1984: 44). This is the similar reasoning that scholars like Niccolo Machiavelli would give. In his attempt to discredit the classical political thoughts of the likes of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, and to sustain a modern socio-political disorder, Machiavelli (1467-1527) taught that human beings are not by nature directed towards virtue as he observes that 'men are by nature ungrateful, disloyal, insincere and

deceitful, timid of danger and avid of profit' (see Machiavelli trans. 1965: 62). Thus, 'people are radically selfish and a wise politician will construct his/her politics on this assumption' (Russell 1971: 493). In as much as possible, Machiavelli tries to be a realist such that in addressing the questions of means and power in politics, Machiavelli threw up several 'immoral' canons which influence the style of governance in many societies even today. In his political treatise, *The Prince* (*Principe in Italian*), Machiavelli (1520), noted that the aims of Princes (rulers) – such as glory and survival – can justify the immoral means (such as killing) to achieve those ends: thus for Machiavelli, the end always justify the means. To emphasise this point, in his Chapter 15 of *The Principe*, Machiavelli had this to say: 'He who neglects what is done for what ought to be done, sooner effects his ruin than his preservation.' This means that Machiavelli taught that the only real concern of the political ruler is the acquisition and maintenance of power. Thus for Machiavelli, to guarantee political stability in the society, even killing by the political leader would be justifiable as long as that helps the leader to transform his/her subjects from bad to good. This is because Machiavelli advised that the domain of politics is to be viewed as a relation of factors which only the Prince has to acquire and control (Ndugbu 1987: 113). In *The Prince*, Machiavelli (trans 1965: 66; see also Ndugdu 1987: 113), thus, would advise political leaders that:

A prince, therefore, who desires to maintain himself must learn to be not always good, but to be so or not as necessity may require [...] Nor need he care about incurring censure for such vices, without which the preservation of his state may be difficult. For all things considered, it will be found that something that seem like virtue will lead you to ruin if you follow them, whilst others that apparently are vices, will, if followed, result in your safety and well-being.

The political philosophy of Machiavelli is a clear depiction of the politics of the modern era where most of the political leaders across the globe are now more concerned with preserving their

power regardless of the question whether the ends they use to do is morally justifiable or not.

However, from a practical view point and a classical perspective of politics, a morally inclusive policy is likely to yield happy results for the greatest number. For this reason, some scholars refuse to make a clear-cut separation between the object and goals of morality and politics. For them, no political activity and policy would promote happiness and security of lives and property if it comes without moral principles. Umejesi (2010: 324) makes the relationship between politics and morality clearer when he argues that 'politics is not dirty but the personalities who practice politics may be dirty and thus drag the noble profession to the mud.' In the section that follows, we examine the tripartite relationship between culture, politics and ethics with a view to evaluate the legitimacy and appropriateness of some political activities in Mozambique.

The tripartite relationship between culture, ethics and politics


Any human culture reflects and mirrors the moral values and ethical norms governing the conduct and behaviour of the people in a society. This means that while culture is broader than ethics (or morality as the two are used interchangeably in this chapter) in that it refers to the collective way of life, general attitudes, values, goals and practices shared by a people or society, culture always reflects moral and ethical beliefs and standards that dictate how people should interact and conduct themselves in both private and public spheres. This means that ethics is normally moulded from a particular culture from which it (ethics) find roots or is at least related to.

In ideal situation, the same relationship that obtains between culture and ethics is extended to the realm of politics. While the relationship of the tripartite concepts is complex, the three interface in human life in varied ways, sometimes in ways that impoverish or enrich (or do both) each other. Each of these variables imposes some sense of control and order in human society. In fact ethics, politics and culture intersect with each other in that the three

impose a sense of order and control in people's lives. Besides, both politics and ethics draw their principles from culture such that every ethical practice and political practice reflects the culture of a people involved in the practice. Both ethics and politics are in fact enriched by culture. And, what is ethical and politically correct is influenced by cultural norms and values. This means that possibilities are there that what is ethical (as what is politically correct) to one group will not be considered so by individual(s) from a different culture. For the theory of cultural relativism, this entails that there is no singular and universal truth on which to base ethical/moral behaviour for all time and geographic spaces, as people's interpretations of what is ethical (or morally good) are influenced by their own culture. A classical example that explains this relativistic reality is that of the differences between the French and Americans' perceptions on whistle-blowing. Compared to the French culture, American companies basing on their culture, consider whistle-blowing to be a natural part of business that they set up anonymous hotlines. The French, on the other hand, have a tendency of viewing whistle-blowing as something that undermines solidarity among co-workers.

Speaking in terms of diagrams, the relationship between culture, ethics and politics could be illustrated as below:

Figure 1: Showing the relationship between culture, politics and ethics



As is represented in the diagram above, the ideal relationship between culture, politics and ethics would be a scenario where politics is more into ethics and ethics is more into politics while both ethics and politics are within a culture (or society). Culture here, thus, represents human society as there is no human society without a culture. In this sense, ethics and politics as with culture would share the same vision and use their collectively owned resources which they get from culture to better all parties. We thus have both a political culture and an ethical culture in human societies and the boundaries between these three variables – culture, politics, and ethics – are elastic and dissolvable. But why ethics in politics?

The necessity of ethics (or an ethical culture) arises for the major reason that human beings are social rational animals with the ability to choose or exercise their will. This means that in themselves, human beings are neither fundamentally good nor fundamentally evil: human beings, thus, have the potential of doing both good and bad even though for purposes of greater happiness in society they are always encouraged to exercise and be guided to goodness. In a society where human beings interact, practical

reason is always important in the promotion of happiness and cultivation of good behaviour. Some modern scholars like Kant support this line of thinking because for him 'practical reason' is superior to 'pure reason' for the simple reason that to be moral for the sake of morality helps to achieve a better and happier society. Polycarp Ndugbu (1987: 100) seconds Kant's reasoning as he argues, 'perhaps the most disinterested reason for performing a moral action is the honest conviction that it is the right thing to do and no other reason.' Put differently, morality (or ethics) has to do with human activities (political activities inclusive) that are judged as either good or bad, right or wrong. The concept of morality, thus, emphasises all conducts that are considered as virtuous, fair and just whether in politics or in other such human spheres. It controls and moderates the manner in which one conducts or behaves himself/herself in relationship with others in any civil or political society. Some, however, remain curious to know whether the precepts of ethics is dependent solely on places, time, persons involved or they are absolute and valid for all places, time and persons.

For moral relativists, the precepts of ethics would always vary from place to place, time to time, and from one person to another depending on one's culture or background. This means that what might be ethically good in society A might be condemned as ethically bad in society B. Similarities in how societies A and B conceptualise the good would be mere coincidence.

However, for the natural law theorists who derive their insights from the divine law, despite apparent differences in context, time and people involved, ethical precepts are always universally binding and applicable to every state or conditions under which men may live. The Stoics support this line of thinking. As Peter Angeles (1981: 275) rightfully notes, Stoics principally believe that:

Knowledge of the functioning of the universe as a whole provides us with knowledge of how each individual thing must behave. Everyone must follow the rational will of the universe and live in conformity with the divine laws of nature, just as

everyone must follow and live in conformity with the laws of one's own country.

Contrary to the Stoics' view, opponents of the natural laws theory, some contemporary existentialists and dialectical materialists, claim that moral precepts are subjective and not universal. They argue that moral precepts are derived from human's instinct of self-preservation and not from nature. Basing on this understanding, those opposed to the natural laws theory argue that actions are judged as morally good if they promote the self-preservation of the individual *and* [judged] evil if the contrary is the case. Ndugbu (1987: 101) sums up the reasoning of the opponents of the natural law theory as:

There is no Divine Being whose commands ought to be obeyed. Man creates his own essence, or rather his values through his everyday choices and it is by so doing that he gives meaning to his life and to his world.

In support of this reasoning, dialectical materialists particularly Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, submit that all morality is always the product of class struggle, the consequence of the economic and political stage of the evolution of the natural world which human society has reached at a given time in history. Quoting the Biblical injunction: 'Thou shall not steal,' Engels, for instance, argues that 'it is only in a state of private property *and nowhere else* that this moral law is common' (see Stumpf 1982: 432, *emphasis original*). Thus, for Engels, as for many other dialectical materialists, the Biblical injunction quoted above could not be an eternal moral law in a society in which the motive for stealing has been eliminated and has no place at all.

Though the treatment of ethical precepts might vary from persons to persons depending on their orientations and societies from where they come, it remains clear that ethical practices are obligatory if human happiness and security to life and property are to be guaranteed. Yet due to the tide of globalisation and

westernisation that have been sweeping across Africa since the last two centuries or so, most countries and people, Mozambique included, now live in multicultural realities which have specific cultural, moral and political challenges. For example, the issue of legalisation of abortion, children's human rights, women's human rights, and care for the aged are both moral and political with how they are normally perceived dependent on one's cultural orientation. This means countries or societies face the challenges on how these issues are perceived differently. Thus, speaking of morality and politics today is no easy task. Be that as it may, the task in this chapter is to situate morality and politics in context, with a view to demonstrate how politics can be enriched by ethics (and vice-versa) and both politics and ethics could as well be enriched by culture.

Why the need for ethical politics?

The primacy of ethics in politics and governance in general cannot be underestimated. Following the classical conceptualisation of a *polis*, there is need in human societies to make sure that politics go hand in glove with ethics and the culture of a society. It is however unfortunate that in most African countries today, political leaders at all levels (from local through provincial to the national) tend to draw a solid line between politics, ethics and even culture. The Shona adage that *nyika vanhu* (lit trans: one is a leader because of the people s/he leads) is now disregarded by many African *rulers* in favour of the Machiavellian philosophy that the end always justify the means. We call them *rulers* because instead of leading the people they dictate and coerce them. These rulers are no longer morally sensitive, with vices such as corruption, misappropriation of government funds, embezzlement and other such abuses of office being the order of the day. Taking the example of Mozambique, this section puts together different accounts which demonstrate that political leaders in the country no longer respect the ethically rich politics we used to have in the Greek *polis*. Neither do they respect the *Unhu/Ubuntu* philosophy, an African philosophy of humanness that used to be a moral compass in all spheres of life of

the African people, especially those in sub-Saharan Africa. The primacy of both *Ubuntu* and ethics as cushion for any political action no longer matter. Unfortunately, political and moral accounts criticising the vices that are fast spreading like veld fire hardly swarm the shelves of bookshops at the same (or even greater) rate as compared to historical accounts in the form of biographies written by historians and aides of rulers in the country. One wonders why some forty years after the Mozambican liberation struggle against the Portuguese imperialism, the country still receives volumes and volumes of homemade history of its liberation and independence struggles when immediate issues that affect the contemporary Mozambican society on daily basis such as corruption by politicians or government officials are left untouched. Joao Coelho (2014: 1) gives a possible explanation to this reality when he says:

In trying to develop a distinct path [in Mozambique]... such scarcity is to an important extent the consequence of the type of neighbourliness relations established between politics and history. In particular, [...] such relations were shaped by two important factors: [...] the monopoly of explanations of the past (*and present*) held by *contemporary* politics and within it by FRELIMO, the ruling party and single source of authority in the post-independent period.

While politics in Mozambique takes in a framework of a presidential representative democratic republic and a multi-party system, many continue to doubt the capacity of this politics to bring in the greatest happiness and good to the masses – the ordinary people who unfortunately and always find themselves at the receiving end in the nefarious political actions of their political representatives. This has largely been a result of a number of vices that seem to emanate right from the top echelons of the government representative body down to the grassroots political representatives. In view of the conduct of Mozambican Police, the

government agents with the mandate to enforce law and order, Bussotti (2013), for example, had this to say:

The ‘normal’ attitude of the Mozambican Police is not to observe the basic lines of conduct of each public official. Citizens are killed here and there by the police that instead should uphold rule of law and promote peace and order. Alfredo Tivane, a Mozambican citizen, was, for example, killed by the Police in Matola (Maputo), because he disobeyed the order of an agent. All the year round, similar episodes occur in Mozambique, as the local Human Rights League points out in its annual reports (p. 5).

The abuse of power by government agents (and officials) in Mozambique even go beyond abuse of individuals to abuse of the whole nation-state they purport to be representing. Political oppositions are more often than not abused, harassed and have their efforts to express their opinions thwarted. This is regardless of the fact that the ruling party consider Mozambique as a democratic republic with a multi-party system. Highlighting the intolerance of the ruling party, FRELIMO, in view of the opposition, Bussotti (2013: 6) observes:

As RENAMO is not considered a political risk, it is possible to abuse its members, and to provoke them too. This induces one to think that RENAMO’s members are not citizens *pleno jure*, and that they do not have the right to demonstrate their clear opposition to the decisions of Mozambican institutions.

The vice in Mozambican politics extends to national economy. As the Guardian Development Network (2013: 5) comments quoting Sebastien Marlier, an analyst at the Economist Intelligence Unit who tracks developments in Mozambique, ‘corruption has become a major concern in Mozambique. A small elite associated with the ruling party and with strong business interests dominates the economy.’

In any morally responsive society, such corruption of the elite group, the political bran, is totally unacceptable. Yet in Mozambique as in many contemporary African countries is exactly what Reuben Abati (2005; emphasis original) reports in the *Sunday Guardian*: ‘politics in *Africa* is about what anyone can get, it is about allocation and the sharing of resources; for an average politician, in the face of allocation and sharing... expediency is all that matters. Politics is about the self and not the common good.’ The separation between politics and ethics by political representatives in Mozambique is not only a disservice to the people of Mozambique. It is a cultivation of the dog-eat-dog politics that is inclined towards the commodification of people’s votes and abuse of power for purposes of self-aggrandizement. Elsewhere on the continent Babalola’s observation (2012: 8; emphasis original) is apt:

Politics in *Mozambique* today is viewed primarily as a business and not a means of service to the nation. Politicians seek public office not to serve but to have their share of the national cake. This explains huge allowances paid to politicians in every sphere of public life.

What Babalola observes is true if we look critically on how politics is played in Mozambique: it is now more of a business enterprise done without a human face regardless of the fact that political leaders are voted into power to serve the people and not their personal interests. This problem is not only political but also historical. Stewart (cited in Irin 1998: 5) makes this clear when he asserts: ‘History is replete with instruction and suggestive of duty. It takes the experience of others and offers it to ourselves, admonishing us to shun their faults and copy their virtues.’ While it is underlined that the problem of politics in Mozambique is not only political but also historical, Stewart makes it clear that if not properly used moral norms could be abused to betray the same people it should protect. Yet as Ojakaminor (2007: 12) argues ‘past empirical experiences have shown beyond doubt that a polity without morality can only be a wily contraption that works only for

the self-interest of the deprived.’ Mozambique, as with many countries beyond, is awash with experiences, both past and present, to justify the ramifications in the negatives of political actions that are devoid of ethical reflection. Most of the incidences of political immorality are a legacy of violence against civilians committed by FRELIMO during the liberation struggle for independence. As Kai Thaler (2012: 552-53; emphasis original) notes:

In the archives of the DGS, I searched through the files on Frelimo activity and found reports on 278 separate incidents of violence against civilians committed by Frelimo forces during the independence war. I have disaggregated these incidents by the types of violence that occurred within attacks, since many incidents included multiple forms of violence *such as...* kidnapping, killing, torture, wounding, violent threatening, assault, and rape.

We argue that most of the forms of violence – political immoral acts – that Thaler notes above continue to take place in many parts of the country perpetrated by government officials directly or otherwise. The Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labour: Mozambique (2009: nd) summarises it all when it reports of Mozambique that:

Incidents of serious human rights abuses in some areas, including vigilante killings, increased during the year. Security forces continued to commit unlawful killings although the government took steps to prosecute perpetrators. Prison conditions improved, but remained harsh and life threatening, resulting in several deaths. Arbitrary arrest and detention as well as lengthy pre-trial detention were problems. An understaffed and inadequately trained judiciary was inefficient and heavily influenced by the ruling party. Political and judicial decisions involving independent media outlets constrained press freedom. Societal problems including domestic violence, discrimination against women, abuse, exploitation, and forced labour of children, trafficking in women and children, and discrimination against persons with HIV/AIDS remained widespread.

The same report went on to give details of immoral acts, most of which have been recently committed by the government or its officials as below:

a). On 5 February 2008, police fired rubber bullets, tear gas, and live ammunition at demonstrators in Maputo protesting increases in the cost of living and particularly a rise in bus fares. According to press reports and police statements, more than 100 persons were injured (including 68 persons shot by the police), and at least five persons died from their injuries. Commenting on police actions during the demonstrations, a police spokesman claimed that police carried out their duty 'to guarantee public order and tranquillity.' No police were punished for firing into the crowd.

b). On 11 February 2008, police in Chokwe, Gaza Province, clashed with protesters demonstrating against the rising cost of living. While Chokwe authorities stated that one person died during the clashes, an independent media report insisted that between three and six persons died. In response to the violence, the Gaza provincial governor claimed that police had no choice but to respond with force in order to restore calm to the city.

c). In August 2008 the press reported that a police officer shot and killed a man in Maputo at point blank range during a personal dispute. A Maputo police spokesman indicated that an investigation, including a ballistics examination, was ongoing, and that a criminal proceeding had been filed against the officer. There were no further developments at year's end.

d). In April 2008, the Criminal Investigation Police (PIC) released one of two police officers being held for the December 2007 killing of August Covilas because his 90-day maximum preventive detention had expired. The two officers shot and killed Covilas after responding to a report that his house was being robbed. The investigation of the second officer was ongoing at year's end.

e). There continued to be reports of abuse and violence by members of the CPC. During the 5 February 2008 demonstrations, the LDH recorded five cases where police beat protesters with

batons. In September, prior to a soccer match, two police agents handcuffed several youths outside the stadium and beat them repeatedly for allegedly being criminals. In October, the daily *O Pais* reported that agents of the PIC in Matola shot Justino Tembe after believing he was an armed criminal fleeing from authorities. The PIC brought Tembe to a hospital in Matola, where they kept him handcuffed for 20 days until a judge in Maputo ordered him released for lack of criminal evidence (Ibid).

All the examples elaborated above could be classified as a crime by Mozambique against its own people – a crime against humanity. It can also be interpreted as a clear testimony that Mozambican politics and governance, as in many other African countries, is fast distancing itself from ethics and culture and becoming more and more irresponsible.

In the light of the shaking political experiences in Mozambique, there is no doubt that the need to retrieve ethics from philosophical formalism and academic marginalia to the forefront of political life and discourse is more urgent now than ever. There is need to shift from Machiavellian type of politics and politics of exclusion to politics of inclusion that respects all stakeholders. This is because in the politics as in business of any society, morality should have a prime place to ensure that the common good of the greatest number is recognised and promoted.

On this note, Kant's objective principle of morality becomes informative and instructive on how both the ordinary people and government officials should conduct themselves in the society they share. For Kant, a theory of politics is inevitably a part of the whole metaphysics of morality given that politics deals with the issue of what one ought to do in a social and political context. In fact Kant (1970: 438) pithily submits that 'politics ought to be adapted to morality.' This entails that in Kant's estimation as that of ours, as long as politics plays down morality and government officials play it not as an avenue for service to the community they pledged to serve when they took oath in government but as a profit-making business, the Mozambican politics will continue going to the dogs and sink into the dustbin of murk chaos.

Conclusion

A critical look by concerned scholars and political moralists at the relationship between morality and politics, particularly in Mozambique, leaves them in utter repugnance and disenchantment. One even wonder how perfect angels from the Almighty Heaven would feel if they happen to visit the political landscape of Mozambique. This chapter has critically dissected and discussed the political landscape of Mozambique with a view to understand the genesis of its immoral activities especially those by the government officials. In this whole attempt, the chapter has argued that the elimination of morality from politics, as presently as is presently the case in Mozambique, results in the failure of political representatives to propagate what Aristotle calls 'good life' which is the ultimate end of all political societies. While borrowing from classical Western scholars such as Aristotle, particularly his conceptualisation of good life, we have also underscored the need for the Mozambican society to go back to its roots and rediscover what engenders and stimulates its political realm. On this note, we have emphasised the need to embrace African philosophical traditions such as that of Ubuntu – a philosophy that promotes a plethora of human virtues, that in no doubt would do a great deal of peace, security, and good governance in the country. The present chapter, thus, concludes that politics without ethics is no different from a louse that feeds on the blood of its host. Political representatives – those who play politics on behalf of the people they purport to be representing – should always know that politics is deeply entrenched in moral integrity and humane values.

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Education for Sustainable Development in Africa: An Appraisal with Focus on Nigerian Experience

Patrick U. Nwosu

Introduction

Generally, when one talks about African development, it ends up being a talk about Africa's underdevelopment. This clearly points to the undeniable fact that Africa is in dire need of development particularly from within the continent itself. In this regard, there cannot be any sustainable development in Africa without self-initiated, holistic education. The education that is key to the continent's development is that which leads the individual to a holistic self-discovery and in turn empowers the individual to add value to the society. It is the education that prepares one to appreciate and cherish African values and potentials. Unfortunately, the reality on the ground in many African countries is the fact that unsuitable educational and economic approaches are the principal causes of the continent wasting chances of development. Most African countries, particularly Nigeria pattern their educational institutions in line with colonial masters' style instead of developing indigenous system. This attitude works against African rich pre-colonial educational system. The pre-colonial African educational system allows one to develop himself/herself and in turn contribute to the development of the society. Functionalism in the light of the common good of the greatest number was the guiding principle of education in traditional African society.

In the light of the above, the objective of this chapter is to make a critical appraisal of education in the context of sustainable development in Africa. Applying historical and analytical methods, the chapter proceeds in the following sub-themes: Africa and

Development, Indigenous Education in Africa, Nature of Education that Guarantees African Development, and in conclusion, the chapter submits that the type of education that contributes to the development of a people must take account of the specific context and essential values of the people. Therefore, an educated African capable of enhancing development in Africa cannot be a visitor to his/her own people.

Africa is a continent riddled with legions of developmental problems of multi-faceted nature. Many of the problems have their origins in what is popularly described as “the scramble for Africa”. The scramble for Africa commonly means “the carving up of the African continent into some thirty colonies and protectorates, that was a byproduct of the aggressive competition amongst the European imperialists in the 19th century” (Shorter 2006: 23). Amongst many other descriptions of Africa, one could describe the continent as a compact of land mass with an area of about 29,952,000 square kilometres. This is approximately 22.4% of the whole land on earth. The vegetation of Africa ranges from tropical rain forest and mangroves swamps to mountain tundra, and the soil from tropical red earths to podols (Nwosu 2011: 5). But very sadly, the scramble gave European nations alone ten million square miles of the new territory. The French occupied Algiers in 1830. Ten years on, an unnecessary border dispute was used as a pretext for annexing Tunisia. At the Berlin conference, Germany, with British and American backing, gave approval to the creation of the Congo Free State. With great feelings, Achebe (2012) writes of this scramble for Africa:

The rain that beat Africa began four or five hundred years ago, from the “discovery” of Africa by Europe, through the transatlantic slave trade, to the Berlin conference of 1885. That controversial gathering of the world’s leading European powers precipitated what we now call the scramble for Africa, which created new boundaries that did violence to Africa’s ancient societies and resulted in tension prone modern states. It took

place without Africa consultation or representation, to say the least (p. 1).

Consequently, France, Britain, Germany and Belgium consolidated their position in the areas allocated to them: the Sahara, the lake regions of East and Central Africa, and the Niger Basin of West Africa.

The scramble for Africa has militated against socio-economic, spiritual political and educational development of the continent. Shorter (2006: 24) expresses the situation thus:

These areas of Africa were already a prey to violence and inter ethnic conflict precipitated by the slave trade; ...the colonial incursion roused strong resistance on the part of African rulers and aggravated their domestic wars. In 1982 an already violent situation was being rendered more violent. Every step of colonial annexation provoked resistance and the consequences of resistance were devastating.

Achebe's recent work, corroborating Shorter's sentiments, reveals a distinctive portrait of post-colonial Africa. He notes in the work that "Africa's post-colonial disposition is the result of a people who have lost the habit of ruling themselves" (Achebe 2012: 2). Added to the foregoing, is also the difficulty of managing the various systems foisted upon African nations upon the dawn of independence by the colonial masters, educational institutions that are key to sustainable development inclusive.

The reality on ground in Africa is that unsuitable educational and economic approaches are the major causes of the continent's illusive attempts to sustainable development. There cannot be any sustainable development in Africa without appropriate home-grown education. The pre-colonial African educational system comes to mind here. It is a system that allows one to develop himself/herself and in turn contribute to the development of society. Functionalism in the context of the common good of the greatest number was the

guiding principle of education or training in the ancient African society.

Education and Sustainable Development

Etymologically, the word education comes from the Latin root “educ-ere” meaning “to lead out”, to bring out (Wormald 1962: 331). Education leads one to a comprehensive self-discovery and actualization. It is about the actualization of the innate potentialities in the individual. The individual, through educational process, gradually manifests his/her potentialities and capabilities. In their study of Philosophical Foundations of Education, Ozmon and Craver (1976: xi) observe that: “Education is involved with both the world of ideas and the world of practical activity; good ideas can lead to good practices and good practices lead to good ideas”. In other words, the educational process of self-discovery is not only to benefit the individual, but also benefits the larger society. This is because education contributes to the growth of society. The essential fact of education is recounted by Onwuka (2002) when he cited Japan as an instance of a nation that developed rapidly through education. He notes that education “is the instrument to be used in transforming any society. Through education, developments of various kinds occur; development in terms of health, environments, transport, and so many other good qualities of life occur” (2002: 16). He went further to say that “in Japan, during the Meiji the Restoration in 1868, education was employed as an instrument par excellence for national policy and was used to cultivate the cardinal virtues of the Shinto philosophy of filial piety, benevolence, justice, propriety, intelligence, and fidelity” (2002: 17). Till date, the handing on of these cardinal virtues to the young ones is the function of the school.

In the light of the above, education is interrelated with the development and direction a society takes; education policy makers and educators ,including the students must become aware of this if they don't yet know. Furthermore, education involves the passing on of the cultural heritage of a people from one generation to the

next. This is the case to assure that essential social and cultural continuity exists. Education also provides skills, abilities, and understanding to develop new ways of doing things in light of changing conditions. But the question is: did the Western-oriented education brought to Africa aim at sustainable development?

Responding to this fundamental concern, Rodney (2009: 293) strongly insists that the Western-oriented education introduced to Africa “was not an educational system designed to give young people confidence and pride as members of African societies.” It was a system of education geared towards African underdevelopment. Fafunwa (2004: 70), on his own part, notes that the missionaries and colonizers undertook the business of education not because they regarded education as good for Africans but because they found that they could not do their work properly without giving the people the tool of reading and writing. Shorter (2006: 198) admits the limitations of Western and missionary education projects in Africa and gave a fair summary of their objective thus: we do not want to create scholars but educated people, formed for Christianity, for a serious life and for reflection.

Sadly, in pursuing their educational objectives the missionaries sowed seeds of discrimination and even violence in the African soil. Between 1892 to 1914, mutual intolerance of one kind or another was characteristic of all Christian denominations in Africa and this has lingered till date. In terms of educational curricular in most African universities, especially in Nigeria, the drivers ignore the crucial aspect of pre-colonial African education that was relevant to Africans and pattern activities after the colonial system. Olupona (1992) attests to this when he writes:

The University of Nigeria, Nsukka, presents a somewhat different programme. As a university that was modelled after the American university system before the civil war, it had some of the best expatriate scholars [...] in Nigeria who had all along encouraged the scientific study of religions (p. 189).

At the same time, the concept of sustainable development, linked to the culture of 'consumption', has entered into crisis. Indeed, the availability of the many real benefits provided in recent times by science and technology, including world-wide-web (www), bring freedom from every form of slavery. Yet, David O'Brien and Thomas Shannon (2010) note that this super development, which consists in an excessive availability of every kind of information and material goods are for the benefits of certain social groups. The super development mistaken for sustainable development: "easily makes people slaves of possession with no other horizon than multiplication of the things already owned with others still better" (p.442).

In trying to achieve sustainable development, that dimension which is specific to human nature must not be lost. Human beings are to be seen always as bodily and spiritual (Gen. 2: 7). Hence, the Brandt Commission report defines sustainable development as "meeting the needs of the present generation without compromising the needs of future generation" (p.135). Put another way, sustainable development should be an everlasting process. It is needed to stress on the quality of life of the people through increase in the real income per-capita, improvement in the education, health and general quality of life and above all, improvement in the quality of natural environment.

The foregoing stresses two fundamental things. The first is that sustainable development cannot be excluded from economic advancement, and closely tied to this, is the fact that development that is sustainable go along with functional educational system. Many other definitions of the concept of sustainable development could be adduced, but suffice it to state that sustainable development entails four important factors: economic, social, environmental and educational framework. Ekanem (2010) confirms this when he argues, "sustainable development aims at bettering people's health and education opportunities, giving everyone the chance to participate in public life, helping to ensure a clean environment and promoting intergeneration equity" (p.37).

Africa and the Development Discourse

Reflecting on Africa from an integral human context, one sees a continent that is rich in biodiversity, rich in aquatic and wildlife. In addition to this treasure the continent is also endowed with oil, gas and many other mineral resources, combined with in-depth search for God expressed in African Religion.

However, modern foundational structures and the coming of new religions in Africa set in motion the present day development challenges on the land. At the foundational base of contemporary African economic, political, educational and social blocks is a strong systemic structure of poverty that has economic interest protection as an objective (Nwosu 2010: 66). The typical poor African country is dependent for foreign earnings on the export of one or two agricultural products such as tea, coffee, or beef. In Nigeria, it is crude oil. In this regard, Dorr (1984) notes that the development situation in Africa is that in which “the economy... was reorganised to serve the interest of the imperial powers” (p.53). Not only were the outside boundaries of the continent decided by the West at the Berlin Conference, but the continuous internal exploitation of the economy has been arranged by the West ever since (Mayson 2010: 104). At the heart of the developmental crisis in Africa is the continued ownership and control of the resources by the imperial powers and unaccountable African governments and elite. The consequence of this, as being witnessed today is the loss of human society and the community expressed through social bias, racism and cultural boastfulness associated with capitalist mind-set. Mayson’s study shows that disharmony now characterises the developmental lives and relationships in Africa. She writes:

The economic worldview of the West, trying so desperately to take over Africa, is based on making profits. A repeated failure demonstrates that this approach does not work. Africa knows that the only profitable path is an economy based on shared, compassionate, cooperative, collective democracy. The alternative is extinction (Mayson 2010: 109).

On his own part, Nnoruka (1998) describes the African developmental efforts as a near scramble for existence. He argues that:

Much of the continent has turned into a battle ground of contending dooms: over population, poverty, starvation, illiteracy, corruption, social breakdown, over crowded cities, war and of war refugees. African has thus become... a vast continent in a free for all, a sort of new-post colonial breakdown (p.242).

Certain factors like political instability and corrupt practices legitimise African woes.

Above all, inappropriate economic policies and misplaced educational approaches are the principal causes of the continent's wasting chances of development. Most African countries, instead of developing and diversifying agriculture, try in vain to industrialise at a time when it is clear that much of the rest of the world is already well on its way into the industrial age (Nnoruka 1998: 242). Worst still, African countries, in their haste to catch up with Western industrialisation, actively but unconsciously discourage agriculture, which constitutes basic strength for most countries. This is not good for African sustainable development. Mayson (2010) imagines what ought to have happened in Africa. She writes:

Africa had plenty of land and resources and people to develop from prehistory to a modern educated and productive state in a century, as the United States and Australian had done. The original root of Africa's wealth was its agricultural potential, which could be developed to provide support for the vast move to the urban centers, where an industrialized population could turn Africa's mineral and manufacturing potential into the full experience of a people enjoying economic and cultural liberation (p.103).

But where is the African developmental and educational framework to achieve this?

Development concerns basically the individual, and sustainable development is the extent to which one realises his/her potentials and attains social integration. Development starts with the individual person anchored on education. Opoku (1985) puts it succinctly: “Development as the realisation of the potentialities of a human society or nation involves the attainment of certain desirable ends, and the surest means of attaining those ends is through education” (pp.69-70). Sustainable development in Africa must take into consideration the person as a whole. African continent would be developed when all parts of societal aspirations are held in balance. What consciousness does Africa hold towards suitable education that can result to sustainable development? The form of consciousness expressed in the *Africanness* of education is the concern of the next sub-headings.

Pre-colonial Education in Africa

No appraisal of education and sustainable development in Africa is complete without adequate attention to the indigenous educational system prevalent in the continent before the advent of colonialism. Indigenous education in Africa is as old as African continent. Nnoruka (1998) offers some valuable insight into indigenous education in Africa. He writes: Africa before its contact with Western civilizations had a rich educational system. The young man who followed this educational system developed himself and eventually contributed to the development of society (pp.243-244). Pragmatism or functionalism that aims at the common good of the greatest number was the guiding principle of education in ancient African society. In other words, education was conceived as a means to an end and not an end in itself. Social responsibility, job orientation, political participation, spiritual and ethical values were important components of African education. Children learnt by imitation. Fafunwa (2004) emphasised that, they (children) together

with the adults “engaged in participatory education through ceremonies, rituals, imitation, recitation and demonstration” (p.2).

In African setting, farming, fishing, weaving, cooking, carving, and knitting and so on form practical courses learnt by doing. There were recreational courses which included wrestling, dancing, drumming, racing and other displays. Munyaradzi Mawere in the work *‘The Struggle of African Indigenous Knowledge System in an Age of Globalisation: A Case for Children Traditional Games in South-eastern Zimbabwe’*, offers plausible insight to the forgoing. Following the same line of thought, Nnoruka (1998) submits that “the periods were normally moonlight and the venue the public square. There was also a system of intellectual training. The courses were local history, legends, the environment, poetry, reasoning, riddles, proverbs, storytelling, and so on” (p.244). These were courses in the class of Mathematics, Zoology, Biology, Geography, Physics, Music, Dance, etc. In this regard, Fafunwa (2004) explains:

Education in old Africa was an integrated experience. It combined physical training with character building and mutual activity with intellectual training. At the end of each stage, demarcated either by age level or years of exposure, the child was given a practical test relevant to his experience and level of development and in terms of the job to be done. This was a continuous assessment which eventually culminated in a passing out ceremony, or initiation into adulthood (p.2).

Education during this period had a focus and objective. It was functional because the curriculum was relevant to the needs of the society. Hardly did men and women roam the villages and towns because of unemployment. The number of unemployed young men and women was very minimal. Fafunwa (2004) further summarises the cardinal contents and totality of indigenous education in Africa as the:

Aggregate of all the processes by which a young adult develops the abilities, attitudes and other forms of behaviour

which are of positive value to the society in which he lives; it is a process for transmitting culture in terms of continuity and growth for disseminating knowledge either to ensure social control or to guarantee rational direction of the society (p. 3).

Education in ancient Africa enabled people to develop a sense of belonging in order to participate actively in family and community affairs. It also empowered people to understand, appreciate and promote the cultural heritage of the entire community.

Nature of Education that Guarantees African Sustainable Development

At this point of the discourse, the fundamental question that comes to mind is: what system of education could contribute to African development? Put another way, what kind of education could enable Africans to develop Africa today? It is education that gives one sufficient opportunity to develop a mental capacity and exposure beyond the immediate environment while at the same time allows him/her to appreciate age-long African values. The educated person becomes in truth African while at the same time open up to other cultures. The recipient of this education appreciates African values and imperative categories such as solidarity or *umunacra* in Igbo, hospitality and respect for elders. To achieve this Nnoruka (1998) pointedly argues that “the study of African values is important... because we find ourselves in a historical setting where vice is extolled at the expense of value...” (p.245). For instance, in traditional African setting leadership was for service. But today most of African leaders are self-centred and lacking in good governance.

The study of African values here implies a critical approach to the world view of African forebears, a revival of their values a renaissance approach to the study of values; knowledge of what values are. A highlight of the possible course content on the Igbo practices of solidarity as a value may be helpful here. The Igbo of

Southeastern Nigeria promote the quality of life of the individual and the community through solidarity. It is through solidarity that the actualisation of the possibilities of the individual person receives the opportunity to express his/her individuality, develops hi/her personality and fully becomes the kind of person he/she want to be. In this way, the community life progresses as well. Taylor (1999) affirms this fact when he writes that human persons can “only develop their characteristically human capacities in society. The claim is that living in society *with others* is a necessary condition of the development of rationality, in some sense of [...] becoming a fully responsible being” (p.190; emphasis original). Although Taylor (1999) used the word “society” which does not have the same meaning with African sense of community, his submission adds more force to the fact that solidarity and unity are inseparable aspect of Igbo social life and by extension African social life. It enriches the quality of African life and hence promotes happiness among members of the community.

The willingness and disposition to live together for purposes of sustainable development is a basic aspect of African social life. Ezekwonna (2005) gives a hermeneutic nexus between sustainable development and Africa within the contexts of education. He writes:

The individual remains part of the whole in his own complexity expressing the ultimate reality. He is placed in a given context which is the community where his reality is actualised. Whatever individuals do is done in the context of the community as a whole (p. 38).

Given the nexus between the individual and the community in Africa, the active participation of all improves the quality of life of the African. In this way, Africans are dictated by their society to be “viable, resilient, industrious, tenacious, achieving people, and experienced in ways of group life, including groups other than those of a kinship nature” (Carlston 1968: 210). In Africa, the individual cannot alienate himself/herself from community life.

From the context of the meaning of development education, Equiano (1967) gives a rich appreciation of African social education. He writes: “agriculture is our chief employment, and everyone, even the children and women, are engaged in it. Thus we are all habituated to labour from our earliest years. Everyone contributes something to the common stock, and as we are unacquainted with idleness we have no beggars” (Equiano 1967: 8). Equiano (1967) explains that solidarity is achieved in Africa as a result of hard work and cooperation on the part of every member of the community. In order that solidarity could promote the quality of life every member of the community must be active. The course content on solidarity should conclude by strongly emphasising the important point that solidarity is an inseparable aspect of African social life. It is the ingredient which gives flavour to African life.

Again, the content of the educational system under discourse should be general and at the same time particular. The general includes the various expression of African culture: myths, folklore, songs, proverbs, plays, symbols, artefacts and so on. The knowledge of them encourages critical thinking among people and elicits strong responses that may form basis for shared discussion. The particular enables the individual to undertake specific studies that appeal to him/her as a person. The history Africans study should not just end with general information. It should pay attention to particular history of one’s locality and kindred. This is very relevant based on the observation of Nnoruka (1998) that “there are some who pass out from universities as graduates without being able to explain the meaning of their family names; beyond their nuclear family, they know almost nothing about their kindred” (p. 247). Against this perspective of specific history, Stewart (1862) argues for the value of the study of history. He writes: “history is replete with instruction, and suggestive of duty. It takes the experience of others and offers it to ourselves, admonishing us to shun their virtues. No person can read a faithful history without advantage...” (p.1). For Stewart (1862) the merit of historical study is more than moral instruction.

The Guardian of Friday, May 22, 2015 confirms the point being made in favour of pre-colonial African education. The Newspaper reports about a Nigerian woman with no formal education but lectured at Harvard, and other top Universities. The woman's name is Nike Okundaye. Nike never went to school to study art. Vocational training in art was passed down to her by her great grandmother. "Watching her great grandmother in the art of *Adire* (a fabrics indigenous to the Yorubas in Nigeria) textile processing and helping her out, Nike walked up the line to become an expert in *Adire* making, dyeing, weaving, painting and embroidery" (*The Guardian*, Friday, May 22, 2015: 5). Nike is today a world acclaimed artist and textile designer. She brings vivid imagination as well as a wealth of history and African tradition into the production of *Adire*. Her works are celebrated in major capitals of the world, with her designs exhibited in countries like the USA, Belgium, Germany, Japan and Italy, to mention just a few. As an accomplished artist, Nike has taught in several universities in the US, imparting the knowledge of her traditional *Adire* designs in many students from across the world. Interestingly, all the education she had all the time was the traditional education that her parents pass onto their children, not the formal education one gets in a classroom. This is the practical and indigenous education that can guarantee sustainable development in Africa.

So far, it has been emphasised that the education that can guarantee African development is one that prepares the recipient to steadily assimilate cherished African value. Such a system of education cannot be lacking in focus. A product of such a system will be one properly formed as an authentic African person. However, the basic challenge here bothers on personal identity. The nature and nurture that play vital roles in the formation of personal identity are not the same in every environment. Be that as it may, for any person to be authentic there must be reflection of the past circumstances of birth, early childhood influences and other realities that shaped one's view of the world.

The issue of personal identity is quite difficult for the African considering the impasse that many African societies find

themselves. It is on the one hand the failure to recognise the identity and importance of every individual in society. There is often the problem of the gap between the rich and the poor, the education and non-education. The educated often arrogantly think that it is their exclusive right to determine the destiny of others. On the other hand, there are times in African society when you find “irrational adherence to some traditional ways of life. The principle is: ‘it has been so, so it is and so will it continue to be’ (Nnoruka 1998: 248). The rationale behind such ways of life, at times, is never critically evaluated and put in perspective. Through the indigenous education system, with focus on African development, as being advocated, some of these challenges would be improved through critical analyses.

The African social impasse requires a radical system of education, radical enough to give to African society the type of character that pragmatism gave to American society in the face of the unduly intellectual idealism that marked the 19th century (Ozmon and Craver 1981: 96). To achieve this, the course contents of African education should be a gradual pedagogical process which, if well carried out, makes the learner at each stage of learning more mature. The maturity will manifest in critical analysis and applications to the benefits of the greatest number. The end product is positive progress and recognition of the diversity among individuals and their circumstances of up-bringing.

The thesis of the chapter is that for education to contribute to African development, it must first appreciate indigenous values and contribution to the development of the African. The African developed through this process becomes a well-educated citizen of African continent. The well-informed African represents a high level of knowledge. His/her principal guide is the development of the continent. He/she is wise especially in respect of the choices being made, knowing that what is irrelevant today could be relevant tomorrow (Nnoruka 199: 249). Schutz (1962) explains that the opinions of well-educated are reasonably founded and verifiable in particular fields. The well-educated is perfectly qualified to make proper assessment of issues and situations. An African well-

information citizen is, therefore able to form a judgment concerning contradictory experts and make more or less well-founded decisions for one's own actions (p.351). Put another way, the educated African does not accept unreflectively any assertion. He or she appreciates the values inherent in African culture, accepts the inputs of others to the development of the continent. At the same time, the individual rejects as abnormal and false the assertion of outsiders telling the African stories

Conclusion

From the various submissions above, it is clear that only education matched with the spiritual and social realities of African society can bring about African development. Such education grows from the environment. The study claims that it is indigenous education system that is best suited in this context. The indigenous education stresses the importance of seeing one in relation to all the experiences he/she encounters in the environment, not just classroom experiences. Through the indigenous process of education, people are looked at in terms of cognitive, physical and emotional development. Other factors that serve to influence and shape lives are also considered as general and particular histories.

Also, the chapter submits that it is time African concepts and categories are used as media of instruction. At the start, there may be deficiencies, but Africans must be bold to make a start.

The chapter concludes that effects of sustainable development cannot be the same in all parts of Africa. For education of a people, it must take account of the specific values of the people. Therefore, for education to be a tool of sustainable development in Africa with focus on Nigeria, sufficient chance must be given to the individual to assimilate the fundamental African values. To this end, a well-educated African will be at home with his/her environment and with his/her own people. He/she through critical study of the values of the people rejects excesses and advocates the mean. It is, in the totality of these, that indigenous education can enhance sustainable development in all African countries.

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The Unsung Dimension of Great Zimbabwe National Monument: A critique

*Tapuwa Raymond Mubaya, Munyaradzi Mawere
& Joshua Chikozho*

Introduction

Several thousands of visitors from diverse backgrounds are flocking each year to Great Zimbabwe National Monument to witness the physical remains of an unparalleled and sophisticated indigenous civilisation that has stood the test of time. What seems to be hidden to many of these visitors is that there is more to Great Zimbabwe National Monument than what physically meets the eye. For the past centuries and decades scholars, particularly from the fields of archaeology and history, have long tangled and grappled with the conflicting historical narratives of the site as well the archaeology and authorship of the site (see for instance, Garlake 1975, 1982; Bent 1971). Many other heritage and archaeology scholars who have looked at heritage site have also grappled with religious dimension (Mawere, Mubaya & Sagiya 2012), symbolism and management of the site (Matenga 1998; Ndoro 2001; Pwiti & Chirikure 2008), and politics surrounding the site (Fontein 2006), among other such aspects. Insignificant attention has been given to try to understand and unpack the perceived intellect, skills and expertise or in other words, the indigenous knowledge systems (IKSs) that masterminded and propelled such self-imposing and impressive dry stone structures of enormous magnitude. We argue that the dry stone structures together with their associated earthen *dhaka* platforms alone without incorporating the unsung indigenous knowledge (IK) that were used to put up such magnificent structures have presented and will always present an incomplete

story of Great Zimbabwe National Monument. This probably explains why the burial site that was used by the people who resided at Great Zimbabwe during its occupational period still remains a puzzle to be resolved and so is the issue of waste management. This may also explain why the real identity of the people who constructed these unique gigantic ancient structures remains generalised if not overgeneralised.

On this note, we further argue that the Western-biased scientific approaches that have been used and continue to be used to conserve, interpret and present the site has outrightly failed to provide a complete picture of Great Zimbabwe National Monument as evidenced by existing gaps of information that if filled may greatly assist in illuminating a broader picture of the site.

That said, this chapter advances the argument that cultural heritage is not only about the material culture – the physical structures per se – but about the knowledge base (ideas, skills and associated expertise) that informed and conceived those structures. The chapter further advances the argument that if careful and meticulous ethnographic studies were carried out by the then early scholars with a view to ascertain some of the IK that were instrumental in the planning, construction and conservation of the monument, it would have been easier to close the afore-mentioned information gaps that remain a puzzle today. However, this could not be done as the early scholars to witness the majesty of Great Zimbabwe National Monument such as Carl Mauch and Theodore Bent, among several others, completely rejected the indigenous origins of the site. Sadly, several scholars – including the local ones – years later and even to date, followed the same erroneous approaches of interpreting the monument using borrowed Western-biased scientific lenses, regardless of the fact that some of them do not fit in context. These lenses have ultimately presented people with an incomplete story of Great Zimbabwe National Monument.

Basing on these observations, the central argument of this chapter is that the aforementioned informational gaps may be filled in by a careful study of the various IK of the people who have inhabited the Great Zimbabwe National Monument for years, the

majority of which are still operational and reflective on the existing physical structures. The chapter winds up by recommending that the true and full story of Great Zimbabwe monument is possible if and only if a critical analysis and evaluation of the diverse IK that influenced the construction, conservation and presentation of the monument before the advent of colonialism is done. Whilst we are aware that it is a difficulty undertaking to reconstruct an unknown past on the basis of the known present, we are advocating and arguing for a situation whereby people who are well grounded in the cosmology and ontology of African cultures solve these seemingly irresolvable heritage issues using African philosophical lenses and approaches that most suit their context. There is need for us as Africans to dig deeper into our cultural labyrinths and identify the different indigenous knowledges or epistemologies that our forebears used as their fonts and springboards of civilization. Hence, in the next section we problematise ‘indigenous knowledge system’ which was indeed the birthbed of great civilisations such as Great Zimbabwe National Monument. Thereafter, we examine the resilience of African heritage but with a focus on Great Zimbabwe National Monument.

Conceptualising Indigenous Knowledge

Indigenous knowledge (also known as local knowledge) refers to a complete body of knowledge, know-how and practices maintained and developed by peoples, generally in rural areas, who have extended histories of interaction with the natural environment (see for instance, Altieri 1995; Boven and Morohashi 2002; Mawere 2014b). These sets of understandings, interpretations and meanings are part of a cultural complex that encompasses language, naming and classification systems, practices for using resources, ritual, spirituality and worldview (Boven and Morohashi 2002; Mawere 2013). These knowledge sets, often referred to as traditional or indigenous knowledge, are the intangible heritage of numerous societies around the globe for there is no human society that doesn’t have its own specific knowledge form. They comprise the

understandings, ideas, skills, worldviews, and philosophies of a particular group of people that cuts across generations but in a way that interlinks and blurs the Cartesian dualistic divide between nature and culture, natural ecology and the social.

IKSs are phenomena quite pervasive in any human society the world over yet definitionally they have received different interpretations from scholars. Ocholla (2007: 2) perceives IK as “a complex set of knowledge and technologies existing and developed around specific conditions of populations and communities indigenous to a particular geographic area.”

For the World Bank (2004; Ellen and Harris 1996), indigenous knowledge implies a large body of knowledge and skills that have been developed outside the formal education system. Interestingly, indigenous knowledge is orally transmitted from one generation to the other through words of mouth, song, dance, rituals and practices. In some cases they are transmitted through imitation and demonstration. In the case of Great Zimbabwe, the rituals that were carried by the indigenous people as a way of conserving the monument (some of which were witnessed by Posselt (1924) who visited the monument in 1889) are considered as IK and so are the constructional styles and designs among a host of many others. In short, all the activities that exhibit the wisdom and ingenuity of the indigenous people of Zimbabwe are considered as indigenous knowledge systems.

For many other scholars (Odhianbo and Jahan 1990; Osunade 1992; Warren 1992), indigenous knowledge is the local knowledge, which has been institutionalised, built upon and passed from one generation to the next. Similarly, Mishra (1989) underscores that IK are built from and based on thousands of years of experience. What all these scholars say about indigenous knowledge entails that indigenous knowledge means one and the same thing. However, Ngwasiri (1995) cautions that the term ‘indigenous knowledge’ has no universally accepted definition. Rather, it has many descriptions such as local knowledge, location and culture specific knowledge, traditional knowledge and localised knowledge systems, which are unique to a particular society or ethnic group. In practical terms,

these are considered as the indigenous technologies developed by local community to solve particular problems taking into account all the local relevant factors. According to Boven and Morohashi (2002), an analysis of definitions such as those given above reveals that several interrelated aspects appear to be more or less specific to IK. Thus, IK is:

- Locally bound, indigenous to a specific area.
- Culture- and context-specific.
- Non-formal knowledge.
- Orally transmitted, and generally not documented.
- Dynamic and adaptive.
- Holistic in nature.
- Closely related to survival and subsistence for many people worldwide.

What remains clear in all the interpretations proffered above is that the system of IK in which the latter is part has always been used across cultures for various ends depending on the needs and aspirations of the society in question (Mawere 2013). This means that IK is quite enduring (but also dynamic) such that it has survived the test of time, adversities, and history. In view of this understanding, Mawere submits that IK can be understood as knowledge(s) form that is unique to a given culture or society generated as people interact with their environment, react to problems, and adapt to change through time. For Altieri (1995), IKs are knowledge forms that have failed to die despite the racial and colonial onslaughts that they have suffered at the hands of Western imperialism and arrogance. In view of the two aforementioned interpretations Mawere (2013) elaborates that IK as a form of knowledge has originated locally and naturally besides that it is intergenerational, that is, it is passed on to future generations in most cases orally by those who hold it.

In line with the above understanding, IK are, therefore, 'indigenous' because the meanings as well as the categories of sense making are deeply context-bound in so far as they are generated

internally within a cultural community and are/were produced through ‘indigenous’ thinking or exploration whether material, philosophical, religious or linguistic (Mawere 2013). Following this thinking, indigenous knowledge can also be understood in other terms as local knowledge (Nakashima *et al*, 2000; Kargbo 2005), traditional knowledge (IDRC), local technical knowledge, indigenous and traditional knowledge (Kawooya 2006), community knowledge and in some cases, even folkloric knowledge (Kargbo 2005).

Also important to note is the fact that recent studies have shown that leading international bodies such as the World Bank and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) have recognised the importance of IK in the discourse of sustainable development. For instance, James D. Wolfensohn, President of the World Bank, opines that, “indigenous knowledge is an integral part of the culture and history of a local community. We need to learn from local communities to enrich the development process” (Gorjestani 2000: 1). The United Nations Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon’s opening remarks at the General Assembly in New York in June 2013 also emphasised on the need to harness culture and all that it offers to foster and propel development in Africa; thus he says:

“Too many well-intended development programmes have failed because they did not take cultural settings into account [...] development has not always focused enough on people. To mobilise people, we need to understand and embrace their culture. This means encouraging dialogue, listening to individual voices, and ensuring that culture and human rights inform the new course for sustainable development” (see for instance, The National Culture Policy of Zimbabwe, 2015).

What Ban Ki-moon mean here is that one of the African people’s surest and effective ways of empowering people to take charge of their own projects and to improve their socio-economic status, self-sustaining livelihoods, and social cohesion while building

peace and unity with each other – now and in the future – is through respecting and seriously consider their culture and all it offers such as indigenous knowledge in whatever they do. Similarly, the World Conference on Science (Budapest 1999), organised by UNESCO and the International Council for Science (ICSU), brought the relationship between science and other systems of knowledge to the fore (ICSU 2002). The results of the Conference are embodied in two documents: the *Declaration on Science and the Use of Scientific Knowledge* and the *Science Agenda – Framework for Action*. Paragraph 26 of the *Declaration*, for instance, notes that: “traditional and local knowledge systems ... make and historically have made a valuable contribution to science and technology, and that there is a need to preserve, protect, research and promote this cultural heritage and empirical knowledge” (ICSU 2002). Apart from that, the introductory note to the *Science Agenda* describes in detail the nature of traditional knowledge and its significance for indigenous and traditional societies:

Traditional societies ... have nurtured and refined systems of knowledge of their own, relating to such diverse domains as astronomy, meteorology, geology, ecology, botany, agriculture, physiology, psychology and health. Such knowledge systems represent an enormous wealth. Not only do they harbour information as yet unknown to modern science, but they are also expressions of other ways of living in the world, other relationships between society and nature, and other approaches to the acquisition and construction of knowledge (ICSU 2002, paragraph 36).

To promote mutual partnership and inclusivity between and amongst all human actors and contributors to heritage around the world, the *Science Agenda* further recommends that special action be taken to conserve and cultivate this fragile and diverse heritage, in the face of globalisation and the growing dominance of a single view of the natural world as espoused by science. In addition, specific recommendations (paragraphs 85-87) are advanced to

sustain and support traditional knowledge and its transmission, including recognition of the vital contribution of women:

Governmental and non-governmental organisations should sustain traditional knowledge systems through active support to the societies that are keepers and developers of this knowledge, their ways of life, their languages, their social organisation and the environments in which they live, and fully recognise the contribution of women as repositories of a large part of traditional knowledge (ICSU 2002, paragraph 86).

Taking into account the preceding discussion, it is important to underline that African scholars have an obligation to promote investigations in this area of knowledge with the view to unravelling both the beauties and usefulness of indigenous knowledge even within modern times (see for instance, Dipholo and Biao 2013; Mawere 2015).

Heritage, resilience, and civilizations of societies

It is indubitable that every society across the world has a history behind its knowledge resources which guides its development process. As such, different communities have left physical traces of their varied activities as a result of their interaction with the environment in which they lived. More often than not, some of these traces are in the form of considerable structures like the pyramids of North Africa, the impressively constructed dry stone structures of Great Zimbabwe National Monument, the spectacular Graeco-Roman architectural monuments of Europe, and the amazing temples and gardens of Asia, among many others (see Ndoro 2001). Interestingly, some of these fascinating and amazing ancient traces of human development and achievements, still stand today as a clear testimony of a past unparalleled civilisation. These ancient remains despite displaying a high degree of craftsmanship and intellectual refinement have attracted the attention of people from diverse ideological persuasions. As an indication and reflection

of their importance, some of these spectacular monumental structures have been conserved and presented to the public as the heritage of mankind in many parts of the world.

Despite fostering identity and inculcating a sense of pride and belonging, the resilience of these ancient edifices continue to play a pivotal role in stimulating cultural tourism in their respective territories. In many other instances, the heritage sites have also acted (directly or otherwise) as fountains of livelihoods for the local populations living around the sites. Above all, the fact that these ancient relics have survived the test of time is a testimony to the good workmanship and prowess of those who built them. In southern Africa for instance, Great Zimbabwe National Monument, the case study adopted in this chapter, is one such good example that still stands as thumb-stamp and testimony to the genuine civilisation of the diverse groups of the people of ancient Africa. In fact, prior to colonialism, Africans in general and the indigenous people of Zimbabwe in particular had their own peculiar ways of knowing and confronting life issues and problems (Shizha 2013; Mawere 2012, 2014b, 2015). However, with the dawn of Western expansionism and imperialism into the interior of Africa, colonialism and its various appendages such as Western education and Christianity disrupted and purposefully despised and distorted the African indigenous ways of knowing. In fact, the colonists imposed Western categories of thought which they unfortunately mythologised and preached as objectifiable and universalisable.

Backed by racist theories of scholars such as Hume, Kant and Hegel and amplified by agents of imperial colonialism like explorers, missionaries and anthropologists, the Africans were presented as primitive and bereft of the capacity of rational thinking (Tosam 2014; Mawere 2012, 2014a). Consequently, any form of knowledge that did not conform to the Western models and ways of knowing was deemed pre-logical, unscientific, and unworthy of adopting for scholarly use. The continued denigration and sidelines of African-oriented epistemology in contemporary academic considerations in Africa is consequent from a long history of racial debasement of the humanity and rationality of Africans as well as

the historical Western superiority complex (Ani 2013). In the context of the colonial relationship between Africa and the West, African epistemology was degradingly deemed irrational and unscientific because it was allegedly opined to be muddled with emotions, religious beliefs, intuitions and myths (Hallen 2004; Laleye 2002; Mawere 2014a, b). The superiority complex of Western colonial powers meant that they were unwilling to find meaning in the ideas, values and systems that run athwart to theirs. The result of such repression, misrepresentations and misinterpretations is that, until now, Western interpreters as well as African analysts have been using categories and conceptual systems which depend on a Western epistemological order (Shizha 2013; Mundimbe 1988). This is exactly the situation that currently obtains around the research and scholarship on Great Zimbabwe National Monument. Sadly, some of the independent governments in Africa, and in particular the Zimbabwean government, has continued to encourage (though inadvertently) the decline of indigenous knowledge systems through the uninhibited importation of all forms of foreign technology without local inputs. This has generated over time, a culture of wholesomely imported technology which is intrinsically unviable within the culture and environment of the African society (see for instance, Akpomuvie 2013).

Yet despite the onslaught of Western hegemonic misrepresentation and superimposition of ideology at the detriment of African episteme, there are indeed some aspects of IK that remained resilient and refused to give in to the misleading dictates of the West. As Kigongo (2002: 5) rightly observes, although “European cultural and intellectual colonisation is a historical reality for Africa, it did not completely erode the sense of Africanity that was, in fact, the fundamental motivating factor of the independence struggle.” It is therefore important at this juncture to set the record straight that although Western science is considered as a means of knowledge acquisition in Africa, it does not account as the only valid and genuine means of knowledge acquisition as propagated by the Global North tradition. Notwithstanding its prominence in mainstream society, Western biased formal knowledge remains but

one knowledge system among many (Boven and Morohashi 2002). What this means is that knowledge includes but not limited to Western science (also known as formal knowledge) but includes other forms such as indigenous knowledge (what others would want to call informal knowledge). As Boven and Morohashi remind us acknowledging these ‘other ways of knowing’ leads to reconsideration of many fundamental notions about development, environmental conservation, heritage protection, and access to information and education (Boven and Morohashi 2002).

Unfortunately for the marginalised and once colonised societies of the world – the subaltern – , until recently, IK were overshadowed and subjugated by Western derived scientific thoughts. In sub-Saharan Africa as elsewhere, the dawn of colonisation brought in foreign knowledges, the so-called “scientific knowledge” that denigrated IK as unscientific, untried and untested for education and social development (Shizha 2010b). In this case, the dominant knowledge is/was frequently Western knowledge, which overpowered and dismissed the ‘other’s’ importance (Barua 2010). This has been the case given the platitude that in politics of knowledge production as in power politics it is those who have the power to dominate, subjugate, or colonise others whose knowledge becomes reified and universalised. The worldviews and perspectives of ‘others’ (those who are on the margin of the global village) are sidelined and vilified as ‘traditional’, ‘irrational’, ‘backward’ and ‘obsolete’ (Shizha 2009: 12). As Shizha further argues, the consequences of this is that rich traditions and culture which define things “African” are now playing second fiddle to the incursion of the globalised Euro-American culture. This is the reason why even today IK are undermined and undervalued in both education and development. On this note, we argue with Shizha (2011) that it is vital to decolonise and deglobalise the misconception of the superiority of Euro-American knowledge in order to debunk the belief that Western oriented knowledge is the only viable one.

In view of the above, we argue that Africa has never remained the same since her unequal encounter with the West who pretended to be on a “civilising mission” when in fact was on a terrorising and

colonising mission. Besides exploitation of resources in a bid to enrich themselves, the European colonialists demonised and distorted all the values of the African people to the detriment of the colonised. We further argue that the colonial experience in Zimbabwe as elsewhere on the continent left three broad legacies on Africa and the African people:

a). Self-denial: Africans were made to believe that their African identity was unworthy. This was inculcated in Africans through doctrines of assimilation (known as *assimilados* in the case of Africans in Portuguese colonies) and mimicry where Africans were ‘forced’ to despise their own values and imitate the European colonialists who believed themselves to be superior in all respects.

b). Cultural decadence: Africans were not only made to deny their own self-identity and worthy but to despise and castigate their cultures into oblivion. To achieve this, the European colonialists demonised all traditional ceremonies such as rain-petitioning ceremonies, castigating these as demonic and ungodly (see for instance Mawere 2014c).

c). Advancement of Western epistemology and thought: Through their education systems and Christian doctrines and values which were typically a representation of the Western world, European colonialists succeeded, to a larger extent, to dislodge African epistemologies and perspectives and substitute them with the Western ones. This latter legacy is the one that continues to haunts cultural heritage site such as Great Zimbabwe National Monument blurring the ‘actual’ picture of the site.

Against this backdrop and narrowing down to the heritage sector in Zimbabwe, it is important to note that heritage management has been seriously impacted and influenced by Western ideological principles to the extent that the indigenous systems that were employed to construct and conserve cultural heritage sites such as Great Zimbabwe National Monument have received insignificant attention from both scholars and researchers. Apart from that, the voices, concerns and aspirations of local communities with a stake in the day to day operations of the site are still not seriously considered owing to the continued use of

outdated and repressive legislation that is deeply rooted in colonial philosophy (see Chipunza 2005). It is sad to note that Western derived methods of conserving and preserving the monument such as demecs (which were introduced at a later stage to monitor the movement of dry stone walls) are still being used extensively in Zimbabwean heritage management despite their exorbitant prices and unavailability on the local and regional market. A genuine question that quickly pops up is: 'In the absence of these modern equipment what were the indigenous methods and epistemologies used to conserve the walls and the entire site?'

The fact that when Europeans arrived at Great Zimbabwe they marvelled at the splendour and majestic of the craftsman and workmanship of the edifice (see for instance, Garlake 1982; Bent 1971) shows beyond any reasonable doubt that the management and conservation systems that were used then were in synchrony and harmony with the use and presentation of the site. What is worrying, however, is that instead of building on the already existing conservation base that was tested and tried, the colonisers amazingly decided to invest their energy, time and resources in uprooting the indigenous conservation mechanisms and instead replaced and substituted them with their "scientific" ones. Moreover, instead of carrying out comprehensive research on the underlying skills and knowledge base which conceived such astonishing wonders, they started questioning the indigenous origins of the site. This was a way of diverting the attention of the people from the real issues at stake as well as a way of creating an opportune moment of looting gold and precious items that were stored at Great Zimbabwe National Monument in the name of proving the origins of the site which was apparently obvious, at least to the local indigenous communities. Such was the beginning of a hegemonic undertaking that gradually silenced and nailed to death the *genius oculus* of the site. The development of the site into a national monument in 1937 and its subsequent elevation on the World Heritage Site in 1986 exacerbates matters. In an endeavour to conform to the dictates and standards of the so-called international community, most of the indigenous conservation

measures were found to be unsuitable and unscientific hence, they were dropped down together with their underlying knowledge systems.

Yet a closer look at the monument reveals several IKSs which are concealed within the self-imposing dry stone structures. The masonry compounded by the architectural styles and designs that befits the walls speak volumes of the skills and creative genius of the minds of the people who constructed the monument. The identification and production of building materials (well-cut granites stones and dolerite rocks that were used as construction blocks and lintels on some of the entrances in the Hill Complex respectively, is one such an example. Again, the use of tambooti (a hardwood that can last for centuries and that is also believed to guard against witches at the western entrance of the Great Enclosure is another example. The indigenous skills of smelting iron, weaving cotton and curving soap stones and wood among many other skills are undeniable cases in point.

Suppression of IKSs and Indigenous Voices in the conservation of Great Zimbabwe Monument

In Zimbabwe, IK have been overshadowed and subjugated by colonial imperialism. Colonial knowledge in sub-Saharan Africa was based on subjugating and silencing African voices. The missionaries and their compatriots (the colonial governments) viewed African ways of knowing, their cosmology, their spirituality and their ontological existence as “barbaric,” “backward,” traditional and “unscientific” (see for instance Mawere 2010, 2011, 2012, 2014a,b; Shiza 2009) Africans were removed from knowledge conversations and their existential experiences and forced to assimilate a hegemonic foreign culture (Shizha 2013). As such, this study will be better appreciated when one takes cognizance of the fact that many symbols, rituals, customs, and traditions of central importance and significance in the indigenous psychologies and cosmologies of most African communities have been neglected, suppressed, and sometimes completely destroyed. Most of them have even been

denied the benefits of a critical analysis to determine their constructive values (Lauer 2007). The suppression and delegitimisation of African cultural values and value system have made the African people to lose confidence in their own culture including the capacity of the culture to address the continent's social, economic, political, moral, psychological, and developmental problems.

As a result of the bombardment and demonisation of indigenous knowledge forms, cultural heritage management in African and in other non-Western societies has mainly been concerned with the preservation and presentation of archaeological monuments primarily from a scientific point of view (Ndoro 2001). In Zimbabwe for instance, the emphasis has been on the preservation of spectacular monumental architectural places like Great Zimbabwe monument. Most efforts to preserve and present the archaeological heritage in Southern Africa suffer from a failure to fully understand the significance of the cultural heritage and its value to local communities (Ndoro 2001). Great Zimbabwe monument may be the most studied historic site in sub-Saharan Africa. For much of the time, however, Europeans were so obsessed with questions of origins and dating; that they paid little attention to the nature of the stone-building societies of which Great Zimbabwe is the pre-eminent exemplar. Similarly, indigenous Zimbabwean scholars who researched and wrote about Great Zimbabwe National Monument were also mainly concerned with issues pertaining to the history, politics, religious significance and management issues of the site. Unlike Mapungubwe, no lavish graves have been found. Theodore Bent, one of the Europeans to first arrive at Great Zimbabwe, searched hard for the burial sites but did not find any (see Bent 1892).

From the interviews carried out by Webber Ndoro on Great Zimbabwe, it came out that explicitly that the local communities around the monument does not appreciate the way the monument has been conserved and managed. The researches carried out by Joost Fontein (2006) on the same site yielded similar results. Ndoro (2001), for instance, noted that very little efforts have been made to

give them accesses to the monument or restore their pride in the history of Great Zimbabwe monument. Their alternative perceptions and histories of the monument have not been considered central to the survival of the cultural property. In most cases the local communities instead of being taken as partners are unfortunately taken as a major threat to the survival of the monument (Ndoro 2001). The empowering of local communities and the restoration of pride with the local heritage is a contentious issue in most parts of Southern Africa. If this were to happen then communities around heritage sites need to be involved in the conservation of sites in their locality. The involvement in such endeavours makes them feel proud and they see the need for the continued survival of the heritage places. Whilst conservation offers a chance for community involvement this is usually not done. The excuse is that this is a highly technical subject which is better left to technocrats who know better (Ndoro 2001). As a result, local communities feel isolated and detached from the monument.

We underline that surprisingly, although Great Zimbabwe has been a subject of intense scholarly debates and controversies ever since it was reported to the outside world by Carl Mauch in 1871, very little has been said about the perceived IK that should be unveiled and explicated to complete the story of Great Zimbabwe National Monument. Prior to the advent of the Europeans and Arabs in Zimbabwe, remarkable indigenous technological innovations were made by the indigenous people of Zimbabwe in traditional iron smelting, stone and wood curving, cloth weaving, pottery as well as the conservation of dry stone walls (see also Akpomuvie 2013). With the advent of European settlers, most of the indigenous techniques involved in these processes were however, either disoriented or discontinued but were well suited to the environment and culture of the people (Okpoko and Ezeadichie 1999). Below is a list of some of the unsung IK and the role that they have played in sustaining not only the people who constructed Great Zimbabwe National Monument but even the contemporary societies living around the vicinity of the monument.

a) Pot making/Pottery

Ceramic pots have occupied a very crucial position in the socio-cultural life of the Shona people of Zimbabwe since time immemorial. These pots were and are still being used for a range of social activities hence they were specifically designed to cater for multiple purposes. Some of the pots were used for preparing relish and *sadzwa*. Others were used for storing water and beer (see Ranger 1967) while more others were used for rituals among a host of other social activities. Taking into account the Shona's sense of beauty and aesthetics as reflected on some of the striking styles and designs on dry stone walls and ceramic remains, the idea that some of the pots may have been used for decoration purposes cannot be ruled out. To this end, some of the designs and patterns had symbolic meanings. Important to note is the fact that this industry of ceramic pot making was, and still is, a female dominated discipline (Ranger 1967). What is also crucial to note are the indigenous skills and technologies which were employed in moulding and polishing the pots. Besides, the selection of the soil suitable for moulding the pots is not only worth noting but clearly shows that the indigenous peoples had significant knowledge of the environment. A certain unique type of soil known as *dongo* or *rondo* in Shona was used. The firing techniques as well as the construction of pottery kilns to ensure a constant supply of heat as well as the ability to identify the ideal soil leaves a lot to be desired. While some scholars such as Huffman (1980), Matenga and Lindal (1995), Lindal and Pikirayi (2010), and Nyamushosho (2013) have devoted their energy to the study of ceramics, their focus was mainly on the types and chronology of ceramics. Thus, little has been researched towards the perceived indigenous skills that were used in moulding the pots themselves. These indigenous skills have been passed down from one generation to the other as part of the Zimbabwean heritage. Today, local communities living around Great Zimbabwe National Monument are tapping into the indigenous knowledge of pot making thereby earning a living out this thriving industry. We therefore argue that the life of the Shona and other Zimbabwean ethnic groups before 1890 were not a haphazard affair, but a well-

organised system with a set of political and socio-economic goals and practices. It also shows a people with definite traditions and artistic tastes as exemplified by their pottery and sculpture of figurines (Gelfand 1979). In short, such heritage legacies anchored in indigenous knowledge and should be conserved so that upcoming generations may also benefit from these skills. Failure to do this will mean that these indigenous traces of the past will be obliterated thereby severing the link between the past and present and completely alienating the future.

b) Stone and wood curving

The Soapstone Birds discovered at Great Zimbabwe National Monument occupy a privileged space in the history of the site. Indeed, they are Zimbabwe's most precious works of art to have been found in an archaeological context (see Matenga 2011). The birds were carved from micaceous schist (soapstone) on the tops of monoliths the height of a person (Garlake 2002). Despite gaining considerable international attention, the birds play an intermediary religious role in the spiritual functioning of the Great Zimbabwe State. Apart from Great Zimbabwe itself, nothing has been invested with as much national symbolic sentiment as these birds. They have become an intricate part of the spiritual and historical basis of the state of Zimbabwe (see Matenga 1998). Notwithstanding their religious value, Zimbabwe upon attaining independence in 1980 adopted one of the birds as a national emblem. Images of birds feature on the national flag, coat of arms, the currency, as well as numerous public and private company logos. The fact that one of the birds was taken to South Africa by Cecil John Rhodes speaks volumes of the underlying indigenous skills which produced sculptures with an exceptionally high degree of craftsmanship and workmanship. What is interesting is that of the few scholars, who studied these birds, their focus was largely on the symbolism of the birds and again insignificant effort was directed to the indigenous ideas and skills which made the production of these birds possible.

c) Iron smelting

In sub-Saharan Africa, iron is the first metal to appear in the archaeological record. Iron working consists of two main stages namely: smelting and smithing. In its natural state, iron ore is embedded in rocks and sand (Njoku 2002). Smelting, therefore, is the process of extracting the ore from its matrix, what is generally known as the iron ore. Smithing on the other hand, is the process whereby the extracted ore or more specifically, the bloom, is converted into items for human use such as knives, hoes, spears, pots, etc. (Njoku 2002). Njoku went further asserting that both smelting and smithing were carried out in a series of stages, each of which was accompanied by elaborate religious rituals. It is vital to note that the Karanga people of Zimbabwe were both adept mining practitioners and skilled metal workers. For instance, Shona iron workers modelled their furnaces in form of a fertile woman, with breasts and scarifications to indicate and activate her fertility, and sometimes with a waist belt to strengthen her sexuality and guard her fertility (Dewey 1990). The shape and decoration of the furnaces may provide evidence of a conceptual association between smelting and rites of passage such as marriage, gestation, and birth in many African ethnic groups. Dewey's research among Shona artisans (1985; 1986) shows that the ancestral spirits strongly influenced iron smithing. Many of his informants claimed that they received their knowledge of smithing through spirit possession or spirit-inspired dreams. The spirits provided the craftsmen with "the power and impetus to create" (Dewey 1986: 54). The products of creation by smelting and smithing included hoes essential to agriculture and to the acquisition of wives through bride wealth transactions. Iron working was therefore linked to success in agriculture and human reproduction – activities that were all controlled by the ancestors according to African cosmology. The indigenous skills of iron smelting are gradually dying and the few people with the indigenous knowledge are dying without passing on the knowledge to their siblings.

d) Construction of dry stone walls

Dry stone construction is an ancient building technique. Dry stone walls are constructed from carefully positioned interlocking stones placed on top of each other without the use of mortar. Considering the fact that Great Zimbabwe National Monument is the core and centre of Zimbabwe's culture, social organisation was informed and guided by IK. In fact, the planning and setting out of the whole site was greatly informed by IK. The construction of walls with broad bases that tapers as the wall increases in height is one of the indigenous knowledge that was used in constructing the walls. This is evident at the Great Enclosure where the base of the wall is approximately six meters in diameter. Add to that, the construction of round structures with some drainage holes highly exhibit the shrewdness of the builders. Round structures despite being strong have an advantage of deflecting wind easily. Still on construction, the use of durawalls was also a way of ensuring security as well as partitioning the use of place among the dwellers. By and large, the construction of stones on top of stones without the use of any binding material known as dry bonding is a unique product of IK that was deployed during the construction of Great Zimbabwe National Monument. The dry stone structures despite surviving for centuries have remained intact in the face of some tremors that were experienced in the country during the course of this decade. The constructions were so sophisticated that many 19th century colonialists were arrogant enough to think that Africans were incapable of building such an intricate set of structures, or to organise such a complex social system as a great city, and claimed that it was built by a lost 'white tribe'.

The indigenous pole and dagga inserted grass thatched huts which were constructed inside the enclosures where the royal families resided are unquestionably a remarkably robust product of the indigenous knowledge system of the people of Zimbabwe in particular and the Bantu speaking people of Southern Africa in general. This resonates with Rapoport's observations in South Africa. Rapoport (1969), who carried out study of indigenous architecture in the construction of huts in South Africa argues that

socio-cultural factors determine the form of indigenous buildings, and that climate, materials, construction and technology are modifying factors.

Some of the indigenous knowledge used at ancient Great Zimbabwe National Monument included, but not limited to the spinning and weaving of cotton. Unfortunately these could not survive the archaeological record and test of time due to the nature of the material that were used but there is evidence that such activities were being carried out at Great Zimbabwe at a considerable scale.

Conclusion

The discussion has shown that the full story of Great Zimbabwe monument is yet to be told as the current one is mired in controversies and misrepresentations propagated during and even before imperial colonialism by explorers, missionaries and researchers. The conservation and management systems used at the site should include indigenous knowledge of the local communities which is a critical factor for sustainable development. Bringing on board indigenous knowledge will also empower the local communities who are currently out of the management equation, besides providing us with a wholesome picture of the monument. Thus, there is need for heritage managers at Great Zimbabwe monument to decolonise their minds from Western objectifications and universalisations by appreciating their indigenous knowledges, skills, and values systems. To consolidate and propagate these indigenous knowledge systems, there is need to step out of the Western epistemic conservation paradigms and dependencies to acknowledge that African-oriented epistemology and indigenous knowledge are vital, valuable and worthy of considering. This will go a long way in conscientising African people, researchers and scholars alike to, while not despising other forms of knowledge, appreciate and value their indigenous knowledge fronts which for a long time have suffered subjugation and delegitimisation by colonialistic systems and Eurocentric scholarship.

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Youths and Ethno-Religious Conflicts in Sino-Nigerian Countries: A Comparative and Transformative Approach

Lemuel Ekedegwa Odeh

Introduction

Ethno-religious conflict is one of the most recurring phenomena in Sino-Nigeria countries, while the youths occupy the productive segment of the society. The youths characterised with energy and vigour are always at the forefront of most the ethno-religious conflicts. Thus, the youth upsurge has continued to serve as a bane bedevilling the political and bi-lateral edifices of these countries. Ethno-religious problem has retarded effective nation building process and viable equal development. The problem has also resulted in high level of poverty situations in the northern parts of Nigeria and retarded economic growth and development in this region in comparison to other parts of Nigeria. This chapter reveals that minority problems in terms of marginalisation, ethnicity, religion as well as unequal development are the major causes of this snag. The chapter takes a historic-structural, analytical and comparative approach to examine the Sino-Nigeria ethno-religious conflicts. To this end, this chapter postulates that religion remains the domineering factor that propels this dismay. The chapter, however, concludes that rule of law coupled with bilateral peace processes are the needed measures to manage this scourge while creating an enabling atmosphere that will ensure sustainable economic growth and eradicate poverty from the populace.

China and Nigeria have certain similarities, namely both countries had independence on 1st October, one in 1949, while the other was in 1960. Both countries have the largest population

within their respective continents. China for instance is the most populous country in Asia, with four out of every Asian being Chinese, while Nigeria on the one hand has the largest population in Africa and it is believed that out of every ten African people in the world one is a Nigerian. Both countries also have the largest economies within their sub-continent. In the same vain, both countries are also prone to ethno-religious disturbances across different states of their country. These ethno-religious conflicts have assumed various coloration and dimensions which have often threatened their corporate existence. The youths also form the vanguard of these conflicts and more often than not are at the receiving end suffering more in terms of physical, psychological and economic deprivation amongst others. This chapter therefore look at some of the causes of this ethno-religious conflicts in China with particular reference to the Xinjiang Province where the conflicts seem more prevalent and Nigeria where the conflicts has completely eroded public thrust on governance. Religion is a force to be reckoned with universally because of her dogmas. Globally in countries like Nigeria, Libya, Syria and China it has caused a lot of havoc to humanity. These havocs are caused by religious adherents. In the name of religion, many have been mired, killed, oppressed, lynched, rendered homeless as well as uprisings of ethno religious conflicts which have been necessitated as a result of *“false doctrinal belief.”*

By way of definition, Religion “is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world, and the soul of soulless conditions. It is the opium of the people.” As opined by Marx. As far as Marx is concerned man made religion, religion did not make man therefore he asserted further that “the abolition of religion as the illusory happiness of what is this and where is it coming from?

*****people is the demand for their real happiness” In simple logic reasoning religion controls the soul of man in the way opium addiction controls the soul of the addict

The issue of Sufism as well as hidden beliefs have greatly contributed to religious uprising universally. The term religion is such a complex one that agreeing with one meaning is quite

difficult. Scholars like Taylor (2005) define religion “as a belief in spiritual beings”. This central issue here is that Spirituality is far more inclusive than the term religion, because it more encompassing to individuals who do not affiliate with any particular religious organization such as a church, synagogue, temple, or mosque, however it is also an integral component of any religion in principle. Frazer (1990) on his part defines it thus “religion is the prostration or conciliation of powers superior to man, which are believed to direct and control the cause and nature and human life.” This is anchored on the Totemism and Exogamy which he further examined as that totemism is both “a religion and a form of kinship classification that identifies individuals and groups as descendants of some common ancestor in mythic times.”

Religion however, has to do with a particular religion. Thus we have religious beliefs, faith domination, religious education and religious instruction. Odeh (2007) on the other hand, has further defined it as a system of beliefs, rituals and practise or a code of moral conduct involving the recognition by man of superhuman power which is entitled to obedience, reverence and worship.

According to Mafeje (1997) religion is an ideologically loaded concept which is not a natural outcome of ethnic existence but it is a class interest, driven phenomenon. Conversely, Egwu (2001) opined that ethnicity is all about mobilization and politicisation of ethnic group identify drawing on those elements that mark out the group such as language, culture, territory, mode of dressing and sharing jokes. The bottom-line of this argument is that in Nigeria most issues both of national and state are seen from both ethnic and religious perceptive so much so that it becomes very difficult sometimes separating the one from the other or what causes which conflict.

Religion as defined by the English Dictionary, is “Belief in a divine or super human power or powers to be obeyed and worshipped as the creator and ruler of the universe or any specific system of belief and worship often involving a code of ethics and resembling suggestive, or likened to such a system of humanism as a religion.” From the above expression, the important word is

“belief” in a particular creator, being or object. Ojoku in his book titled *West African Traditional Religion*, stated that, religion binds man to the unseen power and helps him form right relation with these non-human power; it also binds him to his fellow human beings.

At this juncture it becomes imperative to understand the meaning of ethno-religious. When we talk of ethnicity and religion, we mean ethno-religion. However, it is highly demanding to equally understand the meaning of conflicts. According to Henry George *et al*, (2014) crisis is any event that is or is expected to lead to an unstable and dangerous situation affecting an individual, group, community, or whole society. Conflicts are deemed to be the negative changes in the security, economic, political, societal or environmental affairs, especially when they occur abruptly, with little or no warning. More loosely, crisis on the one hand is a term meaning “a testing time” or an “emergency event”. Having understood the meaning of ethnicity, religion and crisis, it becomes pertinent to define ethno-religious crisis.

Ethno-religious conflicts means a situation in which the relationship between member of one ethnic or religious group and another (such group in a multi ethnic and multi religious society) is characterised by lack of cordiality and mutual understanding driven by suspicious fear and a tendency towards confrontation.

This chapter adopts a comparative analysis of ethno-religious crisis in Sino-Nigerian countries, using a comparative and transformation approach, it is imperative to discuss the causes of ethno-religious crises in these countries (Nigeria and China). Religiosity, ethnic differences, economic marginalisation, minority domination by the majority, colonial legacy, uneven mineral resources, ideological differences, government policies among others were responsible for the ugly situation in both countries under discuss.

However, the thrust of the chapter discuss the origin of ethno-religious crisis in China and Nigeria and also look at some mechanisms towards transformative process in Sino-Nigeria ethno religious conflict. There are many religions in the world but for the

purpose of this chapter the argument shall be persevered around the two popular ones in Nigeria, Islam and Christianity

Origin of Ethno-Religious Conflicts in Nigeria and China

Ethno-Religious Crisis in Nigeria

There is no gain saying that ethno-religious conflicts have been a re-current issue on the political edifice of Nigeria. The genesis of this phenomenon could be traced to the colonial period when the diverse multi-ethnic, multi-religious and multi-lingua separate people were amalgamated to form a single nation baptized 'Nigeria'. This in-turn has led to various conflicts arising from trust problems, fear, domination as well as religious differences. Notable amongst some of these conflicts was the 1964 national census conflicts, with West accusing the North of inflating their population figures, equally was ethnic marginalisation in terms of appointments and promotion in the nation's civil service. All these brought about distrust and suspicion which finally gave vent to ethnic conflict in 1966.

Indeed, religion plays an important role in the ethno-religious crisis in Nigeria. According to Odeh, (2007) 'religion is sensitive, powerful, contensive with life and controlling influence in human has been used to mar rather than make our nation Nigeria. Thus, religious faithful commit various violent crimes and acts in the name of their 'god' by slaughtering innocent souls and destroying property as observed Alamu (2012).

As a matter of fact, it is no longer news that religious violence in Nigeria is a volatile mix of high politics and arguably therefore, political anarchists use it to inflame passions, fiasco, aspersion and maiming. In the words of Alamu (2010) making religion an arm race and a lunch pad for expressing political grievances.

Over the years, Christianity and Islam have led to both physical and ideological conflicts which have altered the nation building process of Nigeria. Nigeria after independence and shortly after the civil war which most Easterners saw religious and ethnic colouration have described as one factor that is robbing the nation

of internal cohesion, and largely responsible for the absence of nation building process. Religion and ethnicity have been used by political leaders to canvass and gain support from their adherents. As the former president of Nigeria Obasanjo (2004) remarked: “there are permanent interest groups that have decided to undermine the state, ignore the rule of law and due process and use religion as a cover to perpetuate uncouth and clearly unreligious action. In fact people now appear to have absolutely no respect for the sanctity of human life.”

Poverty has also been considered one of the major causes of ethno-religious crisis in Nigeria, despite the abundant minerals and human resources bequeathed to Nigeria, it would seem that the country still continued to wallow in the pool of uncertainty, political instability, poor GDP (gross domestic product) and the standard of living and human development. According to Omorogbe and Omolian (2005), the frequent occurrence of ethno-religious crisis in Nigeria has therefore, been attributed to the level of poverty in the country. Ibrahim (2008) also carried out a research on causes of ethno-religious conflicts in Kano state, a northern state in Nigeria and discovered that poor economic base of the populace carried the highest percentage of 34.8%, while religious fundamentalism followed with 31.8%.

Another factor responsible for fuelling ethno-religious crisis in Nigeria is the wrong interpretation of the scriptures by those who claim authority to do. If not so, one would wonder why people act contrary to the teaching of the scripture in matters pertaining to peaceful co-existence, unity and sanctity of life, and property. It is a truism that for an ignorant person to claim authority to knowledge. Many of the ‘religious leaders’ are known to use their shallow knowledge to interpret the scripture to suit their selfish end, exploring and capitulating on the ignorance of their followers.

More so, sectarian jingoism, false doctrinal belief, proliferation of sects in both religions, (Islam and Christianity), as well as excessive patriotism to one’s religious sect, which consequently transformed to fanatics. An example is the Boko Haram terrorist

group which has plagued the peaceful co-existence and political stability of Nigeria.

In addition, economic marginalisation of some ethnic groups is another contributing factor to the rise of ethno-religious conflict in Nigeria. A good example is the reaction of the Ijaws and Ogonis in the Niger Delta Region against the exploitation of the multinational oil companies in their areas with little compensation for the environmental degradation of the area. Also is the plight and agitations of Nigerians in diaspora. Nigerians living in other areas of the country who are not allowed equal participation in the realm of economic and political affairs also served as a snag to this situation.

Moreover, refugee problems and porosity of the Nigerian borders has given room for illegal dangerous immigrants to make in road into the Nigerian environment, hence, perpetuating various ethno-religious ills in the country. An example is the Maitatsine of the 1980's as asserted by Albert (2005). Foreign influence and support from some religious sects all round the world is also a factor contributing to ethno-religious conflict in Nigeria. This is evident in the support gained by Boko Haram from external countries.

The *Guardian Newspaper* of 16th August 2009, while reporting on the Amnesty offer from the Federal Government of Nigeria gave the reason for the Niger-Delta militant struggle as economic, as they had taken up arms to gain greater share of the country's oil wealth which had ravaged their productive and economic system through oil spillage according to Rice (2009). In Nigeria today one of the reasons adduced by the Boko Haram militant for its menace was the death of its leader, Mohammed Yusuf in 2009. The way and manner of his death, was seen as a direct attack on their image as a group as aptly captured by Henrik (2012). They had up till 2009 remained relatively peaceful and typically criticized northern Muslims for participating in what they call a non-Islamic and illegitimate state. Therefore, the near absence of the machinery to protect and defend the basic human rights of a group of people such as the cases above could lead to militancy and general social disorder.

Causes of Ethno-Religious Crisis in Xinjiang, China

China is a conglomeration of ethnic groups and races with different political, economic, religion, linguistics, education, psychological and other socio-cultural differences. The complexity of multi-culturalism is a fundamental factor propelling ethno-religious conflicts in Xinjiang Province of China as opined by Hasamath (2014). Some surveillance procedures are known to place constraints which are potentially threatening to social stability. This view as captured by Ham (2014) can be categorically stated in three perspective via-a-via, socio-political, economic as well as ethno-religious factors

Some of the causes of ethno-religious conflict in Xinxiang, China could be adduced here. Ethno-religious conflict in Xinxiang evolved as a result of various factors ranging from ethno-cultural repression on the part of the CPC (Communist Party of China), unequal economic advantage, unfavourable working condition and the economic gap between the two dominant group in the region via; the Han Chinese and the Uyghur.

As a matter of fact, ethno-religious conflict had been on the rise in Xinxiang from the earliest time. The 21st century has witnessed several ethno-religious violence in Xinxiang Province which has claimed many lives as well as the destruction of property and government buildings. One of these was on July 8 2011 when the Uyghur and Han Chinese ethnic groups had violent clashes. Another incidence was the attack on a police station in Hotan, Xinxiang which left no fewer than 20 people killed according to Lim (2011). Just like the scenario of ethno-religious conflicts in Nigeria, the above factors ethnic rivalry between Uyghur and Han groups have proved more inimical to the peaceful co-existence and unity among the Uyghur Chinese and the Hans. Indeed, ethnic violence has been on the rise in Xinxiang Uyghur autonomous region (XUAR) in recent years as observed by Hasamath (2014). The main actors of violence are the youths who are always used as the vanguard of the conflicts.

Ethno-cultural repressive policies of the state that limit religious practises have proved to be one of the major factors causing the

rise and continuous re-occurrence of ethnic violence in Xinxiang. As observed by Hasamath, (2014) ethno-cultural measures in the areas of religion, cultural practices language are some of the reason propelling the rise of ethnic tension and violence in Xinxiang, China. The phasing of Uyghur language instruction in schools has been seen as favouring one ethnic group over the other. Chinese authorities in Xinxiang have slowly phased out the use of ethnic minority languages as the primary mode of instruction in the majority of schools leaving Mandarin Chinese being the dominant language of instruction in schools. This idea has been seen as hostile degrading the interests of the minorities in this area. This can be seen from the perception of scholars like Fox and Gladney.

Indeed, another vivid factor is the lack of equal representation. Uyghur's are not being equally represented unlike their counterpart Hans. Chinese authorities see Uyghur's as minorities while the Hans were regarded by the Chinese authorities as majority, modern and united. This has greatly affected preferential policies in the socio, political and economic ramification in Xinxiang.

Also, in the labour factor as well there are social disparities, in the labour market, the Hans dominate high status and earn higher wages. Jobs which the Uyghur do not receive in return were given to the Hans. Despite having equal educational qualification, in some cases, the Uyghur Chinese are being marginalised in the area of equal access and opportunities in favour of their Han counterparts. This sectorial and unequal distribution in occupational parlance had been contributing to the reinforcement of ethno-cultural violence in Xinxiang. Social factors on the other hand have also contributed immensely to the continued ethnic violence in Xinxiang. Simply put, the Hans earn more than the Uyghur. The Hans are over represented in high status and high paying occupations and on the part of the Uyghur, the reverse is the case. This has greatly affected social stratification class between two groups in Xinxiang.

It must be further pointed out that settlement pattern between the Hans and the Uyghur Chinese is another contributing factor to the rise of ethnic conflicts in Xinxiang, China. Since the establishment of XUAR in October 1955, the Communist Party of

China has instituted a lot of programs (resettlement) which seems to have favoured the Hans. One of such is the integration of non-Han population into China. This had greatly helped the Han population to supersede that of the Uyghur's.

The Hans have been favoured by the government to settle in urban areas through its various settlement policies. Thus, has restricted the Uyghur Chinese to settle in poorer urban areas of southern Xinxiang. This idea was also opined by Hasamath, and he further observed, that officially, 80.8% of Uyghur's reside in rural areas, in comparison to 46.4% for Hans. That equally well, 9.0 and 0.1% of Uyghur live in the town and city with a corresponding figure of 13.0 and 40.6% for the Han population. Between 1991 and 2011, Han presence in Xinxiang's urban areas increased at a positive rate of about 1.78% with the corresponding rate for Uyghur at 0.07%. This settlement pattern shows a form of internal colonisation he observed.

More so, unequal access to economic opportunities also becomes one of the major factors degenerating to ethnic violence in Xinxiang. Economically, the Uyghur's have difficulties in obtaining or getting highly paid wage jobs and high status in the labour market. Research revealed that the Hans have more advantage than the Uyghur's in the areas of job placement and wages remuneration in Xinxiang, China. Most top government offices are dominated by the Han Chinese, hence, making it possible for the Hans to have superior treatment over the Uyghur Chinese.

Interestingly, the state response is another major factor causing ethno religious violence in Xinxiang, China. This is evident in the various government soft and hard policies to curb this menace. The state had done this through the intimidation of some religious leaders who had been threatened and tried for advocating Islamic fundamentalism and fanaticism. The state also confined and reduced the connection to form Islamic solidarity among the Muslims in China through their various hard policies. Ilham Tohti, (2014) a Uyghur academic was apprehended and imprisoned in Xinxiang. Ilham Tohti is a Uyghur economist serving a life sentence in China, on separatism-related charges. He is known for his

research on Uyghur-Han relations and is a vocal for his criticism of the Chinese government's policies toward Uyghurs in Xinjiang.

Understandably speaking, Uyghurs in both Xinxiang and across the nation in China are been targeted and put under government surveillance by the state authorities. State authorities had painted ethnic violence in Xinxiang China as religious terrorism. The state media have suggested that overseas extremist influence from such terrorist organisations like ISIS, Al-Qaeda among others were responsible for the rise of this ethnic snag according to Dilxat Rexit. (2015)

At this juncture, it needs to be stressed that the state also embarked on some other soft policies, even though, they have not all been able to proffer a lasting solution to ethno-religious crisis in Xinxiang China. These asserted by Guo-Ming Chen et al (1996) are funding, building and maintenance of mosques by the government, preferential policies in education as well as giving favourable access and equality in the area of educational pursuance for the minorities in Xinxiang.

Recently in the last Ramadan of this year, the government of China as reported in the *Guardian Newspaper* placed a ban on Muslims during the month of Ramadan claiming that the practice tended to bring about terrorism, similarly government went further to place ban as indicated thus; “according to the Food and Drug Administration in Xinjiang’s Jinghe county. “China’s goal in prohibiting fasting is to forcibly move Uighurs away from their Muslim culture during Ramadan,” this according to Dilxat Rexit, (2015) a spokesman for the exiled World Uyghur Congress. “Policies that prohibit religious fasting is a provocation and will only lead to instability and conflict.” He further opined that some of these policies gave vent to instability and conflict within the area

As opined by Rexit, (2015) the Communist Party of China is seen as an atheist organisation, hence, party members who happened to be government workers who happened to be government workers are being subjected to some religious repressions in the areas of participation, worship and practices. This includes the story of religious text, repressive measure on religious

attires as well as obligations. The overall effects of state policies on minority ethnic groups has proved inimical and endemic to the re-occurrence ethno-religious violence in Xinjiang, China.

The various causes of ethno-religious conflicts in Nigeria are multi-dimensional, just like the case of China. Many factors have been identified by Ideyi, (2008) which includes selfishness, greed, injustice, poverty, do-or-die politics, and avarice, accumulation of wealth, revolt, repression, immorality and ignorance.

A Comparative Approach to Sino-Nigeria Ethno-Religious Conflicts

Comparatively, economic and social parties, is one of the fundamental factors causing ethno-religious conflicts in Sino-Nigeria countries. For example, Nigeria as a nation is made up of three major tribal groups, viz: Hausa, Igbo and Yoruba. Anytime, any-day, Nigerian president comes from any of these 3 dominant tribes. The issue of marginalisation is always paramount. Since the attainment of independence in 1960, Hausa's have dominated political economy power. Other tribes since then, has been crying of been marginalised in this realm.

Secondly, religion has equally remained a factor to reckon with in Sino-Nigeria countries in the promotion of ethno-religious crisis. False *doctrina* belief has been greatly exhibited in these countries. For example, in China, it has led to such strenuous policies by the Chinese government to banish some religious practices in Xinjiang such as phasing out of Joppa cap by the males, banning of women from wearing hijabs and other coverings, and instruction of mosque, temples, and shrines to allow peace to reign in China.

Likewise in Nigeria, government hard and soft policies have been promoted to arrest ethno-religious conflicts. Conversely, the physiognomy and anatomy of Sino-Nigerian political edifices is such that it is characterised of multi-ethnic, religious, multi-lingua and multi-cultural differences. This factor has propelled various ethno-religious conflicts in Nigeria like the Kaduna and Jos ethno-

religious conflicts in Nigeria and the re-occurrence of ethno-religious violence in Xinjiang, China.

Lastly, interpretation of religious texts greatly accounted for the eruption of ethno-religious conflicts in Sino-Nigerian countries. This could be vividly seen in the various acts of some religious leaders who have indulged themselves in discrediting other people's belief.

In China, to arrest the problems caused by ethno-religious conflicts Chinese government have promoted a lot of soft and hard state policies. Such soft policy includes the various needs of some religious practises which had been mentioned earlier. Likewise in Nigeria, government have done a lot in arresting the scourge. This includes the introduction of the zoning system (rotational presidency), establishment of federal character commission convenience of sovereign national conferences, improvement of quota system, establishment of federal ministry of Niger Delta as well as NDDC (Niger Delta Development Commission).

All these are some of the parameters used by the federal government to arrest the continuous uprisings of ethno religious conflicts in Nigeria. In a small extent various hard and soft state policies promulgated by the Sino-Nigerian government to put an end to ethno-religious conflicts were achieved. To a very large extent, some of the policies have not achieved their aims and objectives of promulgating state policies. The order is still the same. Issues of marginalisation still remained in Sino-Nigerian political systems, socio-economic disparities as well as religiosity are still at stake.

Conclusion

The issue of ethno-religious crisis still prevalent in Sino-Nigerian countries upon all the measures put in place by government, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO), civil liberty organisations to put an end to this scourge, still seem not to be enough to solve the problems. However, the following recommendations were made.

- Establishment of federal ministry of minorities in Sino-Nigerian countries. By this, minority problems ranging from employment, appointments, electioneering, admission quota systems and others will be solved amicably. The ministry will be empowered to take care of minority questions in all ramifications. This to a very large extent would create an harmonious environment from the domination of the majority by the minorities.

- Destructions of the strong holds of false doctrina beliefs. By this, the issue of condemning a particular religion apart from one's religion will be greatly arrested.

- Re-drawing, re-mapping, re-structuring and re-merging of tribes with a common political, economic, cultural similarities to form a state.

- There should be promotion of comparative law of advantage. That is, using the available resources in a state to develop its economy. This would in turn reduce the over dependency of states in the federal allocation which is one of the propelling factors of ethno religious crises in Sino-Nigerian countries. Borne out of the fact that one of the major causes of ethno-religious crisis in Sino-Nigerian countries is resource control. This means that, who is going to be in charge of the national resources or national cake.

- Also going by the research of Xinjiang conflict by Ching Mun Rosalyn Lim (2011) p21, "the Chinese authorities need to recognise that religion can be a force of peace, and differentiate between terrorism, separatism, and mere expressions of political, economic, and cultural grievances". China's conceive approach to managing ethnic relations in Xinjiang is perceived as an attack on the Uyghur identity and this is fanning the simmering conflict in Xinjiang moderating the controls on Uyghur society would help to ease Uyghur dissonance arising from the need to fight for cultural revival.

- There should be a pursuance of a nationalistic vision of religious tolerance and freedom. This could be done through leaders who can spearhead genuine reconciliation effort. These

individuals should sincerely believe in change and genuinely desire a multi-ethnic Sino-Nigeria that accommodates all people irrespective of race, creed, religion or colour. These leaders will be the leaders that would seek mutually beneficial solutions and correcting ethnic prejudices in the Chinese and Nigerian societies. These group of leaders would help to foster commitment and inspire change in the social system

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Reviving African Indigenous Institutions for Democracy, Good Governance and Development: Lessons from Zimbabwe

*Misbeck, P. Chingozha; Munyaradzi Mawere
& Anastacia M. Mawere*

Introduction

Many people in formerly colonised nation-states such as those of Africa still labour hard under the misapprehension that the only perfect way of being in the world is that which exalts the ‘master’ – former coloniser – and disparage the ‘slave’ – the formerly colonised – in ways that vilifies the latter. On the basis of this perspective and all the epistemological lenses associated with it, whatever the former coloniser champions and preaches is right while the perspective of the ‘other’ – the formerly colonised – is overshadowed. A hegemonic epistemological perspective, thus, is not only promoted and endorsed by the former colonial imperialists but sometimes by the formerly colonised themselves who remain entrapped within the silhouettes of colonial hangover. This, however, downplays all knowledge that Africa has, and has had, that sustained it even before white domination that came with the Berlin Conference of 1884. To this Owolabi (1994) argues that one way by which the West can successfully realise full exploitation of the resources in Africa is to step its cultural imperialism and promote its democratic culture as the ideal culture for all societies to follow. We add that cultural imperialism is sometimes not only promoted by the West but sometimes by African governments themselves who feel inadequate to promote what is typically African.

Yet, the knowledge systems and institutions that Africa has always had cannot be defined using Western standards. Neither should they be judged as inferior but as equal others on their own right. They are not inferior because they had the capabilities and abilities to sustain their African economies, and as such these economies developed at their own pace and in their own direction. It cannot be contested that the indigenous populace of the African continent, as elsewhere beyond, had their own enduring ways of doing things, predicting natural disasters, anticipating problems, and handling unforeseen situations (see Mawere 2015a; Mawere and Mubaya 2015). All these ways of predicting and solving problems by the indigenous populations of Africa are generally referred to as indigenous knowledge.

As Mawere (2014; 2015b) tells us, indigenous knowledge can be viewed and defined in various ways depending on one's orientation or point of reference. It is wide ranging and cuts across the life of a people as they adapt and adopt ways that make it possible to traverse life in a manner that is positively yielding. The knowledge, complex as is, could be best understood as a system with institutions associated with it. These systems and institutions helped and continue to help the people to deal with or overcome the problems that disturb their serenity. The coping strategies that are African in nature should thus be respected because undervaluing their effectiveness amounts to lack of appreciation of the experiences and wisdom Africa is endowed with (Twigg 2004; Mawere 2012; 2014; 2015b).

We argue in this chapter that views by Euro-centric scholars such as David Hume, Levy-Bruhl, Georg Hegel, Immanuel Kant, John Locke and many others, that define Africa as a primitive, pre-logical, backward and characterised by inadequacies in virtually all aspects is rather unfortunate, mischievous and should outrightly be dismissed and rubbished as utter nonsense. We underline that the utility and effectiveness of indigenous systems and institutions of Africa is not only limited to one realm of life but virtually all spheres of life. Africa's political institutions, for example, have proven beyond reasonable doubt that Africa has the capacity to

foster and steer governance and development among its people which, in fact, has always been the view of Africa's nationalists and Pan Africanists such as Kwame Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere and many others across the continent. Many of these iconic figures have always been of the belief that Africa has the agency to decisively, accurately and conclusively deal with African problems in an African way, though such efforts are, more often than not, frustrated by some Western interferences in one and many ways in the name of democracy, globalisation, and democratic principles.

This chapter endeavours to critically explore the relationship between indigenous systems, institutions, and democracy and good governance for development in Africa. Using the example of 'traditional' institutions such as chieftainship in Zimbabwe, the chapter makes the argument that if used in a transparently responsible manner, African indigenous institutions have great potentials to promote, good governance, democracy and development on the continent.

Understanding democracy

Democracy is a phenomenon or concept that is so topical in Africa today. Controversial as it is, the concept has been understood differently with some even arguing that there has never been anything that could be considered as democracy in some world societies such as Africa prior to the latter's coming into contact with the Western world. The diverse interpretation, varied forms of democracy (such as majoritarian, pluralist, representative, participatory, and indirect) and controversial history – at least in view of Africa – makes democracy as both a concept and phenomenon a post-colonial challenge to Africa.

While we strongly believe that democracy being a multifaceted and multivalent idea that exist naturally in any well-bonded society, it has always existed in many contexts (including precolonial Africa) across the globe as we will demonstrate later, in this section we focus on democracy largely from its Western conception.

In terms of its history in the Western world, democracy as a system of governance can be traced back to ancient Greece, particularly Athens of the 6th century B.C.E, where it was proposed by Solon after a civil unrest between the rich and the poor in Athens. Etymologically, democracy is derived from the Greek word *demo* and *kratia* meaning people and rule respectively. It can be understood to mean ‘rule by the people’ (Clarke & Foweraker 2001: 194-201), which explains why Abraham Lincoln in his Gettysburg address defined democracy as the government of the people and for the people. This is what Plato (1961) captures in his definition of democracy when he says:

And a democracy, I suppose, comes into being when the poor, winning the victory put to death some of the other party, drive out others, and grant the rest of the citizens an equal share in both the citizenship and offices and for the most part these offices are assigned by lot.

What Plato tells us in the paragraph above represents the unadulterated description of the origin of democracy in Athens and what democracy today aspires to be. However, there is more to democracy than what Plato envisages above. In fact winning elections and having the poor majority in government does not translate to democracy. Perhaps it is from this realisation that Plato prefers institutional dictatorship to democracy. Thus, we cannot rely on his definition of democracy given his stance against democracy.

Pericles is generally considered as Athens’ greatest democratic leader after Solon its originator. This is aptly captured by Thucydides who in a funeral oration recorded Pericles describing him and his Athenian system of rule as:

Its administration favours the many instead of the few; this is why it is called a democracy. If we look to the laws, they afford equal justice to all in their private differences; if no social standing, advancement in public life fails to reputation for

capacity, class considerations not being allowed to interfere with merit; nor again does poverty bar the way, if a man is able to serve the state, he is not hindered by the obscurity of his condition. The freedom which we enjoy in our government extends also to our ordinary life (Thucydides, nd: 2-3).

As could be implied from the preceding discussion, democracy has been seen to have so many faces besides Plato's and Thucydides,' which connotes that it has had definitional haze and diverse forms of interpretations (Adediran 1996). Each of the many scholars who have made an attempt to theorise or define the concept has done so in their own way. This has been largely because the question of democracy is grappled with in many areas across disciplines where scholars hail from a diversity of backgrounds.

The connection between democracy and human rights is well articulated and captured in article 21 (3) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). The article declares: "The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures." Thus as suggested by the UDHR, democracy provides the framework for people to vote, contest elections, debate public issues and any other issues related to the wellbeing of communities involved. For them, democracy seeks to meet human needs and satisfy the basic goals at the heart of communities. This shows that democracy is a means to an end. It, for instance, leads to good governance and socio-economic development in the community where it is genuinely practiced. In fact, it makes no meaning to invest fortunes in building a democracy that yields no results, particularly the greatest good to the majority in society. For other scholars such as Ranney and Kendall (1951), democracy is the rule by the majority instead of the minority. In line with this understanding, democracy come to mean a system of government where majority rules. It basically relates to a form of government in which the government derives its power to

lead the people and is accountable to them for the use of that power. This means in a typically democratic situation, all citizens within a given state are accorded an equal and uncontested right in the decisions that have a bearing on their lives. These decisions include but not limited to the right to vote. In line with this understanding, Mayo (1961) came up with four distinguishing principles of democracy namely (a) popular control of policy-makers; (b) political equality; (c) effective popular control made possible by political freedoms, and (d) decision by the majority when the representatives are divided. Citizens within a state – the physically challenged and the able-bodied ones – are in view of these principles allowed to voice their concerns so that the provisions of the State's Constitution are sustained and upheld by all members in all times. In an ideal democracy there are neither 'sacred cows,' nor 'unequal animal' as in George Orwell's *Animal farm*. All members of the state are equal regardless of their race, religion or creed, colour, gender etc. Democracy is, thus, characterised by the following ingredients:

- The right by all and sundry to elect whosoever they believe in, to superintend over their concerns and interests.
- The independence of the judiciary machinery in dealing with violations of the Constitutional provisions.
- Transparency and accountability at all levels ensuring that no one can ride on the back of others.

No wonder scholars like Basedau *et al* (2007) underline that democracy is a political system that is characterised by high levels of competition and participation in the political system. Ideally as it appears, democracy has, however, met with criticism with many critical scholars especially in Africa with some like Owolabi (1994) and Morrow (1998) arguing that *modern* democracy in Africa is an instrument of continuous exploitation by the West which cannot be expected to solve Africa's legion of problems. We will pursue these arguments later.

It is important for us to underscore that democracy, what we call in this chapter 'modern' democracy, is now actually perceived

with mixed feelings, with some viewing it as good and others as bad. The controversial conception of democracy is, however, not new as history is awash with critiques of the phenomenon. In this regard Plato, for example, considered democracy as one of the worst form of governance. He describes democracy as a form of government which violates the fundamental principles of justice according to which men being born with different capabilities should do only the work of which they are fitted (see Momoh, 1993: 36). Supporting Plato's argument, Momoh (Ibid) argues that the majority might not be the solution to societal problems because it implies that 'where the worldview is racist, tribal, unfair and unjust, democracy becomes tainted with these vices.'

Other critics of democracy such as Sophie Oluwole view democracy as an unjust form of government. For Oluwole (1992: 14), 'democracy is a levelling doctrine and an embodiment of injustice because the democratic process fails to give full recognition to the fact that man is unequal in a number of significant respects and hence cannot be given equal rights in everything.'

For Kenneth Janda and Jerry Goldman (1995), democracy is not even democratic. The duo, in fact, describe democracy as a sham on the basis that power is concentrated in the hands of a few who are said to be representatives of the majority. Janda and Goldman, thus, are critical of any democracy that purports to represent others – representative democracy – as they believe that people do not represent others sincerely and honestly.

Nevertheless, democracy has become widely accepted by many governments and people alike across the globe that failure of a country to uphold democracy now spells doom and disaster for the perpetrators.

Democracy, governance and civilisation of world societies

While the West has, over the years, received accolades from around the world as the originator and strong advocate of democracy, it can still be argued that democracy is not a new

phenomenon in many societies of the world and in particular those of Africa. In fact, it is rather folly to believe that the West is 'God sent' such that all other societies of the world should look up to her as a torch bearer and pacesetter of both democracy and development and democracy. It is a mentality that has cultivated a spirit of docility, indolence, and inferiority in the minds of many people of the formally colonised societies of the world. Historian Jack Weatherford (1988), stressing the same point but in view of the United States of America has, for instance, argued that the ideas leading to the American Constitution and democracy derived from the various indigenous peoples of the Americas including the Iroquois. He further claims that democracy was actually founded between 1000-1450 and lasted several hundreds of years, and that the American democratic system was continually changing and improving over time.

In view of Africa, we also argue that democracy, as with governance and development, is not a new phenomenon. The societies of Africa have always rich in knowledge systems and institutions that dealt with issues of democracy, governance and development. The belief among the indigenous Shona people of Mozambique and Zimbabwe that a leader needed the consent of the ruled and that of the ancestral spirit as well as God, the Creator, is a clear testimony that democracy has always been pervasive in these African societies. The Yoruba societies of West Africa, the Changanis societies of South Africa and Mozambique, the Swazi societies of Swaziland, the Sotho societies of Lesotho, the Tswana societies of Botswana, the BaTonga societies of Zambia, Malawi and Zimbabwe, among many others also traditionally embraced the same belief. For these societies, a leader always exercised both religious and secular leadership, hence the demand that s/he was supposed to be democratically endorsed by both the ruled and the spiritual world.

Corroborating the same idea that democracy is neither a new concept nor phenomenon, Rawlins (2008) in his paper: 'The Challenges of Democracy in Africa' argues that democratic ideas are not new to Africa. The majority of pre-colonial systems of

traditional governance in Africa contained lot of democratic and good governance elements and aspects. Among the Shona people of Zimbabwe, for example, the word “*jecheterere*” which is an equivalent of good governance, did not first appear in vocabulary after the contacts of the Shonas with the Western world. It has always been used even in pre-colonial times especially in folklore, which attest to the fact that the conceptualisation of good governance pre-existed colonialism and Western contacts with the outside world. The pre-colonial contacts with Europeans and the colonial period itself rather disrupted and corrupted the African old systems of governance in a plethora of ways and have left behind situations – such as corruption, embezzlement of state funds, nepotism, and political violence, among others – which are the root causes of many governance problems today. This connotes that Western ideas and institutions which are generally labelled good governance today are by no means the ideal model of democracy or governance in general in Africa. On this note, we argue that Africa has many indigenous systems and institutions that are inclined towards good governance and majoritarian democracy if used responsibly. Chieftainship or is sometimes referred to as traditional leadership is one example as we will demonstrate in the next section.

Traditional leadership and family institution: Promises for good governance and development

While many countries in Africa have a dual political system – customary and statutory, this chapter focuses on Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe’s political system is a duality of customary (also known as traditional leadership) and statutory (also known as modern) systems of government, such that the Constitution of Zimbabwe (of 2013) like the old Constitution recognises the institution of Chieftaincy within its statutory democratic governance (Mawere 2015c). This dual leadership, however, is more pronounced in the rural areas where they exist side by side. For this reason, by using traditional institutions we refer to “the authorities that existed in

pre-colonial and through colonial times such as traditional leadership, which are, at the present time, responsible for governing the welfare of people and the utilisation of natural resources in the countryside” (Mawere 2015c: 61). Traditional institutions depended on inheritance laws that started right from the individual, family unity to the community as a whole.

In Zimbabwe, when the country got its independence in 1980, elected government authorities were tasked to perform the same duties as those of traditional leadership structures. From the top to bottom levels, these included: Office of the President (OoP), Member of Parliament (MP), the Rural District Development Committee (RDDC), elected Ward Councillor (WC), the elected Ward Development Committee (WADCO) presided over by the WC, and the elected Village Development Committee (VIDCO) presided over by the VIDCO Chair in each village (cf. Mawere 2015c). As Maphosa (2002) observes, these structures were formed at independence in 1980 when the new government created five land tenure systems in Zimbabwe, namely communal areas, resettlement areas, small-scale commercial farms, large-scale commercial farms, and state land comprising national parks and forests. We should, however, note that this new system was simply a duplication of the colonial system of governance whereby all land remained state land with its ownership vested in the President of the country. Kruger (1992) is very clear on this when he observes that “from the time of European conquest, chieftainship and other positions depended not only on inheritance laws but also on the government approval” (p. 64). The bureaucratic government structures such as the VIDCOs and WADCOs – better known as local government – were formed in 1984, through the directive of the then Prime Minister (PM) to decentralise the government system in an attempt to allow the communal area populations to actively participate in development issues (Maphosa 2002). The Communal Lands Act (CLA) of 1982 currently vests control over land in the President of the country, but devolves administration to RDC such that the latter manage natural resources in the countryside. The 1988 RDC Act (Revised edition of 1996) gives

power to RDCs as an appropriate authority to control the utilisation and management of natural resources, including trees, conservation of natural resources, control of bush fires, grazing land and agriculture in communal areas (Clarke & Katerere 1994; Maphosa 2002). Moreover, the same Act empowers the Minister of Local Government (MLG) with the mandate to enact conservation and land-use planning by-laws for RDCs, which the latter can employ to override any customary claims (Hobane 1999).

In independent Zimbabwe, the key step towards the (re)empowerment of traditional authority was the establishment of the 1998 Traditional Leaders Act (TLA) (Chapter 29, 17), which empowered traditional leaders to deal with problems of land, natural resources, crimes and disputes in the communal areas. The Traditional Leadership Act states that all chiefs in Zimbabwe are appointed by the President and are tasked to supervise headmen areas, promote and uphold cultural values, oversee collection of taxes by village heads (on behalf of the RDC), and ensure land and natural resources use and allocation in line with the national legislation (Mandondo 2000; Mawere 2015c). All this entails that statutory and traditional leadership exist side by side as shown in Table 1. below:

Table 1. Leadership structures for both the bureaucratic government and traditional structures

	Traditional Leadership Authorities	State/Government Leadership Authorities
National Level	President of Council of Chiefs	President and Cabinet
Provincial Level	Council of Chiefs	Provincial Administrator
District Level	Chiefs (at district level)	Member of Parliament (MP) District Administrator Rural District Council Chair Rural District Development Committee (for Bikita)
Ward	Chief (<i>Vasbe</i>) Chief's Advisors (<i>Dare raVasbe</i>) Headman (<i>Sadunbu</i>) Headman's Advisors (<i>Dare raSadunbu</i>) Village Head (<i>Sabhuku</i>) Village Head's Advisors (<i>Dare raSabhuku</i>) Homestead Head (<i>Samusba</i>)	Councillor WADCO Ward Committee Village Committee VIDCO Chair VIDCO

Source: Mawere 2015c.

Besides, the election of statutory government in the countryside entails that Local Government does the very duty that traditional leadership always had since pre-colonial times with confusion mounting as the two systems of governments, in many times,

contest their powers over natural resource management and other such issues of resource administration. The New Constitution of 2013 clearly shows this. In terms of chapter 15 section 282 of the 2013 Constitution of Zimbabwe, for example, traditional leaders have the following functions:

- To promote and uphold the cultural values of their communities and in particular to promote sound family values;
- To take measures to preserve the culture, traditions, history and heritage of their communities including sacred shrines;
- To facilitate development;
- In accordance with the Act of Parliament, to administer Communal land and to protect the environment;
- To resolve disputes amongst people in their communities in accordance with customary law.

Chapter 15 section 281 (2) of the same Constitution also clearly state that traditional leaders must not:

- Be members of any political party or in any way participate in partisan politics.
- Act in a partisan manner.
- Further the interests of any political party or cause.
- Violate the fundamental rights and freedoms of any person.

While the government seems to have taken over the role of traditional leadership, it remains apparent that they are better positioned and more inclined towards the promotion of good governance and development. This because:

a). Traditional leaders such as chiefs and headmen are closer to the people than the local government. In fact, traditional leaders live in communities with the people they serve yet local government authorities isolate themselves and live far away from the people they serve. This makes traditional leaders better positioned than local government as the former are not only told of what the community needs in terms of good governance and development but actually experience for themselves what needs to be improved in their community. When people in the community, for example, lack clean water, health facilities and road networks, even the traditional

leaders lack the same. This is a different scenario with local government authorities who come once in a while to communities to know what lacks and where needs improvement in terms of governance and development.

b). Traditional leaders such as chiefs in Zimbabwe, as in many other African countries, have a central role in dealing with various community groups. The chief is assisted by his lieutenants to ensure that democracy is sustained among women, youth, children and greater society.

c). Traditional leaders, at least in principle, believe in traditional philosophies such as Ubuntu/Unhu – a philosophy of humanness that embraces peace, unity, sharing, and love amongst people and all other stakeholders of the society (Mawere 2014). They believe in the notion that “you are because we are.” Such philosophy fosters and indeed sustains democracy, good governance and development. It is this concept that initiated the *Zunde raMambo* (the King’s common grannery) so that the vulnerable are not left to the harshness of the world. We argue that by embracing such as philosophy traditional leaders are, therefore, embracing good governance as there is no good governance that does not cherish peace, unity and love.

d). The family institution in many African ‘indigenous’ societies is also key for good governance and development. The family as an institution was also responsible for the socialisation of its members. As Anthony Giddens (2001) tells us, socialisation is the primary channel for transmission of culture over time and generations it is thus critical in children and new members of society to learn the way of their society. Socialisation, thus, helps to connect one generation to another and helps to create harmony.

In the Shona society, for example, at family levels roles were traditionally prescribed to aunties and uncles. Their major role was to ensure that couples avoid breaking relationships unnecessarily. Relationships were treasured. The parties to the conflict would respect the decisions of the family elders. The institution of aunties and uncles employed their wisdom and knowledge of building homes to ensure that harmony prevailed in homes. Any member of

the family who disregarded the advice of these elders would receive social sanctions from other family members. Unfortunately, the family institution is fast losing value in Zimbabwean communities due to westernisation and globalisation that disregard traditional customs and values.

Conclusion

In this chapter we have problematised the concept of democracy and its unquestionable subtle complexities. While we have acknowledged that no form of government is free from criticism and challenges, we have demonstrated that democracy, at least for now, seems to be the best form of government with the potential to foster and steer good governance and socio-economic development of human societies. This is because as a form of government that cherishes diversity and plurality, it guarantees equality of participation of citizens and promotes active participation of all members of the society in governance issues that affect them directly or otherwise. Additionally, we have shown that democracy in Africa can only yield positive results on the continent if it is drawn and grounded in the cultures of the indigenous people, and if the indigenous people are given the opportunity to actively participate in governance issues. This in turn can be easily achieved if political leaders are committed to serve the people with a high sense of responsibility and accountability. On this note, we have argued that a democracy that embraces apposite accountability alongside indigenous institutions such as family and traditional leadership has the potential to promote good governance and socio-economic development in Africa. Taking all these aspects aboard is likely to counter the problems commonly associated with democracy and improve the latter as a form of government while fostering development on the continent.

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Architectures, Technologies and Indigenous Knowledge in Africa: The Impetus and Potential of the BaTonga Indigenous Knowledge and Technology for Fostering Sustainable Development

*Joshua Chikozho, Tapuwa R. Mubaya
& Munyaradzi Mawere*

Introduction

As a result of man's experimental skills in co-existing and interacting with the broader environment in a sustainable manner, Indigenous Knowledge (IK) have been used to solve survival challenges and problems confronting indigenous communities of Africa as elsewhere since time immemorial. The advent of Western imperialism on the African soil coupled with its authoritarian stance on other forms of knowledge broke the umbilical cord that linked Africans with their varied indigenous knowledge systems. Against this backdrop, the sustainability of African indigenous knowledge systems in a global economy has become a topical issue in contemporary discourses of sustainable development. However, it is interesting to note that though there is no standard definition of indigenous knowledge there is nevertheless general unanimity among scholars that communities, cultures and societies have indigenous knowledge systems. Used in the context of this discussion, indigenous knowledge may be defined as the 'knowledge acquired over generations by communities as they interact with their environment' (<http://www.dlist.org/burning-issues/indigenous-knowledge->). By and large, IK refers to a system of understanding one's environment.

Notwithstanding the multiple advantages associated with the use of IK as an engine of sustainable development, the majority of

IK in Africa are facing extinction owing to a range of factors. Taking cognisance of the efficacy of IK in sustaining the livelihoods of especially many rural African societies as well as in informing and guiding their day-to-day activities, the present chapter attempts to explore and unmask the resilient and indomitable spirit of the various indigenous knowledge systems that have, and still continue to serve as springboards for sustainable development. Aware of the multiplicity of indigenous knowledge systems in Africa in general and Zimbabwe in particular, the chapter focuses on selected indigenous knowledge systems from the BaTonga worldview. Drawing examples from the BaTonga ethnic group (which is found in the north-western part of Zimbabwe) and which is also adopted as the case study in this discussion in gauging the potential and impetus of indigenous knowledge systems in Zimbabwe. On this note a nuanced interrogation of four indigenous knowledge systems will form the basis of this discussion. These include the famous BaTonga houses on stilts '*ngazi*' (architecture), smoking pipe (technology), traditional family planning (health) and traditional snake bites treatment (medicine). These indigenous knowledge systems, among many others, have enabled the BaTonga people to deal with different adversities abound in their environment while at the same time fostering sustainable development. Fundamentally important to note is the fact that the focus of the study is not only hinged on the theoretical importance of BaTonga indigenous knowledge systems but on their practical relevance and sustainability as well.

The argument advanced in this chapter is that development and technologies are context informed and dictated hence they cannot be narrowed down and confined to the Western conceptualisation which has assumed centre stage and has also been used as the universal yardstick against which everything else is measured. This chapter underscores that Africa before and even after her contact with the global commons had and still has notions of sustainable development embedded within its diverse IK. To this end, it is indeed unfair to look at African development and sustainability using biased Western lances. Consequently, indigenous people's

cultures and their respective knowledge systems have been largely misunderstood or even dismissed by people purporting to be development planning experts (<https://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/dlc/bitstream/handle/10535/9>). Against this background, Africa has mistakenly been seen as a dark continent, developing continent, a hub of resources, underdeveloped, among a host of other negative descriptions, misrepresentations and misinterpretations.

Borne out of this realisation, Africa needs to root herself by grounding all development on African indigenous knowledge as a basis for authentic African development. The chapter further argues that this can only be achieved if the different indigenous knowledge systems are documented, embraced in school curricula and premised in policy making and developmental forums.

The BaTonga people of north-western Zimbabwe

The BaTonga ethnic group who are found in the north-western part of Zimbabwe is the third largest ethnic groups in Zimbabwe (see Reynolds and Cousins 1989) whose culture got the interference of colonialism very late. For the most part the BaTonga lived an isolated life and religiously depended on their culture (Ncube 2004; Reynolds and Cousins 1989). Their indigenous knowledge and technologies supported their lives from time immemorial. When modern influences encroached their society and environs, the BaTonga generally resisted foreign knowledge forms and technologies in favour of their own. Until recently, Tonga culture remained intact and resilient. Nevertheless, this resilience has generally been misconstrued by some quarters to mean underdevelopment, backwardness, naivety, simplicity, among a lot of other negative descriptions (see Munikwa 2011). That is, the refusal by the BaTonga to adopt foreign influence *en masse* as the standard of life has unfortunately been viewed as the incapacity of BaTonga as a culture to appreciate and accommodate 'superior' Western culture. This explains why the BaTonga ethnic group has suffered the worst multiple stereotypes both nationally and

internationally (see Munikwa 2011). The stereotypes were initially invented by imperial colonisers who found the BaTonga people very difficult to break into their culture. The stereotypical thinking of Europe over Africa and the African people has always had ulterior motives; it is bent on fanning hostility and hatred (Mawere 2014). The invention and projection of stereotypes was therefore a ploy to demonise in order to force-unlock and consequently superimpose themselves (their culture) at the expense of indigenous culture. Interestingly, the BaTonga largely remained faithful to their culture and have always perceived development dictated to them by their own worldview. Unfortunately, even after independence, some ethnic groups in Zimbabwe and Africa at large inherited the stereotyping of the BaTonga thereby perpetuating colonial hegemony.

In spite of all the odds, the BaTonga have steadfastly refused to acknowledge and adopt Western culture or any other culture because they trust their indigenous knowledge and technologies. It is important to appreciate that the BaTonga people do not despise nor even label other cultures. They simply believe in themselves and their culture as the only way towards sustaining themselves. This strength has been a major hindrance to many international and local people with exploitative tendencies who found themselves irrelevant in the face of BaTonga culture. Many African cultures have been plundered because they jumped onto the bandwagon of embracing Western culture at the expense of their own. The imperial masters used this strategy in order to disempower, create dependency syndrome and make Africans lose self-esteem and look up to Europe for everything thereby by perpetuating neo-colonialism. Such ideologies were bending on plundering and exploiting Africa's natural and human resources. Basing on this understanding, Rodney (1972) emphatically argued that the underdevelopment of Africa is a deliberate creation by Europe.

It may well be argued that in so far as this strategy is concerned, the BaTonga people have put up a good fight. Africa is at war on many fronts as the imperial West tries by any means necessary to subjugate and colonise Africa perpetually. While the BaTonga

people are generally looked at as being simple and backward, even by their fellow Africans, they have fared very well and emerged victorious in repelling forces against African development. Zimbabwe has a lot to learn from the BaTonga people if she has to regain her dignity and enjoy sustainable development. The BaTonga have, to a large extent, refused to have their culture colonised because that certainly compromises their strength and future. Africa today is in a sustainable development dilemma, among other dilemmas, because her mind has generally been colonised.

The BaTonga people believe in their worldview for their survival and development. The BaTonga people are conscious of their uniqueness, resourcefulness, fecundity and creativity all of which has carried them from generation to generation. It is this self-pride, belief and determination that Africa critically needs. Africa needs to assert her own standards away from the rigours of always being compared to the West. There is no universal standard worldview, all cultures are equal. As Rodney (1972: 7) aptly argues the major problem bedevilling Africa is trying to satisfy the 'standards' set by her oppressors.

As the chapter unfolds, it will be made clear that the BaTonga ethnic groups' architecture as informed by their environment, resourcefulness and creativity proves beyond reasonable doubt the potential of indigenous knowledge systems as stimuli of sustainable development. Moreover, the technologies of the BaTonga people, as clearly demonstrated by their smoking pipe, (*inchehwa/ndombonda*) is a classical case in point of the efficacy of indigenous knowledge systems in promoting good health. In view of this, it is indeed undeniable that Africa has the creativity to exploit the resources for sustainable development. The traditional health system of the BaTonga as epitomised by the traditional family planning system underlines a thoroughgoing appreciation of the principle of sustainable development. Evidently, sustainable development is not a new form of knowledge in the African body of indigenous knowledge as many agents of development work would want us to believe. It has always been a part of African life. In addition, traditional medicine as seen through snake bites treatment is yet

another clear demonstration by Africa of her impetus to sustain herself. To this end, it can well be argued that one can only draw strength from their own indigenous knowledge without which one is left vulnerable to abuse and exploitation.

Architecture

Africa has a wealth of beautiful buildings. Each housing architectural form is a well-balanced solution to the problem of living in a particular climate, environment and society (Reynolds 1986). The unmistakable unique BaTonga culture architecture commonly described as houses on stilts (*Ngazi*) has become one of the pillars of the BaTonga identity. These houses are normally raised about six feet or so above the ground (Reynolds 1968). Although the house itself is circular, the platform on which it stands is often projected to provide a rectangular verandah. Mopane (*colophospermum mopane*) is normally used for support poles given that it is a hardwood particularly good for house frames and resistant to attacks by both wood beetle and white ant. The architecture bears testimony to the enduring self-belief spirit, resourcefulness and creativity in the BaTonga people. We witness a people authoring a worldview out of their own context. The interplay of the natural and cultural resources in this matrix shows a people in charge of their lives. Clearly, the architecture of the BaTonga people is different from most of the architecture found in Zimbabwe. This is not to dismiss other forms of architectures in Zimbabwe, Africa and the world over but simply because this chapter is merely highlighting the architecture of the BaTonga people.



Fig.1: Map showing the settlement pattern of the BaTonga

While it is evident that the settlement pattern of the BaTonga was and still is informed by the river and its associated benefits, it is also equally evident that the aspect of sustainability has always been a factor among the BaTonga. For this reason their settlement pattern was/is not natural or haphazard, to the contrary, it is a result of deliberate and conscious effort; consciousness to their needs, their environment and capacity to make ‘homes’ in a generally harsh and hostile environment. The area inhabited by the BaTonga had been relegated to wildlife and declared unsuitable for human habitation owing to high temperatures, poor agricultural soils and various diseases that characterised the area. Nonetheless, it is intriguing to see how the BaTonga people tamed the same area to the extent that today, Binga for example, has become one of Zimbabwe’s tourist destinations. So even those who had relegated the area earlier on, now visit the north-west part of Zimbabwe to celebrate nature, culture and enjoy life.



Figure 2: Picture showing one of the houses on stilts

The uniqueness of the BaTonga architecture is a classical case in point of converting challenges into benefits. Most of African roundabout huts are built on the ground. The BaTonga have both kinds of architectures; the roundabout hut built on the ground is commonly known as ‘*nganda*’ while the more popular one which identifies with them is called ‘*ngazi*’ (house on stilts). There is continuous ragging debate among theorists on which of the two models was invented first in the lives of the BaTonga. There are no known dates as to when the BaTonga people initially settled on the banks of the Zambezi River. Oral traditions from the BaTonga themselves say they know of no other origin except on the banks of the Zambezi River also known as the Gwembe Valley in ancient times (Reynolds 1968). With the advent of colonialism the BaTonga people had been advised to leave the area and settle on ‘better’ and ‘habitable’ areas elsewhere. On one hand, this area adored by the BaTonga was also home to elephants, lions, hyenas, leopards, among other predators. On the other hand, the river which

symbolised life as a resource was and still is home to predators including; crocodiles, hippopotamus, among others. Furthermore, the river itself also presented constant danger to drowning and when it flooded it really resulted in loss of life. It was indeed a difficult environment to sustain life and development. It is also a very hot area which falls under region five according to Zimbabwe's climatic regions. Paradoxically, all these challenges and threats are behind the invention of the BaTonga architecture of '*ngazi*'. It is a development resulting from the need to term the environment in order to sustain lives. With all the catalogued dangers lingering all the time, it was certainly inconceivable for the BaTonga to construct their houses right on the ground. To avert the dangers of constant predators and floods, the BaTonga designed huts raised from the ground supported by stilts. This is architecture consciously designed to save life as well as providing accommodation. According to Chief Binga, the '*ngazi*' architecture served two main purposes; for accommodation and for grain storage (pers comm 5th August 2015). That is, when it is used for sleeping it is specially referred to as '*tontolomba*' and when it is for grain storage it is referred to as '*ntombo*'. Except in the event of vicious floods, the '*ngazi*' faithfully saved its purposes.

From the ongoing discussion, it is persuasive that although the BaTonga people have both the '*nganda*' architecture (hut on the ground) and the '*ngazi*' architecture (house on stilts) the latter was invented first owing to attendant challenges in their environment. Moreover, given that in ancient times life was more nomadic than permanent the '*ngazi*' was handy for that kind of life. This chapter argues that the '*nganda*' was invented as life became more permanent as communities transformed from hunting and gathering to more settled farming communities (Reynolds 1989). Thus, we witness a typically African architecture out of an African experience. Normally the '*ngazi*' is also not plastered with dagga to allow for free circulation of air in an environment that is generally very hot. Today when people talk of upstairs, it sounds strictly a western concept when in fact the concept is as old as Africa as seen through the BaTonga people. It is typically a Tonga architecture which has

become a critical part of the BaTonga identity. It clearly demonstrates indigenous knowledge ingenuity, a development sustained by the BaTonga.

While it can be argued that some animals, for example, leopards, can easily climb up the '*ngazi*', it is important to note that the BaTonga doors are generally very heavy by design. In addition, inside the '*ngazi*' hut there is always a dug out slot (*cikungusyo*) in the wood that forms the base in which a wooden peg (*inkwidizyo*) is put which serves as a locking system. So although some animals can climb up the ladder onto the '*ngazi*' they would not be able to force-open the door (pers comm 5th August 2015). All this development is a pure result of undiluted indigenous knowledge which propped up the African worldview. It is sustainable development because it is an African experience, endeavours arising and developing out of the African environment as Africans interacted/ interact with nature.

The lower part of the '*ngazi*' is also useful; it may be used as a kitchen or may be used for keeping goats or any other storage purposes. Owing to the prevalence of predators it would have been unwise to keep goats a distance away from the '*ngazi*'. So keeping the goats just under the '*ngazi*' ensured the safety or at least alerted the owners in time should there be any lingering threat.

Smoking is part of BaTonga culture and both men and women are free to smoke. Smoking is thus a voluntary venture. Before the resettlement of the BaTonga people on the upland, tobacco was grown in the alluvial gardens on the river banks and tributary bottoms (Reynolds 1968). The BaTonga men use a smoking pipe called '*intali*' or '*ntali*' while the women use a smoking made out from gourd called '*inchelwa*' or '*ndombonda*'. According to a research carried out by the BaTonga Community Museum on the 5th of August 2015 in the chiefdom of Chief Binga many interviewees concurred that people smoke for different reasons ranging from; relaxing the mind, satisfaction, enjoy the flavour of tobacco, energiser, a refresher after hard work, among many other reasons. While the BaTonga generally smoke tobacco (Virginia), they have

largely been misconstrued to be preoccupied with marijuana smoking (BaTonga Community Museum File 2003).

Technologies



Fig. 3: Picture showing the smoking pipe used by women

This is a clear result of the ignorance people have on the BaTonga culture. Failure to appreciate the BaTonga technologies has also compounded the problem. Consequently, instead of appreciating the traditional ingenuity and resourcefulness of the BaTonga people, generally the world has demonised development at the expense of humanity. In the BaTonga culture, smoking is as old as time. It has been difficult from the research conducted to specifically determine how and when smoking started. However, it is widely believed that smoking started well before influence from foreign cultures and that before the advent of foreign tobacco the BaTonga had their own indigenous shrubs that they smoked. Interaction with Asians, Portuguese and eventually the British exposed them to foreign tobacco. The fact that men and women have gender specific gadgets for smoking is a persuasive indication

that smoking has always been a part of BaTonga tradition. While this chapter discusses smoking by men and women, its major thrust is on the technology used by women in smoking.

The pipe used by man for smoking has no filter because men are generally believed to be strong enough to withstand the strength of tobacco. On the contrary, the pipe used by women has a filtering system which reduces the strength of tobacco and more importantly traps the fatal impurities contained in tobacco (pers comm 5th August 2015). The smoking pipe used by women is thus an object that must be celebrated and highlighted as a major traditional scientific achievement. Sadly this potential and impetus of Africa has been undermined and sabotaged. Indeed, the onslaught on indigenous knowledge and technologies particularly in Africa has been sustained to the extent that most indigenous communities themselves are beginning to question their own capacity to implement sustainable development (see Awuah-Nyamekye 2015). However, the BaTonga people continue to celebrate their culture and their achievements. Below is an illustration of how the weavers have sought to highlight the '*inchelwa*' as a major achievement of indigenous technology; After exposure to western cultures, most African cultures fell victim to the adage that 'after bathing a child one throws away both the water and the baby'. Indeed, most African cultures have thrown away what defines them and their future. African indigenous knowledge and technologies have been thrown away no wonder Africa is vulnerable today. Africa needs to learn from countries such as India and Indonesia who are protecting and marketing their indigenous knowledge systems on the global market (Mawere 2012). The BaTonga smoking pipe (*inchelwa*) for example, is a vibrant technology which has however been reduced to an object of stereotype. The traditional ingenuity in it has been completely ignored while the stereotype in it has been projected. Thus, the usefulness in it which has served generations and generations from the vagaries of smoking has been muted while the negative unfounded falsehoods in it abound unabated. This chapter stand out to correct such misrepresentations; first the

smoking pipe called '*inchelwa*' is strictly designed for and used by women and second, it is used for smoking tobacco.



Fig. 4: 'inchelwa' as indigenous technology

It is not a marijuana object. Today, this smoking pipe has become synonymous to marijuana all out of ignorance. Whenever, outsiders see this object either on a television set or just a picture of it, they see marijuana as well. It is important to take note of the following; firstly, marijuana is not indigenous to the area inhabited by the BaTonga people, secondly, the history of smoking among the BaTonga people, according to oral tradition, is older than the advent of marijuana. So the gadget was not designed for marijuana although one may abuse it for that purpose. It is also important to point out that marijuana is unlawful in Zimbabwe but the smoking pipe (*inchelwa*) is lawful. It is simply a smoking gadget which may be abused in as much as a knife designed to cut bread may be abused to stab a person. The invention of technologies in the BaTonga

culture is clear testimony of the impetus in Africa which can be rallied towards achieving sustainable development. The wealth in indigenous knowledge and technologies should never be underestimated. See illustration below;




Fig. 5: Picture demonstrating how the smoking pipe works

As illustrated above, the smoking pipe technology is carefully designed to provide for efficient filtering of the dangerous harmful elements found in tobacco which include; nicotine, tar and dust

particles. The metal cap which is put to cover the tobacco is used so that heat is not lost to the environment thereby ensuring complete combustion. Tobacco is more harmful when combustion is incomplete. Either sorghum or millet grain may be added on top of tobacco since the two grains are believed to add flavour to the tobacco (pers comm 5 August 2015). It is also believed that these grains substantially aid the effective combustion of the tobacco. While some old people may be unsure of the comprehensive science of the smoking pipe, this can only be blamed on the collapse of forums on which information is supposed to be passed on from one generation to the other. Water is added in the smoking pipe to serve as a filter. Almost all the BaTonga women who smoke are conscious of this as evidenced by the fact that as they smoke when the water get saturated of impurities, they feel it and throw the water away and replace it with fresh one (pers comm. 5 August 2015). The water is a very efficient filter and that explains why the BaTonga women find it to smoke. To the contrary, men use a shorter version of a pipe called '*intali*' which has no filter since they believe that they are stronger than women. It is interesting to note that issues of gender sensitivity which have taken centre stage in recent times were practised by the BaTonga way back in history.

Family planning

Family planning has always been a natural part of African life and the BaTonga people are no exception to this. From the research conducted by the BaTonga Community Museum (Museum file 2015) it is evident that the BaTonga as a community have always been conscious to family planning. Children were not just born whenever possible; rather there was/is consultation between husband and wife. While some used the natural method of avoidance there is ample oral evidence that others depended on indigenous knowledge to plan their families. It is important to note that in the BaTonga community and in Africa by extension, the field of traditional medicine is generally strictly protected and to a large extent, shrouded in secrecy. As a result, getting comprehensive

detail is a mammoth task. Nonetheless, the protection of skills is not strange even in modern day. The fallacy today is to think that family planning simply refers to bearing of children at long intervals or having a few children yet one can plan to have a few children, a lot of children or not to have children at all. For this chapter, planning to have a few children, planning to have more children with one wife or even in a polygamous set up is all part of family planning appreciated in the African worldview. A man can have as many wives as he can sustain.

When it comes to child spacing, a practice called '*kusungila*' was employed. The practice entails using either a beaded string or a fibre string; a knot or knots were tied with medicine inside to form the knots (pers comm. 2015). The string would then be worn by the woman in the waist for as long as they do not need a child. According to Deria Munenge in Chief Binga chieftdom fibre from baobab tree is used together with some medicine tied on it and its worn by women to prevent untimely pregnancy (pers comm 5th August 2015). When the couple decides to have a baby, the string will be cut off and set aside. Nevertheless, the sizes of families were largely determined by the political environment and of course the sustainability of life in a given environment.

Snake bites

Traditional medicine is as old as humanity. The BaTonga people are renowned for treating snake bites. To date, many victims of snake bites prefer traditional medicine to modern medicine. True, in some cases the effectiveness of traditional treatment far outweighs that of modern treatment. The reverse is also true. However, as indicated earlier in this chapter it is not easy to get information on traditional medicine which adversely affects the development and sustainability of Africa. A lot of knowledge is being lost and will never be recovered because people die with useful knowledge which could have been shared for the development and betterment of the continent. Nevertheless, examples are numerous of people who have safely survived snake bites after receiving treatment based

on indigenous knowledge. Sometimes the patterns of healing in the modern medical health system conflict with those in the traditional health system (Reynolds 1986). This chapter argues that each system is integral and has much to learn from the other. The bottom line is healers, traditional or modern, should be accountable to the community. They must ensure a healthy community to guarantee the sustainable development of Africa.

Traditional healers have astounding knowledge of the wild. They draw on many plants and even on snake venom in mixing their medicines. Some ingredients are used for their physical impact on the body or mind and others for their symbolic value (Reynolds 1986). Some plants used in the preparation of a concoction for the treatment of snake bites in the Zambezi valley include; (*kanunkula*) *ST Croton gratissimus*, (*munyanya*) *T Diospyros quiloensis*. These are normally added to snake venom extracted from other snakes among other ingredients. In the case of scorpion bites the following plants are used; (*galamatongo*) *AP Boerhavia diffusa*, (*chivalewale*) *A Boerhavia erecta*, (*mululwe*) *TS Senna singueana*, (*muweme*) *ST Dichrostachys cinerea* and (*mutuntuhvas*) *Solanum incanum*.

The practice of using indigenous knowledge to cure diseases is not only unique to the BaTonga of Zimbabwe. The same situation, for instance, obtains in Tanzania. In the North-eastern part of Tanzania lives the Sambia and Zigua people. These indigenous communities are well known for their traditional medicine. They have cured people from wounds, stomach pain, tropical diseases such as malaria, among many other through the use of herbs and other traditional means. The knowledge is said to be transmitted among family members from one generation to the next. The father in the family works very closely with the eldest son, who then does the same and carries over the skills to his eldest son (Msuya: n.d).

Challenges to the sustainability of IK in Zimbabwe

Honestly speaking, there are pertinent issues with regard to the sustainability of IK systems in Zimbabwe and Africa by extension. Most of them face the threat of extinction. As highlighted in the

preceding discussion, most IK practices have not been recorded in written form as the knowledge is transmitted orally from one generation to the next. In this way, IK easily faces extinction due to a lack of recording (Msuya n.d). This also renders its preservation difficult. It is unfortunate that the new generation which is supposed to be exposed to indigenous knowledge spend most of their time in formal education where IK is not part and parcel of the curriculum system and as a result they are exposed more to Western education systems and less to IK. As such, there is little appreciation of the existence of IK (Msuya n.d). Another challenge threatening the survival of IK is that owing to its local or environmentally specific nature, IK has traditionally not been viewed as “capital” in a business sense. It has tended to be exclusive at times, susceptible to suspicion, and sometimes to abuse (Kaniki and Mphahlele 2002). Thus, IK has not been managed as effectively as scientific knowledge, which is well managed because it is taken as knowledge that can be interpreted as capital value or profit. Also important to note is the fact IK is not incorporate into the educational curriculum for the purpose of formal transmission from one generation to the next. In this way, even the development and subsequent improvement of the knowledge can be difficult (Msuya: n.d).

Conclusion

From the discussion, that African indigenous knowledge systems and technologies have served generations and generations. Unfortunately the full potential of Africa has not been fully realised owing to the politics of power, conquest, colonialism, capitalism, slavery and exploitation all of which victimised and compromised the African continent. Africa needs space and uninterrupted time to develop. The BaTonga people, in spite of the skewed political, historical and physical environment have never lost their identity and belief in themselves which has been key to their general success. Africa needs to take a position and act accordingly. While the past may have been unfavourable, there is opportunity to make

the future better but this can only be achieved when Africans regain self-belief. Rehabilitating Africa; indigenous knowledge systems and technologies is largely but not solely the responsibility of Africans. The rehabilitation advanced here does not mean that Africa should go back into the past nor does it mean that Africa should adopt an exclusive approach when it comes to issues of sustainable development. Although every culture has enough energy to carry itself, the need to learn from other cultures and experiences remains a constant obligation. Every culture has some strengths and weaknesses which must be addressed if sustainable development is to be achieved. The politics of imperial conquest and subjugation are a major impediment to the richness of humanity. All the cultures, through their indigenous knowledge systems and technologies, contribute to the fecundity of humanity in their different ways. To this end, all the indigenous knowledge systems and technologies found in various cultures, need to be preserved and protected. The best way to preserve them is to allow independent practice and use of indigenous technologies.

Equipped with the knowledge of the historical past and the tendencies of the West, Africa should now move forward and prove herself. The imbalances of the past cannot be corrected but surely Africa can make the future better for herself. This can only be achieved when Africa appreciates both her strengths and weaknesses and forge a better way forward. African governments need to marry legislation to indigenous knowledge systems so that Africa does not lose her identity and ensure that a dignified future is guaranteed.

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Questions surrounding democracy, governance, and development especially in view of Africa have provoked acrimonious debates in the past few years. It remains a perennial question why some decades after political independence in Africa the continent continues experiencing bad governance, lagging behind socio-economically, and its democracy questionable. We admit that a plethora of theories and reasons, including iniquitous and maledictious ones, have been conjured in an attempt to explain and answer the questions on why Africa seems to be lagging behind other continents in issues pertaining to good governance, democracy and socio-economic development. Yet, none of the theories and reasons proffered so far seems to have provided enduring solutions to Africa's diverse complex problems and predicaments. This book dissects and critically examines the matrix of Africa's multifaceted problems on governance, democracy and development in an attempt to proffer enduring solutions to the continent's long-standing political and socio-economic quandaries and hitches. Contributions are by African scholars and researchers from different disciplinary orientations and countries. Grounded in empirical reality as well as the lived experiences of the contributors, the book is an invaluable asset for social scientists, development practitioners, politicians and civil society activists.

MUNYARADZI MAWERE holds a PhD in Social Anthropology from the University of Cape Town in South Africa. He is currently Professor in the Department of Culture and Heritage Studies at Great Zimbabwe University.

TENDAI R. MWANAKA is a multidisciplinary and collaborative artist and writer who lives in Chitungwiza, Zimbabwe. He has written and published on various aspects of society and politics in Zimbabwe.



Langa Research & Publishing
Common Initiative Group
P.O. Box 902 Mankon
Bamenda
North West Region
Cameroon

ISBN 978-9956-763-00-9



9 789956 763009